

**Identities and Independence in the Provinces  
of Santa Marta and Riohacha (Colombia),  
ca. 1750 - ca. 1850**

**by  
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## Preface

This thesis is the product of a series of personal interests, some which I have had for more than ten years and others more recent, and the support of numerous individuals and institutions. My interest in Colombian history began in the early 1990s when I rather suddenly and unexpectedly found myself living in Bogotá. Since then, I have been especially interested in Latin American race relations and the meaning of independence. The present dissertation reflects these interests quite clearly. It is a study of social and racial identities and how these influenced the way in which independence was achieved, and how, in turn, independence and republican rule modified the social make-up of Latin American societies. This was a topic which I thought best could be studied at a local level, and I found the Colombian Caribbean coast particularly interesting during the independence period. Historical studies of the region have tended to focus on the city of Cartagena and its hinterland, which is not hard to understand given the importance of that port economically and politically throughout the colonial period. The neighbouring province of Santa Marta and the adjacent area of Riohacha have received far less attention from historians, despite the centrality of these areas during the wars when they were major royalist strongholds and although the areas are of particular interest due to their special 'ethnic' make-up during the colonial as well as the more recent periods. I also, rather accidentally, discovered there were significant local archives in Santa Marta that could be used to get a closer view of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century society. The present thesis is thus the result of a rather long project, with aims that have been constantly modified, but which nevertheless testifies to some of the personal interests of the author. It can be seen as two studies in one. The first part is a rather detailed analysis of late colonial society, where relations between different social/ethnic/racial groups are studied particularly through their ways of practising marriage. The second part is perhaps a more conventional and narrative history of the wars of independence, but where the intention has been to use the patterns disclosed in Part I in order to analyse the actions and reactions of groups and individuals during the critical years from 1810 to ca. 1850.

This thesis would never have been completed without the help, support and advice of friends and family on both sides of the Atlantic. I am especially thankful to my supervisor at Warwick University, Anthony McFarlane. I have benefited from his generosity, patience, hospitality, enthusiasm and experience, and the possible strengths of this thesis are to a large extent due to his guidance during all stages of this project. At Warwick I am also indebted to Rebecca Earle, Guy Thomson, Sergio Mejía and Synnøve Ones for their comments, encouragement and friendship.

The year I spent in Spain was made particularly fruitful thanks to the staff of the Archivo General de Indias, Archivo Histórico Nacional and the Archivo de la Marina (Bazán), and to all the latinamericanists who were willing to share their thoughts and expertise.

Over the years I have accumulated numerous and substantial debts in Colombia. Aurelio Ramos has always been an exemplary host, a great friend and an insightful guide. At the Archivo General de la Nación in Bogotá, Enrique Ballesteros, Nazly Gonzalez, Yulieth Vásquez, Leonardo Quintero, Mauricio Tovar, Luz Dora Ariza and Carlos Puentes were not only extraordinary helpful in locating material, they also made my research a pleasant experience with their great sense of humour and keen interest in my research. The staff at the Sala de investigadores and manuscript section of the Biblioteca Luis Angel Arango went out of their way to locate primary and secondary sources. Teachers and fellow students at the Universidad Nacional and Universidad de los Andes helped spur my interest in Colombian history during my first stays in the country; thanks to Medófilo Medina, Bernardo Tovar, Mauricio Archila and Gilma de Tovar.

In Santa Marta, my use of the Archivo Histórico del Magdalena would have been impossible without the guidance of Martha Bohorquez. Not only did she help me find material valuable for my research, she also transcribed a census and some parish records, and she let me use a partial index of the archive she had made for her own work along with her notes developed during several years in the archive. Equally helpful was William Ospino, at the time in charge of the historical archive of the diocese of Santa Marta. Despite the limited resources available, he managed to secure me a desk and unrestricted access to the archive with the help of Bishop Ugo Pancini Banfi. My visits to Santa Marta were memorable experiences thanks also to the hospitality of Sandra and Jean-Philippe Gibelin, Carine and Rémi Lajtman and Carlos Varón.

I am also grateful to Renée Soulodre-La France, Joaquín Vilorio and Nils-Olav Østrem, historians with whom I have discussed the thesis, and who have given me important advice. Finn Fuglestad, my teacher and supervisor at the University of Oslo, fomented my interest in history, encouraged me at times when I desperately needed encouragement and his comments and criticisms have always been of the most helpful kind. This research was made possible by a generous grant from the Norwegian Research Council.

Above all, my parents have sometimes disagreed with my decisions in life, but they have always offered me unconditional support. I am eternally grateful to Mette-Linn, my most ruthless critic and relentless supporter. This thesis is dedicated to Oscar and Nathalia.

## **Abstract**

Between 1810 and 1826 Spain lost most of her possessions in the Americas, and the inhabitants of Spanish America ceased to be subjects of the king, and became citizens of a series of new republics such as Mexico, Peru, Chile and Colombia. This thesis explores how the transition from colonial to republican rule was experienced by the inhabitants of the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha (Colombia), and the extent to which the transition implied a radical break with the colonial past. Santa Marta was among the most important royalist strongholds in the northern part of Spanish South America, and the thesis offers an interpretation of the much-neglected theme of Spanish American royalism during the independence period. It focuses on the social and 'ethnic' configuration of the provinces, and it discusses how different social/ 'ethnic' groups were constructed in the colonial period, how they responded and acted during the wars of independence and what the transition to republican rule implied for the make-up of nineteenth-century society. The analyses of late colonial and early republican society are done principally (but not exclusively) through a detailed discussion of marriage practices and patterns. The study is based primarily on archival sources from Spanish and Colombian depositories.

## Abbreviations

AGI	Archivo General de Indias (Seville)
AGN	Archivo General de la Nación (Bogotá)
AGS	Archivo General de Simancas
AHESM	Archivo Histórico Eclesiástico de Santa Marta
AHGSM	Archivo Histórico de la Gobernación de Santa Marta
AHN	Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid)
AMB	Archivo de la Marina 'Bazan' (Viso del Marqués)
Bartolomé	William Jaramillo Mejía, <i>Real Colegio Mayor y Seminario de San Bartolomé. Colegiales de 1605 a 1820</i> (Santa Fe de Bogotá, Instituto Colombiano de Cultura Hispánica, 1996)
BHA	Boletín de historia y antigüedades
CLAHR	Colonial Latin American Historical Review
HAHR	Hispanic American Historical Review
JLAS	Journal of Latin American Studies
LBC	Libro de bautismos del común, 1789 -1790
LBE	Libro de matrimonios de blancos descendientes de españoles, 1772 - 1795
LG	Libro de matrimonios de Gaira, 1783 - 1850
LMC	Libro de matrimonios de la parroquia de la catedral de Santa Marta, 1828 - 1832
LPMN	Libro de matrimonios de pardos, mestizos, negros de Santa Marta, 1772 - 1788
LSM	Libro de matrimonios de la parroquia de San Miguel, 1810 - 1832
NPSM	Notaría primera de Santa Marta
Rosario	María Clara Guillén de Iriarte, <i>Nobleza e hidalguía en el Nuevo Reino de Granada. Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Señora del Rosario 1651 - 1820</i> 2 vols (Santa Fe de Bogotá, Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Señora del Rosario/ Instituto Colombiano de Cultura Hispanica, 1994)



## Introduction: Identities and independence

On 25 July 1815, the day of Santiago, a peculiar ceremony took place in the city of Santa Marta, on the Caribbean coast of South America. A Spanish general honoured the Indian *cacique* of the small town of Mamatoco for his loyalty to the Spanish Crown. The Napoleonic Wars had just ended in Europe, and King Ferdinand VII of Spain had only months earlier returned to Madrid after several years of captivity in France. During his forced absence, many cities and provinces of his large empire in Europe and the Americas had declared independence. When most rebel provinces refused to pledge loyalty to the returning monarch, Ferdinand ordered that they should be reconquered. General Pablo Morillo, with a force of 5,000 men, was sent to Santa Marta, one of the few royalist strongholds to pacify the unruly provinces and restore the authority of the crown.

Upon his arrival, he was told how the rebels from the neighbouring city of Cartagena had invaded Santa Marta in January 1813, and taken possession of the city as the soldiers and militias fled or gave in without fighting. Santa Marta had been held by the rebels until March 1813, when a force consisting mainly of men from the surrounding Indian towns reconquered the city. Morillo was furthermore told that the Indians had fought under the orders of the eighty-year old Don Antonio Nuñez, *cacique* of the town of Mamatoco. The inhabitants of Santa Marta informed Morillo of how Nuñez had shown '...extraordinary courage and the authority which he has over the those of his own kind and the rest of these countries, which he used to impel ... the shameful flight of the rebels.'<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Letter from Pablo Morillo to the Secretario de Estado y Despacho Universal de Indias on 27 July 1815 in AGI, Santa Fe 1201: 'su extraordinario valor y ascendiente que tiene sobre los de su clase y demas de estos países, que lo respetan y guardan grande consideración, con lo que

After hearing the story, Morillo decided to honour Nuñez for his loyalty and bravery. It was no coincidence that the ceremony took place on the day of Santiago, the patron saint of Spain, who had guided the crusaders when attacking the infidels in the Orient, helped them fighting the moors during the reconquista of the Iberian peninsula and stood by the Spanish *conquistadors* during the conquest of the Americas in the sixteenth century. Morillo ordered all his troops to disembark, and in front of them he personally hung the red ribbon around the cacique's neck. Unfortunately '... as Your Majesty is aware, the medals of gold were lost during the fire which struck the ship San Pedro...'. Nuñez was thus only given a ribbon and a diploma for his services to the crown.<sup>2</sup>

One is left to wonder what the cacique thought of the honour bestowed upon him on the beaches of Santa Marta. Perhaps he thought about the three hundred years that had passed since the first Spaniards disembarked on the same beaches and how his ancestors had refused to become vassals of Charles V and how they had fought against the Spaniards for almost a century. Surely they would have been puzzled to see him standing there, with the ribbon and the diploma he had received for defending the King. Perhaps Nuñez also thought about the irony of the fact that the Spanish king was not able to return even a single gold medal in return for the Indians loyalty, considering the tonnes of gold that had been

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dió impulso y energía a la acción en que fueron vencidos y puestos en fuga vergonzosa los insurgentes.'

<sup>2</sup> Morillo informed his superiors in Spain of the honour offered to Nuñez, and the matter was discussed by the Council of the Indies on 3 February 1816. In light of his services, the Council not only confirmed Morillo's decoration of Nunez, but gave the cacique the grade and salary of Captain and the Order of the Cross of Isabela; his son Don Juan Josef Nuñez was given the gold medal and the right to the *cacicazgo* when his father died. 'Expediente sobre haver condecorado el Capital General Don Pablo Morillo con una medalla de distincion al Cacique de Indios Don Antonio Nuñez' in AGI, Santa Fe 1201.

shipped from Santa Marta and the Caribbean coast of South America to the Kings in Spain over the preceding centuries.

Nuñez's bravery on behalf of the crown was to little avail. Only five years later, the entire province of Santa Marta and the viceroyalty of New Granada to which it belonged became independent. The rebels, led by Simón Bolívar, managed to defeat Morillo's forces. The Republic of Colombia was established, and the first constitution written in Angostura in 1819, while some provinces, like Santa Marta and Riohacha, were still under Spanish rule. The few remaining royalist provinces had all been won for the patriot cause by 1821.

The story of Don Antonio Nuñez, cacique of Mamatoco, raises a series of specific questions concerning the society in which he lived and the nature of the conflicts that ultimately led to the formation of the Colombian republic. Why did the cacique fight the patriots? Was he just an ignorant Indian who had been led astray by Spanish royal officials, as Colombian historians have argued? Or did the Indians have something to gain from monarchical rule? Did the cacique perceive the war as a struggle between royalism and republicanism, or did it have other meanings? Did the Indians' position reflect popular opinion in the province, or were the Indian communities so detached from the majority of the population that their political identities and loyalties were entirely different?

Indian loyalty to the Spanish also raises the more general question of the relationship between social position and political alignment during the independence period and this, in turn, opens up the larger problem of understanding social structure in the 'sociedad de castas' created by Spanish

colonial legislation. Starting from the division between Spaniards and Indians at the time of conquest, which separated Indians into a subordinate group that paid tribute and had lower legal standing than those of Spanish descent, a body of Spanish law had gradually created a hierarchy of social positions related to racial origin. While whites enjoyed full rights as free subjects of the crown, Indians and peoples of mixed race [the *castas*] were regarded as social inferiors, and a wide range of rules was deployed to keep them in their place [such as restrictions on access to education, office, freedom of choice in marriage, even the kind of clothing they might wear]. But how did this body of law translate into social practice? Did people accept their racial identities, or did they try to escape them? If so, what did this mean for the *sociedad de castas* by the late colonial period? Were its categories still strong or had they become more fluid? And what, finally, were the political implications of a system of racial hierarchy during the crisis in colonial rule that began in 1810?

It was long assumed that social distinctions based on race were the primary divisions in colonial society and the best way of approaching the behaviour of its various groups. However, in 1977 John K. Chance and William B. Taylor published a controversial article where they argued that by the late colonial period, class was replacing estate as the ordering principle in Spanish American cities.<sup>3</sup> In their study of late colonial Oaxaca, they argued that the so-called *sistema de castas* created by Spanish legislation was becoming increasingly meaningless. They suggested that extensive miscegenation and the considerable economic growth of the period made the older socio-racial designators less important, and the social status of individuals came to depend more on wealth and occupation.

One of the implications of their article was that important social and economic changes were taking place already in the colonial period and that the colonial social structures were less static than previously assumed.

The article was immediately subjected to quite a harsh critique. Robert McCaa, Stuart B. Schwartz and Arturo Grubessich argued that the article contained serious methodological flaws.<sup>4</sup> The interracial marriage ratios, for instance, were misleading because they had been analysed using simplistic statistical methods. While Chance and Taylor argued that the marriage ratios indicated that there was a high percentage of marriages taking place across the socio-racial categories, McCaa et al found that the opposite was true if more sophisticated statistical methods were employed. Using the same material which Chance and Taylor had presented in their article, their critics concluded that '...their data demonstrate just how little effect commercial capitalism had in the destruction of the racial and estate hierarchies of colonial society. The external pressures of capitalist expansion in Oaxaca and the dependent character of that growth reinforced the racial basis of the social structure...'.<sup>5</sup>

While McCaa and his fellow critics drew the conclusion that what was needed in order to understand better the nature of colonial society was more sophisticated quantitative models, Chance and Taylor made quite different suggestions in their reply to the critique.<sup>6</sup> They agreed that the statistical methods

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<sup>3</sup> John K. Chance and William B. Taylor, 'Estate and Class in a Colonial City: Oaxaca in 1792' in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 19:4 (1977), 454 - 87.

<sup>4</sup> Robert McCaa, Stuart B. Schwartz and Arturo Grubessich, 'Race and Class in Colonial Latin America: A Critique' in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 21 (1979), 421 - 33

<sup>5</sup> McCaa et al, 'Race and Class', p. 422

<sup>6</sup> John K. Chance and William B. Taylor, 'Estate and Class: A Reply' in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 21 (1979), 434 - 442

employed by their critics were more exact than their own, but argued that the primary lesson of the debate was that the statistical findings were of limited value since there was considerable doubt about the exact meaning of the socio-racial categories used in the censuses and parish records on which their original article was based. The censuses and parish records should not be interpreted in isolation from other sources. For instance, if one compared the socio-racial designations given to any one individual in different sources, they frequently differed. Since it was considered normal at the time that marriages should be between persons of the same socio-racial category, men or women who had been classified as Indians or mestizos in the census were re-classified as mestizos or Españoles in the parish records if they married someone of a different socio-racial category. The parish records in themselves would therefore give a distorted and more static picture of late colonial society than the dynamic and changing perspective which Chance and Taylor advocated. They also held that the official sources only presented the *sistema de castas* in the way that the colonial elites perceived it, and thus said next to nothing about how the population at large saw and used the system.

How, then, should we approach the study of social structures in Spanish America? In the 1980s and 1990s, two important and distinct trends have left their mark on the study of colonial Latin American social structures and relations. One has focused on studies of marriage and demography, using advanced quantitative methods to compare social organisation in different parts of Latin America. About the same time as the debate between McCaa and Chance, the results produced by Peter Laslett and his colleagues in Cambridge on household and

family structures started to inspire many historians of Latin America.<sup>7</sup> The advantages seemed at first to be great. Data for the models could be assembled using the readily available census material from the late colonial period, and the results could be compared not only within Latin America, but also with European, North American and Asian societies in the early modern period. Since the late 1970s a series of studies on Latin American households and family structure have been published.<sup>8</sup> But the usefulness of Laslett's categorisation of households have been criticised.<sup>9</sup> Although the quantitative studies done in various parts of Latin America, often with the same type of sources and the same models, have produced results which are easily comparable, the value of the results themselves are questionable. Indeed, even Robert McCaa, who has for long advocated the use of quantitative models for the study of colonial Latin American societies, recently suggested that Laslett's scheme had outplayed its role in the study of colonial Latin America.<sup>10</sup>

The other major trend in studies of social structure has taken a more rounded approach to understanding the social stratification in colonial Latin

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<sup>7</sup> Peter Laslett (ed.), *Household and family in past times* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1972)

<sup>8</sup> Some of the most often cited studies include Silvia Arrom, 'Marriage Patterns in Mexico City, 1811' in *Journal of Family History* 3 (Winter 1978); Elizabeth Anne Kuznesof, 'Household Composition and Headship as Related to Changes in Mode of Production: São Paulo 1765 to 1836' in *Journal of Comparative Study of Society and History* 22 (Jan. 1980); Rolando Mellafe, 'Tamaño de la familia en la historia de Latinoamérica' in *Historia Social de Chile y América* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1986); Jorge Pinto Rodríguez, 'El tamaño de la familia chilena en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII' in *Dos estudios de la población chilena en el siglo XVIII* (Santiago, La Serena, 1981); Pablo Rodríguez, 'Composición y estructura familiar' in Rodríguez, *Sentimientos y vida familiar en el Nuevo Reino de Granada* (Santa Fe de Bogotá, Ariel, 1997); Guiomar Dueñas, *Los hijos del pecado. Ilegitimidad y vida familiar en la Santafé de Bogotá colonial* (Santa Fe de Bogotá, Editorial Universidad Nacional, 1996) and Juan Almecija, *La familia en la provincia de Venezuela* (Madrid, MAPFRE, 1992).

<sup>9</sup> Rodney Anderson, 'La familia en Guadalajara durante la independencia y la teoría social de Peter Laslett' in *Encuentro del Colegio de Jalisco*, 8 (Jul. - Sept. 1985), 75 - 92

<sup>10</sup> Robert McCaa, 'Familia y género en México. Crítica metodológica y desafío investigativo para el fin del milenio' in Victor Manuel Uribe and Luis Javier Ortiz Mesa (eds.), *Naciones, gentes y territorios* (Medellín: Universidad de Antioquia, 2000)

American societies. Based principally on the textual and contextual interpretation of sources such as criminal records, wills and civil suit concerning marriage and betrothals, these studies have often produced new insights into the meaning and functions of the socio-racial labels at the time. They have tended to show the complex nature of colonial societies, the flexibility and the fluidity of the racial and social categories.<sup>11</sup> They have also highlighted the importance of considering such factors as honour and public morality in understanding how individuals acquired or lost social standing in their communities.

One of the most recent studies on the social stratification of colonial Latin America is Douglas Cope's illuminating discussion of race in colonial Mexico City in the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century. Even at that time, Cope argues, race was by no means the only designator of social status. Although he accepts that most of the commoners were *castas*, their position relative to the urban elites was determined more by their economic and social situation than by their race. In so far as there existed a cultural divide between the elites and commoners, this can be seen as the difference between an elite and a plebeian culture. The plebeians described by Cope were in some instances genealogically descendants of slaves and Indians, but their relationship within the colonial system was first and foremost a function of their socio-economic role. To these plebeians the minute differences between mestizos, mulatos, castizos etc were of little or no importance in their everyday lives. *Castas* could become wealthy under

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<sup>11</sup> See Verena Martínez-Alier, *Marriage, Class and Colour in Nineteenth Century Cuba. A Study of Racial Attitudes and Sexual Values in a Slave Society* 2. ed (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1989); Ramón A Gutiérrez, *When Jesus Came, the Corn Mothers Went Away. Marriage Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500 - 1846* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1991), R. Douglas Cope, *The Limits of Racial Domination. Plebeian Society in Colonial Mexico City, 1660 - 1720* (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1994) and David Cahill, 'Colour by Numbers: Racial and Ethnic Categories in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1532 - 1824' in *JLAS* 26 (1994), pp. 325 - 346



fortunate circumstances and aspire to elite status, while poor whites could easily become plebeians and hardly distinguishable from the mixed-race commoners. On the basis of this, Cope recommends that historians pay less attention to the wide range of socio-racial labels developed in colonial Mexico, and concentrate more on the processes and structures which influenced the lives of ordinary people and how these themselves perceived their place in society.<sup>12</sup>

One of the problems facing the historian of Latin America is, then, that analytic categories such as class, estate, race and ethnicity do not seem to apply clearly or uniformly to colonial and early republican societies. For instance, as Cope argued, the difference between the largely mixed-race urban plebeian population of Mexico City and the mostly white Spanish elites cannot be reduced simply to one of race. Neither does he think that the difference between plebeians and elites in colonial Mexico City is *ethnic*, although there clearly existed a cultural gap between the two groups, a gap which Cope compares to the difference between elite and popular cultures in early modern Europe. In other words, for the case of Mexico City, the urban poor can be seen primarily as a 'class' or an 'estate'. While this may be true for Mexico City, it is not necessarily the case for other smaller and more provincial cities and towns in Spanish America. And, as Cope himself points out, with respect to village-dwelling Indians in other parts of Spanish America, where native societies had preserved elements of their pre-conquest languages, religions, social system, beliefs, dress and could thus easily be separated from their urban hispanised neighbours, ethnic differences may have played a much more significant role in their relations with colonial elites.

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<sup>12</sup> A similar view was expressed by David Cahill in an article on the racial terminology employed in colonial Peru. David Cahill, 'Colour by Numbers: Racial and Ethnic Categories in the Viceroyalty of Peru' in *JLAS*, 26 (1994), pp. 325 - 346

But what about those areas of Spanish America where the native communities possessed few remnants of their pre-colonial past, except perhaps oral history, myths and legends, but no separate language, no particular dress which separated them from the urban commoners, and when they were Catholics just as (if not more) devout than their Hispanic neighbours? Is the difference still ethnic, or is it one of class or perhaps race? The lesson to be learned, is perhaps one should be careful *a priori* with such strict analytical categories, and attempt to go beyond these to explore the experiences and relationships of individuals and how they themselves perceived their identities and place in society.

Exploration of the meaning of the *sociedad de castas* is the prelude, in this dissertation, to two other large questions. The first of these concerns the influence which position and identity within colonial society exerted over political behaviour during the Spanish imperial crisis and creation of new independent states. While the patriotic historians of late nineteenth and early twentieth century generally assumed that there existed a 'nation' before independence which somehow longed for liberation and that the achievement of Bolívar and his colleagues lay primarily in shaking off the tyrannical chains which bound the various Latin American nations, more recent studies have questioned this romantic notion and explored the fissures and fragmented development of national identities in Latin America. Although recent scholarship has revealed that a 'creole patriotism' began to develop in Spanish America soon after the conquest, this form of pre-independence patriotic identity had important limitations which makes it questionable to treat it as a type of nationalism or national identity in the

modern sense.<sup>13</sup> The principal limitation lay in its aristocratic character. According to McFarlane, '[c]reole belief in, and identification with, regional *patrias* did not ...promote the concept, vital to nationalism, of one "people" within the territorial *patria*.'<sup>14</sup> Creole patriotism was an exclusive concept, which not only worked to separate American Spaniards from peninsulars, but also to mark the difference between the creole elites and the commoners of different racial and ethnic backgrounds. What, then, were the sentiments, social connections and interests that shaped political allegiance during the Spanish imperial crisis?

A third major issue concerns the consequences of the conflict and upheaval entailed in the struggle between Spain and the proponents of independence in America. This is an issue which has occupied historians since the first independent Latin American republics were created almost two hundred years ago, and it is the issue which will be discussed in some detail in the present dissertation. The first studies of the Latin American independence were written during the wars which led to the creation of the first Latin American republics and published in the eighteen twenties. At that time the process encompassing the political upheavals and crises and the battles between royalists and republicans, was frequently labelled 'la revolución'. Few, if any, contemporary writers expressed any doubts about the radical and fundamental character of the developments which were or had just been taking place. Simón Bolívar, for instance, in his famous letter written in exile in Jamaica in 1815, which is after all

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<sup>13</sup> See David A. Brading, *The First America. The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots and the Liberal State 1492 - 1867* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991); Anthony Pagden, 'Identity Formation in Spanish America' in Pagden and Nicholas Canny (eds.), *Colonial Identities in the Atlantic World, 1500 - 1800* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987) and Anthony McFarlane, 'Identity, Enlightenment and Political Dissent in Late Colonial Spanish America' in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6<sup>th</sup> series, vol. 8 (1998).

<sup>14</sup> McFarlane, 'Identity, Enlightenment and Political Dissent', p. 313

characterised by a rather sober and cautious tone, asserted that 'I want more than anything else that the greatest nation in the world be formed in America, measured not so much by its extension or wealth, but for its liberty and glory.'<sup>15</sup> Bolívar's tutor and friend, the linguist and intellectual, Andrés Bello, who initially had strong doubts about the wisdom of creating republics in former Spanish America and whose moderation was renowned, did not hesitate in labelling the process which led to independence a revolution or even a series of revolutions.<sup>16</sup> José Manuel Restrepo, minister of the interior in Colombia in the eighteen twenties, wrote a ten-volume 'historia de la revolución', on the developments which led to the creation of the republic.<sup>17</sup> Similar titles appeared at the same time in various parts of former Spanish America.<sup>18</sup>

In those pre-marxist times, the meaning of the term 'revolution' may have been less radical than at present, but this should not obscure the fact that to contemporaries independence represented a fundamental event in the history of the Americas. It also illustrates that to contemporaries the Latin American independence movements were intimately linked to the revolutions of the Atlantic world in the late eighteenth century. Later nineteenth-century writers did not question this. In Colombia, José María Samper wrote in mid-century that along with the Spanish conquest of the continent in the sixteenth century, the revolution was 'the most transcendental event humanity had witnessed since the

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<sup>15</sup> Simón Bolívar, 'Carta de Jamaica' 6 Sept. 1815, published in Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, *Antología del pensamiento político colombiano* (Bogotá, Banco de la República. 1970) vol. 1, p. 43

<sup>16</sup> See for instance Bello's letter to Servando Teresa de Mier, London 15 Nov. 1821, published in Iván Jaksic (ed.), *Selected Writings of Andrés Bello* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 189 - 191.

<sup>17</sup> José Manuel Restrepo, *Historia de la revolución en Colombia* 10 vols (Paris, 1827)

<sup>18</sup> For instance M. Torrente, *Historia de la revolución hispanoamericana* 3 vols. (Madrid, 1829) and C. Bustamante *Cuadro histórico de la revolución mexicana* 5 vols (Mexico, ?)

invention of the printing press'.<sup>19</sup> While some of the more conservative writers of the second half of the nineteenth century abhorred the consequences of Independence, such as the separation of Church and State, the expulsion of the regular orders and the confiscation of Church properties, they did not cease to consider independence a fundamental event in the history of Latin America.<sup>20</sup> Later in the nineteenth century and perhaps above all during the first decades of the twentieth century, Colombians increasingly saw independence as the period when military heroes and enlightened intellectuals had liberated the nation from the brutal and despotic yoke of Spanish rule. The nationalist, heroic, patriotic and enlightened aspects of the independence struggle were emphasised, and the conflicts between patriots received less attention.<sup>21</sup>

But with the advent of the new materialist trends within the discipline of history in the mid-twentieth century, the impact of independence in Latin America became increasingly questioned. The materialist historians were inspired by the Marxist emphasis on economic and social structures, the dependency models which lead historians to focus on the unequal patterns of commerce and

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<sup>19</sup> José María Samper, *Ensayo sobre las revoluciones políticas y la condición social de las Repúblicas colombianas* (Bogotá, Imprenta de E. Thunot, 1861) quoted in Bernardo Tovar Zambrano, *La colonia en la historiografía colombiana* 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Bogotá, ECOE, 1990), p. 62

<sup>20</sup> For the case of Colombia, the most influential of the conservative writers included José Manuel Groot, Juan Manuel Restrepo and José Eusebio Caro, father of linguist and politician José Antonio Caro. Caro's articles and Quijano Otero's critiques were re-edited and published in *Boletín de historia y antigüedades* 267. For a summary of this debate see Jorge Orlando Melo, 'La literatura histórica en la República' in *Manual de literatura colombiana* (Bogotá, Planeta, 1988), pp. 624 - 628. Malcolm Deas, 'Miguel Antonio Caro y amigos: Gramática y poder en Colombia' in Deas (ed.), *Del poder y la gramática y otros ensayos sobre historia, política y literatura colombiana* (Bogotá, Tercer Mundo Editores, 1993) gives more biographic information about the Caros and their role in nineteenth century Colombian politics.

<sup>21</sup> Some of the most influential patriotic texts which for many generations came to dominate Colombian history as it was taught in primary and secondary schools, and thus served to construct a heroic national history, included José María Quijano Otero's *Compendio de historia patria* from 1874 which in part came as a reaction against the writings of José Eusebio Caro, and above all, Jesús María Henao and Gerardo Arrubla's *Historia de Colombia para la enseñanza secundaria* (Bogotá, 1911). These are reviewed in Jorge Orlando Melo, 'La

power relations between European metropolis and Latin American peripheries and the French Annales' school insistence on the 'longue durée'. All these theoretical and methodological tendencies contributed to make the 'materialist' historians perceive the independence period as a parenthesis. In their view, independence did not alter the social and economic structures of Latin America and it did not make Latin America less dependent on first-world economies. The materialist historians thus differed from the traditional or nationalist historians both in their assessment of the nature of independence and of the characteristics of the republican regimes. While the former had seen the independent republics as free and democratic societies essentially different from the monarchical and despotic Spanish empire, the materialist historians were prone to see the new republics as feeble and weak political structures dominated by traditional elites and easily falling into the neo-colonial traps of the British, French and North American capitalists. One of the first influential studies which marked a shift away from the nationalism of the 'historias patrias' was an article by Charles C. Griffin published in 1949.<sup>22</sup> He argued that '...the revolutions which brought about the establishment of independent governments in America differed in marked degree from the classic revolutions of modern Europe - the French and the Russian - in that their primary effect was to throw off the authority of a transatlantic empire rather than to bring about a drastic reconstruction of society'.<sup>23</sup>

The emphasis on the continuities between the colonial and national periods in Latin American history led to an impressive production of studies on

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literatura histórica', pp. 626 - 643 and in Tovar Zambrano, *La colonia en la historiografía*, pp. 111 - 114

<sup>22</sup> Charles C. Griffin, 'Economic and Social Aspects of the Era of Spanish-American Independence' in *HAHR*, vol 29 (1949), pp. 170 - 187

<sup>23</sup> Griffin, 'Economic and Social Aspects', p. 170

the colonial period. For a long time after the Second World War the common wisdom was that the class structures and power relations which characterised contemporary Latin American societies were formed during the colonial period. The colonial period thus became the object of considerable study, focused especially on social and economic phenomena, such as class and race, the nature of agricultural production and the restraints on domestic industries, the imbalance in trade, the supposedly ostentatious consumption and non-capitalist attitudes of the elites, in short all those themes which could contribute to the understanding of the continued underdevelopment of Latin America.<sup>24</sup> Given the tendency to emphasise the continuance between the colonial and neo-colonial periods, independence came to be regarded of secondary importance. 'When the wars of independence ended', George Pendle asserted, 'no real *social* revolution had occurred. The structure of colonial society, inherited from Spain, remained essentially unaltered...To the mass of population the change of masters was of no great consequence'<sup>25</sup> Stuart B. Schwartz and James Lockhart summed up the view of a generation of scholars in one of the most frequently used textbooks on colonial Latin American history, when they concluded that '...the degree of continuity in the social, economic, and cultural realms between pre- and post-independence ... is obvious and overwhelming.'<sup>26</sup>

Recently, however, there has been some rethinking of the significance of independence. One of the most influential current historians of the Spanish

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<sup>24</sup> Some of the most influential studies in this vein include Raúl Prebisch, *The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems* (1950); Caio Prado Junior, *The Colonial Background of Modern Brazil* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967, Portuguese original first published in 1945); Stanley J. and Barbara H. Stein, *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1970), Celso Furtado, *The Economic Development of Latin America* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970)

<sup>25</sup> George Pendle, *A History of Latin America* 4<sup>th</sup> ed (London, Penguin Books, 1976), p.86

American independence period, François-Xavier Guerra, has opened up some new perspectives on the processes which culminated in the creation of the Latin American republics. In his view, independence represents the entry of 'modernity' in the region. It was during the political crises which followed the French invasion of the Iberian peninsula in 1807 that modern concepts of political representation and modern forms of sociability took hold in Latin American societies. Guerra emphasises that role of the printing press, the emergence of newspapers and popular elections, which were all central elements in the political revolution of Latin American independence. According to Guerra, independence meant '...the end of the old society and the entry into a new era, ... the founding of a new man, a new society and new politics...'<sup>27</sup> This approach to Latin American independence contrasts in several respects with the materialist perspectives which have been prevalent for so long. It shifts the focus away from the economy, and places it in the realm of politics. And perhaps most importantly, it re-establishes independence as a central turning-point in Latin American history. In this post-structuralist perspective, the interpretation of history becomes to a considerable extent the analysis of words. Guerra's is a study of how the meaning of terms such as 'liberty', 'nation', 'Indian', and 'people' changed during the independence period. Society itself, Guerra claims, went through a fundamental change because a new 'modern' way of perceiving it replaced older, monarchical and traditional modes of conceptualising society. While materialist historians tended to view the ideological and political debates which took place in Latin America during the independence

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<sup>26</sup> James Lockhart and Stuart B. Schwartz: *Early Latin America. A history of colonial Spanish America and Brazil* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 424

<sup>27</sup> François-Xavier Guerra: *Modernidad e independencias. Ensayos sobre las revoluciones hispánicas* 2ed (Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica/Mapfre Editores, 1993), p. 13



period as mere rhetoric which clouded or hid the basic economic and social realities, Guerra argues that these debates were fundamental.<sup>28</sup>

Although Guerra and others have focused on the fundamental changes brought by independence, their views are not necessarily entirely incompatible with the materialist view that the social and economic structures of the colonial period survived independence and marked independent Latin American societies for a long time. It is possible to reconcile some of the new ideas on independence with the more traditional view of the continuities between the colonial and republican era. A radical break in the way society was conceptualised may not necessarily have led to fundamental changes in the way people looked upon themselves and their every-day experiences. Indians, for instance, may have been conceptualised very differently in the new republics - as nationals or even citizens with equal rights before the law - but independence may not have altered their economic situation, their social conditions and their culture. In one of the most recent textbooks on colonial Latin America, historians Burkholder and Johnson conclude that 'Independence was an important watershed in the history of Latin America', and they list some of the changes which they believe came as a result of independence. But at the same time, they hold that '[u]nderlying these changes were the vestigial social and economic structures inherited from the colonial era'.<sup>29</sup> An important question thus remains: did the radically new way of conceptualising society have any impact on the lives of ordinary men and women throughout

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<sup>28</sup> One of the critiques which have been raised against Guerra's work, is that it has separated the study of political culture and political debate from material interests and struggle for power. See for instance Charles F. Walker, *Smoldering Ashes, Cuzco and the Creation of Republican Peru, 1780 - 1840* (Durham, Duke University Press, 1999), p. 5 and footnote.

<sup>29</sup> Mark A. Burkholder and Lyman I. Johnson, *Colonial Latin America* 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 347

Latin America, or was the new society mostly something which existed in the minds of articulate elites?

Investigating this question raises serious theoretical and methodological problems. The question itself presupposes that the social experiences of elites and commoners can be separated from the language in which they were expressed. In practice this is difficult. Most, if not all, sources available on both the colonial and early republican periods reflect dominant views on how society *should* be ordered. Even censuses offer difficulties of interpretation: While late colonial censuses differentiated between Spaniards, Indians, 'free people of colour' and slaves, the early republican censuses only distinguished between free and slave. The rather simplistic conclusion that the new terminology reflected fundamental societal changes cannot be accepted *a priori*. On the other hand, the change in terminology for describing and classifying Latin American populations cannot wholly be ignored. Surely, some meaning must be ascribed to the sudden end of socio-racial designators in official sources after independence. This also illustrates another problem when assessing how independence and republicanism affected Latin American societies. While the issue itself requires some sort of comparison between late colonial and early republican societies, the sources available from both periods are often so different that meaningful comparison is impossible. For instance, and as we have seen, one method which has been used to study the social stratification of colonial societies is the study of marriages and the frequency of cross-racial or cross-ethnic matches. These types of studies are usually impossible to conduct for the republican period, simply because ethnic or socio-racial categories ceased to be used in the parish records. One way around these problems is to limit the study geographically to such an extent that the

history of individuals, families and communities become apparent and then assess the totality of these micro-histories.

This approach is very much in line with what Magnus Mörner proposed in a series of articles in the beginning of the 1980s.<sup>30</sup> In these articles the author expressed considerable scepticism towards studies on the social history of Latin America which took the entire sub-continent as an object of analysis. It was necessary to produce more studies on the local and regional levels before a synthesis on Latin America as a whole could be reached. He argued that the many local and regional studies particularly on the late colonial period, tended to modify and question the generalisations based on macrotheories, be they Marxist, modernisation or dependency models. One area where the limitations of the macro-theories had proved to be especially acute was in the understanding of the social stratification of colonial Latin American societies. Mörner argued that historians quickly had realised that the concept of class was especially problematic when applied to colonial Latin American societies. The differences between Indian communities, American-born elites, Spanish officials, slaves and free commoners, could simply not be accounted for by their relationship to the means of production. This had, according to Mörner, engendered a rather futile debate on the question of whether colonial Latin America made part of the capitalist mode of production, albeit with certain feudal elements, or if it was essentially feudal with a few capitalist enclaves. Mörner called for studies less constrained by

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<sup>30</sup> Magnus Mörner, 'Economic Factors and Stratification in Colonial Spanish America with Special Regard to Elites', *HAHR*, 63:2 (1983), 335 - 369; 'Comparative Approaches to Latin American History' in *Latin American Research Review*, 17:3 (1982), 55 - 89; 'Patrones de estratificación en los países bolivarianos durante la época del Libertador: posibilidades de un enfoque comparativo' in *Cahiers des Amériques Latines*, 29/30 (1984), 1 - 12. These articles and others by the same author were published in Spanish in Mörner, *Ensayos sobre historia latinoamericana. Enfoques, conceptos y métodos* (Quito, Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar/Corporación Editora Nacional, 1992)

the abstract questions posed by macro-theories, and more focused on understanding and explaining the social structure of Latin American societies in their own rights. This did not imply that theories coming out of the social sciences should be abandoned. On the contrary, Mörner proposed that historians of Latin America should employ the models, methodologies and theories produced in sociology and anthropology, and particularly those which operated on local and regional levels. Using these models and multiple indicators to determine individual's position in the social hierarchy of Latin American societies, historians should be better equipped to reach a new understanding of the complex and shifting nature of the social stratification of Latin American societies. Mörner specifically requested more studies which covered *both* the late colonial and the early republican periods. In his view, far too many studies of social history ended in 1810, or started in the 1820's or 1830's which made it hard to gain further insight into the nature of the changes brought on by independence.

This dissertation responds to Mörner's call for local and regional studies which cover both the late colonial and early republican periods. But why choose Santa Marta and Riohacha to study the transition from colonial to national rule? These provinces were, after all, never among the most important parts of the Spanish empire in the Americas. They did not contain a large number of royal officials, and the ports were not nearly as important as Cartagena, Veracruz or Havana. Santa Marta and Riohacha were economic and political backwaters for most of the colonial period. Considered to be unruly areas, troubled by various hostile Indian groups, frequently attacked by pirates and known to be nests for local and foreign smugglers, Santa Marta and Riohacha were frontier zones with societies and economies that differed from those of more central areas. However,

it is precisely because they were situated in the periphery of the Spanish empire that Santa Marta and Riohacha are interesting for the student of the independence period. For obvious reasons, most studies on the causes and processes of independence have focused either on Spanish America as a whole, on the areas that would become the nineteenth century nations or on the larger cities which came to be capitals in the new republics. One of the consequences of this tendency is that our knowledge of resistance to independence is limited. We know a great deal about the intellectuals and elite groups in the larger cities of Spanish America who fought against the Spaniards, and considerably less about people in the provinces who often were less enthusiastic about the prospects of independence from Spain and the establishment of republics. Santa Marta and Riohacha are - for the case of Colombia - prime examples of this provincial reluctance and scepticism towards independence. Despite being frontiers or peripheral areas both within the Spanish empire and within the Colombian republic, they were strategically and militarily important during the Wars of Independence. Unlike other frontiers in New Granada, such as the tropical plains east of the Andes, or the Amazon, or the Chocó, which were only marginally affected by the war itself and whose peripheral geographical situation made them largely devoid of any military significance, Santa Marta and Riohacha were battle-grounds. Santa Marta and Riohacha thus offer an opportunity to explore reactions to the Spanish constitutional crisis in a peripheral area, which at the same time was clearly affected by the crisis and deeply involved in its resolution.

The provinces are also interesting for the study of the actions and reactions of the various ethnic and racial groups and classes to the political crisis of the Spanish empire and the establishment of the republic, because a wide range of

ethnic groups found in Spanish America were represented within the boundaries of the provinces. There were various unconquered Indians, Indians in missions, Indian towns that had existed for a long time within the colonial Hispanic framework, a substantial number of slaves, a few wealthy elite Spanish families, a colony of foreigners and a majority of 'free people of colour'. Santa Marta and Riohacha thus provides the student with a range of different ethnic or racial groups, which makes the region suitable for studying how different social groups responded to, and participated in the transition from colony to nation.

To address these issues of social structure under the *sistemas de castas* and the social experience of political change from colonial to republican rule, this dissertation is organised into two parts. Part I examines the development of colonial society in the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha, with an emphasis on the late colonial period. Chapter 1 explores the spatial dimension of social life in the provinces. It maps the territorial patterns created through conquest, the subsequent division between Spanish urban development and unconquered Indian wilderness, and it examines the Spanish attempt at subduing and organising the Indian communities into tribute-paying towns and missions. It focuses especially on the geographical distribution of the population in the late colonial period, the presence of different *ethnic* communities and the relationships between them. The first chapter, then, is neither a demographic study of the province, nor an introduction to the geography of the region. The aim is rather to approach how the inhabitants of the provinces perceived their place in the world in the late colonial period. In the words of Peter Wade, the *ethnic* question *par excellence* is: "Where are you from?"<sup>31</sup> This is the question which informs the first chapter.

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<sup>31</sup> Peter Wade, *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America* (London, Pluto Press, 1997), p. 18

Chapters 2 to 5 expand on questions regarding social stratification, the extent of social interaction and cohesion between and within the different social groups and communities in the provinces. The first of these is a study of the late colonial elites and their relations with royal officials. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the commoners and the slaves, their position within the social hierarchy of the provinces and their relations with other 'groups'. The last chapter in Part I discusses the Indian communities. Like the preceding chapters, it uses primarily sources on kinship and marriage to explore issues related to ethnicity, race and class, how the different groups were formed and how they related to one another. The five chapters in Part I serve two purposes: together they provide a detailed analysis of the social-make up of late colonial society in Santa Marta and Riohacha provinces, and they serve as a basis for understanding the changes brought on by independence and the formation of the Colombian republic which is the theme of the second part of the dissertation.

The five chapters in Part II examine political events between 1810 and 1823 during the wars of independence and discuss social changes brought on by the wars, independence and republican rule. In these years, the inhabitants of the provinces were forced to express their political loyalties through words and deeds. Chapter 6 is a detailed and chronological analysis of the first years of the political crisis, while Chapter 7 analyses the war between royalist Santa Marta and republican Cartagena, and the regional fragmentation caused by the political crisis. Chapter 8 treats the years 1813 - 1818 when Santa Marta was a royalist stronghold from which the Spanish reconquered most of New Granada, and when the inhabitants pleaded for distinctions or forgiveness, depending on the position they

had adopted during the war. The ninth chapter cover the last years of the wars, from 1819 to 1823, which saw the final victory of the republicans, the formation of royalist guerrillas in Santa Marta and Riohacha and incorporation of the two provinces into the Republic of Colombia. The configuration of republican society is discussed in more detail in Chapter 10 which explores kinship and family structures after independence. Like chapters 2 to 5, it uses marriage as a means to map family and kinship relations in various communities and groups. The marriage patterns suggest that fundamental changes had taken place following independence and the creation of the republic. Although socio-racial and ethnic boundaries still existed after independence, they were essentially different from the ones that had been prevalent during the late colonial period. Marital matches which did not occur in the colonial period became increasingly common in the republican period. This indicates not only that the meaning of socio-racial terms changed, but that social practices and the way society was conceptualised underwent a profound transformation in the independence period.

These fundamental changes are perhaps most readily seen when considering Mamatoco and the other villages which had been Indian tributary towns in the colonial period. When Antonio Nuñez, the cacique of Mamatoco, defended the Spanish crown against the republican patriots, he fought for the preservation of a monarchical and colonial order which had secured certain privileges and rights for the descendants of the native inhabitants of the provinces. Nuñez may not have guessed the radical changes which independence implied for him, his community and the other Indian tributary towns within the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha. But as the following chapters will show, the wars of independence did away with many of the vestiges of the colonial order.



## Part I. Colonial patterns

## **Chapter 1. Spatial and social order**

The patterns of settlement and social organisation found in the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha reflect a long historical process of change, first set in motion by the arrival of Spanish settlers and their interaction with native peoples in the early sixteenth century. The subsequent development of the provinces' societies bore many of the hallmarks of developments found elsewhere in Spanish America, as a result of official Spanish strategies for administration and social control, the various and different tactics and responses adopted by the Indian communities in face of conquest and colonial domination; and the gradual emergence of a new type of societies which were essentially different from both the one envisioned by Spanish colonists and those defended by the Indians. However, the precise nature of these processes were not uniform throughout the continent but were, of course, influenced by specific regional settings. It is therefore important to begin this discussion of colonial society in Santa Marta and Riohacha by examining the particular pattern of interaction between Spanish conquerors and native societies which began with conquest and developed with the spread of Hispanic settlement, and focusing on the connection between space and race. Subsequent chapters in Part I will then turn to a closer examination of the social character and identity of provinces' main groupings.

### **Native societies and conquest**

Although relatively unimportant in the late colonial period, the Santa Marta region had once occupied a key position in the Spanish exploration and conquest of northern South America. Indeed, the areas which later was to become the

provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha were among the first to be explored by Spanish discoverers and conquistadors on mainland America. In 1499 and 1500, two expeditions led by Alonso de Ojeda and Rodrigo de Bastidas, respectively, explored the coast of northern South America from the Bay of Paria in present-day Venezuela to Urabá.<sup>32</sup> They discovered the Magdalena river, traded with the Indians and returned to Hispaniola with a considerable booty.<sup>33</sup> These two were the first of many expeditions set up in Hispaniola or in Spain between 1500 and 1525 to explore and trade along the northern coast of South America (map 1). The Spanish did not succeed in founding any permanent settlements in South America during these years, but they explored the coasts, bartered with the Indians, stole their gold and enslaved thousands, and thus found the means to finance further expeditions, and to establish their first enduring mainland colonies.

The area around Santa Marta became an important base for the Spanish adventurers because it provided both gold and Indian slaves in considerable quantities.<sup>34</sup> The bay of Santa Marta came to be known as a good natural harbour, and it was easily recognisable – even in this era of geographical confusion – due to the snow-capped peaks of the Sierra Nevada which could be seen from sea at quite a distance. But perhaps most importantly, the bay was near the Río Grande de Magdalena, the great river which, after Andagoya's 1522 expedition along the Pacific coast, was thought to lead directly to the still mystical empire of 'Biru'.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Jorge Orlando Melo, *Historia de Colombia. La dominación española* (Bogotá, Presidencia de la República, 1996), pp. 87 - 88

<sup>33</sup> Melo, *Historia de Colombia*, pp. 88 - 89

<sup>34</sup> A good survey of the early phases of Spanish exploration and raids on the Colombian Caribbean coast is provided by Hermes Tovar, *La estación del miedo o la desolación dispersa. El caribe colombiano en el siglo XVI* (Bogotá, Editorial Ariel, 1997)

<sup>35</sup> For the conquest of Santa Marta see, Ernesto Restrepo Tirado, *Historia de la provincia de Santa Marta* 2. ed. (Bogotá, Biblioteca de Autores Colombianos, 1953) 1<sup>st</sup> vol.; Henning

Santa Marta, founded in 1526, was at first a fragile settlement, and might have suffered the same fate as the earlier settlements of Santa María del Darién, San Sebastián de Urabá or Nuestra Señora de las Nieves, all of which had been abandoned within a few years. For afflicted by both internal divisions and resistance from native peoples. The frequent disputes among the conquerors over strategies, quarrels over the distribution of gold and competition for crown appointments occurred in a context of constant warfare with the natives, and the meagre results of the various *entradas* into the Sierra Nevada destabilised the settlement at Santa Marta.

While some of the coastal villages near the bay of Santa Marta were quickly subdued and turned into tributary towns to supply the Spanish settlement with food and labour, the villages of the Sierra blocked advance into the interior. And when some of the lowland villages refused to give the Spanish the corn or the gold they demanded, the colony was in serious danger of dissolution.<sup>36</sup> For, although the first Spanish inhabitants of Santa Marta probably had more gold in their hands than they had ever dreamt of, they did not become wealthy. Food had to be bought from Santo Domingo at prices six times higher than on the island, which itself was considered extremely expensive by contemporary Spanish standards.<sup>37</sup> Most of the settlers were heavily indebted to merchants in Santo Domingo or in Spain, and they were therefore trapped in a constant search for

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Bischof, 'Indígenas y españoles en la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta – Siglo XVI' in *Revista Colombiana de Antropología* 24 (1982), pp. 77 – 124; Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff, 'Contactos y cambios culturales en la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta' in *Revista de Antropología* (1953) vol 1, pp. 17 – 122; and by the same author *Datos historico-culturales sobre la antigua gobernación de Santa Marta* (Bogotá, Instituto Etnológico de la Magdalena, 1951); Nicolás del Castillo Mathieu, 'Población aborigen y conquista 1498 – 1540' in Adolfo Meisel Roca (ed.), *Historia económica y social del Caribe colombiano* (Bogotá, ECOE ediciones, 1994) and Constance Jones Mathers, 'Santa Marta Gold: Spaniards in Colombia, 1526 – 1536' in *CLAHHR* 4:3 (Summer 1995), pp. 287 – 310

<sup>36</sup> Melo, *Historia de Colombia*, pp. 107 - 129

gold to pay debts and necessary provisions. The large number of expeditions organised from Santa Marta into the neighbouring areas were thus largely motivated by their urgent need for gold to sustain the settlement, and also the hope of finding a way to Peru or to another rich kingdom or empire. As the *entradas* went increasingly deeper into the land without finding either Peru, or any other empires, the settlers despaired. The arrival of more Spanish settlers from Santo Domingo did not improve the situation. During the *entradas* Santa Marta was virtually deserted and during this period it was no more than an expeditionary base-camp and depot. Santa Marta was, nevertheless, to survive, and though overshadowed by richer settlements in other areas of Colombia, the city became a centre from which Spanish settlement and political authority spread over a wider region. This emerging Spanish colony was initially shaped by the subjugation and exploitation of native communities which, as they were exposed to the Spanish presence entered into a process of change. The speed and extent of that change were not uniform, however. Much depended on the character of the native societies and their geographical location. What, then, were the salient features of Pre-Columbian society in the Santa Marta region at the time of conquest and how were Indian communities organised and distributed?

When the Spaniards arrived, they encountered a large number of different native communities, to whom they gave a bewildering range of names, some native, some Spanish – malibus, chimilas, orejones, mocanás, coronados, caribes flecheros, bubures, cendaguas, coanaos, itotos, aruacos, pacabueyes, chiriguanás, pemeos, tupes, acanayutos, pampanillas (to name just a few).<sup>38</sup> However, we know from modern research that this apparently large array of different groups had

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<sup>37</sup> Melo, *Historia de Colombia*, 121

some shared social and cultural characteristics. There were, in the first place, three main linguistic groups in the region. Within the borders of the provinces later established by Spaniards, there were communities who spoke Kariban, Chibchan as well as Arawakan languages (map 2). It was once believed that these linguistic affiliations were paralleled by differences in social and political organisation. The Kariban groups were thought to be warrior-like hunters and gatherers who did not develop advanced agricultural techniques or refined pottery. The Arawakans were supposedly pacific agriculturists with rather sophisticated styles of ceramics, while the Chibchans were imagined to be the emerging state-builders of northern South America, the most advanced both in terms of socio-political organisation and agricultural techniques.<sup>39</sup>

In fact, differences in economic structure and social organisation between the various linguistic groups were probably not so clear cut or pronounced. Warwick Bray has proposed a *chain model* for describing the developments of pre-Columbian cultures in the South American lowlands, where each culture area '...has its own identity but, at the same time, interlocks with its neighbours to form a continuous and unbroken whole.'<sup>40</sup> Archaeological evidence suggests that, although they belonged to different linguistic families, most of the pre-Columbian villages between the Maracaibo lake and Magdalena river at the eve of conquest constituted one type of society. This fundamental unity was caused by both ecological adaptation (groups migrating from other areas gradually adopted the settlement patterns and agricultural techniques of the existing villages) and by

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<sup>38</sup> Nicolás del Castillo Methieu, 'Población aborigen y conquista 1498 – 1540'

<sup>39</sup> See for instance the entries on the native groups of this area in the *Handbook of South American Indians*

trade and exchange between the various villages. The pre-Hispanic communities were concentrated along the large rivers such as the Magdalena, César and Ranchería. This had several implications for the development of indigenous economic and social structures in the region. First of all it meant that trails or roads were largely unnecessary, as the rivers provided the most convenient mode of transportation.<sup>41</sup> The large rivers linked the different villages and enabled trade and contact across considerable distance, and provided fundamental sources of water and food (fish, shells and animals).<sup>42</sup> The riverine villages were characterised by a differentiated economy, where a mixed-crop agriculture (including intensive maize production) supplemented the shells, fish and reptiles which were hunted in the rivers.<sup>43</sup> The introduction of intensive maize production at the beginning of the first century A.D. preceded what seems to have been a substantial population growth.<sup>44</sup> The social stratification of the riverine villages also became more

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<sup>40</sup> Warwick Bray, 'Across the Darien Gap: A Colombian View of Isthmian Archaeology' in Frederick W. Lange and Doris Z. Stone (eds.), *The Archaeology of Lower Central America* (Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 1984), p. 308

<sup>41</sup> Pedro Aguado, one of the earliest Spanish chroniclers of these areas, claimed that the Spaniards found no paths around the lower Magdalena river because the natives used the river for their 'comercio y comunicación'. Fray Pedro de Aguado, *Recopilación historial* (Bogotá, Empresa Nacional de Publicaciones, 1957), vol. 2, chapter 8, p. 223 cited in Thomas Gomez, *L'envers de L'eldorado. Economie coloniale et travail indigene dans la Colombie de XVIème siecle* (Paris, Association des Publications de l'Université Toulouse - Le Mirail, 1984), p. 148 *passim*

<sup>42</sup> Mary W. Helms, 'The Indians of the Caribbean and Circum-Caribbean at the end of the fifteenth century' in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Cambridge History of Latin America* 13 vols (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978 - 1983) vol. I, pp. 37 – 58; Bray, 'Across the Darien Gap', pp. 308 – 309; Reichel-Dolmatoff, *Arqueología de Colombia* pp. 144-147.

<sup>43</sup> The first traits of permanent or at least semi-permanent settlements have been found at Puerto Hormiga, Barlovento and Monsú near Cartagena, not far west of Santa Marta and Riohacha. The oldest ceramics from these sites have been dated to ca 3,000 B.C., which place them among the oldest ceramics discovered on the American continent. The diet of the first inhabitants there seems to have consisted primarily of fish, shells, turtles and crabs. Sites similar to the early Puerto Hormiga, Barlovento and Monsú have been discovered in Zambrano, on the Magdalena river and close to the Zapatosa lagoon where the Cesar and Magdalena rivers merge. The sites at Zambrano and Zapatosa are much more recent, but they are earlier than 1,000 B.C., and most archaeologist seem to agree that they are part of the same tradition. Warwick thinks they form the centre of what he calls the *Tecomate tradition* which stretched from Venezuela to Panamá. The survey of archeology is largely based on Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff: *Arqueología de Colombia* and Warwick Bray, 'Across the Darien Gap'

<sup>44</sup> Interestingly, the type of maize which has been found on the Caribbean coast of present-day Colombia is the same type which is most common both in Venezuela and in the lower part of

complex, if such conclusions can be drawn from the types of funerary urns which have been excavated.<sup>45</sup> The villages that the Spanish conquistadors encountered throughout Santa Marta and Riohacha were thus hierarchically ordered. However, although the villages were socially stratified and the native elites could boast signs of lavish consumption, there appears to have been little political organisation above the village level, and there was certainly no empire or kingdom which united the riverine villages in manner reminiscent of the Aztec, the Inca or the Muisca.

There were, however, some areas between Lake Maracaibo and the Magdalena river with communities that differed from the ones outlined above, particularly the so-called Tayrona culture area which comprised several groups of villages in the northern and western slopes of the Sierra Nevada. The villages and cities of the Sierra were situated between sea-level and up to 2,500 meters, principally along the various rivers which run towards the north and down to the Caribbean sea and the Ciénaga Grande from the lakes and glaciers close to the Sierra summits.<sup>46</sup> Large difference in altitude made for marked climatological

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Central America, but which is not found north of Costa Rica, nor south of Colombia. Bray, 'Across the Darien Gap', p. 318

<sup>45</sup> The marked difference in the way the dead were treated probably reflects that great differences existed among the living as well. Bray, 'Across the Darien Gap', p. 335 and Reichel-Dolmatoff, *Arqueología de Colombia* pp. 157-164

<sup>46</sup> A good overview of what the early Spanish chroniclers write about the people of the Sierra is provided by Henning Bischof, 'Indígenas y españoles en la Sierra Nevada'. For the links between the pre-Hispanic cultures and the present-day inhabitants of the Sierra, see various of Reichel-Dolmatoff's works, for instance *Arqueología de Colombia* pp. 252 – 288; 'Contactos y cambios culturales' and *Datos historico-culturales*. For a critique of Reichel's views see Carlos Alberto Uribe, 'We, the elder brothers: Continuity and Change among the Kággaba of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, Colombia' (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 1990). Bray, 'Across the Darien Gap', pp. 335 – 337 sees the Tayrona 'chiefdoms' as ecological adaptations and not essentially different from the cultures in the rest of the South American lowlands. Armand Labbé, 'The Tairona: Guardians of Fertility and Lords of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta' in *Colombia before Columbus. The People, Culture, and Ceramic Art of Pre-Hispanic Colombia* (New York, Rizzoli, 1986) is a good introduction to pottery from the Sierra. Juan Mayr, *La Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta* (Bogotá, Mayr & Cabal, 1985) brings excellent pictures from the area and good maps of the archaeological sites.



variations within each of these valleys, ranging from tropical temperatures in areas close to the sea to temperate climates around 2,000 meters. Within this environment, an impressive native society emerged: the slopes of the Sierra between Río Ancho and Río Frio are crowded with pre-historic artefacts, stairways, terraces and tombs, and the ruins are of cities rather than villages.<sup>47</sup> Of these, the most striking is the recently discovered Buritaca-200 site (also called Ciudad Perdida), which extends more than two square kilometres and probably housed thousands before it was abandoned.

What were the characteristics of this Tayrona culture and how did it interact with and influence Spanish colonisation in the Santa Marta region? The name Tayrona was, in all probability, originally that of a single settlement, that of the village of Tayronaca or the Tairo valley, which is but one of many valleys formed by the rivers that flow from the Sierra and into the Caribbean sea.<sup>48</sup> For, the most common way for the first Spaniards in Santa Marta to refer to the Indians was by the names of their settlements: Indians who lived in the village of Gaira were described as *gairas*, the ones from Bonda as *bondas* and so on. The use of the term Tayrona was later generalised by Lucas Fernández de Piedrahita, who writing in 1688, applied it to all the Indians who lived on the northern and western Sierra slopes. Taken up by subsequent writers this usage has been misleading because it suggests that the inhabitants of the various villages and cities of the Sierra belonged to *one* nation (or worse still, *tribe*); in fact, modern archaeological and

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<sup>47</sup> Bray: 'Across the Darien Gap', p. 336

<sup>48</sup> Fernandez de Piedrahita, Lucas: *Historia General de las Conquistas del Nuevo Reino de Granada* (Antwerpen, Ribas, 1881). [First published in 1688]. For an account of the chronicler's description of the Indians of the Sierra, see Henning Bischof: 'Indígenas y españoles en la Sierra Nevada' which is a summary of his dissertation 'Die spanisch-indianische Auseinandersetzung in der nördlichen Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (1501 – 1600)' (Bonn, 1971)

ethnohistorical research indicates that they regarded themselves and were seen by the first conquistadors as separate entities. Contemporary scholars now normally refer to the 'Tayrona culture area' or simply the 'Tayrona culture', in order to point to similarities of agricultural techniques and settlement patterns, and the probable existence of a commonly-understood language in the north-western part of the Sierra.<sup>49</sup> This does not imply that the peoples of the area shared one ethnic identity (which is doubtful), nor that they belonged to one political unity (which they certainly did not), but that the villages and cities in the area had some common characteristics which distinguished them from those of the lowlands.

The first Spanish chroniclers divided the northern slopes of the Sierra into 'provincias': Betoma, Posigueica, Buritaca, Tairona and 'la provincia de Arhuacos'.<sup>50</sup> Although the Spaniards saw them as distinct political units, they all shared certain characteristics, such as a common language (called 'Atanque' by the Spanish).<sup>51</sup> This was almost certainly a Chibchan language, as all the remaining native groups in the Sierra Nevada speak languages which belong to this family.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Bray, 'Across the Darien Gap', pp. 332 – 337 and Bischof, 'Indígenas y españoles', pp 83 ff

<sup>50</sup> Bischof, 'Indígenas y españoles..', p. 83 and fig. 3; Reichel-Dolmatoff, 'Contactos y cambios culturales', pp. 19 - 27

<sup>51</sup> There is a considerable discrepancy on how to describe the series of villages in the northern slopes of the sierra. The reason for the variety of different terms used – 'the Tayrona nation' (Piedrahita 1688), 'the Tayrona culture' (Mason 1939), 'the federation of villages of the Sierra Nevada' (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1953), 'the Tayrona tribe' (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1965), 'the Tayrona chiefdoms' (Bray 1986), 'the city-states of the Sierra' (Bischof, 1982) and 'the incipient states of the Sierra' (Reichel-Dolmatoff, 1986) – reflect general theoretical disagreement regarding the political evolution of human societies and the shifting preferences within the disciplines of anthropology and archaeology, rather than fundamental disagreements over the nature of relationships between the villages and cities in the Sierra Nevada. Commenting on this bewildering variety of terms, Carlos Alberto Uribe Tobón, 'La antropología de Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff: Una perspectiva desde la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta' in *Revista de Antropología* (1986) vol II, nos 1-2, p. 10 suggests that the societies of the Sierra Nevada in the sixteenth century do not fit into either the concept of *tribe*, *chiefdom* or *state*, and he suggests that rather than devoting too much effort to the issue of classification in schemes that obviously do not fit, it would be wiser to gather more knowledge on the relationship between the various villages.

<sup>52</sup> G. Reichel-Dolmatoff: 'Contactos y cambios culturales', pp. 47 ff analysed the toponyms and onomastic names found in early Spanish sources and found that although not identical to any of the four languages spoken today in the Sierra, the names were nevertheless understandable in

Apart from language, other characteristics made the villages of the Sierra different from those on the large rivers. A distinctive tradition of producing golden artifacts set them apart from their lowland neighbours, and made these areas particularly interesting to the Spanish. The small rivers and creeks along which the villages of the Sierra were situated were not large enough to be navigated with canoes. Thus, unlike their lowland neighbours, the inhabitants of the Sierra constructed an extensive network of stone paths and stairways which served to connect the lower villages with the higher ones and the different valleys with each other.

The presence of this network of stone causeways points to the existence of a quite stratified and specialised form of social organisation in the highlands, but the frequent creation and dissolution of alliances between different villages and cities suggests that no strong overarching authority existed.<sup>53</sup> According to Reichel-Dolmatoff's study of marriage-patterns among the twentieth-century Kogi, and especially their own understanding of how the clans had originated and developed over time, the Tayrona settlements were probably held together by inter-village and inter-clan relationships.<sup>54</sup> Before conquest, he argues, systematic exogamy linked the villages of the Tayrona (or Tayros), the Matúna and the Kogi, and some smaller unidentified ones. In each village, men belonged to one patrilineal clan (*tuxe*) and women to a matrilineal one (*dake*). Only certain *tuxe*

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most instances and clearly related to all four. See also Bischof: 'Indígenas y españoles', p. 83. Terence Kaufman, 'The native languages of South America' in Christopher Moseley and R. E. Asher (eds.), *Atlas of the World's Languages* (New York, Routledge, 1994), p. 55 lists Tairona as one of the documented native languages in South America and notes that 'no longer an ethnic language, [it] is said to be in use as the shamanic/ priestly language of the Kogis.' This is improbable. Although the Kogi claim that their ceremonial language is Tairona (or téijua), Reichel-Dolmatoff shows how often the persons who claim to be talking uses the common Kogi word, with a nasal pronunciation and stress on the last syllable. Certain Latin and antiquated Spanish words are also part of the téijua vocabulary. See Reichel-Dolmatoff, *Los Kogi de Sierra Nevada* (Palma de Mallorca, Bitzoc, 1996), pp. 264 – 265.

<sup>53</sup> Bischof, 'Indígenas y españoles', pp 83 ff

<sup>54</sup> G. Reichel-Dolmatoff, 'Contactos y cambios culturales', pp. 27 - 36

were suitable partners for certain *dake*, and the male clans from one village were invariably matched with one or more female clans from other villages. For instance men from Matúna belonged to the clan of foxes and could only marry women from the clan of armadillos, which came from the Tayrona valley. However, apart from the groups that were included in the marriage pool, there existed several other groups which, according to Reichel-Dolmatoff's Kogi informers, were strangers and *other people*. These were not exogamous, but would sometimes steal women from the villages in the exogamous system. Gradually, these other groups were converted into clans as well, although with considerably lower status than the original ones, and thus incorporated into the system. The system, then, provided a means to cope with instability, allowing villages to move or disappear and absorbing new peoples as they arrived. Clans could be created and discontinued according to shifting needs and circumstances, leaving the underlying system undisturbed.

The Tayrona culture of the Sierra Nevada has been seen as foreign to the wider region in which it was found. Reichel-Dolmatoff, for example, argued in his first works that the Sierra Nevada cultures were manifestly different from other traditions and cultures of the coastal regions and he believed that they were an offshoot of external influences. At that time, the earliest ceramics found in the Sierra were from the eleventh and twelfth centuries and were similar to ones found in Gurrialba in Costa Rica from roughly the same period.<sup>55</sup> The staircases, the terraces and the environment of Gurrialba also seemed to resemble those of the Sierra Nevada. He therefore concluded that the cultures of the Sierra Nevada

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<sup>55</sup> For this view see especially Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff, *Colombia: Ancient Peoples and Places* (London, Hudson & Thames, 1965) and also his 'Colombia indígena: Periodo

represented a quite recent migration from Central or Mesoamerica, and that the marked difference between the cultures of the Sierra Nevada and the ones of the surrounding lowland areas was explained by the different geographic and ethnic origins of the inhabitants. This view has, however, been modified recently. It was first criticised by Henning Bischof in 1968.<sup>56</sup> At Pueblito he excavated ceramic wares which were considerably older than the Tayrona ceramics then known (probably from the sixth or seventh centuries), and which were clearly related both to ceramic styles from surrounding lowland areas and to later ceramics in the Tairona area. This showed that Tayrona ceramics could have developed locally. Probably as a consequence of this and other criticisms, Reichel-Dolmatoff modified his views on the origins of the Tayrona culture in his later works. In 1986 he explained that '...instead of proposing that the culture of Sierra Nevada had a Costa Rican origin, or that the cultures of Costa Rica had a Colombian origin, I suggest that Costa Rica, Panamá and the Caribbean coast of Colombia constituted *one coherent cultural area*'.<sup>57</sup> The current consensus now seems to be that the Tayrona culture was related to other culture areas in Colombia and lower Central America, but that it is not necessary to find an original culture somewhere in Central America or Mesoamerica to account for its origins and development. The villages of the northern slopes of the Sierra Nevada were thus different from their lowland riverine neighbours, but perhaps not as different as it has been customary to portray them.

Although it is impossible to provide a complete and detailed overview of the pre-Columbian cultures in Santa Marta and Riohacha before conquest, this

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prehispanico' in J. G. Cobo Borda and Santiago Mutis Durán (eds.): *Manual de historia de Colombia* vol. 1 (Bogotá, Instituto Colombiano de Cultura, 1978).

<sup>56</sup> Henning Bischof: 'Contribuciones a la cronología' and 'La Cultura Tairona'

brief outline does at least allow us to see how their basic features came to influence the patterns and processes of conquest. First of all, there was no overarching pre-Columbian authority that united all the different groups living in the region. Although the chiefdoms or incipient states of the Sierra Nevada had constructed impressive public pathways, used irrigation and advanced forms of agriculture, they did not have any authority over groups outside the Sierra, and not even the villages of the Sierra were united in one federation. Neither the lowland riverine villages nor the villages and cities of the Sierra had developed systems of taxation or of forced public labour, essential to the Spanish conquerors. The situation at eve of conquest in these areas was thus very different from central Mexico, Peru or the Muisca territory in the interior of New Granada. The native communities of Santa Marta and Riohacha were therefore not particularly interesting to the Spanish conquerors. It proved difficult to make the natives provide them with foodstuffs and labour, and the only possible candidate for imperial submission, the Tayrona villages, generally opted for violent resistance to Spanish dominion and withdrawal to the highest villages of the Sierra where they were beyond the Spaniards' reach. The area immediately around Santa Marta was nearly depopulated, as the Indians either died from Old World diseases or fled to join the still unconquered villages in the Sierra.<sup>58</sup>

In the midst of native population decline and continued resistance towards the Spanish colonisers, the settlement at Santa Marta soon found itself in a desperate situation. Although some Indian tombs were found close to the city in

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<sup>57</sup> Reichel-Dolmatoff: *Arqueología de Colombia* p. 283

<sup>58</sup> European diseases reached Peru before Pizarro and may have travelled overland through Colombia. Thus, though we know relatively little about the impact of epidemics in early colonial New Granada, it is reasonable to suppose that native peoples were among those who

1529, gold was no longer abundant, and the town's Hispanic inhabitants did not dare to go far on their own outside the city out of fear of the Indians, and kept a caravel and a lighter ready in the port in case the city should be attacked. They could not even go to the subdued villages to collect the tribute '...although they needed it quite badly in order to buy supplies in these islands, because they [did] not have any harvest in the land.'<sup>59</sup>

## The making of a colonial spatial order

A new phase in the development of the colonial society in and around Santa Marta started in the 1530s. When the expedition that departed from Santa Marta in 1536 under Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada reached Muisca territory and founded the city of Santa Fe de Bogotá, some of the pressure was removed from Santa Marta. It was no longer the focal point for a series of military expeditions, and some of the gold fever that marked the first decades of conquest began to wear off. New settlers increasingly went to the interior rather than remain on the coast, and, with a smaller but more stable Spanish population, the settlers who remained in Santa Marta began to establish a sustainable economy. The first haciendas were starting to produce crops, and cattle-ranches were established in the empty spaces left by the disappearing native villages. And, although conflicts with the tributary towns continued, Indian revolts became less frequent.

The character of the Spanish colonial society which emerged in Santa Marta, was shaped by both Spanish political and cultural practices and local

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suffered first from exposure to epidemic disease. See John Hemming, *The Conquest of the Incas* (San Diego, Harvest/HBJ, 1970), p. 547

circumstances. Typically, Spanish American colonial society was centred on the Spanish city, meticulously laid out around the *plaza* surrounded by the church, government buildings and the mansions of the most distinguished *vecinos*. Local city government was in the hands of a *cabildo* composed by the local notables. The Spanish city was ideally surrounded by Indian towns, clearly separated from their head city both in space and by law. Education and indoctrination of the Indians were entrusted to Spanish notables (normally conquistadors and their relatives), who in turn received the privilege of using the Indians as labour on their own lands or receiving tribute from their produce. In theory, these *encomiendas* ensured the protection of the Indian communities and complete separation between the so-called Indian and Spanish republics.<sup>60</sup>

The spatial order of Santa Marta and Riohacha soon started to deviate from this ideal. The native population simply died too quickly or fled, rendering the *encomiendas* small and of little value. A handful of Spanish towns were founded from the 1540s, but the number of *vecinos* was small, their resources scarce, and the towns owed their existence mainly to the strategic position which the area occupied as the main route from the Caribbean coast to Santa Fe and the New Granadan interior (map 3). The Magdalena river became especially important as it was the most convenient connection between Santa Fe and the Caribbean, and beyond to Europe. There were quite large pre-Hispanic villages in Tenerife and Tamalameque, and these were formally turned into Spanish cities in 1541 and 1546. However, their Spanish population remained small during the sixteenth

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<sup>59</sup> Juan Friede (ed.), *Documentos inéditos para la historia de Colombia* 10 vols (Bogotá, Academia Colombiana de Historia, 1955), vol. 3, pp. 192 – 193. Cited in Constance Jones Mathers, 'Santa Marta Gold', p. 308

<sup>60</sup> For a general description to the system of *encomienda* in Spanish America see for instance Schwartz and Lockhart, *Early Latin America*, pp. 68 - 71 and 92 - 96



century, and, with only a handful of encomenderos, their families and a priest, Tenerife and Tamalameque were urban centres only in the loosest sense of the term.<sup>61</sup> There were ten *vecinos* in Tamalameque in 1574 and in 1583, and the number had dropped to seven by 1609. Tenerife was about the same size with seven *vecinos* in 1574 and ten in 1583.<sup>62</sup> Around 1560, the tributary population of Tenerife was estimated at 1,500 and that of Tamalameque at 500.<sup>63</sup> By 1627, the number of tribute-paying Indians had dropped to 276 in Tenerife and 27 in Tamalameque.<sup>64</sup> During most of the sixteenth century, the tribute-paying Indians along the Magdalena river worked as *bogas* on the canoes which transported people and goods between the interior and the coast. As the native population declined, the colonial authorities attempted to regulate the Indians' work and restrain the encomenderos from working them too hard. In fact, the Audiencia and the Council of the Indies favoured the use of African slaves instead of Indians as *bogas*, and the Indians were gradually replaced by slaves.<sup>65</sup>

Some of the same patterns of Indian depopulation and replacement by African slaves may be observed on the Guajira peninsula, where Riohacha was to emerge as the main Spanish settlement. The driving force for change here was the discovery, in 1538, of pearl beds between the Cabo de la Vela and the mouth of the Ranchería river, and the subsequent movement of an entire colony of pearl fisheries from the island of Cubagua, off the coast of Venezuela, to the Guajira

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<sup>61</sup> The conquest and establishment of colonial society along the lower parts of the Magdalena river are described by Thomas Gomez. *L'envers de L'eldorado* pp. 148 – 222 and by María del Carmen Borrego Pla, 'Visita de Martín Camacho a los indios bogas de la gobernación de Santa Marta' in *Anuario de estudios americanos* 38 (1981), pp. 271 – 303. See also Miranda Vázquez, *La gobernación de Santa Marta (1570 - 1670)* (Sevilla, Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1976), pp. 85 - 109

<sup>62</sup> Miranda Vázquez, *La gobernación* p. 54

<sup>63</sup> Melo, *Historia de Colombia* p. 214

<sup>64</sup> Miranda Vázquez, *La gobernación* p. 45

peninsula.<sup>66</sup> Two towns were founded on the western coast of the Guajira peninsula in 1538. One was Nuestra Señora Santa María de los Remedios del Cabo de la Vela, which served as the administrative centre for the pearl fisheries and the residence of some of the owners of the fisheries and their households. The other, San Juan, was a base for operations, where the overseers lived and where the Indian, and later also African, slaves were kept along with the equipment and the canoes. San Juan had no fixed location: it functioned more like a mobile camp that moved according to the needs of the fisheries.<sup>67</sup> In 1541 Nuestra Señora de los Remedios del Cabo de la Vela had 1,500 inhabitants, of whom most were Indian slaves.<sup>68</sup> The city was moved in 1544 to the mouth of the Ranchería river, and was called Nuestra Señora Santa María de los Remedios del Río de la Hacha, or simply Riohacha.<sup>69</sup> Riohacha was further away from the major pearl beds, but it had fresh water, was suitable for agriculture, and - perhaps most importantly - was less vulnerable to pirate attacks as it lay on the river rather than directly on the coast. The trade out of Riohacha was not large, but it experienced good periods especially between 1580 and 1600 and from 1616 to 1630.<sup>70</sup> The number of *vecinos* increased from fifteen in 1574 to twenty-five in 1583 and thirty in 1622.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> For the *visitas* to the riverine towns and the decrees which regulated the work of the Indians, see María del Carmen Borrego Pla, 'Visita de Martín Camacho'

<sup>66</sup> The classic work on the pearl fisheries in sixteenth century Spanish America is Enrique Otte, *Las perlas del Caribe – Nueva Cádiz de Cubagua*. (Caracas, Fundación John Boulton, 1977) For the pearl fisheries on the Colombian side see Weildler Guerra Curvelo, 'La ranchería de las perlas del Cabo de la Vela' in *Huellas* 49/50 (April – August 1997), pp. 33 – 51 and Melo, *Historia de Colombia* pp. 129 – 130. See also Manuel Luengo Muñoz, 'Noticias sobre la fundación de Nuestra Señora de los Remedios del Cabo de la Vela' in *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 6 (1949), pp. 757 – 797.

<sup>67</sup> Guerra Curvelo, 'La ranchería de perlas', p. 34

<sup>68</sup> Melo, *Historia de Colombia* p. 129

<sup>69</sup> Guerra Curvelo, 'La ranchería de las perlas', p. 37

<sup>70</sup> Miranda Vázquez, *La gobernación de Santa Marta* pp. 82 – 84 provides a table based on the statistics of Chaunu, where it appears that the most important periods of trade between Riohacha and the peninsula was between 1581 and 1600, and from 1616 to 1630. Miranda Vázquez and Chaunu seems to agree that the trade was based almost exclusively on pearls.

<sup>71</sup> Miranda Vázquez, *La gobernación de Santa Marta* p. 54

At first the majority of the pearl divers were Indians brought from the eastern coast of Venezuela and the islands of Cubagua and Trinidad. Additional Indians were enslaved through raids in the Guajira itself, in the Sierra Nevada and the Cesar valley.<sup>72</sup> Very gradually the Indians were replaced by African slaves, partly because the Indians fled or died, and partly because the laws against enslavement of Indians was more efficiently enforced after 1542. In 1550, the majority of the pearl divers were still Indian, and Indian slaves were used at least until 1570<sup>73</sup> By 1612, however, the 240 African slaves in the pearl fisheries constituted the bulk of the divers.<sup>74</sup> The divers endured extreme working conditions. They were taken out to the pearl beds off the coast in canoes, and forced to dive. They were chained when sleeping or not working, to prevent them from running away and from smuggling pearls to strangers.<sup>75</sup> The best pearl beds were apparently found as deep as twenty meters below the surface, and the legs of the divers were frequently tied so that they would not escape or drown themselves.<sup>76</sup> Not surprisingly, many Indian and African slaves fled or attempted to flee from the fisheries. As Michel Perrin has shown, the social organisation, ideological and material cultural traditions and life style of the Guajiros of today (the wayuu) have elements of both arawak, non-arawak Indian, African and European origins.<sup>77</sup> It is possible that this cultural integration began with the first run-aways from the pearl-fisheries.

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<sup>72</sup> Guerra Curvelo, 'La ranchería de perlas', pp. 38 - 42

<sup>73</sup> Guerra Curvelo, 'La ranchería de perlas', p. 49

<sup>74</sup> Miranda Vázquez, *La gobernación* p. 49

<sup>75</sup> Guerra Curvelo, 'La ranchería de perlas', p. 41

<sup>76</sup> René de la Pedraja, 'La Guajira en el siglo XIX: Indígenas, contrabando y carbón' in Gustavo Bell Lemus (ed.), *El caribe colombiano. Selección de textos históricos* (Barranquilla, Ediciones Uninorte, 1988), pp. 2 -3.

<sup>77</sup> Michel Perrin, 'El arte guajiro de curar: tradición y cambios' in Gerardo Ardila (ed.), *La Guajira. de la memoria al provenir: una visión antropológica* (Bogotá, Editorial Universidad Nacional, 1990), pp. 211 - 237

Spanish settlement in the Santa Marta region also gradually spread inland. One of the main Hispanic settlements in the province's interior was the city of Valledupar, founded in 1550 by captain Hernando de Santana, when he was sent out from Santa Marta to suppress a major slave revolt in Venezuela.<sup>78</sup> Passing through the César valley he found numerous native communities and founded the city on the banks of the river Guataporí, which runs into the César. Valledupar soon became one of largest cities of the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha. In 1627 there were still 298 tributary Indians in Valledupar and Pueblo Nuevo de Valencia de Jesús (founded in 1589).<sup>79</sup> Compared to Riohacha and Santa Marta it was a large settlement with thirty vecinos throughout the second half of the sixteenth century.<sup>80</sup> (Compared to the Spanish settlements in the interior of New Granada, however, Valledupar and the other 'cities' in the province of Santa Marta were small.<sup>81</sup>) Valledupar and the surrounding areas were convenient for Spanish colonists as it provided fertile land for agriculture and large plains suitable for cattle grazing. The Cesar valley also provided a corridor between Riohacha and the middle of the Magdalena river. Both Riohacha and Santa Marta could be reached by the rivers, yet it was situated at considerable distance from the coast and was thus safe from pirate attacks. Later in the colonial period, the valley would be especially important as a route for transport of contraband from Riohacha to Mompóx and the interior of New Granada.

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<sup>78</sup> Antonio Araujo Calderón, *Cuaderno de historia provincial* (Bogotá, Control. General de la República, 1978), pp. 27 - 40.

<sup>79</sup> Miranda Vezquez, *La gobernación*, p. 12

<sup>80</sup> Miranda Vázquez, *La gobernación*, p. 54

<sup>81</sup> In 1560 Santa Marta province had ca. 150 vecinos while Santa Fe had 600, Popayán 500 and Cartagena 300 according to Melo, *Historia de Colombia*, p. 264

The other main inland town in the Santa Marta region was Ocaña, founded in 1570 by Fernando Fernández de Contreras and a group of colonists from Pamplona. Sent by governor Velásquez de Velasco of Pamplona to find a way by land to Santa Marta and to establish a town in the territory of the Hacaritama Indians, Fernández de Contreras was only allowed to found the city on the condition that it would fall under the jurisdiction of Santa Marta (and not Pamplona). This is why Ocaña, although situated in the northern parts of the Cordillera Oriental and near Spanish cities such as Cúcuta, Pamplona and Socorro, came to be part of the province of Santa Marta. At 1,200 meters above sea level, Ocaña had a more temperate climate than any of the other cities in the province, and the principal agricultural produce of the area included wheat and cocoa which could not be grown at lower altitudes. Ocaña provided the coastal cities with highland products and benefited from its location close to a subsidiary of the Magdalena. But as the other cities of the provinces, Ocaña was small. In 1624 there were twenty encomiendas around Ocaña, distributed among the founders of the city and their descendants. The largest of these had eighty Indians, and were among the largest in Santa Marta province, although modest compared to the size of encomiendas in the interior of New Granada.<sup>82</sup>

By 1600, almost a hundred years had passed since the first Europeans sailed along the Caribbean coasts of South America, and in course of that century, dramatic transformations and abrupt changes had occurred in Santa Marta and Riohacha. As the native population declined, their societies underwent fundamental structural changes. The villages that were subdued and turned into tributary villages were not simply remnants of pre-Hispanic towns but had

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<sup>82</sup> Miranda Vázquez, *La gobernación*, pp. 170 - 172

become hybrid communities attuned to Spanish needs. The Indian groups which resisted conquest were equally disturbed. They were forced to retreat from their villages into more isolated regions, and leave the great rivers which had been their source of food and means of communication prior to conquest. These unconquered groups were not only forced to adopt new means of survival (the Guajiros became pastoralists), but they also incorporated other groups into their new 'colonial' forms of society.<sup>83</sup>

Although the effects of conquest on the native peoples were dramatic, Spanish control over the territories of Santa Marta and Riohacha was by no means complete by the seventeenth century. Only seven rather small Spanish towns had been founded, and effective Spanish control was limited to strips of land on the Caribbean coast and along the largest rivers. Wide empty spaces were found between the pockets occupied by the Spanish and the remote retreats of the unconquered groups where runaway slaves and other marginal segments of colonial society could live undisturbed. Moreover, during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the processes which undermined the official ideal organisation of colonial space had already begun. In Santa Marta and Riohacha, African slaves replaced Indian labour both in the pearl diving of the Guajira and in the *boga* of the Magdalena river, and the first rebel slave communities (*palenques*) dates back to the mid-sixteenth century. Miscegenation and the consequent formation of a relatively large mixed race population also challenged the existence of a scheme of Spanish government founded on the notion of the two 'republics', of Indians and Spaniards respectively. Contact with foreigners, through illegal

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<sup>83</sup> For instance, the Guanebucán of the lower Guajira was probably subsumed into the exogamous system of the higher Sierra Nevada. See Reichel-Dolmatoff, 'Contactos y cambios', pp. 27 - 36

trade with the French, British, Dutch and Danish colonies on the Caribbean islands, further accentuated the rather disorderly character of Santa Marta and Riohacha provinces, providing them with commercial contacts outside the Spanish monopoly system. Established in the second half of the seventeenth century, the European colonies of the Lesser Antilles were dominated by sugar plantations, and had an intensive and specialised production system which required importation of primary products such as meat and wood. The northern coast of South America in general, and the sparsely populated provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha in particular, could supply these goods in abundance. In exchange for clothing, wheat, liquor and slaves, all segments of society participated in the contraband trade. The informal sector of the local economy outstripped the legal sector seven times over, according to one estimate.<sup>84</sup> From a peninsular Spanish point of view, such trade with foreigners undermined the mercantile system and depleted the financial resources of the Crown.

## Spatial order in the eighteenth century

By the eighteenth century, then, Santa Marta and Riohacha remained on the fringes of Spanish colonial society, and over the course of the century, royal officials, clergy and local elites frequently criticised their condition and called for government action to impose order to stimulate social and economic development. Jesuit Antonio Julián claimed in the 1740s that Santa Marta could have been 'the pearl of the Americas', the richest of the Spanish domains overseas, if only the population was conquered once and for all and made to live

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<sup>84</sup> Lance Grahn, *The Political Economy of Smuggling: Regional Informal Economies in Early Bourbon New Granada* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1997)

in 'society'.<sup>85</sup> Concerned with the material and spiritual progress of the province, Julián's comments on the province provide interesting glimpse of the problems with the province as perceived by a Spanish ecclesiastic in the mid-eighteenth century. To Julián, the principal obstacle to order and progress were the unconquered Indian groups and other segments of the population which did not live 'en policía y a son de campana' (literally in polity and within the sound of church-bells).<sup>86</sup> In Spanish towns in the Americas, the *plaza* with the parish church, the town hall and the residences of the most influential inhabitants marked the centre of moral and political space. Within the city, those who lived on the outskirts were thought to be of inferior status. Those who lived *dispersos en el monte* (literally, dispersed in the wilderness) were barbarians. People who did not live in urban centres, however small, were only marginally superior to animals. Julián, describing the Motilones of the Sierra de Perijá, thought they were: '[l]ike beasts in the wilderness, [they] run and turn in a very vast area looking for places to do harm...' and worst of all they appeared '...not to stay permanently anywhere..<sup>87</sup> The unconquered groups in the Sierra Nevada which lived more or less permanently in their own villages, were not barbarians in Julian's eyes. The Tupes, for instance, were 'pobres gentes' and constituted a 'miserable docilísima nación' but they were pacific and neither barbaric nor terrible, although they lived in the 'tinieblas de la gentilidad'.<sup>88</sup> To contemporaries the idea that Spaniards also could inhabit the monte was shocking, a sure sign of moral disintegration. Describing the 'terrible nation of the Chimilas' and the attack of some Chimilas

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<sup>85</sup> Antonio Julián, *La perla de América Provincia de Santa Marta reconocida, observada y expuesta en discursos históricos a mayor bien de la Católica Monarquía, fomento del comercio de España, y de todo el Nuevo Reino de Granada, e incremento de la cristiana religión entre las naciones bárbaras que subsisten todavía rebeldes en la provincia* [First published 1779?] (Bogotá, Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana, 1951), p. 27

<sup>86</sup> See Margarita Garrido, *Reclamos y representaciones. Variaciones sobre la política en el Nuevo Reino de Granada, 1770 – 1815* (Bogotá, Banco de la República, 1993), pp. 231 - 236

<sup>87</sup> Julián, *La perla*, p. 208



lead by a mestizo on a hacienda in the Cesar valley, Julián commented: '...there may be other mestizos and blacks fleeing from justice and in refuge among those barbarians, and God forbid there are any whites.'<sup>89</sup> As can be seen from the accounts of Julián, place was burdened with meaning. And ethnic and racial identities were in part determined by place and manner of residence.

Order and material progress were among the primary targets of the Bourbon reforms carried out in eighteenth-century Spanish America. In the provinces of Santa Marta, perhaps the most eye-catching attempts at reform were intended to re-establish and maintain the hierarchical spatial order of the provinces, a 'second conquest' in a quite literal sense. This was done in two ways. First, there were a series of so-called pacification campaigns against some of the largest and still unconquered Indian groups (the Guajiros, Chimilas and Motilones). Secondly, a substantial re-population campaign was carried out between 1745 and 1770 along the Magdalena and César rivers, to remove any inhabitants of the 'wilderness' and re-settle them in newly founded towns along the rivers.<sup>90</sup> The aims of these campaigns were 'to oblige all free and vagabond people of this or that sex of any quality or condition to live in society' and to force them to live in 'Christian community, in harmony with concord, polity and human society'.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Julián, *La perla*, pp. 181 - 183

<sup>89</sup> Julián, *La perla*, p. 192

<sup>90</sup> A collection of documents concerning this campaign is provided by José María de Mier (ed.), *Poblamientos en la provincia de Santa Marta en el siglo XVIII* 3 vols. (Bogotá, Procultura, 1987). See also Luis Alarcón Meneses, 'Espacio, poblamiento y variaciones territoriales en el estado soberano del Magdalena' in *Historia Caribe* 1:1 (1995), pp. 25 - 48; Gilma Mora de Tovar, 'Poblamiento y sociedad en el Bajo Magdalena durante la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII' in ACHSC 21 (1993), pp. 40 - 62 and Orlando Fals Borda, *Historia doble de la Costa* vol 1 (Bogotá, Carlos Valencia Editores, 1980), pp. 103A - 114A and 112B - 114B.

The campaign was motivated by more than simply a moral quest for spatial order and religious discipline. The unconquered Chimilas, who lived in the lower parts of the Sierra Nevada and in the swampy lowlands between the Magdalena and the César, had launched a series of raids on Hispanic settlements and travellers in the early eighteenth century.<sup>92</sup> This situation turned especially troublesome when England and Spain went to war in 1739. In 1741, the British laid siege to Cartagena de Indias, and the city had to be provisioned with food by land. Entrusted with this task was Joseph Fernando de Mier y Guerra, a peninsular Spaniard who had come to New Granada and established himself in Mompóx in 1740. Named *maestre de campo* in 1740 by the viceroy, his task was to transport cattle from the province of Santa Marta and particularly the César valley to Cartagena. In order to achieve this, the roads and rivers had to be secured from Chimila attacks. There was also a fear that the British would provide the Chimilas with arms to foment rebellion. One of the aims of founding of towns along the Magdalena and César rivers was therefore to contain the Chimilas and secure transportation.

An astonishing 22 towns were founded along the Magdalena river between 1744 and 1770 (map 5). Despite Mier y Guerra's success in founding towns, the problem of demographic dispersal and spatial disorder remained. In 1801 the cabildos and parish priests of Santa Marta were asked to comment on this problem.<sup>93</sup> Their replies were quite varied. Some put the blame on the rich

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<sup>91</sup> 'obligar a toda la gente libre y vaga de uno y otro sexo de cualquier calidad o condición a que vivan en sociedad'. Cited by Gilma Tovar, 'Poblamiento y sociedad', p. 46 and 47

<sup>92</sup> Carlos Alberto Uribe Tobón, 'La Rebelión Chimila en la Provincia de Santa Marta, Nuevo Reino de Granada, durante el siglo XVIII' in *Estudios andinos* 7:13 (1977), pp. 113 - 163

<sup>93</sup> The background for these reports was that Josef María Lozano, one of the wealthiest men in Santa Fe had written a letter to the King where he complained about the sparse and dispersed population of the whole of New Granada. He claimed that most of the inhabitants lived dispersed in the wilderness and that only a few cities in the viceroyalty were worthy of the

landowners of Santa Marta, Valledupar and Mompóx who had occupied the best land, and forced the poorer members of the community to work land farther away from the parishes and the roads and rivers.<sup>94</sup> Others merely stated that the majority of the inhabitants were agriculturists and consequently had to live in the most remote corners of the land for their own subsistence and were therefore doomed to live a 'wild, rustic and savage life'.<sup>95</sup> Frequently the priests and the cabildos attributed the dispersal of the rural population to the natural laziness of the inhabitants. The cabildo of Valledupar, for instance, held that the towns and villages under its jurisdiction were '...so small that there are no permanent judges there to administer justice, and there are places where laziness have led to the abandonment of agriculture which is so necessary for the subsistence of these villages, and they live in scarcity even though the country is - if not rich - at least fertile and abundant ...'.<sup>96</sup> In some instances, the authorities explicitly linked spatial disorder with the race of the inhabitants: 'This jurisdiction is only inhabited by a few Blacks and sambos', the priest of the parish of Santa Ana explained, 'and their relaxed and perverted inclinations give no hope for progress whatsoever; on

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name. The inhabitants lived outside of society and religion. In order to remedy this situation, Lozano proposed a new round of campaigns to force people to live in the towns and cities. A Real Cédula was issued in Aranjuez on 24 Apr 1801, whereby the King asked the Archbishop of Santa Fe to comment on this proposal. The archbishop in turn passed on copies of the Real Cédula to all the bishops so that they could inform the parish priests and provide reports from each parish of the archbishopric. A copy of the Real Cédula is found in AGN, Reales cédulas 34, folios 349 - 351.

<sup>94</sup> See for instance the reports of the priest of Barrancas in the César valley, Joseph María de Fuentes to the vicario juez eclesiástico of Valledupar, Barrancas 1 Aug. 1803 in AGN, Curas y obispos 10, folios 416 - 417 and the report of the cabildo of Valencia de Jesús, 7 Oct. 1802 in AGN, Reales cédulas 34, folios 365 - 373

<sup>95</sup> 'La mayor porcion de los numerosos havitantes de esta Jurisdiccion son hombres dedicados a la Agricultura, y Labor, y por consiguiente retirados a las campiñas mas remotas de ella para ganar su substento con el interez que les produce el fruto de su trabajo, de cuya constitucion les resulta la practica de una vida silvestre, rustica y montaras' in report from cabildo of Ocaña to the governor of Santa Marta, Ocaña 12 Jul. 1803 in AGN, Reales cédulas 34, folios 393 - 396. A similar view was expressed by the parish priest of Chiriguaná, 8 Aug. 1803 in AGN, Reales Cédulas y ordenes 34, fols. 431 - 32 and by the cabildo of Tamalameque, 27 Jul. 1803 in AGN, Reales cédulas 34, folios 399 - 402.

<sup>96</sup> Informe del cabildo de Valledupar, 7 Sept. 1802 in AGN, Reales Cédulas y ordenes 34, fols. 381 - 82

the contrary, as enemies of good government, they oppose any whites who could enlighten them...<sup>97</sup> Whatever local authorities saw as its cause, they all agreed that the dispersion and disordered living of some of the inhabitants of the provinces was a serious problem which undermined the colonial social order.

Given such complaints about the dispersal of the population, the 1793 census of the province of Santa Marta, which provides us with a detailed view of the distribution and composition of the population, has to be read with caution. According to the census, which listed inhabitants by sex, marital status and 'ethnic category' (white, Indian, free people of all colours and slaves) for each of the 53 parishes in the province, 83 per cent of the population (47,127) resided in towns and villages with more than 500 inhabitants.<sup>98</sup> The census thus gives the impression that the population conformed to the spatial order envisioned by colonial authorities. In fact, the census did not include the unconquered Indian groups, and we cannot know to what extent the parish priests who conducted the census locally were able or willing to include those who lived beyond parish boundaries. However, flawed though it is, the census nevertheless provides a view of how the census-takers and Spanish authorities pictured the province and the spatial order of its inhabitants. Seen in conjunction with other sources on the formal political and ecclesiastical organisation of the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha, the census thus reveals the ideal spatial and social order of the provinces in the late eighteenth century.

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<sup>97</sup> Report by Juan Antonio Afis, Santa Ana 30 Nov. 1804 in AGN, Curas y obispos 10, folios 423 - 424

<sup>98</sup> 'Santa Marta 1793. Padron general que manifiesta el numero de personas havitantes en esta provincia de Sta Marta con distincion de clases, sexos y estados incluso parvulos' in AGI, Indiferente General 1527

The census was ordered hierarchically, ranking each settlement by ecclesiastical and political status, and it reflected the same ideas on spatial and social order as those expressed by Julián in the 1740s and the cabildos and priests in 1802 - 1804. There was - quite literally - a concern to put everyone in their place. The provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha constituted one bishopric. The city of Santa Marta was the seat of the bishop, and thus the ecclesiastical head of the diocese.<sup>99</sup> Santa Marta was also the capital of the province of Santa Marta, and the seat of the governor, the highest ranking royal official. Although Riohacha was recognised as a separate province, for most of the colonial period the governor of Santa Marta also served as the governor of Riohacha.<sup>100</sup> As we have seen, the city of Santa Marta was the first city that been founded in this part of Spanish America, and from there had parted most of the expeditions which founded the other Spanish cities of the provinces. The city of Santa Marta was thus the political, military, ecclesiastical and symbolic head of the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha. According to the 1793 census, it had 3627 inhabitants of whom 499 were classified as whites, and the remaining were free people of all colours and slaves. Only 21 Indians reportedly lived in Santa Marta in 1793.

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<sup>99</sup> The diocese of Santa Marta was among the first to be established in South America, but it soon became one of the least prestigious. Most of the other dioceses had more inhabitants, higher income, more churches and more clergy than Santa Marta. Of the nineteen bishoprics in Spanish South America, there were only three that had lower income from tithes (diezmos) than Santa Marta in 1628: Buenos Aires, Asunción and Concepción. The relative situation of Santa Marta did not improve during the eighteenth century. In 1806, of the twenty-three bishoprics that existed then in South America, only Panamá and Paraguay had less income from tithes than Santa Marta. See A. C. van Oss: 'Comparing colonial bishoprics in Spanish South America' in *Boletín de estudios latinoamericanos y del Caribe* 24 (1978), pp. 33 - 40 and G. Martínez Reyes: *Finanzas de las 44 diócesis de Indias 1515 - 1816* (Bogotá, Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1980), p. 89

<sup>100</sup> When the Audiencia of Santa Fe was established in 1550, it was decided that Riohacha would continue to be under the jurisdiction of the Audiencia of Santo Domingo like the rest of Venezuela. But in 1593, Riohacha was incorporated into the province of Santa Marta. See José Polo Acuña, 'Aspectos históricos de Riohacha durante el periodo colonial' in *Historia caribe* 2:3 (1998), p. 37

Below the city of Santa Marta in the territorial hierarchy came the other cities founded in the sixteenth century. The bishopric was divided into *vicarías*, of which there were six at mid-eighteenth century, presided over by a *vicario juez eclesiástico* (a subordinate ecclesiastical judge), who acted as judge in place of the bishop in first instance in any ecclesiastical trial.<sup>101</sup> The six vicarías were Riohacha, Valledupar, Ocaña, Pueblo Nuevo de Valencia de Jesus, Tenerife and Tamalameque.<sup>102</sup> All these held city status, except Tenerife which was only a *villa*. Cities and villas also had the right to have their own cabildos, whose members were recruited from the local elites. These cities, then, had a certain degree of political autonomy with respect to the capital, and three of them (Ocaña, Valledupar and Riohacha) also had their own *Real Caja* and a royal official (*tesorero*) to manage the accounts and collect taxes. The cabildos also had the right to name judges and corregidores for the smaller subordinate parishes under their jurisdiction. All the towns, with the exceptions of Tamalameque and Tenerife, had churches with several *prebendas* or ecclesiastical positions, ranging from eight in Riohacha to twenty-three in Ocaña. The largest were Ocaña with 5,673 inhabitants and Valledupar with 3,777 which made both more populous than the capital. They were nevertheless of modest size compared to the largest cities in New Granada.<sup>103</sup> The other vicarías and cities of Santa Marta and Riohacha provinces had between 800 and 1,700 inhabitants. The 'ethnic' configuration of these cities as presented by the census resembled that of Santa Marta. Of the 5183

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<sup>101</sup> By 1793 there were nine. In addition to the seven mentioned in the text, Guamal and Sitio-Nuevo had been elevated to vicarías. See AGI, Indiferente general, 1527.

<sup>102</sup> See "Razon del numero de prebendas de la Santa Iglesia de Santa Marta, y sus Posehedores como tambien de todos los curas del Obispado con sus anexos de cada Pueblo", 27 February 1759 in AGI, Santa Fe 1245, "Razon del numero de Prebendas dela Iglesia de Sta Marta sus valores, y Posehedores, y delos curatos todos del Obpado con sus anexos, y sacerdotes de cada Pueblo, sus edades" n.d. in AGI, Santa Fe 1247 and "Yndice delas Yglesias, Prebendados, Parrocos, Vicarios, y demas beneficiados del Obispado de Santa Martha en Indias", 7 December 1768 in AGI, Santa Fe 1189

people who were categorised as whites in the 1793 census, 3400 (or sixty-five per cent) lived in the cities. And in these 'cities', between four and thirty per cent were categorised as whites, the rest were free people of all colours and slaves. Very few or no Indians lived in the largest cities.

Each of these cities and villas had jurisdiction over an uneven number of parishes, which in principle were either Spanish or Indian. The Spanish parishes in this category were typically recent settlements and they included for instance most of the towns which had been founded by Mier y Guerra in mid-eighteenth century. Devoted to agriculture, cattle-herding and river transport, these towns had a priest and a *alcalde* or *captian a guerra* at most, appointed from their head city. Most of the subordinate Spanish parishes had few or no inhabitants categorised as whites. The exceptions were some of the larger towns in the César valley such as Fonseca, San Juan de César and Valencia de Jesús. The vast majority of the inhabitants in the subordinate Spanish parishes were categorised as free people of colours. There were practically no Indians and few slaves in these parishes.

The Indian parishes included in the census were of two different types. Some were remnants of the *encomiendas* which had largely been withdrawn by the Crown in early eighteenth century. Instead of paying tribute to an *encomendero* or working on his land, the male inhabitants between the age of eighteen and fifty paid an annual tribute of four pesos to the Crown. The tributary parishes were generally served by secular clergy, and thus fell under the jurisdiction of the diocese. The other Indian parishes were served by friars (mostly

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<sup>103</sup> In 1778, Cartagena had 16,361 inhabitants, Mompóx 7,003; Santa Fe de Bogotá 16,420.

Capuchins), and called missions or pueblos of the recently converted. Since the end of the seventeenth century, a series of missionary campaigns had been directed towards the unconquered groups such as the Guajiros and the Chimilas. If these campaigns succeeded, the recently conquered natives would form a mission (pueblos de indios recién convertidos) until they had been taught Spanish, been baptised and were considered ready to form an ordinary tributary parish. The vast majority of both types of Indian parishes were categorised as Indians in the census, and of the 8,636 Indians in the province, 7,602 (eighty-eight per cent) lived in Indian parishes.

The census thus gives the impression that there existed strong social and spatial boundaries between the 'ethnic' groups of the late colonial province. The whites lived in the large cities along with their slaves and large mixed-race populations; the Indians lived in tributary parishes or in missions, while the smaller and more recent Spanish parishes were dominated by mixed-race populations. The question, of course, is whether this is an accurate picture of late colonial social order in Santa Marta and Riohacha provinces. Were the boundaries between the different groups as solid and clear-cut as the census suggests? What were the criteria used for determining the categorisation of individuals along these lines? How were these ethnic boundaries maintained, and how did they function in every-day life for the inhabitants of the provinces? Had the Spanish monarchy and Church succeeded in implanting their norms of law and morality on these communities and how, if at all, did they differ in the manner in which they lived under Spanish rule? Did they share social values and attitudes and to what extent



did they feel themselves to be part of a larger provincial community with an identity distinct from other regions of New Granada?

One way of approaching these questions is to focus on the institution of marriage. Marriage was regarded as a fundamental institution of Christian life, to which neophytes had to become accustomed and Hispanics continuously reminded. The central position of marriage in the eyes of both civil and ecclesiastical authorities explains the impressive variety and amount of sources which relate to marriages. We have at our disposal not only the well- preserved registers of marriages in the parish records, but also a series of criminal cases against transgressors of different types from civil, ecclesiastical and Inquisition courts, comments and reports by secular and regular clergy on the marital practices of specific villages and the population in general, the genealogies of the principal families, just to name a few examples. The study of marriage thus provides a pathway into analysis of the character of social groups and their relationships, the nature of social norms and behaviour, and their change over time. The next four chapters, then, are more detailed discussion of the nature of the social or ethnic categories used in the 1793 census and marriage is used as an instrument in order to approach these issues. This will, in turn, provide a context for explaining the positions taken by individuals, families and communities during the protracted crisis of political change that followed the collapse of Bourbon government in 1808.

## **Chapter 2. Local elites and royal officials**

From the foregoing discussion of colonial spatial order, some of the criteria used by elites to distinguish themselves from the rest of the population should be clear. The elites were categorised as whites, they lived in the oldest and largest cities of the provinces, they controlled the cabildos of these cities and they descended from the first conquistadors and encomenderos of the area. This chapter will examine elite society in more detail, in order better to understand its composition, the boundaries which separated the elites from non-elites, the relationship between local elites and royal officials and the connections between the elites of these provinces with other cities in New Granada.

Contemporary records of marriages in the city of Santa Marta immediately suggest the continuing salience of a vision of society as a hierarchy based on lineage and ethnicity, since the Cathedral of Santa Marta recorded marriages in two registers: the 'Libro de matrimonios de blancos descendientes de españoles' and the 'Libro de matrimonios de pardos, mestizos, negros'.<sup>104</sup> (As will be recalled from chapter one, Indians were not supposed to live in the city of Santa Marta and there were no marriage books specifically for them.) More substantively, the entries in these books provide concrete information on who married whom. Of course, they encompass only a small percentage of the region's adult population and consequently cannot be regarded as an infallible guide to the social values, practices and interactions of its social groups. Nonetheless, we will analyse their data in some detail because they do offer a potentially revealing glimpse of the structure of the province's leading town and of the social and cultural values of its

major groups. Let us consider these data, then, with a view to understanding the ways in which samario society was structured, how its main groups related to each other, and, in particular, the extent to which individuals from the different social groups married across ethnic boundaries. In this chapter, we will examine the white Creole families who considered themselves to be the social elite; the next chapter will then turn to the marriage practices of people of non-European descent.

White society in Santa Marta was, as in most Spanish American towns, made up of largely of 'españoles': that is people of European descent who were born in America (the creoles) and Spaniards (peninsulares) who were present in the city as either temporary or permanent residents. There were in addition small numbers of foreigners from other European countries. The data on marriages in the city of Santa Marta suggest that, on the whole, the whites were highly conscious of racial distinctions. White marriages were recorded in a separate register, dedicated solely to individuals who were 'blancos descendientes de españoles' and thus intended to ensure that local whites had a clearly recorded pedigree which would enable them to construct and sustain a superior social status. An overview of the marriages recorded in this book, shown in Table 2, indicates that one important means for the city's creoles to sustain their 'whiteness' was by marrying European immigrants.

These data show that a high proportion of the 'white' marriages contracted in Santa Marta between 1772 and 1795 were between European men

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<sup>104</sup> The Libro de matrimonios de blancos descendientes de españoles 1772 - 1795 (hereafter LBE) and Libro de matrimonios de pardos, mestizos, negros 1772 - 1788 (hereafter LPMN) are both found in the Archivo histórico eclesiástico de Santa Marta (hereafter AHESM).

(from Spain, the Canary Islands and France) and women from Santa Marta. Of the 86 marriages recorded in the 'white' marriage book in these years, at least 32 were between Spanish men and *samaritas*, and three were between Frenchmen and *samaritan* women. If, however, we examine in more detail the 86 marriages recorded in this register during the period 1772 to 1795, we find that while the city's creoles found some solidarity as 'whites', they were divided by other markers of social standing. The marriage records show that, even in this provincial outpost of the Spanish empire, whites formed 'noble' and non-noble groups, and behaved in subtly different ways when choosing marriage partners.

### Nobles in the city of Santa Marta

There was no titled nobility in the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha in the late colonial period. But a limited group of families identified themselves as 'nobles', a claim based on a set of criteria which were similar all over Spanish America.<sup>105</sup> They descended from the first conquerors of the area, the *encomenderos* of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and early governors of the provinces. They could boast purity of blood, considerable wealth, noble occupations, high military ranks, frequent service in the *cabildos*, loyalty to the Crown and prestigious residences. Noble status was important because it enabled individuals and families to claim the rights and privileges of prestigious offices and positions in the provinces, and thus set them apart from the rest of the population. But it was a precarious possession: it could only be gained with great difficulty and was easily lost. The construction of a noble class was thus a continuous process, a struggle involving high stakes and risks. In this struggle, marriage was undoubtedly of

paramount importance. A good match could confirm or even raise the status of individuals and families; a bad one might ruin an entire lineage.

In the city of Santa Marta, a handful of families laid claim to noble status. They were easily identifiable. When the officers of the militia of Santa Marta were reviewed in 1778, one of the data given for each individual was their *calidad*. Seven of the twelve officers were described as 'nobles', one was of unknown *calidad*, one was 'honest' or honourable (*honrada*), three were of known *calidad*.<sup>106</sup> Six of the seven officers listed as nobles were born in Santa Marta and belonged to the group of families which dominated prestigious offices in the city towards the end of the colonial period. These six were Pedro Melchor de la Guerra y Vega, Juan Nuñez Dávila, Pedro Norberto Díaz Granados, Diego Fernández de Castro and Thomas de la Guerra y Vega. These families, the Guerra y Vegas, the Nuñez Dávilas, the Díaz Granados' and the Fernández de Castros, recur repeatedly in the late eighteenth century sources as the most prestigious families in the city. To these four families should be added the Munive y Mozos, who were related to the above through a series of marriages, and the Zuñigas, who although only defined as of 'known' *calidad* in the militia registers, occupied central positions in the cabildo of Santa Marta and were also, albeit more remotely, related to the other noble families of the city. These various families holding these six surnames monopolised practically all positions of importance in the city of Santa Marta towards the end of the eighteenth century, except for those to which only peninsulars could aspire. Of the twenty young men from the city of Santa Marta who were allowed to study at the two Colegios Mayores of New Granada,

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<sup>105</sup> For a discussion of nobility in New Granada, see Juan Villamarín, 'The Concept of Nobility in Colonial Santa Fé de Bogotá' in Karen Spalding (ed.), *Essays in the Political, Economic and Social History of Colonial Latin America* (Newark, University of Delaware, 1982).

seventeen belonged to these families.<sup>107</sup> Both Colegios required students to prove noble status and 'purity of blood' to enter.

In order to perpetuate and enhance the noble standing of their members, only certain types of marriages were acceptable. The basic principle was that of endogamous marriage among the claimants to nobility, whereby an individual of such extraction would choose a marriage partner of equal standing. For nobles, then, acceptable marriages were within the family (usually between first or second cousins), between the noble families of the city of Santa Marta, or with noble families from elsewhere in the province or the viceroyalty or marriages with peninsular Spaniards. As we shall see, not all these types were equally frequent, and some were preferred over others.

The first kind of noble endogamy was the most difficult to achieve. Marriages between cousins or persons who were consanguineously related were prohibited by Canon Law, and could only be secured by dispensations granted by a bishop. Marriages between cousins were not frequent in Santa Marta. Of the eighty-six marriages recorded in the 'Libro de matrimonios de blancos descendientes de españoles' in the parish of the Cathedral of Santa Marta between 1772 and 1795, only four were between cousins.<sup>108</sup> All these involved members of the Díaz Granados family.<sup>109</sup> Marriage between cousins had an important advantage: it kept dowries and property within the family. However, it was

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<sup>106</sup> AGI, Santa Fe 1242

<sup>107</sup> See figures 2 and 3.

<sup>108</sup> Statistics based on LBE.

<sup>109</sup> The first was when Joseph Díaz Granados married Mariana Díaz Granados in 1777 (LBE 12 Apr. 1777). The second occurred the same year when Josef Antonio Díaz Granados married Gabriela de Castro (LBE 27 Jul. 1777). The third case was when José Vicente Díaz Granados married María Cayetana Díaz Granados (LBE 7 Dec. 1793). The fourth and last involved the

contrary to Catholic doctrine, and something which at least in theory should be avoided, and was relatively infrequent.

Probably the most preferred match was the union of two noble families which had both been established for a long time in Santa Marta. These matches not only contributed to maintain the status of individuals and families, but also strengthened the claims of the *samaritan* nobility in general to wealth and noble descent. The marital unions between the six families mentioned above were frequent in the latter half of the eighteenth century, and created a web of noble families in Santa Marta which were all interrelated. The Díaz Granados and the Nuñez Dávila were related principally by the three marriages between the children of Pedro Norberto Díaz Granados and Francisco José Nuñez Dávila.<sup>110</sup> The Guerra y Vegas were related to the Díaz Granados through a similar arrangement.<sup>111</sup> The Fernández de Castros were also tied to this network through

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marriage of Rafael de Zuñiga and Concepción de Zuñiga, who were also related to the Díaz Granados family, but more remotely (LBE 4 Dec. 1777).

<sup>110</sup> Pascual Díaz Granados married Joaquina Teresa Nuñez Dávila in 1767, Pedro Josef Díaz Granados married Magdalena Nuñez Dávila and María Cecilia Díaz Granados married Juan Esteban Nuñez Dávila. See for instance Miguel Wenceslao Quintero Guzmán, 'Díaz Granados - (Genealogía)' in *Boletín de historia y antigüedades* 66:725 (1979), pp. 251 - 266

<sup>111</sup> Two other children of Pedro Norberto Díaz Granados (he had at least eleven), Pedro Norberto jr married María Luisa de la Guerra y Vega, and María Antonia Agustina Díaz Granados married Pedro Melchor de la Guerra y Vega. The parents of María Luisa and Pedro Melchor were Pedro Melchor de la Guerra y Vega (sr.) and María Antonia de Mendoza. See José M. Restrepo Saenz y Raimundo Rivas: *Genealogias de Santa Fe de Bogotá* (Bogotá, Librería Colombiana, 1929?), p. 307-312

a series of marriages.<sup>112</sup> The Munive y Mozos and the Zuñigas were connected to this noble network too, but more loosely.<sup>113</sup>

All these families could claim descent from the first conquerors and governors of the province. The first Díaz Granados in Santa Marta, Gabriel Díaz Granados was born in 1655 in Navalmoral in Extramadura in the Peninsula.<sup>114</sup> Thirty-two years old, he married seventeen year-old María Josefa Rosa Mendoza y Castellanos in Santa Marta.<sup>115</sup> The little we know about Gabriel Díaz Granados' past in Extramadura suggest that he was not from a very wealthy family. However, he came to Santa Marta as *alférez de infantería*,<sup>116</sup> and married María Josefa, who was the daughter of Pedro Juan de Mendoza y Castellón and María de Castellanos y Peñalosa.<sup>117</sup> When they married, María Josefa brought a dowry of 500 pesos in money, two slaves and various *prendas* of gold and silver.<sup>118</sup> María Josefa descended both from the earliest governors and conquistadors of Santa Marta (through her father's line) and the governors, pearl fishery owners and conquistadors of Cubagua and Riohacha (through her mother's line).<sup>119</sup> All the

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<sup>112</sup> Josef Manuel Fernández de Castro was a peninsular Spaniard who came to Santa Marta in mid-eighteenth century. In 1754 he married Catalina Pérez Ruiz Calderón who was the daughter of the interim governor of Santa Marta, Domingo Pérez Ruiz Calderón. Josef and Catalina had two daughters and four sons: Gabriela Fernández de Castro married José Antonio Díaz Granados in 1777, and María Isidora married Antonio José Narváez y de la Torre, the governor of Santa Marta in 1786. Josef's sister, Manuela Fernández de Castro married Gabriel Díaz Granados in 1744 (who were the parents of José Antonio who married Gabriela Fernández de Castro in 1777). See Pedro Castro Trespalacios, *Culturas aborígenes cesarenses e Independencia de Valle de Upar* (Bogotá, Casa de Cultura Valledupar, 1979), p. 268

<sup>113</sup> The first Zuñiga in Santa Marta was José de Zuñiga y Peñagos (b. 1693 in Seville). One of his sons, Manuel José de Zuñiga, married Francisca Nuñez Dávila around 1750. One of their sons, Ramón de Zuñiga, studied at the Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Señora del Rosario in Santa Fe and sat on the Santa Marta cabildo on various occasions. See Testamento de Ramón de Zuñiga, 20 Jan. 1817 in NPSM, Protocolos de 1817 and Rosario 729.

<sup>114</sup> Hernandez de Alba, 'Estudios históricos' in Restrepo, *Genealogías*, pp. 312 - 313

<sup>115</sup> Quintero Guzman, 'Díaz Granados', p. 252-53

<sup>116</sup> Restrepo, *Genealogías* p. 307 and Quintero Guzman, 'Díaz Granados', p. 253

<sup>117</sup> Quintero Guzman, 'Díaz Granados', p. 253

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> María Josefa Rosa de Mendoza y Castellanos', paternal grandfather was Juan de Mendoza, *sargento mayor*, governor of Santa Marta, *encomendero* of Taganga, Mancingita and Bodaca. Her great grandfather's great great grandfather, was Miguel de Castellanos who had served in



subsequent Díaz Granados could thus claim descent from the first Spanish families in the area. The Guerra y de la Vegas had a similar claim, partly through their marriages with the Díaz Granados, but also because Pedro Melchor de la Guerra y Vega, the first of that surname in Santa Marta, had married María Antonia de Mendoza, the daughter of Eugenio Gabriel de Mendoza who descended from the first governors of Santa Marta and who was related to the Mendoza y Castellanos family.<sup>120</sup> The Nuñez Dávila had been encomenderos and governors at least since the beginning of the seventeenth century.<sup>121</sup> The first Fernández de Castro in Santa Marta, was Nicolas Felix Fernández de Castro, who was born in Madrid 1686 and was appointed comptroller of the Royal Exchequer in Santa Marta. When he arrived he was already married to Josefa Bermúdez y Bustamente from Cádiz, but their children married with the Díaz Granados family.<sup>122</sup> The history of the Munives was similar. Alonso de Munive was born in Spain in the late seventeenth century, married in Spain and was appointed treasurer of the Royal Exchequer in Santa Marta. His son Salvador Munive married Rosa María Mozo de la Torre, grand-daughter of governor Joseph Mozo

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wars in Italy early in the sixteenth century and who died in Cubaguas, after having been *contador* in San Juan and *tesorero* in Cubaguas. His son, Francisco de Castellanos, was among the first colonists of Riohacha in the 1530's, and Francisco's son, Miguel de Castellanos, who was born either in Cubaguas or Riohacha, married Juana de Rivas who was the daughter of Juan Tomé de Rivas, *capitan de infantería* during the conquest of the island of Cubaguas. Miguel's son, Francisco de Castellanos (and María Josefa Rosa's great grandfather) married Elena Peñalosa Villafañe in 1585 in Santo Domingo and Francisco was *alcalde ordinario*, *regidor perpetuo* and both *tesorero* and *contador* of the treasury in Riohacha. Francisco's son, Francisco de Castallanos y Peñalosa also sat on the *cabildo* of Riohacha at least twice and he was the father of María Castellanos y Peñalosa, the mother of María Josefa Rosa.

<sup>120</sup> Restrepo, *Genealogías de Santa Fe*, p. 307-312

<sup>121</sup> Miranda Vásquez, *La gobernación de Santa Marta*, p. 107

<sup>122</sup> 'Cedula en que S.M. concede cien pesos anuales por via de limosna a Da Josepha Bermúdez de Bustamente, viuda del oficial que fue de las cajas reales de Santa Marta Dn Nicolas Fernández de Castro' in AGI, Santa Fe 964. Their son Juan Manuel Fernández de Castro married in 1754 Catalina Pérez Ruiz Calderón, daughter of Andrés Pérez Ruiz Calderón, interim governor of Santa Marta 1763 - 1767, and María Francisca Díaz Granados. See Castro Trespacios, *Culturas aborígenes*, p. 268. In 1744 their daughter Manuela Fernández de Castro married Gabriel Díaz Granados, grandson of the first Díaz Granados in Santa Marta.

de la Torre of Santa Marta, whose family was already intermarried with the Nuñez Dávilas and the Díaz Granados.<sup>123</sup>

After a few generations of intermarriages between a handful of noble families, the claims to noble status and distinctions became very strong. Consider Pascual Díaz Granados, for instance. Although his paternal great grandfather Gabriel Díaz Granados had only come to Santa Marta in the second half of the seventeenth century, Pascual descended from the first encomenderos of the province both through his mother's line, his grandmother's line and his great grandmother's line (figure 4). Pascual was born in Santa Marta in 1749, son of Pedro Norberto Díaz Granados and María Josefa Ruiz Calderón y del Campo who had at least ten children in addition to Pascual.<sup>124</sup> When Pascual was 18 years, he married Joaquina Teresa Nuñez Dávila y Mozo, who was four years older than him. Joaquina Teresa was the daughter of Francisco José Nuñez Dávila and Ana Teresa Mozo de la Torre and granddaughter of Joseph Mozo de la Torre, who had been governor of Santa Marta during the first decades of the eighteenth century.<sup>125</sup>

By 1800, Pascual was undoubtedly one of the wealthiest men in the province. In 1801 he owned four houses in the city of Santa Marta, the sugar plantation Santa Cruz del Paraíso close to the town of Gaira, and a series of cattle ranches in the Cesar valley. Most of his rural property was in cattle and horses. On the ranches Santa Barbara de Berdecía, San José de Guartinaja, San Simon de Guartinaja, María Angola, Quiebrahueso and Playón de Chimilas he had more

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<sup>123</sup> AGI, Santa Fe 1180 and *Genealogías de Santa Fe*, pp. 307 - 313

<sup>124</sup> Pascual's father, Pedro Norberto, had been *tesorero oficial de las cajas reales* (treasurer of the royal exchequer).

than 6,200 head of cattle and nearly 900 horses. According to the evaluation of his property in 1801, the cattle was worth close to 40,000 pesos and the horses a little more than 7,000 pesos.<sup>126</sup> The sugar plantation Santa Cruz del Paraíso with its buildings, its sugar mill, the land and the cane was worth around 11,000 pesos. The residence of the Díaz Granados in the city of Santa Marta was valued at 14,000 pesos. He was also one of the largest slave owners in the province. According to the 1801 evaluation, he had 93 slaves who were worth more than 17,000 pesos. At the age of sixteen and as most of the noble men in Santa Marta, he became officer in one of the militia companies of Santa Marta. He rose to the rank of *capitán* in 1780 and in 1785 he became *coronel*, the highest rank below of the governor and the highest which a man born in Santa Marta could attain in the city.<sup>127</sup>

Pascual was not only wealthy and loaded with military distinctions. He could boast descent from the first governors and encomenderos, and he was related to practically all the prominent families in the city of Santa Marta. In the cabildo of 1792, for instance, which was formed by nine members, Pascual had one cousin (José Francisco Díaz Granados), one son-in-law (Pablo Oligós) and a brother-in-law (Juan Nuñez Dávila).<sup>128</sup> As we will see below, the governor thought Pascual controlled the cabildo either because they were his relatives or because he had authority over them in other ways. Several of Pascual's relatives pursued ecclesiastical careers and came to occupy the higher positions in the diocese. Domingo Díaz Granados, Pascual's brother, was *cura* of the cathedral in 1780 and

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<sup>125</sup> AGI, Santa Fe 1180

<sup>126</sup> AGI, Santa Fe 1201. See also Hermes Tovar, *Grandes empresas* pp. 131 - 135 and anexo 6.

<sup>127</sup> Restrepo, *Genealogías*, p. 309 - 310.

<sup>128</sup> For the elections of the 1792 cabildo and the conflict between the governor and the cabildo regarding this, see AGN, Empleados públicos del Magdalena 5, folios 870 - 917

was later promoted to *chantre*. Another brother, Pedro Gabriel Díaz Granados became *chantre* and archdeacon of the diocese.<sup>129</sup> But the institution which perhaps was most heavily infiltrated by Pascual's relatives was the local militias. Pascual was himself coronel and captain of the militia companies of Santa Marta until his death, and after his death he was replaced by Josef Francisco Munive y Mozo, whose daughter had married Pascual's son.<sup>130</sup> The two divisions of the infantry regiment of Santa Marta in 1805 were captained by José Francisco Díaz Granados, Pascual's cousin (whose lieutenant was Silvestre Díaz Granados, Pascual's nephew) and by Miguel de Zuñiga, whose lieutenant was Juan Esteban Nuñez Dávila, Pascual's brother-in-law.

Although marriages with noble families from elsewhere in the province and in the viceroyalty were not common among the most prominent families of the city of Santa Marta at the end of the colonial period, there were a few matches which linked the Díaz Granados and the Fernández de Castros to outsiders, particularly to noble families in Valledupar, Cartagena and - to a certain extent - Santa Fe. These marriages were by no means frequent, but they were important as they laid the basis for a noble network which transcended the limits of each city and which was later to play a role in determining political alignments during the wars of independence. However, before we turn to the noble families and elites of the other cities and the family connections which existed between them, we must first consider the relations between the samarian nobility and the royal officials, and the marriage patterns of the non-noble whites in Santa Marta.

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<sup>129</sup> 'El obispo de Santa Marta da cuenta a V. M. del estado material y formal de las Iglesias de su diócesis' in AGI, Santa Fe 1200 and Restrepo, *Genealogías*, pp. 307ff

<sup>130</sup> Restrepo, *Genealogías*, pp. 307ff

## Royal officials and relations with local elites

As the overview above suggests, the most common marital matches for the noble families in Santa Marta in the late eighteenth century included marriages between cousins and marriages with any of the limited number of elite families in Santa Marta. It also points to the tendency for marriages between peninsular royal officials and local elites in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. The first Díaz Granados, Fernández de Castro, Guerra y de la Vega and Munive in Santa Marta had all been royal officials who had linked up with the local noble families. But towards the end of the eighteenth century, these patterns had changed, as we shall now see.

In theory, higher-ranking officials were supposed to be outsiders to avoid collusion with local elites. Spanish law placed strict limitations on marriages between higher-ranking officials and local women, and for some positions even on their children and other relatives. In practice, however, there were several ways of circumventing these rules, and historians have often found that high-ranking officials such as viceroys, oidores, and governors sustained close relations with local elites.<sup>131</sup> In Santa Marta during the four last decades of Spanish rule, such relations call for particular attention, both because the perceivable patterns are subtle and complex and because of the evident significance of these relations for understanding responses to the political crisis after 1810.

In order to understand the relations between royal official and local elites in the city of Santa Marta, some aspects of appointment procedures and the

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<sup>131</sup> For New Granada, see for instance John L. Phelan, *The People and the King: The Comunero Revolution in Colombia, 1781* (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), pp. 3 - 17

background of the various officials need to be taken into account. The higher-ranking officials in the city of Santa Marta included the governor, the lieutenant governor, the comptroller and the treasurer of the Royal exchequer. Of these, the governor was obviously of highest rank. Usually an individual with a military career, the governors were appointed by the King after having been proposed by the Council of Indies. The governors were normally peninsulars or creoles with experience in the peninsula, and they were likely to be at least forty years old by the time they were appointed. Of the five governors who served in Santa Marta between 1770 and 1810, four were peninsulars (figure 5) and one was a nobleman from Cartagena de Indias with extensive military experience in Panamá, Cartagena and Extramadura in Spain. The latter, Antonio Narváez y de la Torre, was the only of the governors who married a member of the samarian nobility, which he did one week after his term had ended.<sup>132</sup> Two of the others were already married to peninsular wives before they took possession of the government of Santa Marta, and one married a woman from Santa Marta who belonged to a recently arrived family in the area who was not included among the local nobility.

The background of the lieutenant governors was very different. They were appointed by the viceroy after having been proposed by the Audiencia in Santa Fe, and they were lawyers rather than military officers. They were normally recruited among creoles, and specifically among those who had studied law at the Colegios mayores in Santa Fe. The youngest of these were in their late thirties when appointed, and they were in some ways already part of a creole nobility. Three of the four lieutenant governors who served in Santa Marta between 1780

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<sup>132</sup> 'Relación de meritos y servicios del capitan de infantería e ingeniero ordinario Antonio de Narvaez y la Torre' in AGI, Santa Fe 1234. His marriage to María Isidora Fernández de Castro is recorded in LBE, 24 Mar 1786

and 1810 were born in New Granada, and all three had studied law at the Rosario or San Bartolomé in Santa Fe.<sup>133</sup> These three were married before they took possession of their post in Santa Marta. The only peninsular, José María de Aviles married a fourteen year old girl from Saint-Domingue who along with her mother and other French women had fled from the revolution there.<sup>134</sup> The age and background of the governors and the lieutenants meant that the possibilities of marriages with local elites were slight.

The same may have been true for the comptrollers, who - on the basis of the little information we have on their age and marital status - generally were married before they came to Santa Marta. The treasurers, however, were more likely to marry in Santa Marta. Of the four treasurers who served in Santa Marta between 1770 and 1810 (of whom at least two and probably all four were peninsulars), at least three married with local elites. But it should be noted that they married members of the Zuñiga and Mozo families, and not with the Díaz Granados and the like.<sup>135</sup>

The low frequency of marriages between peninsular officials and samario nobles may therefore partly be explained by the small number of eligible peninsular officials. Santa Marta was only a provincial capital of little prestige and the number of peninsular royal officials was never large. Many were already married when they were appointed, so that the opportunities for nobles to

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<sup>133</sup> For more information on José Simeon Munive y Mozo, see discussion below on his conflict with the cabildo. On Manuel Campusano, see Rosario 339, and Viana, Bartolomé 1640.

<sup>134</sup> 'El gobernador de Santa Marta informa sobre el casamiento de José María de Aviles, teniente de gobernador de dha ciudad con María Victoria Panage de Ruse, francesa' in AGN, Genealogías 3, folios 449 - 478

<sup>135</sup> For their appointments, see AGI, Santa Fe 1180. The marriages of Nicolás García and Manuel Truxillo were recorded in LBE, 1 May 1772 and LBE 9 October 1792.

embrace peninsular officials through marriage was slight. Nevertheless, four of the peninsular officials did marry while they were serving in Santa Marta, and when they *did* marry they did not marry the local noble families. It is possible that the samarian nobility felt that those peninsular officials who came to Santa Marta did not have the sufficient *calidad* to be a proper match, or that the upper tier of peninsular officials regarded the samario elite as beneath them. What is striking, however, is the nobles' more general rejection of Europeans as marriage partners. As we will see, families who were considered white, but not noble, did marry peninsulars and European-born foreigners to a much larger extent. Here, the question of 'calidad' provides a likely answer. There was no great cluster of well-paid and prestigious officials posts in Santa Marta, nor a rich agriculture, nor mining, nor strong external commerce; no doubt most of the Europeans who came to Santa Marta were of humble social origins. For the samario nobility, who were concerned with lineage rather than simple whiteness, they were therefore inadequate marriage partners, since they could not contribute to displaying and sustaining pretensions to a noble lineage.

The late eighteenth-century absence of marriages between nobles and peninsular officials did not mean, however, that the samario elite made had no connections with crown officials. Governor Astigarraga was accused by the viceroy of being too lenient against the contraband trade, because he was forced to '...contract friendships and connections, and as a consequence of these [he was] forced to make concessions which were prejudicial to his service'.<sup>136</sup> His successor, Antonio de Samper, was arrested and imprisoned in Cartagena on the

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<sup>136</sup> Letter from Joseph de Espeleta to Antonio Valdes, Santa Fe 19 May 1790 in AGS, Guerra 7086, exp. 6



same charge.<sup>137</sup> Treasurer Manuel Truxillo had to flee Santa Marta and leave his wife, when frauds were discovered in the funds of the Royal Exchequer which Truxillo had used to invest in his own businesses and those of Pascual Díaz Granados.<sup>138</sup> The comptroller was arrested, probably as a result of the same fraud.<sup>139</sup>

The case of José Simeón Munive y Mozo, lieutenant governor between 1780 and 1791, illustrates several aspects of the relationships between officials and local elites. After a decade in this office, Munive came under attack from the cabildo of Santa Marta. In 1791, the *regidor* Fernando Manuel del Río informed the viceroy that Munive y Mozo had obtained his position unlawfully, since he was not only born in Santa Marta himself, but also married to a *hija del país*.<sup>140</sup> José Munive y Mozo had been appointed *teniente de gobernador* in 1780, and these were one of the high-ranking posts which, in legal principle, could not be held by persons born in the district or married to a local woman.<sup>141</sup> Munive was regarded with suspicion by members of the samario elite, who evidently assumed that Munive would use his official position to pursue family interests and, by implication, to damage the interests of other elite families. In the view of *regidor* Río, '...justice has no enemy more powerful than connections, friendships, passions and hatred and one cannot perceive how it can be administered

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<sup>137</sup> Restrepo Tirado, *Historia de la provincia de Santa Marta*, vol. 2, p. 289

<sup>138</sup> See 'Pedro Gabriel Díaz Granados contra la testamerntaria de Pascual Díaz Granados', 1802 - 1806 in AGN, Testamentarias del Magdalena 2, folios 610 - 728

<sup>139</sup> See 'José de la Cruz, esclavo de Manuel Cartas, contador que fue de las Reales Cajas de Santa Marta, solicita permiso para casarse' in AGN. Negros y esclavos 1, folios 997 - 1003. See also 'Manuel de Cartas y Tejerina, contador de la real hacienda se Santa Marta, se queja del gobernador que lo redujera a prisión' in AGN, Empleados públicos del Magdalena 10, folios 676 - 692

<sup>140</sup> AGI, Santa Fe 739 Copy of letter from Fernando Manuel del Río to Joseph de Espeleta, copy dated 19 December 1791.

impartially by a subject who regularly is involved in these matters...'<sup>142</sup> And since the *teniente* was '...native of Santa Marta, married to a creole, surrounded by his own relatives and those of his wife, he is forced to accommodate to them, protect them, give them favours, by which justice and integrity are not seldom sacrificed.'<sup>143</sup> On this basis and on behalf of the *cabildo*, Río asked the viceroy to remove Munive from his post.

The antagonism against Munive was not a merely personal matter. Manuel Antonio Rubianes explained that several inhabitants in Santa Marta had complained about Munive because his private and commercial interests took precedence over his royal duties. There had been one specific case, according to Rubianes, which had upset the city. A Frenchman, Miguel Marcial, sued the *administrador de aguardiente*, Francisco Alvarado, for the brutal treatment of two slaves who belonged to Marcial.<sup>144</sup> Because of the treatment, one of the slaves had died. Munive, who had acted as a judge in the case, concluded that Marcial was not entitled to any compensation for the loss of his slave, and that he furthermore had to pay for the costs of the case. In addition to this particular case, and his partiality more generally, Rubianes claimed that Munive was having a public and scandalous affair with a married woman.<sup>145</sup> Rubianes himself had found it impossible to do anything about this scandal during his *visita general*, because the

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<sup>141</sup> José Simeón Munive y Mozo was married to María Manuela Mozo de la Torre. See 'Testamento de María Antonia Munive y Mozo de la Torre', 22 Jun 1807 in NPSM, Protocolos de 1819 - 1820

<sup>142</sup> AGI, Santa Fe 739 Copy of letter from Fernando Manuel del Río to Joseph de Espeleta, copy dated 19 December 1791: 'no teniendo la justicia enemigos mas poderosos que las conexiones, amistades, las pasiones, y los odios, no se puede concebir como se administre imparcialmente por un sugeto en quien es muy regular concurren estos contrarios afectos'

<sup>143</sup> Ibid. 'El es natural de Santa Marta, está casada con criolla, le rodean sus parientes y los de su muger, se ve en la presición de contemporizar con ellos, de protegerles y darles favor, en lo que se sacrifica no pocas ocaciones las justicia y la integridad.'

<sup>144</sup> Copy of letter from Manuel Antonio Rubianes to the viceroy in AGI, Santa Fe 739.

married couples continued to live together and Munive's wife concealed her anger at this insult to her honour. Rubianes therefore suggested that the best solution was to move Munive to another location, away from his mistress, his commercial interests and his relatives.

The governor of Santa Marta, José de Astigarraga, defended Munive by turning these accusations back on the complainants whom, he stated, were equally burdened by extensive family networks which prevented them from carrying out their duties impartially. Astigarraga implied that this was not a conflict over an official who abused his position, but a conflict derived from competition between leading families over power. Indeed, he argued that Munive was an honest official who was accused of corruption because he had attacked corrupt practices among leading vecinos. According to Governor Astigarraga, Munive had fulfilled his duties well during the 11 years he was *teniente*, and although it was true that he was born in Santa Marta and that he had some relatives there, '...this has never impeded the correct administration of justice, which I myself have experienced during the 6 years and five months I have been in charge of this government. Astigarraga went on to say that

“During these years and the earlier ones, there has never been the slightest complaint against Munive. Although I have seen that the *regidores*, their relatives and some other individuals linked to them do not get on well with him, because of his eagerness in fulfilling the service of the King,

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<sup>145</sup> Ibid: 'por que amas de lo expuesto mantiene publico y escandaloso concubinato con una

because he declared that some of the furniture  
in the homes of Fernando del Río and Pablo  
Oligós were contraband and should be  
confiscated...”

Despite the governor's defence, Munive was removed from his position and the viceroy appointed Manuel Campusano to replace him. But this simply produced another round of accusations, in which Astigarrara took the offensive. On hearing of Campusano's appointment, Governor Astigarraga wrote to the viceroy to oppose this appointment on much the same grounds used by Munive's critics. Campusano, said the governor, had far too many connections and relatives in the province.<sup>146</sup> Not only was Campusano born in Valencia de Jesús and thus legally ineligible for the position, but he was related to some of the most powerful families in Santa Marta. Campusano's brother José was married in Valencia de Jesús where he had a number of children and grand-children. In Valledupar he also had relatives, among them the *Coronel* Agustín de la Sierra, his brother-in-law. In Guaymaro, the *Coronel* Eduardo Guerra, was also his brother-in-law, and worst of all '...in this city he is related to the extensive family of the Granados, and among them the *Coronel* Pascual Díaz Granados ....who has at his disposal the *regidores* of this cabildo, some because they are his relatives, others because they are under his authority...' Astigarraga also mentioned that this network was beginning to become especially dangerous because Ana Joaquina de la Guerra y Vega, first cousin of Pascual, was planning to marry José Antonio

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Señora casada'

<sup>146</sup> Letter from José de Astigarraga to el marques de Bajamar, Santa Marta 25 August 1792 in AGI, Santa Fe 739

Berrío, one of the *fiscales* at the Audiencia in Santa Fe.<sup>147</sup> The governor's efforts were to no avail, however, and Munive did not regain his post.

As this case clearly shows, family networks were of extreme importance to the elite families in Santa Marta. Strategic marriage alliances could create 'connections, friendships and passions', and they could oblige officials to grant favours and protect friends and relatives. Thus marriage with officials was a desirable strategy for nobles and one that was perhaps inevitable, since, as nobles, they considered themselves to be the people most eligible to hold office. Such marriages were not without potential complications, as we have seen, since high-ranking officials were generally not allowed to marry in the district where they served, and had to apply for a license from the King if they wanted to get married. Few of these licences have been found from the province of Santa Marta, and it seems that royal officials who wanted to marry chose to avoid applying for formal permission since this was a costly and protracted procedure. Some, no doubt, attempted Munive's strategy: marry and hope that no one would hold it against them. Another possibility was to simply wait until one had been appointed to a different district, as did Antonio Narváez y de la Torre (1733 - 1812), governor of Santa Marta from 1776 to 1786.<sup>148</sup> Antonio Samper, on the other hand, managed

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<sup>147</sup> Ana Joaquina was the daughter of Pedro Melchor de la Guerra y Vega and María Antonia Agustina Díaz Granados, who was Pascual's sister.

<sup>148</sup> Antonio Narváez y de la Torre was appointed governor of Santa Marta on 22 May 1776, took possession of the government on 17 January 1777 and was replaced by José de Astigarraga who took possession of the government on 16 March 1786, after having been appointed on 11 June 1785. On 24 March 1786, one week after he had been replaced by Astigarraga, Antonio Narváez y de la Torre married María Isidora Fernández de Castro y Aguilera in the cathedral of Santa Marta. Antonio was born in Cartagena to one of the most prestigious families there, and he occupied a series of important royal positions in late colonial New Granada. His father was Juan Salvador Xavier de Narváez y Berrío (1702 - 1777), *alcalde ordinario* and *alferez mayor* in Cartagena, *corregidor* of San Juan de Girón and from 1765 *administrador* of the aguardiente monopoly in Cartagena, who descended from the first families of encomenderos and conquerors in Cartagena. Juan Salvador married Catalina Antonia de la Torre y Berrío in Cartagena in 1731 and thus became Conde de Santa Cruz de la Torre. Antonio Narváez y de la Torre descended from Francisco Nuñez Velázquez de Quero

to have his marriage to Bernarda Bravo consecrated in Santa Fe while he was physically in Santa Marta, no doubt to make it seem that he was marrying someone from outside his jurisdiction.<sup>149</sup>

### The 'white descendants of Spaniards'

If the nobles' preference for marrying whites was refined by an additional concern to marry whites of comparable social standing, the other white vecinos of Santa Marta showed more simple racial prejudices. Below the group of noble families, there existed in the city of Santa Marta another layer of 'Spanish' families which were distinct from the commoners but did not meet all the criteria of nobility or were not considered to be of the same *calidad* as the Díaz Granados, the Nuñez Dávilas, the Fernández de Castros and the Guerra y de la Vegas. In this layer or status group, we find, for instance, the officers of the militias whose *calidad* was described as known (*conocida*) or unknown (*no conocida*), and as 'honourable' (*honrrada*) rather than 'noble'. This group included the Ziosis, the Cataños, the de la Rosas, the Barlisas, the de Armas, the Luque Morenos, the Porras, and a series of other families which constituted the bulk of the population categorised as 'white' in the 1793 census. Compared to the close-knit self-proclaimed nobility of

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through his mother's line, and was thus already distantly related to the Díaz Granados' and the Fernández de Castros. If Antonio had attempted to apply for royal permission to marry María Isidora while he was still governor of Santa Marta, he would probably not have been granted his wish. María Isidora was first cousin of Pascual Díaz Granados (María Isidora's mother, Catalina Pérez Ruiz Calderón, was the sister of María Josefa Ruiz Calderón, Pascual's mother), and her sister Gabriela had married José Antonio Díaz Granados (son of Gabriel Díaz Granados and Manuela Fernández de Castro, Gabriela's and María Isidora's aunt). See 'Relación de meritos y sevicios de D. Juan Salvador de Narváez y Berrío' in AGI, Santa Fe 1234; Quintero Guzman, 'Díaz Granados' (although there seems to be some errors in his article concerning the various Diego Nuñez de Velazquez who lived in Santa Marta in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) and Restrepo, *Generalogías* p. 307

<sup>149</sup> Copy of the marriage certificate is found in 'La parte de Benita Bravo, vecina de Santa Marta, solicita se declare por legitima heredera a su hija tenida durante el matrimonio con D. Antonio Samper' in AGN, Solicitudes 13, folios 133 - 185

Santa Marta, the non-noble whites were characterised by a larger degree of openness, and they were particularly welcoming towards peninsulars with a certain level of social status. Some of them managed to become officers in the militias and members of the *cabildo*, and in general it seems they had respectable occupations (they were not engaged in manual labour). They had their marriages recorded in the '*libro de matrimonios de blancos descendientes de españoles*' like the 'noble' families, and many of them had substantial properties in and around the city. They were thus distinguished from the population in general by their claim to be white, by their legitimate birth, by their decent occupations and their wealth. They could not, however, claim descent from the first conquerors and governors of the province, and this separated them from the 'nobles'.

One outstanding difference between the marriage pattern of this group and that of the nobles was that they were much more likely to marry peninsular Spaniards and other Europeans. Of the 86 marriages recorded in the book for '*blancos descendientes de españoles*' between 1772 and 1795, ten included members of the noble families. The remaining 76 marriages were thus marriages of the non-noble white group. Of the 76 grooms, 40 were from Spain and three were from France, while only 14 were from the city of Santa Marta. Bridegrooms from Spain actually outnumbered the grooms from the city of Santa Marta itself in the marriages recorded in the book for 'white descendants of Spaniards'. As we saw when looking at 'noble' marriages, these men did not marry into the noble families, but took their brides from women of lower social status. Evidently, then, there was a marriage market in which prestigious, white but non-noble *samaritan* families partnered their daughters with peninsular immigrants.

This did not mean, however, that creoles who wished to defend their status as whites were ready to enter into marriage alliances with Europeans simply because they were of their European origin. In fact, fewer than half the peninsulars' marriages in Santa Marta between 1772 and 1795 were recorded in the books for 'whites'. The rest were recorded in the libro de pardos, mestizos, negros, showing that many Europeans were ready to marry into the mixed-race lower classes. For foreigners (that is mostly men from France and Italy), it appears to have particularly difficult to marry into the creole elite. Most of the foreigners in the city of Santa Marta were men. They were sailors, merchants and artisans who for different reasons became stranded in Santa Marta and settled down there. In the marriage registers from 1772 to 1795 (until 1788 for the 'pardos, negros, indios') there are recorded ten marriages with nine men (one married twice) who were not from Spain or Spanish America.<sup>150</sup> Only three of them had their marriages recorded in the book for 'blancos', and they were all French.<sup>151</sup> And, although these foreigners had succeeded in having their marriages recorded in the prestigious marriage book for 'blancos descendientes de españoles', they did not marry into the most prominent families in Santa Marta. Two of the three married women of the Ziosi family. The Ziosis were considered to be of pure ancestry (without Moorish, Jewish and African blood), but they had never occupied the highest-ranking positions in Santa Marta.<sup>152</sup> They were not elected to positions in the cabildo, and none of them were officers in the militias.

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<sup>150</sup> These nine were Juan Baptista Arnao (France), Josef de los Santos (Marseille), Juan Baptista Lafita (France), Nicolas Galian (Genova), Francisco Garros (France), Luis Negrín (Rome), Vicente Ferrer (Evora in Portugal), Juan Conrado (Genova) and Miguel Barli (Genova).

<sup>151</sup> Juan Baptista Arnao married María Josefa López, the daughter of Francisco Xavier López and Juana Francisca Ziosi. Josef de los Santos from Marseille married Ana Fernández, and Juan Bapista Lafita married Francisca Ziosi.

<sup>152</sup> See case of Barlisa vs Lafita below.



Being French or foreign in general, was not a great advantage on the *samaritan* marriage market before independence.

A few foreigners managed to make part of the select group which sat on the cabildo and held important posts in government. But this seems to have happened only rarely before the mid-eighteenth century, and not at all afterwards.<sup>153</sup> The foreigners who came to Santa Marta in the second half of the eighteenth century found it more difficult to be accepted among the elite. Manuel Benito Josef Pacheco was originally from Portugal, and had come to Santa Marta in 1766 or 1767 while he was working on ships which sailed on Cuba, Cartagena and Riohacha.<sup>154</sup> In Santa Marta he had worked as *expendedor* in the royal tobacco monopoly, he had married María Josefa Bernea in 1771 and he owned urban property (a house of barro and two in stone, some gold and silver and four slaves) worth a little less than 5000 pesos, which made him a reasonably wealthy man by

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<sup>153</sup> The foreigners who came to Santa Marta before 1750 and held notable positions in local government, included Esteban Bodquin (from Ireland) who married Dorotea de Zuñiga and was appointed treasurer. See María Carmen Mena García, 'Santa Marta durante la Guerra de Sucesión Española' in *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 36 (1979), pp. 646 - 647. One of his descendants, Lucas Esteban Nuñez Dávila Bodquín García, studied at San Bartolomé after 1741. (See Bartolomé 952); Juan Claros, born in Antwerp, while this was still under Spanish rule, he left his native land at an early age and emigrated to America with Francisco Santaren, who had been appointed captain of one of the companies of Cartagena. They arrived in Cartagena in 1690, but during the siege of Cartagena in 1697, they both left and went to Santa Marta. In Santa Marta, Claros settled and in 1711 he married Ana de Herrera y Espinola, native of Gibraltar. He was elected *regidor*, *alcalde de hermandad* and *alcalde de primer voto*. He also served four years as interim *contador oficial* of the royal treasury and he had by 1737 managed to hold more than 10.000 pesos in landed property (See AGI, Indiferente general 1536); Juan Baptista Machado, a native of Portugal who had gone to Santa Marta before 1700 as an agent of the *asentista de negros*, Gaspar de Andrade. When the War of Succession broke out in 1700, Machado stayed in Santa Marta to take care of the business, and in 1701 he married Josepha Sánchez de la Rosa who was native of Santa Marta, daughter of Miguel Sánchez de la Rosa and Gerónima de Zuñiga. Juan Baptista and Josepha had six children by 1737, some of which were married in Santa Marta, and one who was serving as *teniente* in one of the militia companies in Santa Marta. Juan Baptista himself had been elected *alcalde de hermandad*, *provisor general* and *alcalde ordinario* twice, and he possessed property worth a little more than 5.000 pesos. (See AGI, Indiferente general 1536)

<sup>154</sup> 'Testimonio de las diligencias practicadas sobre justificar la cristiandad hombría de bien y residencia de Manuel Benito Josef Pacheco y abaluo de los Bienes que este posee' in AGI, Santa Fe 1195

samaritan standards, but he never served on the cabildo.<sup>155</sup> Juan Miguel Marcial was French and first known in Santa Marta for having made Juana Francisca del Campo, a *parda libre*, pregnant with twins.<sup>156</sup> In 1771 they married, between 1774 and 1780 they had five more children. At first, Juan Miguel was trying to make a living as a cook, which several witnesses claimed was very difficult in Santa Marta, although Marcial was '...unique in the art of the kitchen...'. He also set up a small business buying and selling food. In 1778 he was given the exclusive right to sell *papel sellado* in Santa Marta, which, although not very lucrative, must have provided a certain income. Despite his meagre financial resources, he was able to make connections to the local elite in Santa Marta. When his son Juan Josef was baptised in 1774, María Cecilia Díaz Granados was the godmother.<sup>157</sup> However, when the younger children were baptised, the padrinos were Nicolas Ximeno (from Vizcaya), his brother Andrés Ximeno and María del Carmen Colet, the widow of Bernardo Buri. When two of Marcial's slaves were mistreated by the *administrador* of the liquor monopoly in Santa Marta, many *vecinos* seems to have supported him against the *administrador* and the *teniente del gobernador* Munive, among them Fernández del Río and Pablo Oligós who, as we have seen, belonged to the group 'controlled' by Pascual Díaz Granados. Although Marcial had not married into the local elite, and despite never occupying prestigious positions in local government, he was able (perhaps through his wife) to enter into a circle of powerful and influential subjects, presumably in some sort of patron-client relationship.

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<sup>155</sup> Ibid and 'Carta de naturaleza a Benito Josef Pacheco, natural de Portugal y vecino de Santa Marta' 29 June 1786 in AGI, Indiferente General 1536.

<sup>156</sup> This is the same Marcial who sued the *administrador* de aguardiente for brutal treatment of two slaves. 'Testimonio de un superior orden del exmo señor virrey de este nuevo reyno de Granada, y otras diligencias que conducen a solicitar Juan Miguel Marcial de nacion frances carta de nauraleza' in AGI, Santa FE 1195

<sup>157</sup> She was married to Juan Esteban Nuñez Dávila, and she was the sister of Pascual Díaz Granados.

The cases of the foreigners are interesting primarily because they can shed some light on the criteria used by *samaritan* society to define the social status of individuals and families. Clearly, although race was important, it was not the sole criterion for creole families choosing marriage partners. First, creole nobles did not choose European marriage partners, but selected from among their peers. Second, the creoles who did marry Europeans were not considered to be among the exclusive upper layer of *samaritan* society. Thirdly, among this latter group, there was clearly a concern to ensure that European husbands matched the honour and status of the bride. This is most clearly reflected in the reluctance of prominent creole families to marry their daughters to foreigners. For foreigners were likely to be of low social status, unlikely to have any property in Santa Marta, could easily run away, might even be suspected of heresy, and had none of the social connections which were essential for the protection and advancement of social standing in late colonial Santa Marta.

Whiteness did not, then, of itself guarantee marriage into white society; it was, however, an essential preliminary qualification for marriage in respectable creole society. Elite families based their claim to prominence in part on their purity of blood, and loss of this purity could have immediate and drastic consequences for the families involved. The case of the conflict between María Dominga Barlisa and Manuel Antonio Lafit over broken marriage promises illustrates the extent to which differences in racial status could be an unbridgable impediment to marriage, even where failure to legitimate a sexual union brought a

loss of family honour.<sup>158</sup> Manuel Antonio Lafit and María Dominga Barlisa had promised to marry each other (exchanged *esponsales de futuro y de presente*), and under this promise María Dominga had let Manuel Antonio deflower her. Manuel apparently got cold feet, because María Dominga went to the ecclesiastical judge (provisor general) and asked him to compel Manuel Antonio to fulfil his promise. But Manuel was a reluctant *fiancé* and in order to force him into the marriage, the authorities had to obtain his mother's acceptance of the union. Manuel's mother, Francisca Ziosi, however, opposed the marriage on the grounds that María Dominga was not of the same status as her son.<sup>159</sup> María Dominga's father did not accept that they were of different social standing, and thus an enquiry was conducted into the genealogies of the parties involved.

The enquiry revealed that María Dominga and Manuel Antonio were related: María Dominga's father and Manuel Antonio's mother were first cousins. (Figure 6). This relationship among whites was not sufficient, however, to guarantee María Dominga's whiteness. Indeed, Francisca Ziosi's opposed the marriage because, while her father's racial identity was not in doubt, the *calidad* of María Dominga's mother, Cención de Armas, was doubtful. According to Francisca and the witnesses she brought forth, it was publicly known that Cención was not white. One of her witnesses, Juan Bautista de Mier y Villar, declared that he had known Cención's parents and that her mother was a *mulata* from the town of Moreno in the province of Riohacha and her father was native of Santa Marta,

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<sup>158</sup> 'Real provisión compulsoria pedida por Juan Barlisa de lo actuado por los jueces civiles y eclesiasticos de Santa Marta, en la demanda para que se verificase el matrimonio de María Dominga Barlisa, hija del demandante, con Manuel Antonio Lafit' in AGN, Juicios criminales, tomo 74 folios 901 - 962

<sup>159</sup> By the *Pragmática sanción* of 1776 and several subsequent royal decrees, parents in Spanish America had the right to oppose the marriage of their sons and daughters if they thought the match was unequal.

'...but that they were not white, nor reputed to be white, neither here [in Santa Marta], nor in Riohacha or in the parish of Moreno.'<sup>160</sup> The sixty-two year old retired sergeant Juan Manuel Guerrero thought that '...the mother of Cención was cuarteroon of a *mulata*' and Rafael Bermúdez declared that 'Cención never had been known as white.'<sup>161</sup>

The witnesses brought forth by Juan Barliza did not attempt to refute that his wife had not been entirely white. Instead they launched a counter-attack which emphasised the foreignness and lowly social standing of the French husband of Francisca Ziosi. First of all he was a foreigner who '...never obtained *carta de naturaleza*...or distinctions of any kind...' and thus he was not '...comprehended in the estate of the nobles.'<sup>162</sup> Francisco Rigal knew that Lafit was French, and that he worked as a sailor, that he was the captain of a *guayro* and that he owned some *chinchorros* in Santa Marta, which were surely not noble occupations.<sup>163</sup> Luis de Santo Domingo declared that '...Lafit was not known as anything more than a Frenchman and without any distinctions whatsoever.'<sup>164</sup> The witnesses also testified that Juan Barliza and Cención de Armas had three daughters, besides María Dominga, all whom had been educated and raised decently and in a Christian manner.

The question was how to measure Cención's impurity of blood against the lowly occupation and foreign origin of Lafit. This was clearly a delicate problem,

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<sup>160</sup> Ibid. folio 946 'pero que ni estos fueron Blancos, ni reputados por tales ni en esta ciudad, ni en la de Riohacha, ni Parroquia de Moreno.'

<sup>161</sup> Ibid. folio 947: 'la madre de Cención era quarterona de mulato' and 'Cención jamas ha sido conocida por Persona blanca'

<sup>162</sup> Ibid. folios 947 - 950

<sup>163</sup> Ibid. folio 952

<sup>164</sup> Ibid. folio 954: 'Que el D. Juan Baptista Lafit no fue conocido mas que por Frances, y sin distincion alguna.'

which the governor Andrés de Samper seems to have wanted to avoid at all costs. He first refused to accept the case, saying that as long as Francisca opposed the union, there was nothing the authorities could do, since according to a *Real Cedula* of 1788, betrothals made without parental consent were invalid. María Dominga's father was determined to restore the honour of his daughter (and his own ), however, and managed to make the fiscal of the Audiencia in Santa Fe order Samper to go through with the hearing. When the hearing was completed, it was Samper's duty as governor to judge whether the parental opposition was just or not. This he refused to do, claiming that, since the hearing had taken more time than was customary, he had no obligation to judge in the matter. He therefore sent the case directly to Santa Fe. The Audiencia then ruled that Francisca's opposition to the unions was just, since María Dominga could not claim purity of blood.

As the case indicates, white families preferred marriage to other whites, but at times had difficulty in determining who was and was not 'white' in a society where there was evidently some marriage across race lines. Indeed, the case suggests that in Santa Marta the very criteria by which social standing was judged were constantly being contested and debated in conflicts such as the one between Barlisa and Ziosi. Race clearly mattered, and in this particular case it was the black ancestry of Cención de Armas which eventually made the judges in Santa Fe decide that there was a discrepancy between María Dominga and Manuel Antonio in terms of social status. But this decision was not taken without opposition. Barlisa refused to accept that his cousin's son was of a higher social standing than his own daughter, simply because his cousin had married a foreign sailor, whereas he had married a *quarteroon of a mulatto* from Moreno. The criteria for judging

social standing which Barlisa used in his argument are by now familiar: legitimacy of birth, Christian education, honourable occupation and morally sound conduct. He did not achieve his aim in this case, but maybe he would have, had the case been judged in Santa Marta rather than in Santa Fe (where there were few people of African ancestry). The case also illustrates that elite standing was precarious. It could be lost easily, and once lost, it would be hard to regain it.

### Elites in Riohacha, Ocaña and Valledupar

Unfortunately, the sources available for this study do not allow a comparably detailed discussion of elite marriage patterns in the other cities of Santa Marta and Riohacha provinces. But there are two general questions we should ask about the marriages of the elites in the rest of the diocese, before we move on to discussing the marriages of other groups. First, to what extent did elite families in the major cities of the two provinces intermarry with each other? Secondly, to what extent did the other cities have marriage patterns that differed from those of the city of Santa Marta?

It seems that there was not *one* elite in the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha towards the end of the colonial period, but rather elites within each of the major cities with their own genealogies and particular histories. The cities of Santa Marta, Riohacha, Valledupar and Ocaña had been founded by different groups of conquistadors in the sixteenth century, and, as we have seen for Santa Marta, these early colonist elites reproduced themselves by intermarrying with the other families in the same group and with new arrivals from Spain. Although

marriages between elite families of the different cities in the province occasionally occurred, in general there were distinct elites within each city.

The clearest example is Ocaña. As we saw in the first chapter, Ocaña was founded in 1570 by a group of conquistadors from Pamplona and the northern part of the province of Tunja. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Ocaña was the largest city in the province of Santa Marta with its 5,600 inhabitants.<sup>165</sup> Of these, more than 1,700 were (or more than thirty per cent) categorised as whites in the 1793 census (Table 1). This was much a higher percentage of 'whites' than in any other city or town in the province of Santa Marta, and one can only speculate on the possible reasons for this difference. Were the criteria for 'white' status different in Ocaña? Were the processes of race-mixing entirely different than in the coastal areas? Regardless of the answer, there is no reason to believe that elite society in Ocaña was less restricted or close-knit than in the city of Santa Marta. In Ocaña, too, a handful of families monopolised the cabildo and held the most important political and ecclesiastical positions. If we consider, for instance, the members of the cabildos of Ocaña from 1750 to 1810, we find that the same families recur. They had surnames like Quintero Príncipe, Jácome Morineli, Sánchez Barriga, del Rincón, Caravajalino, Rizo, Rodríguez Terán, Llaín Saravia, Omaña, Navarro, Ibáñez, Lemus and Copete.<sup>166</sup> These were (of course), the same surnames held by the students from Ocaña at the Colegios mayores of El Rosario and San Bartolomé.<sup>167</sup> When Joaquín Colmenares from the town of Cúcuta was accused by his wife, Francisca Antonia Jácome, of having abandoned her and for living *amancebado* with another woman, Colmenares declared that he did not

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<sup>165</sup> 'Santa Marta 1793. Padron general' in AGI, Indiferente General, 1527:

<sup>166</sup> Members of various seventeenth- and eighteenth-century cabildos in Ocaña are listed in Alejo Amaya, *Los genitores* (Cúcuta, Imprenta del Departamento, 1915)



expect justice to be fulfilled in Ocaña because all the judges there were related to his wife.<sup>168</sup> Although a large percentage of the inhabitants of Ocaña was categorised as white, the elite which ruled the city were probably no more numerous than its counterpart in Santa Marta.

Some of the late eighteenth-century elites in Ocaña could boast descent from the first conquerors and encomenderos of the area. The great grand-father of María Antonia del Rincón, for instance, whose name was Bartolomé del Rincon and born in Ocaña, probably descended from José del Rincón who was encomendero in Ocaña in 1627.<sup>169</sup> And as we have seen, this family had married with the Quintero Príncipes, who in turn descended from Juan Quintero Príncipe, who controlled one of the largest encomiendas in Ocaña in 1627. Most probably this Juan was one of the descendants of Pedro Quintero Príncipe who had been conquistador in the expedition of Jerónimo Lebrón, which left Santa Marta in 1540 for the interior.<sup>170</sup> The Fernández Caravajalinos were established in Ocaña at least by the second half of the seventeenth century, and possibly much earlier.<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>167</sup> See figures 2 and 3.

<sup>168</sup> AGN, Juicios criminales, tomo 68, folios 918 - 918v: 'viendo que los principales sugetos de aquella ciudad son sus deudos, y en aquella actualidad los jueces tan inmediatos, que el mas apartado era primo hermano de su madre, nos regresamos temerosos de que no me administrase la justicia devida'. Francisca Antonia was the daughter of Gregorio Jácome (1723 - 1800?) from his second marriage with Juana de Omaña. Francisca Antonia was the second cousin of Joaquín Rizo, the corregidor, and of Juan Rafael del Real y Soto, alcalde ordinario de segundo voto. She was first cousin of Simón Jácome, the alcalde ordinario de primer voto. Joaquín Rizo was the son of Miguel Antonia Rizo who had been corregidor previously, and who was the son of Gregorio Agustín Rizo and Ana María Luisa Jácome, and married to María Antonia del Rincón, who was the daughter of Antonio del Rincón and Josefa Quintero Príncipe.

<sup>169</sup> Trinidad Vasquez, *La Gobernación de Santa Marta* p. 171

<sup>170</sup> This first Quintero Príncipe in New Granada was born in Andalucía in 1520, married María Sánchez Castellano with whom he had more than eight children, occupied several positions on the cabildo of Pamplona in the 1550's and 1560's, and had several encomiendas around Pamplona. He lived until he was at least 70, and he, or one of his sons, probably participated in the founding of Ocaña in 1571. José Ignacio Avellanada, *The Conquerors of the New Kingdom of Granada* (Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 1995), pp. 179 - 229

<sup>171</sup> Francisco Fernández Caravajalino was the great-grandfather of María Antonia del Rincón who married Miguel Antonio Rizo. AGN, Genealogías, tomo 3, folios 792 - 820

Like their peers in Santa Marta, the late colonial elites of Ocaña could base their claim for nobility on descent from the first conquerors.

But the nobles of Ocaña differed from those of Santa Marta in their relation to peninsulars in general and royal officials in particular. There were very few peninsular officials in Ocaña. The city and its jurisdiction was governed by the cabildo and by the governor based in Santa Marta. The only official serving in Ocaña in the late eighteenth century was the Oficial Real y Juez de puertos, a position comparable to that of treasurer in Santa Marta. Only three individuals held this position between 1750 and 1810: José Mateo Sánchez Barriga, Joseph de Llaín y Saravia and Miguel de Ibáñez (Figure 5). Of these, Sánchez Barriga was undoubtedly the one who experienced most tension with the local elites. Between his appointment in 1754 and at least until 1761, there were serious conflicts between him and the cabildo and later with the local priests.<sup>172</sup> The creation of this post affected the interests of the cabildo, because prior to 1754, the jurisdiction of the taxes was in the hand of the *alcaldes ordinarios*. In the 1750s a series of lawsuits between the members of the cabildo and the newly appointed royal official culminated in the removal of several prominent *vecinos* from their seats in the cabildo. José Antonio del Rincón, José Rodríguez Terán, Francisco Sánchez y Posada, Gregorio Jácome Morineli, Alonso Quintero Príncipe, José Trigos and Felix de Omaña were all suspended from their posts and some of them were even arrested. Allied with the priests of Ocaña (who were also members of the city's patriciate), the former *capitulares* sought revenge by

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<sup>172</sup> Jorge Meléndez Sánchez, *Vivir la región* 2. ed. (Bogotá, Codice editoriales, 1994), pp. 169 - 179. McFarlane comments on the same conflict in 'Civil Disorders and Popular Protests in Late Colonial New Granada' in *HAHR* 64:1 (1984), pp. 17 - 54. José Mateo Sánchez Barriga was born in San Lucar de Barrameda in Spain in 1721 according to the information given when his son Miguel sought to enter the school of San Bartolomé in 1764, see Bartolomé 1195

excommunicating the brother of the royal official, Pedro Sánchez Barriga, for an alleged usurpation of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the a case concerning tutelage of a young woman.<sup>173</sup> But the conflict between the royal officials such as José Mateo Sánchez Barriga and his successors was gradually weakened by the inclusion of these outsiders into local elite society. The son of José Mateo, Miguel entered the school of San Bartolomé and became a lawyer of the Real Audiencia in Santa Fe.<sup>174</sup> His immediate successor, the peninsular Sebastián Llaín Sarabia, who was appointed in 1761, married Antonio del Rincón y Quintero Príncipe, member of the principal families of Ocaña and descendant of the conquistadors and first encomenderos of the area.<sup>175</sup> One of his daughters, María del Rosario Llaín Sarabia, married Simón Jácome Morineli, another member of the local nobility.<sup>176</sup> A native of Cartagena de Indias, the next royal official of Ocaña was Miguel de Ibáñez who was appointed sometime before 1786.<sup>177</sup> He also married into the local elite through his wife Manuela Jacoba Arias Pereira Rodríguez Therán.<sup>178</sup> Given the very low number of officials in both Ocaña and Santa Marta, one should perhaps be careful in drawing conclusions on the different elites perception and acceptance of peninsular officials, but it seems to be clear that in Ocaña, the local nobility did not avoid marriages with the officials.

Given the location of Ocaña in the interior, there were probably fewer peninsulars and Europeans than in the city of Santa Marta. One possible reason for the greater openness of the Ocaña elites towards peninsulars may have been

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<sup>173</sup> Meléndez Sánchez, *Vivir la región*, p. 173

<sup>174</sup> San Bartolomé 1195 and Restrepo, *Genealogías de Santa Fe*, pp. 95 - 96

<sup>175</sup> AHESM, tomo 20, folios 95 - 97

<sup>176</sup> El Rosario 905

<sup>177</sup> Meléndez Sánchez, *Vivir la región*, p. 174

<sup>178</sup> She was born in Ocaña in 1772 and was the daughter of alcalde ordinario Manuel José Arias de Pereira and Juana de la Cruz Rodríguez Therán y Fernández Carvajalino. See El Rosario, 1010

simply that few low-status peninsulars arrived there. But marriage with peninsulars could also be risky endeavours in Ocaña. Thoribia Sánchez Barriga was, nonetheless, particularly unfortunate when she married Angel Antonio Bustamente in Ocaña on 6 August 1769, who after years of investigation by the Inquisition was found guilty of bigamy.<sup>179</sup>

The local elites of Ocaña very rarely married with elites from other cities in the province of Santa Marta. In Santa Marta, there was only one person from Ocaña whose marriage was registered in the book for whites between 1772 and 1795. That was Antonia del Real who married the peninsular *tesorero* Santiago Lopez de Castilla in 1778.<sup>180</sup> As we have seen, the surnames of the men who sat on the cabildo in Ocaña, or who were accepted as students to the Colegios mayores in Santa Fe, did not match the surnames of the elites in Santa Marta. The Ocaña elites, however, were closely linked to the elites of the other cities in the northern parts of the Eastern cordillera. Surnames such as León Carreño, del Rincón and Rodríguez Therán were also found, for instance, in Pamplona, and many of the students from Pamplona at the Colegios mayores had ancestors from Ocaña and vice versa.<sup>181</sup> When Francisca Antonia Jácome from Ocaña married Joaquín Colmenares from Cúcuta in 1793, they were related to the third degree of consanguinity and had to apply for dispensations from the bishop of Santa Marta.<sup>182</sup> They were both from the principal families of their respective cities. And when José Galves Carrascal of Ocaña had to prove the 'nobility' of his blood in 1777, most of the witnesses he called were from San Gil, because many of his

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<sup>179</sup> The following case is found in AHN, Inquisición, 1623 (caja 1), expediente 6

<sup>180</sup> LBE, 11 January 1778

<sup>181</sup> See for instance Rosario 734, 769, 818 and 871

<sup>182</sup> AGN, Juicios criminales 49, folios 768 - 803

forefathers on his father's side were from there.<sup>183</sup> Ocaña, it seems, was more integrated in to the networks of the interior highland areas than to the coast.

The elites of Santa Marta did not marry with families from Riohacha either, but for a different reason. By the end of the colonial period, the city of Riohacha no longer had its own noble elite with families who could boast descent from the first conquerors, encomenderos and governors of the province. The depletion of the pearls and the frequency of pirate attacks made the city unattractive, and in 1777 the city of Riohacha had only 1,789 inhabitants of whom 205 were categorised as whites.<sup>184</sup> Situated along the river of La Hacha (also called Ranchería) only a few hundred meters from the coast, and removed from any large Spanish cities, Riohacha had been the object of a series of pirate raids from the 1550's and at least until the beginning of the eighteenth century. The pearls were naturally the most treasured plunder for pirates in Riohacha. But they also went there to get meat and wood, which could be difficult to obtain on the islands.<sup>185</sup> The Castellanos, which had been among the first colonisers of the area in the early sixteenth century and who were governors of the provinces for several generations afterwards, seem to have abandoned the city sometime during the late seventeenth century. And none of the surnames found in the census of 1777 match those of the first conquerors and encomenderos. The individuals categorised as whites in the 1777 census were probably relatives of royal officials and soldiers who had been stationed in Riohacha during the various campaigns against the Guajiro Indians. Unsurprisingly, practically no marriages are known

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<sup>183</sup> AGN, Genealogías, tomo 3, folios 325 - 419

<sup>184</sup> AGN, Censos de varios departamentos 6, folios 502- 538

<sup>185</sup> Kris E. Lane, *Pillaging the Empire. Piracy in the Americas, 1500 - 1750* (Armonk, 1994) and Kenneth Andrews, *The Spanish Caribbean: Trade and Plunder, 1530 - 1630* (New Haven, 1978)

between these whites from Riohacha and the leading families of Santa Marta. Of the 86 marriages recorded in the 'Libro de matrimonios de blancos descendientes de españoles' in Santa Marta between 1772 and 1795, only two of the brides and none of the grooms were listed as originally from Riohacha. (table 2 ). And the two brides from Riohacha who married in Santa Marta between 1772 and 1795, and had their marriages recorded in the book for Spaniards, did not marry grooms from Santa Marta.<sup>186</sup>

Given the tendency for marriages to take place in the parish of the bride, it is of course entirely possible that a number of *samaritan* men married women from Riohacha in the parish of Riohacha. Since we do not have the parish registers of Riohacha, which could have been used to check more thoroughly the elite connections between the two cities in the late colonial period, an alternative is to use the household census of Riohacha from 1777.<sup>187</sup> That census does not give the geographic origin of the inhabitants, but it at least provide the surnames of all the heads of household and of the wives. In 1777 there were just 49 households in Riohacha headed by people categorised as white. As wives were listed with their own surnames, there were more surnames than households. In total, there were 53 different 'white' surnames in Riohacha according to the census. These can be compared to the surnames of the brides and grooms whose marriages were recorded in the 'libro de matrimonios de blancos descendientes de españoles' in Santa Marta between 1772 and 1795. If there was a high degree of intermarriage between elites in Santa Marta and Riohacha, we would also expect to find many of the same surnames in the two cities. This, however, is not the

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<sup>186</sup> María Josepha Ibarra married Domingo Antolin from Palencia in Castilla, and Josefa Piña, the illegitimate daughter of Rosa Mozo, married Antonio Cabrera from Tenerife in the Canaries. LBE, 24 December 1774 and 15 August 1788

case. Only ten surnames are found both in the 'white' part of the Riohacha census and in the 'matrimonios de blancos' in Santa Marta (where there were 120 different surnames). And several of these twelve surnames, like Fernández, García, Guerrero, Pérez and Rodríguez, are so common in any Spanish American city that they can hardly be taken as an indication of inter-relatedness. Individuals in Riohacha with surnames like Bernal, de Armas, de Castro, Ibarra and Mozo were more probably related to families in Santa Marta with the same surnames. But there were only a few individuals in Riohacha with these surnames common to both cities, and they did by no means constitute a dominating group in the 'white' part of the census.<sup>188</sup> More significantly, perhaps, there were no one in Riohacha with surnames like Díaz Granados, Nuñez Dávila, Pérez Ruiz, Guerra y de la Vega or Múnive y Mozo.

Valledupar differed from both Ocaña and Riohacha in that its elites were to some extent linked with those of the provincial capital. The extended Daza family, for instance, which occupied many of the cabildo posts in Valledupar during the decades before independence, descended from the same Mendozas and Castellanos' who the first Díaz Granados' had married in the late seventeenth century. Juan Antonio Daza, who was regidor on the Valledupar cabildo, was the great grand-son of Carlos de Mendoza, who was the son of Diego de Mendoza and Francisca de Castellanos y Peñalosa who was the aunt of the María Josefa de Mendoza y Castellanos who married Gabriel Díaz Granados in 1687.<sup>189</sup> He also descended from the Rivadeneiras who had been among the most important

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<sup>187</sup> AGN, Censos redimibles, legajo 6, folios 502- 538

<sup>188</sup> According to the 1777 Riohacha census, there were two Bernals, one de Armas, three de Castros, three Ibarra and one Mozo.

<sup>189</sup> For the genealogical trees of some of the members of the Daza family of Valledupar, see AGN, Mapas y planos, mapoteca 4, nos 141A - 143A.

encomenderos of the Santa Marta province in the early seventeenth century.<sup>190</sup> The Dazas themselves seem to have come to this part of Spanish America very early. There was one Diego Daza in Cartagena in the late sixteenth century, who served as treasurer in Cartagena in 1582, was lieutenant governor in 1585 and 1586 (when he was chosen to negotiate the ransom with Francis Drake after his attack on Cartagena) and was alcalde on the Cartagena cabildo in 1590.<sup>191</sup> This Diego Daza did not have any encomiendas in Cartagena, and it is likely that either he or his sons later established themselves in Valledupar. The Dazas of the late colonial period were undoubtedly considered to be 'nobles' in the same manner as the principal families of Santa Marta and Ocaña. When the militia company of Valledupar was revised in 1818, both Juan Salvador Daza and Luis Gregorio Daza were described as *hijosdalgo*.<sup>192</sup>

But the linkages between the nobles of Valledupar and Santa Marta were not only rooted in common genealogies. Several of the most prominent families from Santa Marta had extensive cattle ranches in the César valley, and often resided in Valledupar. Pascual Díaz Granados, as we have seen, had several ranches in the César valley, two of his sons lived in Valledupar and one married into a local noble family there.<sup>193</sup> Several members of the Díaz Granados family were born and lived in Valledupar.<sup>194</sup> So did several of the Fernández de

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<sup>190</sup> Juan Rivadeneira, was the encomendero of Bonda in 1627, which at that time had 70 encomendados. Trinidad Miranda Vazquez, *La Gobernación de Santa Marta* p. 163

<sup>191</sup> María Carmen Borrego Plá, *Cartagena de Indias en el siglo XVI* (Sevilla, EEHA, 1983), pp. 96, 281, 337 and 517.

<sup>192</sup> 'Indice de la Plaza mayor voluntaria de Valledupar, 1818' in AGI, Papeles de Cuba 756 A

<sup>193</sup> Pascual's son José Vicente lived in Valledupar where he died in 1801. See AGI, Santa Fe 1201. His brother, Pascual Venancio married Juana Francisca Pumarejo in Valledupar in 1816. See 'Solicitudes de Juana Francisca Pumarejo' in AGN, Solicitudes 11, folios 22 - 32

<sup>194</sup> In addition to the ones mentioned above, José de Jesús and María Cayetana were both born in Valledupar. Their parents were Pedro Norberto Díaz Granados (1743 - 1783) and María Luisa de la Guerra y Vega. See Restrepo, *Genealogías de Santa Fe*, pp. 307-312 and Rosario 755



Castros.<sup>195</sup> These noble families were linked with an extensive network which included the Daza, Pumarejo, Ustáriz, de Quiróz and Loperena families and which had ramifications to some of the most notable families in Cartagena de Indias (especially de Quiróz, Narváez de la Torre and Navarro).<sup>196</sup> It was this network governor Astigarraga was alluding to when he objected to the appointment of Manuel Campuzano as lieutenant governor in Santa Marta, who had relatives in both Valencia de Jesús and Valledupar, and was related to the Díaz Granados family.<sup>197</sup> As we will see in later chapters, this network is crucial for understanding how the wars of independence were enacted on the Caribbean coast of New Granada.

From the foregoing discussion of marriage patterns among the late colonial elites of Santa Marta province, it should be evident that marriages were imbued with social and political meaning. For the elites, marriage was a means of upholding their claims to status and local power, and while within white society race was by no means the only or the most important criterion for judging social standing and political legitimacy, it was evidently a primary qualification. The connections between elite families within and outside each city, are also important because they tended to form close-knit and exclusive groups which in turn could

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<sup>195</sup> José Manuel Fernández de Castro, son of Nicolás Felix Fernández de Castro, married Catalina Pérez Ruiz Calderon in Santa Marta in 1754, but they later moved to Valledupar, and several of all their six children were born in Valledupar. Of these Gabriela Fernández de Castro married first her own cousin José Antonio Díaz Granados, and after his death she married Pedro Fernández de Madrid, a royal official from Guatemala who served first in Cartagena and was later superintendente of the Casa de Moneda in Santa Fe. It was her sister who married Antonio Narváez y de la Torre in Santa Marta in 1786. Their brother José Manuel Alvaro Fernández de Castro married María Concepción Loperena de Ustariz y de la Guerra, member of a notable family from Valledupar. For the remaining three brothers, Diego, José Salvador and José Ignacio we lack information. See particularly the wills of José Manuel Alvaro and María Concepción Loperena in Castro Trespalacios, *Culturas aborígenes*, pp. 220 - 227

<sup>196</sup> See particularly Castro Trespalacios, *Culturas aborígenes*, p. 165 and pp. 274ff.

<sup>197</sup> See the discussion above on the conflict between the cabildo of Santa Marta and the governor over lieutenant governor Munive y Mozo.

dominate local political, ecclesiastical and military institutions. However, perhaps a word of caution is required: the local nobility should not be seen as one monolithic and monopolistic entity with a set of sharply defined interests and political aims. There were, as we shall see, frequent conflicts between members of these families.

### Chapter 3: The commoners

#### Marriage among the commoners

To what extent did commoners share the social values of the white elites? Did elites and commoners have a common sense of identity based on shared location, or did the racial hierarchy divide them into different, even opposing, groups? Contemporary white commentators usually characterised the common people as an indistinct mass, defined in cultural terms by their deviation from the norms of respectable society. At the time, the elites entertained strong prejudices about the sexual behaviour of the subordinate classes. Elites tended to view commoners as bastards, the illegitimate offspring begotten in consensual unions of different types. In colonial Spanish American societies, the *castas* (people of mixed race) were thought to be the illegitimate offspring of Spanish men and Indian women. *Mestizo* was thought of as a synonym for illegitimacy, impurity, criminality, poverty, vagrancy and lack of honour.<sup>198</sup> This association of racial mixture with bastardy and immoral behaviour went back to the first period of the conquest, when Spanish conquistadors frequently had established informal unions with Indian women, or simply obtained sex by force. But simultaneously with the non-formalised unions of Spanish males and Indian females, there had also been marriages between Spanish conquerors and the daughters of *caciques* and Indian noblemen. These matrimonial alliances had been encouraged by the crown, and until the very end of the colonial period, several royal decrees underlined the fact that noble Indians, noble mestizos and noble Spanish should enjoy the same

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<sup>198</sup> Cope, *The Limits of Racial Domination*, p. 19

privileges.<sup>199</sup> Mestizos, at least in principle, could be just as noble as the Spanish nobles in the eyes of the Crown. This, however, should not obscure the fact that most mestizos were thought of as bastards or descendants of bastards. The offspring of Spanish and African unions, or Indian and African unions, suffered under an even stronger legal discrimination. All Africans or descendants of Africans in Spanish America were tainted by slavery, and could not -in the eyes of the crown - have any pretensions to nobility.<sup>200</sup>

But what was the reality that lay behind this prejudiced portrait of the common people? Was popular culture so radically different, so clearly distinguished from respectable white society by promiscuity, disrespect for the institution of marriage, and a tendency to perpetuate its indiscipline by rearing children within unstable households? Studies of the lower classes in neighbouring Venezuela by Kathy Waldron and Juan Alméjida raise these questions only to come to very different conclusions. Waldron's study of the *visita* of Bishop of the diocese of Caracas takes the view that marriage was not an entrenched institution of the lower classes in Venezuela. The numerous cases of consensual unions and illegitimate births recorded by the bishop, and the consternation he expressed in his reports are taken as evidence for the laxity of sexual morality in colonial Venezuela.<sup>201</sup> Alméjida, however, takes the opposite view.<sup>202</sup> His quantitative study of censuses and marriage records indicates that all sections of late colonial

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<sup>199</sup> For the concept of noble mestizos see for instance the text of the 1778 Pragmática Sanción de matrimonios and the 1778 Real Cédula by which this law was made effective in Spanish America in AGI, Santa Fe 727. These texts have also been published by Richard Konetzke, *Colección de documentos para la Historia de la Formación Social de Hispanoamérica 1493 – 1810* (Madrid, 1962) vol. 2 pp. 406 – 412 and pp. 438 – 441.

<sup>200</sup> See 1803 'Real Cédula sobre matrimonios de hijos de familias' in Konetzke, *Colección de documentos*, vol. 2, pp. 794 – 796

<sup>201</sup> Kathy Waldron, 'The Sinners and the Bishop in Colonial Venezuela: The *Visita* of Bishop Mariano Martí, 1771 - 1784' in Asunción Lavrin, *Sexuality and Marriage in Colonial Latin America* (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1992), pp. 156 - 177

Venezuela (with the exception of slaves) married and lived in households consisting of two parents and their children. Almécija convincingly argues that moralistic condemnations such as those written by Bishop Martí may provide a distorted picture of the social values and behaviour of the common people in Venezuela.

Differences between Waldron and Almécija cannot be ascribed solely to their use of different sources, but arise from differences in their object of study. Almécija's main concern is the household structures of colonial Venezuela, and he tries to show that most households consisted of small nuclear families. He attacks the concept of large patriarchal families as a myth, and claims that the colonial period was not characterised by the breakdown of traditional family values and structures. Waldron, on the other hand, uses the Bishop's report to argue that it was very common to have children outside of wedlock and that illegitimacy was neither uncommon nor necessarily scandalous. Although very different in their emphasis, these two approaches are not incompatible. A household structure based on the nuclear family, with a high percentage of married couples living together with their children only, could co-exist with a high incidence of illegitimate births. To put it another way, a traditional and conformist household structure may not necessarily betoken adherence to conventional Christian rules for sexual abstinence and monogamy.

Despite their differences, the depictions of Waldron and Almécija of sexual norms and family structures in colonial Venezuela are instructive, because when read in conjunction their texts indicate some of the problems which have to

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<sup>202</sup> Almécija, *La familia en la provincia*

be addressed when discussing issues such as sexuality, marriage and family in Spanish America. First of all, it is apparent that both quantitative and qualitative sources, if available, should be used carefully and critically. As Almécija argues, reports on the poor moral conduct of the lower classes may exaggerate the laxity of sexual norms in colonial society. But quantitative sources, such as censuses and marriage and baptism registers, may be equally distorting and are thus not necessarily more reliable than the kinds of sources used by Waldron in her study. Census-takers and ecclesiastical registrars were usually parish priests who presumably shared an interest in representing families of their parishes as law-abiding, devout, educated and well-behaved. With these observations in mind, let us now turn to the question of marriage and families among the commoners of Santa Marta.

Did commoners in Santa Marta practice marriage? The most accessible and easily computable statistic which can throw some light on marriage customs is the so-called 'marriage quotient', or the percentage of married individuals to the entire population. The marriage quotient is a rough measure which can be misleading, especially for small populations, because it does not take into account the proportion of individuals who were not eligible to marry, such as children and clergy. For our purpose, however, the marriage quotients are useful because they make it possible to determine whether marriage was a common institution overall in the diocese, if marriage was more common among certain groups, and if the institution was more firmly established in certain types of settlements. It also makes it possible to compare - however superficially - marriage propensities in Santa Marta and Riohacha with other regions in Spanish America and elsewhere in the eighteenth century.

According to the census of 1793 there were 47,127 inhabitants in Santa Marta of whom 131 were clergy. The census list the number of married and single men and women by racial category and by parish. The marriage quotient can thus be calculated fairly easily, and provide a first, albeit very general, indication of the extent to which people married. For the entire population, the marriage quotient was 28.15 per cent (Table 1). This percentage is comparable to the marriage quotient of the archdiocese of Caracas which can be deduced from Bishop Martí's own census taken between 1772 and 1788. According to his data 27.6 per cent of the population of the archdiocese were married.<sup>203</sup> Was this high or low? As we have suggested, interpretations of this situation depended on perspective. The bishop himself felt that situation was alarming, and Waldron seems to accept his view that the institution of marriage in late eighteenth-century Venezuela was weak. Almécija on the other hand finds that these numbers are not sufficiently low to show that family structure was collapsing. In fact, a marriage quotient of this order is only slightly lower than those found in communities in Europe and elsewhere in the early modern period.<sup>204</sup>

The average marriage quotient for the entire province conceals significant differences between the free and the slave population, and between different towns and settlements. For 'blancos', 'indios' and 'libres' the overall marriage quotient is around 30 per cent (slightly higher for Indians, and slightly lower for

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<sup>203</sup> Almécija, *La familia en la provincia*, p. 236

<sup>204</sup> In Peter Laslett (ed.), *Household and family*, p. 74 there is a table which includes the marriage quotients for six different samples. In the 100 so-called standard English communities between 1574 and 1821, the marriage quotient was 33.4 per cent. In Ealing (Middlesex) in 1599 it was 28 per cent, in Longuenesse (Pas-de-Calais) in 1778 it was 30 per cent, in Belgrade in 1733 - 34 it was 39 per cent, in Nishinomiya (Japan) in 1713 it was 32 per cent and in Bristol (Rhode Island) in 1689 it was 32 per cent.

the free population). This percentage is 'normal' compared to averages found in European eighteenth century communities, and suggest that generally speaking we should expect to find that marriage was indeed a common institution among these groups. The marriage quotient for slaves, however, is much lower. For the slave population in general the marriage quotient was approximately 12 per cent, though this conceals significant geographic variations. In some towns and places, the marriage quotient of slaves approached the high twenties, but in most places and in all the larger cities where most of the slaves were registered, it was around 10 per cent or lower. The marriage patterns of slaves, as indicated by the marriage quotients, must have been very different from that of the free population. Slave marriages and family composition will be discussed separately below.

As witnessed from the overall marriage quotients for both provinces, there were no significant overall differences between the marriage quotients of whites, mixed-race and Indians. But if we look at the situation more locally and regroup the data according to types of settlements, then interesting variations come to light. In Spanish villages with less than 1000 inhabitants, the marriage quotients were around the 30 mark for both 'Blancos' and 'Libres', and even slaves had marriage quotients over 25 per cent. But in these villages, the marriage quotients of 'Indios' were considerably lower than in the Indian towns. Less than 25 per cent of the 'Indios' living in smaller Spanish villages and towns were married, whereas in the Indian towns more than 32 per cent of the 'Indios' were married. One explanation for the high marriage quotients in small villages and towns is that it was easier for the parish priest (and the rest of the population) to ensure that all couples got married, and conversely more difficult for transgressors to escape the moral vigilance of priests and people. The relatively low marriage quotient of



Indians living in Spanish villages may have been because many of them were individuals who had left their original villages in search for employment. Interestingly, the marriage quotient of the 'Blancos' and 'Libres' living in Indian towns were relatively high, which could suggest that the priests of the Indian towns were more vigilant than their colleagues in the Spanish villages, or that non-Indian males found partners more easily in Indian towns, than Indian males in non-Indian villages.

In the cities and towns with more than 1,000 inhabitants, the marriage quotients were generally lower than in the smaller towns and villages. The overall marriage quotient for 'Libres' in the larger cities and towns was 28.04, compared to 29.92 in the towns with 500 to 1,000 inhabitants. For slaves the same tendency can be seen. 25.85 per cent of the slaves in villages with less than 500 inhabitants were married, whereas only 12.65 per cent of the slaves in the cities with more than 1,000 inhabitants were married. For 'blancos' and 'Indios' the difference was less pronounced, but still noticeable. In the cities, 31.50 per cent of the whites were married, in the smaller towns and villages the percentage was 31.72 and 39.78 respectively. Most of the individuals who were characterised as Indians in the census lived in tributary towns where the marriage quotients were high. The few 'Indios' who lived in Spanish cities and towns were less likely to be married, and the ones living larger cities were less likely to be married than those living in smaller villages. In general then, the marriage quotients seem to indicate that marriage was indeed a common institution among the majority of the population in late colonial Santa Marta. The main exception [to which we will return later] was slaves, who had very low marriage quotients, especially in the cities.

What of the sexual practices of the commoners, usually regarded by contemporaries as promiscuous and immoral? As mentioned above, an episcopal *visita* was conducted in parts of the province of Santa Marta between 1776 and 1778, and the reports made by the different *visitadores* can throw some more light on the sexual practices of the population. The bishop or his representative visited most parishes with secular clergy and interviewed the priest as well as a number of *vecinos* in each parish. The respondents were asked to come forward with any irregularities among the clergy (such as failure to perform the sacraments, unkind treatment of the lay population, immoral or violent behaviour in general) and among the population - especially concerning their marital status and sexual practices. The declarations of the witnesses are of considerable value: they are not only a source which can give us some impression of the sexual and marital practices of the population of Santa Marta, but may also provide a view of the norms by which the conduct of lay and ecclesiastical individuals were judged.

During the *visita* 13 parishes were visited, which included about half of the population in the province of Santa Marta, and a total of 40 sexual transgressions were reported (Table 4).<sup>205</sup> Transgressions were of four types. One type involved priests or other ecclesiastics who had vowed celibacy. Another included those illicit unions where one or both of the partners were already married to someone else (adultery). A third were illicit unions between an unmarried couple, and the fourth were so-called unlawful separations where no illicit unions were reported, but where the married couple did not live together. These four different types of

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<sup>205</sup> The discussion below is based on the declarations and interviews found in 'Testimonio de los Sumarios en que constan las vidas y Costumbres de las personas de todos estados, y Clases de la Provincia de Santa Marta actuados en la Pastoral primera Vissita del Obispo Dn Francisco Navarro' in AGI, Santa Fe 1193

sexual transgressions probably had different causes and should be treated separately.

Ten of the forty cases reported involved unlawful separations. Under Canon Law, husband and wife were obliged to live together unless they were granted a *divorcio* by the Bishop.<sup>206</sup> These ten cases arose from failure to observe this law, and were brought against husband and wives who did not live together. Typically these cases implied that either the husband or wife had moved to another town. In the village of Aguachica near Ocaña, Don Julio Matheo Martina, one of the witnesses called upon to testify about the lives and customs of the inhabitants there, reported that Don Manuel de Cesé García '...was married in San Juan de Girón, [but] he is known in this place without the union and licence of his wife, but he has ascertained in conversations with the witness that he will soon go and get her...'<sup>207</sup> In San Bernardo, Francisco Romualdo Durán testified that '...Celedon Moreno, mestizo by colour, who was a resident [vezino] of this place, married to Petrona Corro, who still lives here, left eight or ten years ago, and without a just cause he left his said wife abandoned here. Later [the witness] has heard that he was in the Cauca area, and there is a rumour that he is dead...'<sup>208</sup> These cases of unauthorised separations indicate that marriage was regarded as an important institution and reflect the determination of the Church to ensure that its rules were enforced even in cases of uncontested separations.

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<sup>206</sup> This type of *divorcio* is normally translated as 'separation', because it did not allow the partners to re-marry.

<sup>207</sup> 'Testimonio de los Sumarios en que constan las vidas' folio 36 r in AGI, Santa 1193

<sup>208</sup> 'Testimonio de los Sumarios en que constan las vidas' folios 44 r - 44 v. in AGI, Santa Fe 1193

More telling, perhaps, are the cases of adultery and informal consensual unions. During the *visita* twenty-six cases of illicit relationships between lay people were reported. This number is surprisingly low, considering that the *visita* was conducted in thirteen parishes which together had more than 25,000 inhabitants. However, although the *visita* is of little use statistically, there are some remarkable aspects of the cases reported which may help us to understand more about the marriage patterns of late colonial Santa Marta. First of all, it is striking that the majority of the cases involved couples who could not get married even if they wanted to, because they had already been married to someone else. This could indicate that couples normally married, but that if the marriage did not work out, then consensual unions were a possible alternative. If this is the case, then the difficulty is to explain the consensual unions between persons who were both single. Of course, impediments of affinity and consanguinity could exist but not be mentioned in the accusations made by the witnesses. But it nevertheless is beyond doubt that there were couples who chose not to marry even if they legally could. The main point, however, is that such consensual unions seem to have been relatively rare, judging both from the reports made during the *visita* and the marriage quotients computed from the census material.

While the marriage quotients suggest that people were more likely to be married in the smaller villages than in the larger cities, during the *visita* most of the sins were reported in villages with relatively few inhabitants. This can probably be taken as an indication that in the smaller villages it was more difficult to get away with transgressions without being noticed. It was probably also easier for the priest to ensure that the inhabitants abided by the rules of the church, assuming that the priests took their service seriously. The role of the priests is thus a central

concern. In the literature on colonial Spanish America, the clergy is often portrayed as the one of the strongest forces of acculturation and evangelisation. The secular and regular clergy were not only supposed to make Indians into good Christians, but also to ensure that the Hispanic population respected the Church and fulfilled their duties as good Catholics. The question is not merely whether they succeeded, but even more fundamentally, if the clergy can be said to constitute such a force. Did the parish priests, for instance in the diocese of Santa Marta, try hard to make the inhabitants behave like good Christians, or were the ecclesiastics largely of the same morals and ethics as the population they were set to serve?

Examples of both kinds of priests can be found in the primary sources. As noted above, many of the witnesses, especially in the small towns declared that their parish priest lived an orderly and exemplary life, and was efficient in remedying 'public sins' committed by parishioners. But there are many examples of priests who did not conform to this ideal. Some lived in concubinage with their servants and slaves. Others were too fond of playing cards, drinking and mingling with the *plebe*. Some examples from the ecclesiastical records give a sense of the ways in which some priests related to their parishioners. In the parish of San Antonio, for example, several witnesses confirmed that the Father had an illicit affair with his *samba* slave, María Josefa de Zuñiga.<sup>209</sup> In the city of Santa Marta, five witnesses testified that the *Dean* of the Cathedral, Dr Don Francisco Muñoz Castellanos, '...in the years of his youth had vacillated in the vice of concupiscence, [but] his moral conduct had for a long time now been

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<sup>209</sup> Ibid. folio 10 r.

repaired...<sup>210</sup> The other ecclesiastics in the city were only reprimanded for their fondness of playing cards (*naypes*). In Valledupar, one of the three witnesses claimed that the *cura* of Valledupar, Don Felipe Maldonado, was having an illicit affair with Doña Joaquina de Armas, the wife of Don Simón Maestre. The same witness declared that the *sacristán* had an affair with a *mulata* called Juana Ignacia Molina.<sup>211</sup> In the village of San Jacinto, one witness accused the *cura* of having had two children with a servant called María Cecilia.<sup>212</sup>

But these were the exceptions. Other witnesses testified to the great care and efficiency of the ecclesiastics. According to Joaquín Gutiérrez, '...the parish priest...fulfils his duties very well...he treats everyone with love and kindness ... and in this village I do not know of nor have I heard of anyone of the sins mentioned in the edict...because since there are few people, if the Father knows of any, he deals with it...'<sup>213</sup> Clearly, the ideal priest should look after his flock and ensure that they did not live in sin. Similar views was expressed by Antonio de León y Carranza, one of the witnesses interrogated in Simaña, a village of around 500 inhabitants: 'Since there are only a few and peaceful inhabitants here, I do not know of any who has committed the sins you have mentioned...and if someone in his fragility incur in any of those crimes, the priest will with efficiency attempt to remedy and punish the ones who deserve it...'<sup>214</sup> This was presumably easier in

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<sup>210</sup> 'Testimonio de los Sumarios en que constan las vidas', folio 2r in AGI, Santa Fe 1193

<sup>211</sup> 'Testimonio de los Sumarios en que constan las vidas', folio 21r in AGI, Santa Fe 1193

<sup>212</sup> 'Testimonio de los Sumarios en que constan las vidas' folio 28 v in AGI, Santa Fe 1193

<sup>213</sup> 'Testimonio de los Sumarios en que constan las vidas', folio 16v in AGI, Santa Fe 1193: 'Que el Padre Cura de este dho sitio cumple mui bien con su obligación sin faltar a ella en lo mas leve, que a todos trata con mucho amor, y afabilidad enseñandoles la Doctrina Christiana. Que en este sitio, no sabe, ni ha oido decir que haya ningún pecado de los que por el edicto ni extra se le han preguntado, pues como corta su feligresía, luego, que alguno se save por dicho Padre Cura se pone remedio.'

<sup>214</sup> 'Testimonio de Sumarias en que constan las vidas' folio 39 vin AGI, Santa Fe 1193: 'Que como este es un vecindario corto, y pacifico, no save que ningunos hayan cometido los delitos

the smaller villages than in the larger towns and cities, and the priest described by Gutiérrez appears very close to the ideal caring and diligent parish priest. Most of the priests who were under the auspices of the *visitador* were described by the witnesses as caring, respectful and diligent.

If the cases reported during the *visita general* were representative for the kinds of informal unions in the diocese during the late eighteenth century, then several conclusions can be drawn regarding marriage practices. First, the very low number of cases on adultery and concubinage suggest that marriage was indeed a common and entrenched institution in the diocese. Secondly, the majority of the cases were informal unions by people who could not get married, either because one or both of the partners were already married to someone else, or because the man was an ecclesiastic. Thus, one may argue that these cases do not indicate a disrespect or indifference towards marriage. Perhaps the most general conclusion that can be drawn from the reports is that people were not only expected to get married, but also to live with the person they had actually married. Unlawful separations were duly reported by the witnesses interrogated by the Bishop and his representative. Furthermore, the central role of the parish priests in ensuring that people did not live in public sin is emphasised by several witnesses, particularly in the small towns.

There are reasons to believe, however, that the *visita* does not provide us with an entirely accurate picture of the situation in the diocese of Santa Marta. Indeed, the small number of adultery and concubinage cases reported from the largest cities - Santa Marta, Valledupar and Ocaña - where the marriage quotients

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que se le han leydo, ni succitan en ellos, porque si alguno como fragil incurre en algun delito,

were particularly low for the non-elite free population and for the slaves, suggests serious under-reporting in these places. On the other hand, the disproportionately large number of cases reported from San Antonio and San Bernardo suggests unusual zeal in these localities. Another possible reason for this imbalance may be that the situation in the larger cities was less transparent than in the smaller villages, that city people interfered less in each other's lives or cared less for the rules of the Church. And, if the *visita* testimonies give the impression that most people expected that they and others would live within the framework of marriage, and that informal consensual unions were the exception rather than the rule, there are also indications that neither the colonial authorities nor the population in general regarded sins such as concubinage and adultery as particularly problematic.<sup>215</sup> In the case against the lieutenant governor José Munive y Mozo, referred to above, the visitador had accused the lieutenant of living in public and scandalous concubinage with a married woman.<sup>216</sup> But Rubianes was the only one who made this particular accusation against Munive. The members of the cabildo chose to focus on what they meant were unjust conduct in judicial cases and his marriage to a creole woman with relatives in the city. Perhaps they felt that the concubinage was not a serious offence, or perhaps it was something invented by the visitador. The most likely explanation, however, is that it was not considered to be a serious offence. If it had been, the viceroy would no doubt have ordered or asked the authorities in the city to do something about it, and references to this crime would have figured in the further

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el Cura con eficacia procura remediarlo y darle el castigo que merece'

<sup>215</sup> A similar argument is made by Anthony McFarlane, 'Las reglas religiosas en una sociedad colonial: el concubinato en la Nueva Granada, siglo XVIII' in *Iglesia, religión y sociedad en la historia latinoamericana 1492 -1945* [Papers presented at the 8<sup>th</sup> Congress of the European Association of Historians of Latin America (AHILA)] (Szeged, Centro de estudios históricos de América Latina, 1989) 2. vol., pp. 93 - 107

<sup>216</sup> Copy of letter from Manuel Antonio Rubianes to the Viceroy of New Granada in AGI, Santa Fe 739



correspondence in the case. But Rubianes accusation attracted no further comment. The case of Juan Thomas de Villas, who was accused of having his own slave as a concubine, gives the same impression.<sup>217</sup>

Tolerance of a certain laxity in sexual morals was, however, not incompatible with a widespread practice of marriage among commoners. Another source which confirms that marriages were indeed common among the commoners of the province of Santa Marta in the late colonial period, and that one should be careful not to exaggerate the fluidity and weakness of family structures among the lower classes, is found in the census data. For a handful of towns and villages in the province of Riohacha, we have the house-to-house list on which the census of 1778 was based. For every household, the census-takers noted the name, race and family relation for each individual.<sup>218</sup> We also have house-to house lists from the Capuchin missions taken in 1753 and 1754.<sup>219</sup>

On the basis of these lists it is possible to get a close view of the household structure and the extent to which the nuclear family with two parents constituted the typical household. Consider, for instance, the village of Boronata. Boronata was originally a mission founded by the Capuchin friars in the lower Guajira not far away from the city of Riohacha. It was founded early in the eighteenth century, and served for many years as the headquarters of the capuchin missions among the Guajiro indians. The mission attracted non-Indian settlers early on, and had come to consist of two communities. One was Indian,

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<sup>217</sup> AGN, Negros y esclavos, tomo 4, folios 358 - 368

<sup>218</sup> The house-to-house lists of the hispanic settlements of the province of Riohacha taken in 1777 can be found in AGN, Censos de varios departamentos 6

predominantly Guajiros, some of whom lived permanently in the village and some who came and left depending on the relations between the capuchin friars and the different Guajiro clans on the peninsula. The other part of the village consisted of people classified as 'mulatos', 'sambos', 'pardos' and 'negros'. We know next to nothing about the economic activities of the villagers, but presumably cattle ranching was the most important activity in this as in most other inland villages in the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha. In the house-to house list done in 1754, 214 individuals were registered as living in the non-Indian part of the village, they lived in 36 households, which gives an average of 5.94 person per household (Table 5). This average household size was slightly larger than averages in the samples discussed by Laslett et al.<sup>220</sup> In the archdiocese of Caracas between 145 and 1798, the average household contained slightly less than 5.5 persons, in Villa Rica (Brazil) it was 5.10 in 1804, in Medellín (New Granada) it was 4.88 in 1786 and in Durango (Mexico) the average household in 1777 had 5.39 persons.<sup>221</sup> The slightly higher average of Boronata is explained largely by the presence of slaves in some of the households. On average there were 1.47 slaves in the households in Boronata. In other words, without the slaves, the mean average size of Boronata households would have been lower than most other averages recorded in the eighteenth century. It should furthermore be noted that only nine of the thirty-six households in Boronata had slaves. These nine slave-holding households had a total of 53 slaves, giving an average of 5.89 slaves per slave-holding household. These nine households were presumably the wealthiest of the

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<sup>219</sup> The census of Boronata as well as the other capuchin missions in the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha from 1753 and 1754 can be found in 'Cuaderno sobre el Estado de las Misiones de los RR PP Capuchinos' in AGI, Santa Fe 1185.

<sup>220</sup> The mean average household size for the 100 standard English communities was 4.75, in Longueness it was 5.05, in Belgrade 5.46, in Nishinomiya 4.95 and in Bristol (Rhode Island) it was 5.85. Laslett (ed.), *Household and Family*, p. 77

<sup>221</sup> Almécija, *La familia*, p. 57

households in Boronata at the time. The cacique (whose household for some reason was counted among the non-Indian part of the village, although he and his wife were both categorised as Indians,) had thirteen slaves. He had two sons and a daughter, and two of his slaves were married to free women who also were listed as part of the household. In total the household of the cacique, Cecilio Lopes de Sierra, was formed by him and his wife, three children, thirteen slaves, two free women who were married to his slaves and one free man who may have been the son of one of the free women living in the household.

The cacique's household was what is generally called a 'multiple family household' (since there were several married couples in the household). But this was not common in Boronata in 1754. Only 3 other households were multiple family households. Almost sixty per cent of the households in Boronata in 1754 consisted of married couples with children, and twenty-two per cent were simply married couples who lived alone. In 1754, there were no single mothers with children in Boronata. There were only two female-headed households, and in both cases the women were widows. In general, then, the household structure of Boronata in 1754 seems to support the view that marriage was a common institution and that families remained together.

Certain aspects of the census from Boronata (and the other mission towns as well) also indicate, however, that there were frequent irregularities in the make-up of families. For instance, the census-taker in Boronata differentiated between marriages and legitimate marriages. Of the 42 married couples listed in the census, only 17 were legitimately married by church (or the friar). Presumably, the couples who were listed as married, but whose marriages were not recorded as

explicitly legitimate, lived in what we have chosen to call informal consensual unions. These unions, it seems, were stable enough to make the census-taker actually record the couples as married although their unions had not been sanctified by the church. Surprisingly, the mixed-race couples were not the most likely to have illegitimate unions. As Table 8 indicates, the marriage propensities in Boronata in 1754 did not follow the pattern we could see in the provinces as a whole in 1793. Whereas in 1793, the whites and the Indians were the groups which had the highest marriage quotients, the racial groups most likely to have contracted legitimate marriages in Boronata in 1754 were the slaves (whose race was not described in the census) and the so-called 'sambos' (usually the children of blacks and Indians). Indians had both legitimate and illegitimate marriages, while the only white person in Boronata had not married legitimately.

### **Racial boundaries**

One of the principal question concerning the make-up of late colonial Spanish American societies is the extent to which they can be said to have been 'pigmentocracies'. In Santa Marta and Riohacha we have already seen that some of the fundamental differences between different sectors of the population were described in racial terms. The elites who sought noble status were careful not to have their lineages tainted by coloured blood. But within the group of non-elite, non-Indian, free population, the racial terms or the differences in skin-colour appeared to have had limited (but, still, some) significance for the choice of marriage partner. This can be seen from a variety of different sources.

The more specific racial terms which were meant to distinguish the commoners from each others must have been rather fluid. There are numerous examples, for instance, of the same individual being categorised in various different ways. When the slave José de la Cruz Cartas applied for a permission to marry María Dolores Ramos, he described her as a *morena*, whereas the judge in the case stated that she was a *negra*.<sup>222</sup> Likewise, in the case reviewed previously where Antonio Lafit were sued by the father of Dominga Barlisa for broken marriage promises, there was a debate about the social standing of Dominga's mother. One witness claimed she was a *mulata*.<sup>223</sup> Another said she was a *cuarteroon* of a *mulata*, and a third merely said she was reputed not to be white. Numerous examples of variances in the way individuals were categorised can be found. But more telling perhaps are the racial designations given to married couples in censuses. Although it is known from other studies on marriage in Spanish America that the racial terms of couples were frequently modified so that married couples would have the same race, there are still a number of cases where the racial designations of man and woman were not the same.

In Riohacha, as we can see from table 7, most white women were married to white men, most black women were married to black men, most *parda* women were married to *pardos* and *sambas* frequently married *sambos*. But fourteen of the *samba* women married 'non-sambo' males, and four of the nine black women married 'non-black' men, eleven of the thirty-one white men married 'non-white' women. Clearly, although marriage was not random with respect to race, cross-racial marriages were common. Cross-racial marriages were even more common in smaller towns such as Boronata. The marriage patterns of Boronata suggest

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<sup>222</sup> AGN, Negros y esclavos 3, folios 998 - 1003

that among the commoners, the finer racial distinctions mattered little. In so far as racial endogamy existed, it mattered in the broader categories of 'white', 'Indian', 'black' and 'mixed-race'. The non-Indian part of Boronata was overwhelmingly mixed-race, although a few Indian women also lived there. And there doesn't seem to have been a racial barrier between for instance mulatos and sambos. This corresponds to other areas of Spanish America as well. Indeed, later in the century, in the censuses which were taken in 1777 and 1793 the finer racial categories such as mulato, sambo and mestiso were normally replaced by broader categories such as 'pardos' or 'libres de color'.

Another aspect of the 1754 Boronata census well worth noting is that, while most of the women were ascribed racial categories which implied Indian descent (such as India, samba, mestiza), most of the men were categorised as descendants of blacks (like mulato and sambo). This probably reflects the fact that Boronata was still a very young settlement in 1754, and that the non-Indian part of the village was probably formed by male settlers from other parts of the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha who married mostly Guajira Indian females. As we shall see later, this interaction with Indians was facilitated by the practice among several Guajira clans of exchanging women with the surrounding non-Indian population. The census seems to reflect this trend.

### The geographic origins of brides and grooms

Another dimension of commoner society revealed by marriage records concerns its interactions with other communities which lay beyond the province. Given the

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<sup>223</sup> See the discussion of the case between Barlisa and Lafita in chapter 2.

character of this fundamentally agrarian society and the limitations on easy communication with other towns and settlements in the larger region of New Granada that lay inland, we should not be surprised if most marriage partners were from the same locality. This certainly seems to have the case in the New Granadan interior, where, as Pablo Rodríguez has shown, most marriages in Tunja, Cali, Medellín and Cartagena in the late eighteenth century were between brides and grooms from the same cities.<sup>224</sup> And, predictably, this is generally true for the commoners who married in the city of Santa Marta during the last half of the eighteenth century. However, there was also a notable difference, since a high percentage of marriages between women from the city of Santa Marta and the surrounding areas were with men from various parts of the Spanish empire, including the Iberian Peninsula.

The 1772-1788 marriage register for 'pardos, mestizos, negros' did not always record the birth places of marriage partners, but it does provide sufficient data to allow us to draw some conclusions about the provenance of such partners and to speculate about its social implications. Of the 299 marriages recorded, the geographic origins were listed for 212 (71 per cent) of the men and for 183 (61 per cent) of the women (Table 3). These large samples show significant differences in the origins of brides and grooms. Of the 183 lower class brides whose origins were recorded, 153 (84 per cent) were from the city of Santa Marta. Of the remaining 30 brides, 14 were from the province of Cartagena, eight were from the province of Riohacha and eight from other places in the province of Santa Marta. If the women were mostly from the city of Santa Marta and the Colombian Caribbean, the men had much more diverse geographic origins. Of

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<sup>224</sup> Rodríguez, *Sentimientos y vida familiar*, p. 231

the 212 grooms whose geographic origin was recorded, 113 were from the city of Santa Marta (53 per cent). The others came from several places: Spain and the Canary islands (15 per cent), from the province of Cartagena (12 per cent), from elsewhere in Spanish America (9 per cent), from France, Italy and Portugal (3 per cent), from the province of Riohacha (3 per cent) or from the interior of New Granada (3 per cent).

There are several surprising aspects of these statistics. First, the high percentage of grooms not originally from Santa Marta testifies to the 'cosmopolitan' character of the city of Santa Marta. Men from other parts of the Spanish Caribbean and from Spain and the Canary islands counted for about 40 per cent of the 'common' grooms between 1772 and 1785. Secondly, it is surprising that so few of the grooms were from the surroundings of Santa Marta, from the province of Santa Marta itself or from the interior of New Granada. Only two grooms were from the province of Santa Marta outside the city, just six were from the province of Riohacha and from the interior of New Granada.

The geographic patterns of the samarian marriage market raise interesting questions about the nature and strength of regional and proto-national identities in the period immediately before independence. If marriages were an indication of regional cohesiveness, the marriage patterns of the lower classes of the city of Santa Marta may have set Santa Marta apart from the rest of New Granada. While most of the brides and grooms who arrived in the city of Santa Marta in the second half of the eighteenth century were from the city itself, a considerable minority of the grooms were from the Spanish Caribbean and the Iberian peninsula. Surprisingly few of the brides and grooms were from other parts of the



Colombian Caribbean region and next to no one came from the interior of the viceroyalty.

The lower class women of Santa Marta, to the extent that they could decide their own marriage partners, were evidently very willing to marry men from far away. But why did they not marry men from their own province, or from the interior of New Granada? The most obvious answer, perhaps, is that the marriage patterns simply reflected the nature of the economy. Since most sailors were from ports, European and American, it is not surprising that women from Santa Marta ended up marrying people from Spanish American ports like Cartagena (twelve grooms)<sup>225</sup>, Barranquilla (seven grooms)<sup>226</sup>, Maracaibo (eight grooms)<sup>227</sup>, Guaira (two)<sup>228</sup>, Campeche (two)<sup>229</sup>, Habana (one)<sup>230</sup>, Lima (one)<sup>231</sup>, Puerto Rico (one)<sup>232</sup>,

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<sup>225</sup> The grooms from the city of Cartagena who married in Santa Marta between 1772 and 1788 were: Juan Aniseto Alaman who married Nicolasa Mozo on 9 April 1786, Bartolomé Sole who married María Francisca Ibarra on 13 May 1786, Lucas Cagullós who married María Ignacia Carronzales on 22 July 1786, Félix Rodríguez Camacho who married Joaquina de Sierra on 9 September 1786, Ambrosio Bustos who first married Magdalena Torres on 5 March 1774 and then María Agapito Mozo on 27 February 1776 and then María Rita Noriega on 15 January 1782, Ildefonso Pomares who married Narcisa Lobo on 4 September 1777, Venancio Martínez who married Marquesa Fuentes on 28 February 1782, Narciso Padilla who married Isabel Amaya on 1 June 1778, Miguel Josef Bernal who married Juana María Barrera on 1 December 1780 and Josef María Llanes who married Juana Fernández on 27 May 1782. All were recorded in LPMN.

<sup>226</sup> Grooms from Barranquilla included Francisco Martínez who married Antonia del Castillo on 29 July 1784, Ragalado Nieto who married María Concepción Hernández on 17 July 1787, Joseph de los Santos Vilora who married Nicolasa Moreno on 18 March 1777, Manuel de Barros who married María Andrea Mozo on 8 December 1788, Josef Antonio Gomes who married Francisca Antonia Escobal on 7 May 1782, Juan Manuel de Horosco who married Feliciano Martínez on 26 August 1785 and Andrés Troya who married Phelipa Racines 4 January 1786. All were recorded in LPMN.

<sup>227</sup> The grooms from Maracaibo were Miguel Antonio Nepumuceno Calancha who married María Gregoria Gomes on 30 June 1787, Juan de Dios de los Reyes who married Juana (no surname given) on 5 May 1777 and then María Antonia Martínez on 20 August 1787, Josef Antonio Diaz who married María Lucia Barcena on 18 March 1778, Josef Francisco Morillo who married Juana Josefa de Armas on 26 November 1780, Josef Antonio Almonza who married Liberata Pacheco on 3 February 1782, Francisco Manuel Moreno who married Catalina Pacheco on 17 May 1777 and Juan de Dios de Raval who married Alvina del Mon on 13 September 1787. All were recorded in LPMN.

<sup>228</sup> Juan Luis de Roxas, from La Guaira, married María Catalina Martínez on 26 December 1774 and then he married Pasquela Saballos on 5 April 1782.

<sup>229</sup> From Campeche, Thomas Crespo married María del Carmen Robles on 7 December 1774 and Lucas Rubio married María Ebrat on 12 March 1787.

<sup>230</sup> Sebastián López from Habana married María Remigia on 22 February 1773.

Santo Domingo (two)<sup>233</sup>, Panama(one)<sup>234</sup> and Puerto Cabello (two)<sup>235</sup> or from European ports such as Genova (three), Rome (one), Barcelona, Palma de Mallorca, Navalmoral, Pontevedra, Santa María, Cádiz and Málaga, and from Spanish coastal regions such as Galicia, Vizcaya, Asturias, Cataluña, Andalucia, Mallorca and Canary Islands.

But the correlation between Santa Marta's position as a port and the marriage patterns of its daughters is not perfect. It was not just a matter of who was present in the city. Certain men were clearly avoided. We know for instance that many men from the Indian tributary towns surrounding Santa Marta visited the city frequently. Yet, only two men from these towns married in the city of Santa Marta between 1772 and 1788. We also know that, though British, Dutch and Danish sailors and merchants often visited Santa Marta, there was only one marriage registered in the same period which involved a man from a non-Spanish, Protestant country.<sup>236</sup> This indicates that marriage was more than just the outcome of trade. It seems to have been the case that samarian women only reluctantly married tributary Indians and non-Catholic foreigners, perhaps for different reasons. But they were clearly willing and able to marry peninsular Spaniards or Spanish Americans from other parts of the empire. It may be, then, that marriage among commoners strengthened the bonds between samarian society and the

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<sup>231</sup> Domingo Valerio Llorente from Lima married María Francisca Andias on 30 September 1777.

<sup>232</sup> Luis Josef Martínez from Puerto Rico married Petrona Barranco on 23 March 1773.

<sup>233</sup> Joaquín García from Santo Domingo married Marquesa Granados on 5 September 1773 and José de la Rosa from Santo Domingo married Manuela Faustina Gomez on 20 September 1787.

<sup>234</sup> Iginio Joseph de Zojo from Panama married Manuela Mozo on 12 November 1776.

<sup>235</sup> Pasqual Rafael Arias from Puerto Cabello married María del Carmen Tapia y Corali on 17 November 1787 and Bernardo de la Rosa Betanza married María de la Encarnación López on 13 January 1788.

<sup>236</sup> Juan Mathias Parra from Curazao married María de los Santos Perez from Santa Marta, LPMN 3 Nov. 1780

empire. Most of these husbands from Spain and Spanish America became fathers, and their sons and daughters subsequently became embroiled in the wars of Independence. Places such as Cartagena, Puerto Cabello, Campeche, Habana or even Barcelona, Cádiz and San Sebastián de Guipuzcoa and Palma de Mallorca may have been more immediate to them than Santa Fe or Boyacá. This gave *samaritan* society a very different make-up from those of the interior regions of Spanish America. Whereas in the interior, peninsular origins was generally a mark of distinction, in a port like Santa Marta, most of the men born on the Iberian peninsula had their marriages recorded in the book for 'pardos, negros, indios'. It seems, moreover, that marriage to whites as a means of strengthening white identity was not confined to the creole elites.

The marriage between Manuel Cayetano Pasqual and María Manuela Joanes in 1791 illustrates these patterns. María Manuela and Manuel Cayetano had exchanged *esponsales*, and Manuel 'havía gozado de su virginidad'. María feared, however, that Manuel would leave Santa Marta for 'tierras estrangeras'. She therefore approached the ecclesiastical judge, in order to have the marriage consecrated before Manuel left the city. When Manuel was questioned in order to establish that he was single and that there were no impediments to the marriage, he explained that he was the son of Jayme Pasqual, a native of Barcelona, and Ana Yballe from Santa Marta. He was 23 years old and a sailor by profession. When asked which ports he had visited he stated that he had been once to the Mosquito coast, and that they had passed through Jamaica and Cartagena on the way. He had also been to Curazao, and the other voyages had all been to Jamaica. Another witness added that Pasqual had also sailed to Riohacha and Portobelo. María Manuela was also the daughter of a peninsular. Her father was Francisco Joanet,

native of Menorca, and her mother was Sebastiana de Armas, a *tercerona* from Riohacha. She was 18 years, worked in sewing, and just like her future husband she was definitely a commoner, although both had fathers born in Spain.<sup>237</sup> Thus, even where both groom and bride were commoners, they were connected to and had knowledge of both the Iberian peninsula and the Caribbean, including foreign ports such as Jamaica and Curazao. The interior of the viceroyalty must have seemed much more distant, as practically no grooms married in Santa Marta came from the interior of the viceroyalty.

Marriage patterns among commoners suggest, then, that, although the marriage register subsumes such people under the definition of *pardos* etc., they were a diverse group in terms of race and geographical origin, and included a substantial group of white males from Europe. Commoners may have been unable to marry into white creole society, which excluded people of colour and poor whites, and commoners showed a similar consciousness of racial and cultural status by refusing to marry tributary Indians (except in early frontier settlements such as Boronata, where other women were scarce). Indeed, female commoners showed a decided preference for marriages with the poor Europeans [mostly Spaniards] who arrived in the city and province. In a sense, then, the common people, though they were probably far less conscious of minor racial distinctions than were the white elites, showed prejudices about colour that were similar to those found among the creoles of second rank. And, like the creoles, they established few bonds with the interior of New Granada. This lack of genealogical interchange between the interior and the coast may have been caused principally by limited trade between the two regions, but it is quite possible that

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<sup>237</sup> 'Información para contraer matrimonio, Manuel Cayetano Pasqual y María Manuela Joanes,

after decades and centuries of such patterns, people from the interior were regarded as more foreign than people from the Iberian peninsula or the Spanish Caribbean.

## Chapter 4: The slaves

African slaves had lived in Santa Marta and Riohacha since the early sixteenth century, but the region cannot be regarded as a slave society.<sup>238</sup> However, although the economy did not depend on slave labour and slaves were a minority in all areas of the region, they constituted a sizeable percentage of the population. The import of slaves to the province of Santa Marta and Riohacha probably increased towards the end of the eighteenth century, with the establishment of several sugar plantations and the general demographic and economic growth of the period. In the 1793 census, there were 4,127 slaves (8.76 per cent of the population) in the province of Santa Marta, while in 1778 469 slaves (11.83 per cent) were counted in the province of Riohacha.<sup>239</sup>

The majority of the slaves in Santa Marta were located in and around the largest cities. Large number of slaves lived and worked on the handful of sugar plantations outside the city of Santa Marta and San Juan de Ciénaga. On Santa Cruz, Pascual Díaz Granados' large estate between Gaira and Santa Marta, there were 67 slaves in 1801.<sup>240</sup> On the sugar plantations Garabulla and Papare near San Juan de Ciénaga there were 60 and 82 slaves respectively in 1808.<sup>241</sup> But these were by far the largest sugar plantations in the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha, and the majority of the slaves did not live on sugar plantations. Many lived on cattle ranches, which were numerous but required a smaller labour force

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<sup>238</sup> Avellanada, *The Conquerors of the Kingdom*

<sup>239</sup> The 1793 census for Santa Marta can be found for instance in AGI, Indiferente General 1527. The 1778 census of the province of Riohacha can be found in AGN, Censos de varios departamentos 6. Summaries of both were published in Anthony McFarlane, *Colombia before Independence* pp. 359 - 360.

<sup>240</sup> AGI, Santa Fe 1201 and Hermes Tovar, *Grandes empresas* p. 203

<sup>241</sup> Dolcey Romero Jaramillo, *Esclavitud en la provincia de Santa Marta 1791 - 1750* (Santa Marta, Instituto de Cultura y Turismo del Magdalena, 1997), pp. 95 - 96

than the sugar plantations. Pascual Díaz Granados, for instance, had four cattle ranches in the province of Santa Marta in 1801 with a total of fifteen slaves.<sup>242</sup> Probably most of the slaves in the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha were so-called urban slaves. They could be artisans, shop-keepers, domestic servants and sailors, to name just a few of the most common occupations of urban slaves in Santa Marta. Of Pascual Díaz Granados' eight slaves who lived in the city of Santa Marta, was a skilled mason (*maestro de albañil*), a shoemaker, a tailor and a sculptor. In other words, slaves in late colonial Santa Marta and Riohacha could have a large variety of different occupations, and, given the relative weakness of large-scale agriculture and the absence of mining, played economic roles more varied than in societies with a high concentration of slaves, such as Popayán, certain areas of Venezuela, Cuba and Brazil.

### Why few slaves married

Although slaves were by definition unfree, they had some possibilities of manoeuvre within the colonial Spanish American society. We will not enter into the heated debate about the legal status of Spanish American slaves and the question as to whether their legal rights had any practical value, though we do need to be aware that slaves in Spanish America could contract legally binding marriages (unlike the slaves of most Anglo-American states). In practice, however, they seldom did. The marriage quotients for the slave population in late colonial Santa Marta and Riohacha were significantly lower than for the rest of the population. The overall percentage of slaves who were married in the province of Santa Marta in 1793 was 12.99, and in the province of Riohacha in 1778 it was

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<sup>242</sup> AGI, Santa FE 1201

6.82.<sup>243</sup>. But these percentages conceal significant differences between different cities, villages and towns. The slave marriage quotients in many of the towns and villages with less than 1,000 inhabitants was well above 25 and thus not dramatically lower than the free marriage quotient. Slaves registered in towns and cities with more than 1,000 inhabitants had the lowest marriage quotients. In the city of Ocaña it was 9.1, in Santa Marta 12.18, in Valledupar 10.05 and in Riohacha only 3.66.

One question we must address then, is why slaves did not contract legitimate marriages even though they legally were allowed to do so. The most straight-forward explanation would be that they did not want to. Perhaps slaves defied Hispanic civil and ecclesiastical authorities by not marrying, so that the low percentage of married slaves represents a form of resistance to slave-owners and colonial authorities. In this perspective, one might also perhaps see the slaves' reluctance to marry as an attempt to defend African or African-American customs and values. This line of argument would place the slaves in a similar situation as the Guajiros, who openly rejected Catholic marriage rituals, maintained polygamy and thus rebelled against one of the most basic institutions of Hispanic society. But this hypothesis does not seem to fit well with the evidence from Santa Marta. The slaves were generally more integrated into Hispanic society than the Indians, unconquered and subdued alike.

The inclusion of slaves within the Hispanic community was reflected in their territorial pattern of settlement. Whereas unconquered Indians such as the Guajiros lived in territorial pockets not controlled by the colonial authorities and

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<sup>243</sup> See table 1.



the tributary Indians lived in separate Indian villages around the largest cities, the slaves lived mostly in the cities and on the plantations and the ranches, often in the same households as their masters. Their identification with Hispanic society was, moreover, probably reinforced by the fact that most were born locally. One indication of their origins is found in baptismal and marriage records. Some were listed as 'bozales' (the term used for slaves born in Africa). For example, several slaves who married or had their children baptised were born in Africa. When Joaquina, a slave of Francisca Martínez, had her daughter baptised on 7 August 1789, the priest recorded in the register that Joaquina was 'bozal'.<sup>244</sup> Another slave mother, Ysidora, also owned by Francisca Martines, was registered as a bozal.<sup>245</sup> And when the slaves Antonio and Barbara Granados, whose master was Pascual Díaz Granados, had their son baptised in October the same year, the priest noted they were both from Guinea.<sup>246</sup> Of the 52 slaves who married in Santa Marta between 1772 and 1788, we know that Antonio and Margarita Martines, both slaves of Gregorio de León, were bozales.<sup>247</sup> We also know that the free man Luis Joseph Manjarres who married the slave María, was originally from Guinea.<sup>248</sup> These three were, however, the only slaves in the marriage registers who were explicitly stated as born in Africa. We also know that of the 91 persons who were baptised in Santa Marta between July 1789 and April 1790, eight were adult slaves. Some of these were bozales, others were unbaptised slaves from other colonies such as Josef Jacome Jerome who was 'de nación inglés'.<sup>249</sup>

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<sup>244</sup> LBC, 7 August 1789

<sup>245</sup> LBC, 28 October 1789

<sup>246</sup> LBC, 11 October 1789

<sup>247</sup> LPMN, 4 May 1773

<sup>248</sup> LPMN, 17 March 1777

<sup>249</sup> LBC, 26 October 1789

The marriage and baptism records thus show that the majority of slaves were 'criollos' and probably born in the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha. Very few of the slaves had surnames that indicated any 'tribal' or geographic origins in Africa.<sup>250</sup> None of the 52 slaves who married in Santa Marta between 1772 and 1788 had such surnames.<sup>251</sup> Nor did any of the 31 slave fathers and mothers who had their children baptised in the cathedral of Santa Marta in 1789 - 1790 'African' surnames.<sup>252</sup> The censuses give the same impression, although the geographic origins of the slaves were not recorded. Of the 54 slaves in Boronata in 1754, there was only one with an 'African' surname. Antonio Caravali was probably born in Africa, but he was among the few in the town whose marriage was then legitimate.<sup>253</sup> Of the 92 slaves Pascual Díaz Granados owned in 1801 only three were said to be bozales. All of these lived on the sugar plantation Santa Cruz del Paraíso.<sup>254</sup>

The vast majority of slaves in late colonial Santa Marta and Riohacha were integrated into the Hispanic sphere of colonial society. Most of them were probably born in the provinces. All of them had Spanish first names, and most had Hispanic surnames. They lived in the large cities, or on sugar plantations or cattle ranches along with the white and coloured free Hispanic population. It is therefore difficult to see the low marriage quotients of slaves as an indication of

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<sup>250</sup> Compare for instance with the Chocó, where William Fredrick Sharp found that in the mid-eighteenth century about half the slaves had African tribal or regional surnames such as Mina, Congo, Arara, Carabali, Chamba, Chala, Zetre, Mandingo, Popo and Tembo. W. F. Sharp, *Slavery on the Spanish Frontier: The Colombian Chocó 1680 - 1810* (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), pp. 114 - 115

<sup>251</sup> LPMN, 1772 - 1788

<sup>252</sup> LBC 1789 - 1790

<sup>253</sup> Antonio Caravali was married to the slave Justa and they had four children. The 1754 census of Boronata can be found in 'Santa Marta. Quaderno sobre el estado de las Misiones de los RR PP Capuchinos, Progresos, y estado de ellas en la Nacion de Indios Guajiros'. AGI, Santa Fe 1185 (hereafter 1754 Quaderno)

<sup>254</sup> AGI, Santa Fe 1201

cultural or social resistance against Hispanic and Catholic domination. On the contrary, evidence suggests that slaves in late colonial Santa Marta and Riohacha sought to form nuclear families, get married and protect the families from the instability which slavery necessarily implied. If most slaves did not marry, it was not because they did not want to, but because they were prevented from doing so.

In some cases it is evident that slave-owners only reluctantly allowed their slaves to marry. The case of the slave José de la Cruz Cartas illustrates some of the difficulties slaves faced when they wanted to marry.<sup>255</sup> His former master was Manuel de Cartas, *contador oficial real* of the Royal Treasury in the city of Santa Marta. In 1796 his master had been accused of some irregular behaviour (probably smuggling or corruption), and all his possessions had been confiscated. José de la Cruz had then been 'deposited' with José Francisco Díaz Granados.<sup>256</sup> Shortly after, Díaz Granados died and the slave was transferred to José Francisco's mother, Manuela Fernández de Castro. When José de la Cruz expressed his wish to marry María Dolores Ramos, a free *morena* from the city of Santa Marta, Manuela refused to give him the licence on the grounds that since she was not his rightful owner she was not in a position to do so. José de la Cruz therefore asked the governor of Santa Marta to give him the license to marry '...since it would not harm the interests of my master or those of the Royal Treasury'. The governor then sent a letter to the former comptroller -who was at the time behind bars in Riohacha- and asked him to give his approval of the marriage. But Manuel de Cartas refused to give the permission and the case was returned to the governor of Santa Marta. The governor then had Vicente Moré,

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<sup>255</sup> AGN, Negros y esclavos 3, folios 998 - 1003

*síndico procurador* of the cabildo of Santa Marta, give his opinion. Moré cited the seventh article of the so-called *Código negrero* of 1789 where masters were instructed to let slaves marry.<sup>257</sup> Moré could not see that José de la Cruz' marriage would affect the interests of his owner. The slave was thus given the permission to marry, two months after he had asked for the licence.

Although the authorities in this case seem to have supported the slave and ensured that his rights were protected, this was probably unusual. José de la Cruz undoubtedly benefited from the fact that his owner was imprisoned and therefore unable to control or pressure him directly. It may also be the case that the governors of Santa Marta and Riohacha and the members of the *cabildo* were more concerned with damaging the former comptroller than improving the well-being of his slave. Certainly, there are no other cases like this one from Santa Marta, which suggests that that slaves could expect little support against their owners from the civil authorities.

### Keeping families together

As José's case illustrates, slaves often had to struggle in order to get married. They also had to struggle to keep their families together. A slave rebellion which occurred on a huge cattle ranch of San Antonio Rompedero de Pestagua -one of the most valuable properties of the Count of Pestagua, Andrés de Madariaga, between San Juan de la Ciénaga and the mouth of the Magdalena river shows that

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<sup>256</sup> José Francisco Díaz Granados was at the time regidor of the Santa Marta cabildo. He was the son of Gabriel Díaz Granados, and thus the cousin of Pascual Díaz Granados. He also married Pascual's sister, Mariana Díaz Granados.

<sup>257</sup> The *Código Negrero* is reproduced in Richard Konetzke, *Colección de documentos* vol. 3, pp. 643 - 652. For a brief discussion of its background, see Hans-Joachim König, 'The Código

defence of family might well have been an important motive for violent resistance.<sup>258</sup>

The slaves on this cattle ranch rebelled in the beginning of 1768 and took control of the property. The background of the revolt is unfortunately impossible to reconstruct from the surviving documents. The most detailed account of the events are found in a letter from the owner himself, Andrés de Madariaga, to the interim governor of Santa Marta, Manuel de Herrera y Leyva.<sup>259</sup> Although this letter undoubtedly gives an incomplete and distorted narrative of the uprising, it can nevertheless help us to understand better the context of the slaves' struggle to protect their families.<sup>260</sup> In his letter dated 2 February 1768, Madariaga assumes that the governor has already been informed that the slaves have revolted. The count arrived in Soledad and immediately wrote a letter to his slaves where he offered them a pardon if they promised never to speak of the incident, if they laid down their weapons and if they returned to their work. According to Madariaga the slaves responded that they would speak to him if he met them alone and unarmed. Madariaga did not feel it was right that he should 'expose his life nor his respect to the discretion of their immoderate will and shameless hands'.<sup>261</sup> He therefore asked for assistance from the *Capitán a guerra* of Soledad, who provided five veteran soldiers and a few militiamen but few arms. When the group went to the place where they were supposed to meet the slaves, the slaves had fled,

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Negrero of 1789, its Background and its Reverberations' in Wolfgang Binder (ed.), *Slavery in the Americas* (Würzburg, Königshausen & Neumann, 1993), pp. 141 - 150

<sup>258</sup> For some of the history of this property see Hérmes Tovar, *Grandes empresas* pp. 102 - 110

<sup>259</sup> This letter and other correspondence regarding the revolt is found in AGN, Negros y esclavos 3, folios 910 - 932

<sup>260</sup> This rebellion has been discussed from a somewhat different perspective by Anthony McFalane, 'Cimarrones and Palenques: Runaways and Resistance in Colonial Colombia' in Gad Heuman (ed.), *Out of the House of Bondage: Runaways, Resistance and Marronage in Africa and the New World* (London, 1986), pp. 131 - 151

because a spy had told them that Madariaga was not alone. Three days earlier Phelipe Carvonel had come to see Madariaga, and Madariaga had asked him to help by advancing against the slaves from a different side. Madariaga and Carvonel agreed that Madariaga should fire a shot when he was in control of the ranch, so that Carvonel and his men could join in with those of Madariaga. But this plan did not work since the slaves had been warned and because Carvonel had not brought enough men. Instead the slaves ambushed Carvonel's group, killed Carvonel and fatally wounded the sergeant Antonio de Castro. The other men in the group fled, and the slaves were able to take their weapon and those of the two wounded men. When Madariaga had ordered his men to find people who could carry Castro and Carvonel back to Soledad, the slaves suddenly appeared. Madariaga, according to his own version of the event, stood up facing the slaves' loaded blunderbusses and rifles and asked them why they had taken up arms. The slaves then replied that if he ordered his men to leave, they would talk to him alone.

The subsequent conversation between the master and his slaves reveals much about their unequal relationship, the way slavery functioned in practice and the possibilities - however limited - the slaves had for improving their own situation. The slaves first told Madariaga that they feared that he had come to kill some of them and punish the rest for what they had done to the overseer. It is not entirely clear why the slaves had rebelled in the first place. In several documents there are allusions to a problem with the overseer, though there is no explanation of what he had done or what the slaves had done to him. Presumably, the overseer had pressed the slaves too hard or trespassed the norms for what was

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<sup>261</sup> 'no siendo justo el que Yo expusiese ni mi vida ni mi Respecto a discrecion de Su

acceptable on a cattle ranch in late colonial Santa Marta, and the slaves had somehow retaliated. Perhaps they drove him away or killed him. When Madariaga asked them to explain why they had rebelled against the overseer, the slaves simply replied that it was because of the treatment he gave them. The slaves then promised that if Madariaga swore by the sacraments that he would pardon them, they would give in on the condition that if any of them were sold, he should sell all of them '...with all the women and the children and so that no one would have to stay on the hacienda...'.<sup>262</sup> The rebel slaves thus clearly insisted on staying together, including not only the men who had rebelled, but the women and children as well. This was undoubtedly partly a measure taken to ensure that Madariaga could not weaken the group by dividing it or selling off some of the leaders, but the fact that the slaves explicitly included the women and the children shows that family ties were important to them. We cannot know how many slave families lived on El Rompedero, nor the household structure which existed there at the time of the uprising. We do know, however, that these slaves were thoroughly acculturated into Hispanic society, since they not only engaged in written correspondence with their owner prior to the negotiations, but also made the owner swear by the sacraments on the promise he was about to give them.

In his letter to the governor, Madariaga also explained how the slaves had threatened to rebel again if the conditions for their surrender was broken. They swore that they would set fire to the hacienda, kill as many animals as they could and flee to the 'Indios Bravos'. 'Going native' was surely an effective threat and more fearful to Madariaga, the governor and the Hispanic population in general

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desenfrenada voluntad y atrevidas manos' folio 921 v.

than the destruction of property. It was also a realistic alternative for the slaves. Although these slaves were Hispanised, it would not be difficult for them to join the Chimila bands which caused great havoc and fear in the province of Santa Marta in the late eighteenth century. The lands of the cattle ranch bordered with the territories where the Chimilas launched their ambushes and attacks on travellers and settlers. The eastern side of the lower Magdalena valley, south of the Ciénaga Grande and the western hills of the Sierra Nevada were the core of Chimila territory, and non-Indians had on several occasions joined and even became leaders of Chimila bands.<sup>263</sup>

In the event, the slaves preferred to stay on the ranch instead of taking refuge with the Chimilas. If they had wanted above all to escape from slavery, it would have been fairly easy to simply run away in these sparsely populated areas. What the slaves sought, however, was to remain in slavery on the cattle ranch provided that they could stay together and on the condition that they were not badly treated by their master or their overseer. Liberty was not necessarily the most important aim for all slaves.<sup>264</sup> 'Going native' must have implied considerable loss socially and culturally. Running away and joining the Indians seems to have been an act of desperation, a last resort if all other alternatives failed.

Why did Madariaga explain his conversation with his slaves in such detail? After all, it is apparent from the text that the Count of Pestagua was not in

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<sup>262</sup> 'baxo de la condicion que Si yo queria sacar para vender alguno de ellos, havia de ser a todos, con todas las negras y muchachos, de modo que ninguno havia de quedar en la hacienda' folio 923 - 923 v

<sup>263</sup> See for instance Julian, *La perla*, p. 192

<sup>264</sup> A similar argument is made by McFarlane who analysed several cases of different forms of slave resistance in New Granada in his '*Cimarrones and Palenques: Runaways and Resistance in Colonial Colombia*'



control, and that his slaves were in a position where they could dictate the conditions of their own working contracts. Writing this letter was thus an admission of weakness. On the other hand, it was probably necessary in order to ensure that he kept his slaves. Madariaga wanted the governor to understand that the slaves had no intention of causing more disorder if only they were left in peace on the ranch. In order to emphasize the seriousness of the negotiations between himself and the slaves, Madariaga also explained in detail how the slaves had provided him with animals to carry the deceased and the wounded back to Soledad, how he had sat down with them and shared tobacco and liquor before they followed him to the port of the river. Madariaga ended his letter by asking the governor of Santa Marta to let the slaves continue working in peace as long as they did not flee to other parts of the province.

Slaves on cattle ranches, such as El Rompedero, were relatively privileged compared to slaves on sugar plantations or in the cities. Living on a huge ranch the slaves were likely to have more room for manoeuvre and be subject to less direct control from master and overseer than those on plantations and in the cities. The slaves on large cattle ranches were also more likely to be able to form and maintain families. This is reflected in the marriage quotient for slaves. While the quotient was very low for slaves in the large cities, it was moderately high and approaching the levels of the free population in smaller towns in the cattle-raising areas. While the marriage quotients for slaves in the cities were around five per cent, it was well above twenty and in certain towns over thirty in the cattle areas around the Magdalena and Cesar rivers. In Boronata, in a typical cattle-ranching area, the marriage quotient for slaves in 1754 was 29.63 per cent.<sup>265</sup> Most of these

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<sup>265</sup> 1754 Quaderno

married slaves were married to other slaves in the same household. Only two of 54 slaves were married to free people, and in both cases the spouse also made part of the master's household. This suggests that it was difficult for slaves to marry someone who did not belong to the same master. Masters, although they were legally bound to let slaves marry freely, probably tried to prevent slaves from marrying outside the household. Therefore, slaves in households with many slaves were more likely to be married than slaves in households with few slaves. Since most of the slaves in the large cities did not live in households with many slaves, this can at least in part explain why the marriage quotients of slaves in the cities were so much lower than the quotients for slaves in smaller towns and in the cattle-ranching areas.

The same trend can be seen from the slaves owned by Pascual Díaz Granados. As noted above, most of his slaves worked and lived on the sugar plantation Santa Cruz del Paraíso, but he also had slaves on cattle ranches near Valledupar and a few slaves in the city of Santa Marta. Of the 67 slaves on the sugar plantation, there were eighteen couples or 36 married persons which give the extraordinary marriage quotient of 53.73. This extremely high number is partly due to the very low number of children per couple. There were only 21 children in total, giving an average of 1.17 children per couple. None of these were older than 12 years, and it is possible that once the children reached that age they were either transferred to other properties of Díaz Granados or sold. The high number of married couples on the sugar plantation suggests that the owner preferred to have families on the plantation rather than single men and women, perhaps because slaves with stable families were less likely to run away.

Slaves in the city were less likely to be married. Of Pascual Díaz Granados' eight slaves who lived and worked in the city of Santa Marta, there was only one named couple; the others may have been married to slaves of other owners or to free persons, but it is unlikely. The marriage quotient for slaves in the city of Santa Marta in 1793 was 12.18, and thus considerably lower than the quotients in smaller towns and on the plantations and the ranches. In other large cities such as Valledupar, Ocaña and Riohacha the quotients were even lower. One reason for this was that slave-owners in the cities had few slaves and were reluctant in letting their slaves marry with slaves of other owners. This tendency is confirmed by the marriage records of the city of Santa Marta between 1772 and 1788. In this period, there were seventeen marriages recorded between slave men and slave women.<sup>266</sup> Eight of these marriages involved slaves who had the same master. At first sight it may seem that this indicates that it was just as easy for slaves in the city to marry slaves of different owners, given that nine of the marriages were between slaves who did not have the same master. But since few slave owners had many slaves, the frequency of slaves marrying within the household would have been much lower if marriages had been random with respect to owners. In other words, it was difficult for slaves to get married at all if they lived in the city and even more difficult if they wanted to marry someone who did not belong to the same master.

That low marriage quotients among slaves cannot be explained primarily as cultural resistance and defence of African or African-American customs is also indicated by the marriage quotients of free blacks. In the overall 1793 census for the province of Santa Marta, there were no racial distinctions beyond the category

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<sup>266</sup> LPMN, 1772 - 1788

'free people of all colours', but in the household list of the city of Riohacha from 1777, racial labels such as 'blanco', 'pardo', 'sambo', 'indio' and 'negro' were used. If we assume that most of the 'negros' were freed slaves and their immediate descendants, we would expect their marriage quotients to be similar to those of slaves if the cultural argument were true. But of the 64 free 'negros' in the census, 19 were married, which gives a marriage quotient of 29.69 which was even higher than the marriage quotient of the free non-white population in general and almost ten times as high as the one for slaves. Thus the scattered evidence we have from Santa Marta and Riohacha suggest that it was the condition of slavery which made it difficult for slaves to marry and to form 'normal' families.

It must also have been difficult for slaves to protect and maintain their marriages. One of the inherently destabilising factors in slavery was the death of the owner and the subsequent partition of the property of the deceased.<sup>267</sup> By law owners could not prevent their slaves from marrying different owners, but married slaves could legally be sold individually. The owner did not have to sell couples together. Dolcey Romero Jaramillo, who has studied slave sales in Santa Marta between 1791 and 1851, found that most slaves in Santa Marta were sold alone. Between 1791 and 1820, 1670 slaves were sold in the city of Santa Marta. These sales were done in 1503 transactions, which implies that 90 per cent of the slaves sold in Santa Marta in that period were sold individually. The slaves who were sold in groups, included eight families with parents and children, but mostly they were mothers with children. In the same period, of the 38 children who were

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<sup>267</sup> For the case of late eighteenth century Brazil, Alida Metcalf has argued that one of the most important causes of slave family instability was the death of the owner, and the sale and inheritance transfers which invariably followed. Alida C. Metcalf, 'Searching for the Slave Family in Colonial Brazil: A Reconstruction from São Paulo' in *Journal of Family History* 16:3 (1991), pp. 283 - 297

sold, nineteen were sold with their mother and the rest were sold individually.<sup>268</sup> These numbers can indicate two very different tendencies. On the one hand they suggest that slave fathers and mothers alike could risk being separated from their families through sales. But at the same time, the total number of children sold (38) compared to the total number of slaves sold (1670) suggest that it was not common to sell slave children at all. This may have been motivated by mere economic shrewdness rather than humanitarian concern, since owners knew that slaves were more valuable after reaching puberty. But it could suggest that owners felt a moral obligation to keep slave families together. These motives do not exclude each other, and it is likely that both factors contributed to making sales of slave children rare. Nevertheless, it must have represented a real risk for the slaves, a risk threatening enough to make the slaves on El Rompedero as we recall, make their master swear by the sacraments that he would not separate the men from their women and children.

### Marriages between slaves and free people

Slaves, when they were able to marry, did not only marry other slaves. In fact the frequency with which slaves married free persons is surprisingly high. Of the 35 marriages in the city of Santa Marta between 1772 and 1788 which included at least one slave, seventeen were marriages between two slaves, fourteen were marriages between slave men and free women and four were marriages between slave women and free men (Table 10). In the city of Riohacha in 1777, seventeen slaves were married. Of these, only six were married to other slaves. Four male slaves were married to free women, and four female slaves were married to free

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<sup>268</sup> Dolcey Romero Jaramillo, *La esclavitud*, pp. 74 - 85

men. Two slave men and one slave woman were married to persons whose name and condition were not listed (Table 11). This indicates that if the slaves managed to marry, they were just as likely to marry free persons as other slaves, although these figures should not be taken too literally, since the sample is small, and in any case only refers to the cities.

The relatively high frequency of marriages between slave men and free women is another indication of the degree to which the slaves formed part of the Hispanic community of late colonial Santa Marta and Riohacha. Although the slaves definitely had a subordinate social status and were discriminated against both by law and in practice, some of them did manage to form family ties into the free sections of the community. This of course did not only happen through marriage. A high number of slaves in late colonial Santa Marta were emancipated or were able to buy their own freedom. According to the figures which Dolcey Romero Jaramillo obtained from counting both *manumisiones gratuitas* (where the owner emancipated the slave 'for free') and *manumisiones pagadas* (where the slave, family members or friends bought the slave's freedom), there were 39 manumissions in the city of Santa Marta between 1791 and 1800 and 73 between 1801 and 1810.<sup>269</sup> Of these 112 manumissions, 17 were free manumissions and 95 were bought. These numbers are quite high considering that the slave population of the city of Santa Marta in 1793 did not reach 500. The relative high frequency of marriage between slave men and free women, and the relative high rate of manumission, confirm that there was a certain fluidity between slaves and the free sector of the population. Unlike most of the Indian communities in Santa Marta, whether tributary or unconquered, the slaves formed part of the Hispanic urban

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<sup>269</sup> Romero Jaramillo, *La Esclavitud*, anexo 7

communities, and could - although with difficulty - enter into the free Hispanic population.

Another important area of contact between slaves and the rest of the population lay in sexual relations between slaves and the free population outside the institution of marriage. When slaves found it difficult to get married, they often resorted to informal consensual unions, a phenomenon which is omnipresent in the primary sources from the late eighteenth century. However, there is at least one serious methodological and theoretical problem with the analysis of these non-formalised unions. It is difficult, if not impossible, to write about them without taking a view of the motivations which led the partners to engage in illicit sexual affairs.

There is a tendency in the literature to view any non-formalised union between two slaves or a slave and a free person of colour as a more or less permanent relationship which exists because marriage was so difficult to attain. Conversely, when illicit unions between female slaves and white males (or slave-owners whatever their racial denomination) are discussed, we tend to assume that it was an abuse on part of the socially superior white male. These assumptions may be correct in most instances, but they may also be simplistic or simply wrong in individual cases. The problem is that the sources generally do not contain much information about the interior power relation between couples, whatever their social standing. Thus when the episcopal *visita* disclosed several instances of priests living *amancebados* with slaves or having children with them, it is easy to jump to the conclusion that the slaves were subject to a sexual abuse by someone who was not only socially superior, but supposedly also their spiritual leader and

intercessor. Images of pressure, force and violence come to mind. But were these relationships invariably abusive? Did the unequal status of the partners necessarily imply that one was abusing the other? Unfortunately, the sources available for this study seldom reveal much of the internal character of the illicit unions denounced in the late colonial period, and it is not our intention to discuss this problem at length. However, we need to be aware of the problem when writing about illicit relationships between partners of unequal social status, because the words we normally use to describe these relationships often imply a verdict on the nature of the union. An 'informal consensual union', for instance, implies or can be understood as a union where both partners willingly enters into an illicit relationship. When a man has a concubine, on the other hand, we suppose that this is not necessarily the case.

The two illicit relationships which involved slaves and which were reported during the Episcopal *visita* in 1776 are difficult to decipher. In San Antonio, several witnesses testified that the priest was having an affair with his slave. One witness said that '...the priest is defamed by a *samba* who is his own slave...with whom he as an illicit friendship.' The same witness said he knew this because the slave had told it herself.<sup>270</sup> Perhaps the term 'ilícita amistad' and the fact that the slave told about the relationship suggest that she had not been forced into this relationship, but the evidence is hardly conclusive. Another witness simply reported that it was public knowledge that '...the priest has an illicit

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<sup>270</sup> 'Sumario en que constan las vidas, costumbres' folio 10 in AGI, Santa Fe 1193: 'que el Padre Cura ha oydo decir el Declarante de publico y notorio se halla infamado con una Samba su propia esclava nombrada María Jossefa de Zuñiga, con la que se asegura tener ilícita amistad, por haversele dicho al Declarante la misma samba María Josefa, verificandose mas con algunas acciones, y palabras, que entre ella y dho Padre ha visto y oydo el Declarante, Que assi mismo se dice de publico Que la referida Samba malparió cuyo engendro era del citado Padre, como tambien, el que se dice tiene de presente'



friendship with a slave and the she is pregnant with his child'.<sup>271</sup> It is perhaps worth noting that witnesses who reported this did not appear to perceive it as a big scandal. The same witnesses testified that the priest fulfilled his duties well. No steps seem to have been taken by the ecclesiastical authorities to punish or to remove the priest from his position. On the contrary, in the report written by the bishop of Santa Marta in 1781, he wrote that Nicolas Moreti, the priest of San Antonio, was '...a subject of medium capacity and zealous in the execution of his Pastoral Ministry, and although he [was] given in by a certain imposture..', the bishop judged that he should be forgiven.<sup>272</sup>

Perhaps more telling is the denunciation and the case against Juan Thomas de Villas for having an 'inveterado concubinato' with his own slave and for having abandoned his wife. According to the *visitador*, Manuel Antonio Rubianes, who visited the province of Santa Marta in the early 1790s, Juan Thomas maintained '...a scandalous ... and public adulterous concubinage with his own Black slave with whom he has children'.<sup>273</sup> The judges and witnesses were not primarily concerned with whether Juan Thomas had forced the slave into this relationship. Rubianes, in his own words, wanted '..to remedy the spiritual ruin of this subject..', and the moral outrage he expressed in the case concerned how Villar had betrayed his lawful wife. In other words, it seems that an affair with a slave was not

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<sup>271</sup> 'Sumario en que constan las vidas' folio 11 v in AGI, Santa Fe 1193: 'Que el Padre Cura cumple con su obligación en lo que toca a decir misa y administrar los Santos Sacramentos pero que no trata a los feligreses con el amor y caridad que debe por que en algunas ocasiones les matrata de palabras en la Santa iglesia .Que ha oydo decir en el sitio Que el Padre Cura D Nicolas Moreti está en ilícita amistad con una esclava suya nombrada María Jossefa, y tambien se dice que de presente la tiene embarazada'

<sup>272</sup> 'El reverendo obispo de Santa Marta da cuenta a V. M. del estado material y formal de las iglesias de su diócesis con Informe de las Vidas, Costumbres y Meritos de sus Eclesiasticos' (n. p.) in AGI, Santa Fe 1200: 'Cura de la parrquia de San Antonio, D. Niolas Moreti, sugeto de mediana capacidad y zeloso en el cumplimiento de su Ministerio Pastoral, y aunque se halla capitulado es por cierta impostura que juzgo se indennise.'

necessarily scandalous if both partners were single. But in this case, Juan Thomas Villar was a married man and it was the obligation of the authorities to save him from 'spiritual ruin'. The judges were not overly concerned about the nature of the relationship between the master and the slave, and Juan Thomas himself did not clarify this point in his declaration. He merely admitted that he had an affair with the slave, that she was pregnant and that he wanted to end the relationship. He had therefore sent her to a family in San Stanislao in the province of Cartagena, and he was preparing to have her emancipated. The slave was never questioned in this case, and we cannot therefore know her side of the story.

It was not rare that slaves were freed in Santa Marta but, as Dolcey Romero Jaramillo has shown, most of the slaves who were freed bought their own freedom. A few were also freed without any direct economic compensation. In some of these cases, a sexual relationship between the slave and the master may have the prelude to emancipation. This was certainly the case of Juan Thomas Villar's slave. It was probably also the case when the illegitimate daughter of the slave Ana Josefa Rivero was baptised in Santa Marta in 1789. The master, a certain P. del Valle, declared that the new-born child would be free from birth.<sup>274</sup> We may assume that he was the father. But this did not happen frequently. Of the twenty-three children born of slave mothers who were baptised in Santa Marta between July 1789 and April 1790, this was the only case where the child was freed from birth.<sup>275</sup> Seven of these children were explicitly stated to be illegitimate, and in fourteen cases the name of the father was not disclosed. The illegitimacy rate for slaves must have been high, and considerably higher than that of the free

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<sup>273</sup> 'El Visitador Gral de Santa Marta dirige a V Exa. la causa que le a seguido a Juan Thomas de Villa', folio 359 in AGN, Negros y esclavos 3

<sup>274</sup> LBC 25 September 1789

population. This of course, must be seen in connection with the difficulty slaves experienced when they wanted to marry. But it also reflects that female slaves were sexually vulnerable.

The slaves thus in many ways formed part of the lower-class, urban, Hispanic communities of late colonial Santa Marta and Riohacha. They were generally more integrated into Hispanic society than the Indian groups. Although slavery itself made it difficult if not impossible for slaves to marry and to form stable families, from the sources available to us it seems that slaves aspired and struggled to become part of free Hispanic population. It is also possible that the free population did not perceive the slaves as being culturally very different from themselves. The relative high frequency of marriages between slaves and free persons indicate that the cultural and social border which divided slaves from free people was not impassably wide. The cultural distance between slaves and Indian communities was much wider, even though geographically many slaves lived close to the unconquered Indian groups. Taking refuge with the Indians was not a popular alternative to slaves. As shown by the case of the rebellious slaves on El Rompedero, 'going native' could be used as a threat by the slaves, but if possible they preferred to stay in slavery on the condition that they were treated reasonably. The gulf that divided Indian communities from the Hispanic population in which slaves were included, will be further explored in the next section which discusses the position of the Indian communities in late colonial Santa Marta and Riohacha.

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<sup>275</sup> LBC

## **Chapter 5. The Indian communities**

In Chapter 1 we saw that two types of Indian communities existed in the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha in the colonial period. Those communities that had been subdued by the Spanish conquerors in the sixteenth century, had been converted into encomiendas and provided labour to the encomenderos of the Spanish cities. By the beginning of the eighteenth century the encomiendas had mostly reverted to the crown, and were thereafter known as tributary towns because their male inhabitants aged between eighteen and fifty were obliged to pay an annual tribute to the Royal Exchequer. The other type of communities were the unconquered ones, and within Santa Marta and Riohacha provinces there several such groups even at the end of the eighteenth century, the largest being the Guajiros, the Chimilas, the Aruacos and the Motilones. During the so-called second conquest of America, the Spanish renewed their attempts of subduing the unconquered groups, and throughout the eighteenth century there was a prolonged campaign to reduce the 'barbarous' to urban living. The aim, in other words, was to convert the unconquered groups to tributary towns. The second part of this chapter examines this process as it evolved particularly on the Guajira peninsula, and the relations between the Indian communities there and the rest of the population in the province. But first, we will examine in more detail the position of the tributary communities and specifically the relations between these and the Spanish cities around which they were clustered.

### **The tributary towns**

Towards the end of the eighteenth century there were still twenty-seven tribute-paying Indian villages in the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha, with a total

Indian population of more than 8,000 (Table 1). The Indian towns were geographically located near the largest Hispanic cities, such as Santa Marta, Ocaña, Valledupar and Riohacha (Map 6). The geographic location of the tributary towns in the immediate vicinity of the largest Spanish cities was no coincidence. The foundation of the Spanish cities in the sixteenth century occurred simultaneously with the 'reduction' of the native communities to *encomiendas*, and the *encomiendas* were positioned to allow the Spanish to control the Indians.

During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, all *encomiendas* reverted to the Crown, and the Indians, instead of working for an *encomendero*, paid tribute to the Royal Exchequer.<sup>276</sup> The annual tribute was by Royal decree of 11 September 1701 set at four pesos, payable in money or in kind.<sup>277</sup> The produce of the towns depended on their geographic location. All towns had communal lands, called *ejidos*, where a large range of different crops were grown including corn. Most of the towns also seem to have had cattle. Some of the villages in the César valley paid the tribute with woven textiles such as hammocks and bags (*costales*) used for packing and transporting sugar, tobacco and coffee.<sup>278</sup> In the tributary towns along the Magdalena river and in San Juan de Ciénaga, fishing and maritime transport (*boga*) were important economic activities. In the latter, there were 77 *bogadores*, 115 fishermen, 119 agricultural labourers and 2 fishing-net weavers among the tributary population in 1804.<sup>279</sup> The economic activities of the

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<sup>276</sup> For this process in Santa Marta, see María del Carmen Mena García, 'Santa Marta durante la guerra', pp. 576 - 592

<sup>277</sup> Ibid. p. 582

<sup>278</sup> See for instance 'Sumario general de cargo de la Cuenta de la tesorería de Hacienda del Valle Dupar', 1805 in AGI, Cuba 726 B; 'Sumario General de Cargo en la Cuenta de de la Tesorería de Hacienda del Valle Dupar', 1806 in AGI, Cuba 725 B and 'Sumario General de cargo de la Cuenta de Tesorería de Hacienda del Valle Dupar', 1807 in AGI, Cuba 723 A

<sup>279</sup> Statistics based on 'Censo de San Juan de Ciénaga', 1804 in AGN, Caciques e indios 9, folios 769 - 788

tributary towns, then, probably resembled those of the villages and smaller towns inhabited by non-Indian commoners.

Given the close relationship between the tributary towns and the Hispanic cities, one might think that the Indian towns were increasingly becoming depopulated or Hispanised. We know, for instance, that in the highlands of New Granada, the Indians' *resguardos* were under enormous strain in the late colonial period. Their lands were sold, Hispanic settlers moved into the villages (with or without official acceptance) where they came to dominate the local political institutions, and where extensive miscegenation weakened Indian identity and enabled non-Indian residents to take control of the local political institutions.<sup>280</sup> This tendency was absent, however, from the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha in the same period.<sup>281</sup> On the contrary, the Indian tributary towns in Santa Marta and Riohacha were still surprisingly 'Indian' by the end of the colonial period. The vast majority of the inhabitants were categorised as Indians both in the census of 1793 and in the counts of male population of the tributary towns conducted in 1804. Only very few marriages were recorded between Indians from the tributary towns and non-Indians. Town officials were recruited locally, and furthermore, the Indian towns seem to have been quite successful in defending their communal lands from being taken by the sugar plantations and cattle-ranches owned by the Spanish elites near the Indian towns.

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<sup>280</sup> See for instance, Margarita González, *El resguardo en el Nuevo Reino de Granada* 2. ed. (Bogotá, La Carreta, 1979). Similar processes have been studied for Quito and its hinterland by Martin Minchom, *The People of Quito, 1690 - 1810: Change and Unrest in the Underclass* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1994)

<sup>281</sup> Although this appears to be what Lola G. Luna argues. See her *Resguardos coloniales de Santa Marta y Cartagena y resistencia indígena* (Bogotá, Biblioteca Banco Popular, 1993)

These patterns can be illustrated by taking a closer look at the tributary towns around the city of Santa Marta for which the documentation is richest. In the second half of the eighteenth century, there were five tributary towns in this area: Mamatoco, Bonda, Taganga, Masinga and Gaira (Map 8). Masinga belonged to the parish of Bonda, and Taganga to the parish of Mamatoco, so that the five towns constituted three parishes. These three parishes had between 308 and 389 inhabitants according to the 1793 census (Table 1). In Mamatoco (with Taganga) and Bonda (with Masinga) all inhabitants were categorised as Indians except for the priest, and in Gaira there were only eight 'free people' and one slave. The counts of male inhabitants in 1804 give the same impression: these towns were overwhelmingly 'Indian' at the eve of independence.<sup>282</sup>

The tributary Indians rarely married outside their villages. Of the 299 non-white marriages recorded in the city of Santa Marta between 1772 and 1788, there were only two cases of either a bride or groom being from the tributary towns around Santa Marta; María Francisca Nuñez from Mamatoco married Phelipe Padilla from Tolú in the province of Cartagena and Simona Noriega from Bonda married Francisco Ramos from Honda in the interior of the viceroyalty.<sup>283</sup> Conversely, very few outsiders married in the Indian parishes. Of 109 marriages recorded in the parish of Gaira between 1783 and 1810, there were only three grooms who were explicitly stated to be of other parishes, two from Molino and

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<sup>282</sup> For Gaira 1804, see AGN, Censos de varios departamentos 6, folios 583 - 587; for Mamatoco and Gaira 1804 see AGN, Censos de varios departamentos 8, folios 294 - 299 and for San Juan de Ciénaga 1804, see AGN, Caciques e indios 9, folios 769 - 788

<sup>283</sup> These are recorded in LPMN 29 Dec 1784 and 20 Feb 1775 respectively. There are also four marriages involving either a groom or bride from San Juan de Ciénaga, but as there were a number of non-Indian residents there, it is probable that the cienagueros who married in the cathedral of Santa Marta were not tributary Indians.

one from San Juan de Ciénaga.<sup>284</sup> The vast majority of the grooms listed in marriage books from Gaira between 1783 and 1809 can be found also in the counts of male population of Gaira from 1804, the main exceptions being the eight slave couples who were wedded in Gaira.<sup>285</sup> The strong insular character of the marriage patterns of these towns is further corroborated by the repeating occurrences of the same surnames in the various censuses from the tributary towns in the eighteenth century. In Gaira in 1804, of the 102 tributary Indian males listed 39 had the surname Manjarrés, 15 Eguí, 11 Incapié, 8 Boto and 8 de Silva. These are the same surnames which recur in the marriage records and other lists of inhabitants.<sup>286</sup> Similar patterns are visible in the other tributary towns around Santa Marta. In Taganga the most common surnames were Basques, Daniel, Matos, Yaritama and Doy, and in Mamatoco the most common were Nuñez, Duica, Sifuentes, Cuchara and Peña.<sup>287</sup>

This, however, should not be taken as a sign that the tributary towns were merely remnants of pre-conquest communities resisting acculturation and cultural change. Although our knowledge of these towns is limited (anthropologists and historians have tended to be more interested in the unconquered groups), the tributary towns should be seen as colonial constructs, very much influenced by Spanish ideas and institutions. This may be appreciated for instance in the use of Spanish surnames which appear to have been adopted from the conquistadors,

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<sup>284</sup> Libro de matrimonios de Gaira 1783 - 1850 (hereafter LG) in AHESM. The three marriages with grooms from other parishes were the ones between Vicente de Ortega (from Molino) with Feliciano (no surname recorded) 30 Aug 1785; Manuel Manjarres from Ciénaga with Romualda Ruiz 2 Jan 1793 and Gregorio Díaz from Molino with Calara Castro 16 Aug 1794.

<sup>285</sup> The slaves who were married in Gaira were most probably slaves who worked on the sugar plantations nearby, such as Santa Cruz del Paraíso owned by Pascual Díaz Granados.

<sup>286</sup> See for instance 'Lista de los naturales que voluntariamente quieren trasladarse de su Pueblo de Gayra a las tierras e Rio Frío' in AGN, Resguardos 12, folios 404 - 406



encomenderos and governors of the sixteenth century. For instance, the most common surnames in the towns around the city of Santa Marta such as Manjarrés, Nuñez, Incapié and de Silva are likely to have been adopted from Luis de Manjarrés (governor of Santa Marta 1545 - 46, 1548 - 1551, 1554, 1556 - 1559 and 1561 - 1565), Diego Nuñez (encomendero of Mamatoco and Tamaica), Pedro Martín Hincapié (encomendero of Sinanguey) and Victoria de Silva (encomendera of Seraymaca).<sup>288</sup> Moreover, the very high marriage quotients in practically all the tributary towns compared to those of the free commoners (Table 4) suggest that the tributary Indians (unlike the unconquered groups) had internalised Catholic marriage customs. There were no complaints from priests in the tributary towns about polygamy, which were frequent among some of the unconquered groups. In fact, judging from the marriage quotients, the tributary Indian communities were among those settlements in the provinces with most 'normal' and ordered marriage practices. The marriage quotients of the tributary towns in general was 32.91 which was even higher than that of 'whites' in the cities (Table 1).

Unlike many of the *resguardos* in the interior of the viceroyalty, the tributary Indians in Santa Marta maintained control over local political institutions. In each tributary town there were political representatives recruited from the Indian residents, but appointed by Spanish authorities. The number of these varied, but normally included a *cacique* (chief), *capitanes*, *alcaldes*, *fiscales* and sometimes a *sacristán* to aid the parish priest who was a Spaniard appointed by the Bishop. In the largest towns the number of representatives could be large, such as

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<sup>287</sup> 'Padrón general del Pueblo de San Gerónimo de Mamatoco de todos los Barones de que se compone dho pueblo y su anexo de San Francisco de Taganga', 1804 in AGN, Censos de varios departamentos 8, folios 294 - 299

<sup>288</sup> List of encomenderos in the province of Santa Marta, 1624 and of governors 1525 - 1700 in Miranda Vásquez, *La gobernacion de Santa Marta*, pp. 141 - 172

in San Juan de Ciénaga where there were four *alcaldes*, two captains, four *regidores*, four *alguaciles* and four *fiscales* in 1804, all recruited from the tributary population.<sup>289</sup> In the smaller towns the number of such employments was correspondingly small. In Taganga in 1743, there were only a *cacique* and an *alcalde*.<sup>290</sup> As can be readily appreciated, these positions were not modelled on pre-Hispanic native institutions, but were institutions the Spanish had introduced all over Spanish America in the sixteenth century for the internal government of the Indian communities. The very names of the positions were all Spanish, except for *cacique* which was a term picked up by the first explorers on the Caribbean islands and subsequently used indiscriminately to describe leaders of native communities. However, some aspects of this local town government may have interacted with older political traditions and structures in the Indian towns. For instance, although the *caciques* were formally appointed by Spanish authorities, they had to show that they had a hereditary claim to the title in order to be appointed. Thus in the counts of tributary Indians, the oldest son of the present *cacique* was frequently identified.<sup>291</sup> And in Ciénaga, Sebastián Manjarrés was replaced by his son Luis de Manjarrés who in turn was replaced by his son Sebastián Manjarrés who was the *cacique* in 1743.<sup>292</sup> However, it is still an open question whether inheritance of *cacicazgos* through the paternal line was practised in the pre-conquest period. This may have been another practice introduced in the

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<sup>289</sup> 'Padrón de los naturales que se hallan en San Juan de Ciénaga' in AGN, Caciques e indios 9, folio 769

<sup>290</sup> Arturo Bermúdez Bermúdez, *Materiales para la historia de Santa Marta* (Bogotá, L. Canal y Asociados, 1981), p. 81

<sup>291</sup> See for instance the census of Mamatoco in 1743 in Bermúdez, *Materiales para la historia*, p. 76

<sup>292</sup> For the genealogy of some of the 'notable' indians in Ciénaga, see 'Testimonio de los documentos que acreditan la ascendencia de José Vicente del Rosal por ambas lineas' 1791 in AGI, Santa Fe 1197. That Sebastián Manjarrés was the *cacique* in 1743 can be seen in the summary of the 1743 census published in Bermúdez, *Materiales para la historia*, p. 82. For some comments on the the passing on of *cacicazgos* in Ciénaga, see 'Manuel Manjarrés solicita

colonial period. The main point, however, is that at the end of the eighteenth century, and perhaps even more than in previous centuries, the tributary towns were still vital communities which were able to defend what they perceived to be their rights and traditions and to make a quite successful use of the Spanish legal system for their own purposes.

It is also beyond doubt that the tributary towns which existed in the Santa Marta area in the late eighteenth century were conglomerates of various towns and villages which had been united throughout the colonial period as the native population declined. This last point may be illustrated with a series of statistics on the number of tribute-paying Indians and encomiendas/tribute-paying towns in the area around the city of Santa Marta from 1627 to 1804. In 1627 there were twenty-seven encomiendas in the Santa Marta area and a total of 696 tribute-paying Indians.<sup>293</sup> In 1661 there were twenty-eight encomiendas, but only 370 tribute-payers, and all of the encomiendas had fewer tribute-payers in 1661 than in 1627.<sup>294</sup> In other words, between 1627 and 1661 the tributary population had declined, but the number of villages remained on the same level. The few data we have from the early eighteenth century indicate the lowest tribute-paying population for the entire colonial period. Taganga and Masinga had only eight tribute-payers each, while Bonda had twelve.<sup>295</sup> In the subsequent census of 1743 the tribute-paying population seems to have recovered. Mamatoco with 37 tributary Indians had more in 1743 than in 1627, and Gaira with its 26 had more

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e cacicazgo de la Ciénaga en la provincia de Santa Marta', 1817 in AGN, Solicitudes 10, folios 1 -2

<sup>293</sup> AGI, Santa Fe 50, cited in Trinidad Miranda Vazquez, *La gobernación de Santa Marta*, pp. 163 - 164

<sup>294</sup> AGI, Contaduría 1432 and 1661, cited in Lola G. Luna, *Los resguardos coloniales*, pp. 124 - 125

<sup>295</sup> AGI, Santa Fe 347, 348, 504, 505, 518 and 769, cited in María del Carmen Mena García, 'Santa Marta durante la Guerra', pp. 579 - 580

in 1743 than in both 1661 and 1627. Masinga (with 17) and Bonda (18) had more than in 1700, but less than in 1661. Taganga, however, continued to decline, with only five tribute-payers in 1743.<sup>296</sup> These numbers, however, conceal the fact that the number of tributary towns had declined sharply since 1661. In 1743, there were only nine tributary towns. This number, as we have seen, continued to decline until 1793, when there were only six such towns left. Thus, the six towns which existed at the end of the colonial period were the result of a continuous re-settlement process whereby the tributary population of small towns were moved to the larger as the population declined. Thus, when the tributary population started to increase again sometime in the mid-eighteenth century, no new tributary towns were founded. And while the number of encomiendas/ tributary towns decreased from twenty-seven in 1627 to six in 1804, the total number of tribute-paying Indians in these towns was actually larger in 1804 than in 1627.<sup>297</sup>

The Gairas, the Bondas, the Mamatocos etc. of the late eighteenth century were, then, not simply the descendants of the pre-Hispanic inhabitants of their own villages; their populations included people from the entire area around Santa Marta. There is evidence which suggests that the late colonial inhabitants of the tributary towns descended from native groups even farther away. When Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff conducted a brief survey of the surnames common in the 1743 censuses of Mamatoco and Gaira, he found that some of them may have been of Tayrona origin, like *Yaritama*, but that others commonly found in these towns around Santa Marta, such as *Egui*, *Gui*, *Tete*, *Cogna* and *Doy* were probably

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<sup>296</sup> Bermúdez, *Materiales para la historia*, pp. 75 – 83. His lists are probably based on 'Censos de Mamatoco, Masinga, Bonda, Jeriboca, Taganga, Tanjica, Ciénaga y Gaira' in AGN, Caciques e indios 32, folios 341 - 368

<sup>297</sup> AGN, Censos redimibles, legajo 8 folios 295 –99 and legajo 6, folios 583 – 88

originated in the Magdalena river area.<sup>298</sup> We know that natives from the lower Magdalena valley were taken to Santa Marta as prisoners in the sixteenth century, and it is likely that some were incorporated into the Indian villages which existed close to the city. According to Reichel-Dolmatoff, some of the surnames seem foreign altogether to the region, and he suggested that surnames such as *Bache* and *Cache* and local toponyms such as *Calembe*, *Congaegato* and even *Masinga* have African origins. It is not our purpose to verify or reject these hypotheses, but to note that they corroborate the ideas that Indian tributary towns were the result of conquest and colonisation, and not merely remnants of the pre-Columbian villages brought under Spanish rule.

The rising demographic figures of the second half of the eighteenth century are remarkable, so remarkable, in fact, that it is difficult to accept that they accurately reflect population growth in the Indian towns. More efficient administration, and a stronger emphasis on forcing people to live in urban centres, whether Indian or not, probably inflated census figures. Nevertheless, the population almost certainly did increase. The number of children reported in the censuses of 1743 and especially in 1804 was very high compared to the number of adult men. There are other signs, too, of a revitalisation of the tributary towns towards the end of the colonial period. Compared to the feeble encomiendas of the seventeenth century in sharp demographic decline, the few remaining tributary towns in the second half of the eighteenth century appear to have been stronger both demographically and politically. But the resurgence of these towns, should not be seen primarily as a renaissance of a pre-Columbian past. Their social and political resurgence was profoundly imbedded in the Spanish colonial system.

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<sup>298</sup> Reichel-Dolmatoff, 'Contactos y cambios', p. 54 – 55

The political strength of these communities and their ability in the late colonial period to defend communal resources can be seen most vividly in the series of legal disputes they engaged in with members of the local elites resident in the major cities of the region. These disputes were generally over land, grazing and fishing rights, and usually involved conflicts over the measurement of the ejidos and the private plantations and ranches owned by the elites. In San Juan de Ciénaga, the tributary Indians sustained a legal dispute with some of the most prominent of the noble families of Santa Marta for at least forty years.<sup>299</sup> To the east of San Juan de Ciénaga lay the large plantations of Santa Cruz de Papare and Garabuya, the two largest sugar plantations of the province of Santa Marta. Papare and Garabuya were founded on the shores of the river Toribio, by José Mozo de la Torre, governor of Santa Marta from 1713.<sup>300</sup> In 1753 the properties were passed on to the Nuñez Dávilas, who, as we saw in Chapter 2, made part of the close network of noble families in the city of Santa Marta.<sup>301</sup> Despite the formidable economic and political power of their opponents, the tributary Indians

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<sup>299</sup> 'Asignación de tierras en Ciénaga a los indígenas y largo litigio sostenido por el Protector de ellos, con Nicolás Martínez y después del fallecimiento de éste, con sus hijos Francisca y Nicolás, por las haciendas de Garabulla y Papare', 1757 - 1793 in AGN, Resguardos 12, folios 1 - 294

<sup>300</sup> For the history of the owners of these properties from 1700 to 1948, see Marco Tulio Vargas, *Anotaciones históricas del Magdalena* (Bogotá, Editorial Lumen, 1948), pp. 71 - 76, although there are some errors in his genealogical data. The appointment of José Mozo de la Torre is found in AGI, Santa Fe 1179

<sup>301</sup> Francisco José Nuñez Dávila was married to Ana Teresa Mozo de la Torre, daughter of the former governor. In 1776, they were bought by Nicolás Martínez, and were passed on to his daughter Francisca Martínez. A catalan merchant, José Nicolás de Ximeno bought them in 1799 and passed them on to his nephew José de Ximeno who was married to Ramona Oligós, daughter of Pablo Oligós and Ana Teresa Díaz Granados. In 1839 they were sold by Ramona Oligós to Joaquín de Mier and they were in the possession of the de Mier family until the 1940s. See Vargas, *Anotaciones*, pp. 73 - 76; 'Escritura de venta de 27 fanegas de tierra a favor de Nicolás Martínez de los herederos de Francisco Josef Nuñez Dávila', 1776 in AGN, Resguardos 12, folios 76ff; 'Testamento de José de Ximeno,' n.d. in NPSM, Protocolos de 1829; 'Testamento de Pablo Oligós', 17 April 1817 in NPSM, Protocolos de 1817; 'Testamento de José Nicolás de Ximeno' 13 Jan 1820 in NPSM, Protocolos de 1819 - 1820; Hermes Tovar, *Grandes empresas*, pp.136 - 136 and anexo 7; Bermúdez, *Materiales para la historia*, p. 274; Romero Jaramillo, *Esclavitud*, pp. 92 - 98

of San Juan de Ciénaga managed to sustain a protracted lawsuit over the lands in question and they eventually succeeded in securing the rights to most of the lands they claimed.

Similar conflicts over land between the tributary towns and large plantations occurred all over the province of Santa Marta. The Indians of Mamatoco fought for lands in the vicinity of their towns against the pretensions of deacon Francisco Muñoz Castellanos.<sup>302</sup> And later they came in conflict over land with José Francisco Munive y Mozo, coronel of the militias of Santa Marta and owner of the sugar plantation Sanata Cruz de Curinca.<sup>303</sup> The town of San Pedro del Morro defended their lands against Diego Gómez Hidalgo, relative of the marquis of Valdehoyos.<sup>304</sup> And several of the towns in the César valley complained that white landowners let their cattle graze on the ejidos of the Indian communities.

The tributary towns in the late colonial period were not, then, feeble remnants of a pre-Hispanic past, but had strong communal institutions which enabled them to defend their lands and resources even in the face of powerful enemies. They did this by the effective use of the Spanish legal system and seldom by violence (no cases of violent revolts are known from 1750 onwards in these towns). It is perhaps not surprising, then, that these communities were to play an essential part during the wars of independence, as we shall see later.

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<sup>302</sup> 'Mensura y asignación de tierras a los naturales de Mamatoco con oposición de Francisco Muñoz Castellanos, deán de la catedral de Santa Marta', 1779 - 1782 in AGN, Resguardos 12, folios 295 - 387

<sup>303</sup> For property owned by José Francisco Munive y Mozo, see his will given in Santa Marta 8 Jan. 1834 in NPSM, protocolos 1834-35. The conflict is described in a letter by José María Martínez de Aparicio to the King, 25 Nov 1810 in AGI, Santa Fe 746 and in the 36 acta of the Junta de Santa Marta, 24 Nov 1810 in AGI, Santa Fe 746

<sup>304</sup> 'El presbítero Mateo Bruno de Urquiza y Barros, cura doctrinero de San Pedro del Morro, defiende a sus feligreses en la posesión de sus tierras, y en el pleito que les movió Diego Gómez Hidalgo' in AGN, Resguardos 12, folios 437 - 527

## The unconquered groups: the Guajiros

Of the unconquered groups which still existed in Santa Marta and Riohacha provinces at the end of the colonial period, the Guajiros were the most numerous and the greatest problem for the Spanish authorities. For obvious reasons, only rough estimates of the size of the Guajiro population in the late eighteenth century are available. In 1760, the *cacique* of Boronata estimated that there were around 7,000 Guajiros who could bear arms, which would perhaps indicate a total population of at least 20,000.<sup>305</sup> In 1778 governor Antonio de Narváez y la Torre calculated their population to be around 30,000, although he admitted that it was 'impossible to verify because they [were] not subject to regular settlements and many still live[d] like beasts in the wilderness'.<sup>306</sup> By this he probably meant that most Guajiros were semi-nomads, moving between different settlements depending on the season and having no fixed residence. The Guajira peninsula was a semi-desert, unsuitable for agriculture due to the lack of rain and the scarcity of water, and as such it was of little interest to colonists. But situated within easy reach of the Dutch colonies in the Lesser Antilles, near other foreign islands such as St. Thomas, Jamaica and Saint-Domingue and far from any large Spanish cities, it had soon become a haven for contraband trade.<sup>307</sup> The Guajiro Indians exchanged cattle and wood for arms, liquor and cloth. Eager to put an end to this trade, which Spanish authorities believed robbed the Royal Exchequer

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<sup>305</sup> AGI, Santa Fe 1196

<sup>306</sup> 'Provincia de Santa Marta y Rio Hacha del Virreynato de Santafé. Informe del gobernador D. Antonio de Narváez y la Torre' in Sergio Elias Ortíz (ed.), *Escritos de dos economistas coloniales* (Bogotá, Banco de la República, 1965), pp. 35 - 36. In 1779, three different officials reached different conclusions regarding the size of Guajiro population. The governor of Riohacha, Antonio Zejudo thought there were 14,970 Guajiros who could bear arms; militia captain Hilario Suarez thought there were 12,300 while militia sergeant Luis Guerrero estimated them to be 5,460. See 'Calculo del número de Indios Guagiros, Hombres de Armas, que se regula puede tener la Provincia del Rio Hacha' in AGI, Santa Fe 702



of substantial revenues, colonial governments used various tactics to subdue the Guajiros.

The relationship between Guajiros and Hispanic colonial society has normally been treated as one characterised by hostility and warfare. The Guajiros have been portrayed as an ethnic group which successfully defied the Spanish attempts of colonisation, evangelisation and pacification. The few studies which have focused on the relationship between the Hispanic communities and the Guajiro clans in the eighteenth century have tended to see it as a more or less continuous and violent struggle where the Hispanic communities, represented by Capuchin friars, local militias, Spanish military regiments and colonial authorities, in vain attempted to bring the Guajiros under colonial rule, convert them to Christianity, and stop them from trading with foreign merchants.<sup>308</sup> The Guajiros, conversely, have been portrayed as natives who, by adopting certain aspects of western technology and economic systems (such as cattle-herding, the use of firearms and trading), were able to resist Spanish colonisation and thereby defend their traditional culture, their mythologies, their social organisation, their language and their religion. The history of Guajiros and Spanish in the colonial period has been written as if it were a continuous violent confrontation which ended in the late eighteenth century with Guajiro victory.

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<sup>307</sup> See particularly Grahn, *The Political Economy of Smuggling*, pp. 31 - 64

<sup>308</sup> Allan J. Kuethe, 'The Pacification Campaign on the Riohacha Frontier, 1772 - 1779' in *HAHR* 50:3 (August 1970); Lance R. Grahn, 'Guajiro Culture and Capuchin Evangelization: Missionary Failure on the Riohacha Frontier' in Erick Langer and Robert H. Jackson, *The New Latin American Mission History* (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1995); José Polo Acuña, 'Aspectos históricos de Riohacha'; René de la Pedraja, 'La Guajira en el siglo XIX: Indígenas, contrabando y carbón' in Gustavo Bell Lemus (ed.), *El Caribe Colombiano. Selección de textos históricos* (Barranquilla, Ediciones Uninorte, 1988)

A closer examination of the primary sources suggest that relations between the Guajiros and the Hispanic communities were far more complex, flexible and pragmatic. For long periods in the eighteenth century, the relationship between the Guajiro clans and the Hispanic communities in the province of Riohacha was tranquil and pacific. Contact was maintained through barter and trade and also by marriages and non-formalised unions between Guajiros (especially women) and Hispanics. Although Guajiro uprisings occurred and so-called pacification campaigns were initiated by the Hispanic communities (particularly between 1769 and 1778), violence was limited, surprisingly few people were killed and the hostilities did not last for long periods of time. Spanish-Guajiran relations were not primarily characterised by permanent conflict between Christianity and native mythology, between colonialism and Guajiro autonomy, between Spanish law and clan justice. Rather, the relationship between the Hispanic population and the Guajiros was in many ways symbiotic. While the Guajiro clans and the Hispanic communities were distinct and autonomous societies, to some degree they depended on each other and were connected by both family and commerce.

The complexities of the somewhat peculiar relationship between Guajiros and Hispanics are shady due to the nature of the eighteenth-century sources. We do know that the Guajiros were divided into clans (called *parcialidades* by the Spanish) and that each of these was headed by a *cacique*.<sup>309</sup> In 1779 Spanish authorities identified eighteen such clans estimated to have between 50 and 3,800 adult male members, dominating different parts of the peninsula and each with its

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<sup>309</sup> For an attempt to study in more detail one of these *caciques*, see José Polo Acuña, 'Una mediación fallida: las acciones del cacique Cecilio López Sierra y el conflicto Hispano-Wayuú en la Guajira 1750 - 1770' in *Historia Caribe* 2:4 (1999), pp. 67 - 76

own cacique.<sup>310</sup> But the internal organisation of these clans in the eighteenth century is still poorly understood. Although a considerable amount of material written by the Capuchin friars who ran missions among the Guajiros for most of the eighteenth century has been preserved, the friars were not overly concerned with describing Guajiro society. Their concern was to convert the Indians, to make good Christians of them and to make them live permanently in small towns or villages, 'a son de campana'. In this they failed. Although some Guajiros were baptised and some were legitimately married by the church, the Guajiro clans remained outside the reach of both secular and ecclesiastical authorities during the entire colonial period. The reports written by Capuchin friars and other Spanish authorities, generally revolve around the difficulties of converting the Indians and only fragmented descriptions of Guajiro society can be pieced together to shed light on some aspects of Guajiro society. And these fragmentary texts cannot be understood outside the context in which they were written: hence we need to trace the history of the missions in the Guajira peninsula.

As will be recalled from Chapter 1, the first Spanish settlements on the Guajira peninsula were pearl fisheries. Probably most of the Guajiros were descendants of people who had fled from these fisheries or who had managed to evade the slaving raids of the sixteenth century. Since then, the Guajiros were described by Spanish authorities as groups of nomadic cattle-herders who lived on the peninsula, who resisted colonial domination, who knew how to handle firearms and who traded with Dutch, French, English and Danish merchants who came to the peninsula in search of cattle and wood. Prior to the arrival of the Capuchins, the attitude of the local Hispanic community towards the Guajiros

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<sup>310</sup> 'Calculo del numero de Indios Guagiros, Hombres de Armas, que se regula puede tener la

were certainly ambivalent. On one hand, the governors of Riohacha and Santa Marta frequently petitioned higher authorities in Santa Fe and Madrid for money, soldiers and arms to control the Guajiros. On the other hand, it is beyond doubt that the Hispanic population in Riohacha themselves not only gained from, but were dependent on Guajiro illegal trade. The Guajiro Indians served as middlemen for Dutch and other merchants, supplied salt, meat and wood in exchange for a large variety of different products such as textiles, weapon, liquor and knives.

For most of the eighteenth century, Hispanic attempts of evangelisation and pacification were handled by Capuchin missions. The first missions were established in this area in 1694, after the *visita* of Fray Juan Cuadrado de Lara, who stopped in Riohacha on his way to Santa Marta and was able to baptise two adults and some children.<sup>311</sup> In response to his report, a Real Cedula was issued in 1694 which ordered the Capuchins to evangelise the Guajiros of Riohacha. Following the royal decree, several friars were sent to Riohacha and five mission towns were founded. However, due to Guajiro resistance and the death of several of the fathers, the missions were abandoned. Another royal decree of 1704 ordered the revitalisation of the Capuchin missions in Riohacha, but apparently no friars were sent there until 1716. From 1716 until the end of the colonial era, the Capuchin mission existed more or less permanently in the province of Riohacha.

The Guajiros proved to be more difficult subjects than Friar Cuadrado de Lara had thought when he wrote the optimistic report in the 1690s. The initial hostility towards the missions can in part be explained by the intransigence of the

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Provincia del Rio Hacha' in AGI, Santa Fe 702

first friars and also by the experiences the Guajiros had had with Spanish colonisation during nearly two hundred years of Spanish presence in the area. A further complication was the conflict between secular and regular clergy over whether the new Indian towns should be missions in the care of the Capuchins or tributary towns served by secular priests appointed by the bishop of Santa Marta. The bishop opposed the mission because, he said, he had been '...working hard to have the province like a garden without sins and in peace, and it is not just [that the friars] are starting to disturb this for me...' <sup>312</sup> According to the bishop, the Indians themselves had said that they had 'buried the war', but now that the friars had been proclaiming conquest among the Indians of Riohacha and Maracaibo, the Guajiros had been provoked to take up the arms again. <sup>313</sup> Although the bishop thought a conquest of the Guajiros would be convenient, it had to be done in an orderly manner, and not by young men like the missionaries who had no practical experience in the Indies. In his view, the friars only made matters worse, and their arrival was 'more a disease than a medicine.' <sup>314</sup> The bishop therefore asked the Council of Indies to order the Capuchins to stay within the borders of the province of Maracaibo. This was accepted neither by the Council nor by the friars, and the conflict continued until the Bishop, Antonio de Monroy y Meneses, was replaced in 1735.

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<sup>311</sup> See Lance Grahn, 'Guajiro Culture and Capuchin Evangelization', p. 137 -138

<sup>312</sup> Letter from the Bishop of Santa Marta to the Council of Indies, 31 March 1719 in AGI, Santa Fe 525: 'pues trabajando en la mayor limpieza de tener la Provincia como un jardin sin culpas y en paz, no es razon qu estos me la comiencen a turbar'

<sup>313</sup> Ibid.: 'han vozeado tanto la conquista que los Indios de entre Maracaibo y Rio de la Hacha, que tenian enterredas las guerras (como ellos dicen) se han ostigado, y Salen con entero desahogo a flechar, y a llenarse las haciendas de Ganados, motivados tambien de dos salidas que con cien hombres hizieron de el Rio de la Hacha, con titulo de Conquista por el theniente de governador de aquella ciudad, sin horden al parecer de el de esta provincia y esto todo impulsado de los dos religiosos que se mantienen en los dhos dos sitios.'

<sup>314</sup> Ibid.: 'aunque la conquista sea conbeniente .aya de ser en la forma prescindida por V. M. y precediendo las Reglas y Solicitudes tan Savidas, y escritos por tantos Hombres, doctos, Santos y praticos, faltandoles algunos requicitos a estos Padres, no han adelantado en veinte años, sino es muchos gastos a V.M. ni adelantarán tampoco en muchos mas, porque como sean los

In 1724 the Capuchins had eight towns in the lower Guajira. San Juan de la Cruz was located four leagues from the city of Riohacha and it had 270 Indians. San Antonio de Orino was six leagues from La Cruz, and contained about 370 Indians in 1724 including the 100 sick and absent. Four leagues from the former and situated on the coast, the town of San Agustín de Manaure had approximately 200 Indian inhabitants. On the *Camino real* between Riohacha and Maracaibo the Capuchins had founded San Nicolás de Menores, which was twelve leagues from the city of Riohacha and served as headquarters for the mission for most of the eighteenth century. In 1724 it had more than 200 hundred Indians. San Felipe de Palmarito was five leagues from Menores and twelve from Riohacha. It had 273 Indian inhabitants in 1724. The last town administered by the Capuchins in 1724 was San José del Rincón, which was only three leagues from the city of Maracaibo. It was founded by Fray José de Soria and it had 160 indians in 1724.<sup>315</sup>

During his conflict with the friars the bishop founded new parishes in the province of Riohacha administered by secular clergy. According to a report from 1724 written by the governor (who evidently was on the side of the friars), the towns founded by the bishop were badly governed. The governor claimed that in the town of San Pedro Nolasco en el Salado the Indians '...were rude, they walked about in the nude, they ate snakes, lizards, other animals and wild herbs and roots. Their only occupation was to rob travellers, and they refused to live in the houses the Bishop had had constructed'.<sup>316</sup> According to the governor, the difference between the secular parishes and the missions could not be greater. Palmarito, for

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mas que vienen muy Mozos sin practica alguna, y a tres messes passen por sus personas o por escrito a Ynformar, se sigue ser su Venida mas enfermedad que remedio'

<sup>315</sup> Mena García, 'Santa Marta durante la Guerra', pp. 671 - 672

instance, was 'a town with fresh and admirable land for agriculture and for cattle and the Indians were very much devoted to work'. In San José de Rincón, the Indians were 'very devote and industrious, they [had] admirable agricultural lands in which they work[ed] with great dedication, which they also [did] in sowing and cattle herding'.<sup>317</sup> Orino was a 'happy and healthy' place, while the Indians of La Cruz 'were completely pacified and indoctrinated'.<sup>318</sup>

Evidently, the conflict between the bishop and the friars makes it difficult to interpret the reports on the missions from the first half of the eighteenth century. Much of the documentation from this period was influenced by arguments between the secular and regular clergy over the control of the territory of the lower Guajira, and is thus not particularly trustworthy regarding the Indians. The bishop repeatedly accused the Capuchins of being too young and for having too little experience; they were, furthermore, too intent on conquest, which in his view frequently lead to unnecessary hostilities with the Indians. The Capuchins, on the other hand, consistently claimed that the secular clergy was neither able nor willing to maintain the small Indian parishes. They claimed that every time a mission was turned into a secular parish, it was abandoned shortly after by both Indians and priests. They also claimed that one of the main obstacles of the mission was the immorality of many of the local non-Indian inhabitants who partook in the vices of the Indians, who traded with them, spoke their language, and took their daughters for mistresses.

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<sup>316</sup> Mena García, 'Santa Marta durante la Guerra', p. 672

<sup>317</sup> Ibid. : 'muy aplicados y devotos; tenían admirables tierras de labranza en las que trabajaban con gran aplicación, com también en tejer y criar ganado..'.  
<sup>318</sup> Ibid. : 'completamente pacificados y puestos en doctrina.'

Nevertheless, in 1726, only two years after the gloomy report written by the governor of Santa Marta, most of the Capuchin missions among the Guajiros were converted to secular parishes. The remaining friars climbed into the Sierra Nevada where they founded San Antonio de Yucal, San Pedro and San Miguel among the Arhuacos. They also came across a *palenque* of run-away slaves where they founded the town of San Lorenzo. When the bishop Monroy y Meneses withdrew in 1735, the four towns in the Sierra were converted to secular parishes, and the friars returned to the Guajira where they found the former missions abandoned by the secular clergy. In 1736 the Capuchin friars founded San Antonio de Padua del Sitio de Boronata in which the old town of Menores was incorporated. They furthermore founded Nuestra Señora del Socorro del Rincón de Cullus with the Indians who had formerly belonged to the town of El Toco. Pueblo Nuevo de San Joseph de Leonissa was founded in 1753 with the dispersed Indians who previously had lived in La Cruz. In 1754 the friars founded the [even more ornately named] Pueblo Nuevo de Nuestro Seráfico Padre San Francisco del Sitio de Orinos, in the same place where the mission town of Orinos had existed before and with many of the same Indians. In 1750, four friars went up to the upper Guajira and attempted to found four towns there: Macuyra, Bahia Honda, Sabana del Valle and Chimare. However, some of the friars died, and the rest had to flee because of warfare between different Guajiro clans. All of these four towns in the upper Guajira were abandoned by 1754. In 1754, then, the Capuchins had only four missions among the Guajiros, with less than 1,500 Indian inhabitants. These four towns were all constructed on the basis of towns which had existed intermittently since 1694, and they were all located in the lower Guajira (Map 9).<sup>319</sup>

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<sup>319</sup> 1754 Quaderno



The Capuchins undoubtedly found it difficult to evangelise among the Guajiros. But this does not mean that contact between the Guajiros and the non-Indian population was generally hostile. Again, the institution of marriage provides a useful pathway for probing into the internal functioning of a segment of Santa Marta society and its relations with other groups, allowing us, in this case, to get a better view of Guajira communities and their relations with Hispanic society. The Capuchin friars commented frequently on marriage customs and they conducted censuses which reveal both the difficulties encountered by the friars in instilling Catholic marriage customs among the Guajiros and the extent of inter-marriage between the Guajiros and the non-Indian population. In the censuses taken of the four Capuchin missions in the Guajira in 1754, only a handful of Indian couples were legitimately married by the friars. In Nuestra Señora del Socorro del Rincón de Callus (hereafter El Rincón), a town of 324 Indian inhabitants, no legitimate marriages were recorded. The prefect of the Capuchins in Riohacha commented that '...none of the Indians are legitimately married by the Church, but according to their own Law, because it has been so difficult to remove this sect from them, and there is neither punishment nor subjugation, and they can easily take and leave women, buying them for a cow or a beast and each of them has as many they can according to the law of Muhammed, which is common in this nation...' <sup>320</sup> As alluded to by the prefect, the Guajiros practiced 'marriages' which did not correspond well with the customs the friars were trying to introduce. The Guajiros could have several wives at the same time, wives could be bought (or stolen) and these marital unions were not permanent. But it should

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<sup>320</sup> 1754 Quaderno: 'Se compone dicho Pueblo , de las familias e Indios puros del Padron siguiente de Nacion Guajira; con la advertencia, que ninguno está casado legitimamente por la Iglesia; sino segun su Ley, por lo dificultoso que es, quitarles esta Secta, no haviendo Castigo ni Sujeción alguna; y por la facilidad en tomar y dexar mugeres, comprandolas, por una baca o

be noted that although the Indians could have several wives, few were able to. In El Rincón only seven Indian men had more than one wife and none had more than three.<sup>321</sup> Although the friars often denounced the Guajiros for practising polygamy, only a few men appears to have had the wealth necessary to have several wives and the overwhelming majority of Guajiro men had only one wife.

In the other mission town the situation was not very different from that of El Rincón. In Pueblo Nuevo de San Joseph de Leonissa del Sitio de La Cruz (hereafter La Cruz) there were also only 'pure' Indians. The town had 420 inhabitants, and fourteen couples were legitimately married, fifty-four couples lived in consensual unions not recognised by the Church.<sup>322</sup> In the town of San Antonio de Padua del Sitio de Boronata (hereafter Boronata) the situation was more complex because a considerable number of non- Indians lived there. In 1754, there were 438 inhabitants of which there were thirty-five families of free people (most of them classified as mulattoes, zambos and mestizos) and forty-nine 'pure' Indian families.<sup>323</sup> Of these forty-nine Indian families (where both husband and wife/wives were classified as Indians), there were seven couples who were married legitimately, so the institution of marriage was clearly not entrenched among the Indians of Boronata either. But only two men had more than one wife. In Boronata, then, the Indian population seem to have conformed slightly better to the Catholic ideal, and unlike the town of Rincón, the friars had begun to make some headway in making the Indians accept, or at least use,

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una bestia, y teniendo cada uno las que puede, segun Ley de Mahoma; lo que es comun in esta Nacion'

<sup>321</sup> 1754 Quaderno includes censuses of Nuestra Señora del Socorro del Rincón de Cullus, San Antonio de Padua del Sitio de Boronata, Pueblo Nuevo de San Joseph de Leonissa and Pueblo Nuevo de Nuestro Serafico Padre San Francisco del Sitio de Orinos, all of which were situated on the Guajira peninsula.

<sup>322</sup> 1754 Quaderno

<sup>323</sup> 1754 Quaderno

Christian marriage. Another process can also be discerned from the census of Boronata. Of the thirty-five other couples in the non-Indian part of Boronata, there were twelve Indian women who lived with non-Indian men. Of these twelve relationships between Indian women and non-Indian men in Boronata, six were legitimately married. All of these twelve men were classified as coloured.<sup>324</sup> Seven were categorised as zambos, three as mulatos, one as mestizo and one as negro. No Indian men married non-Indian women. We should note that unrecognised unions were not confined to the Indian part of the population. Of the twenty couples where none of the partners were categorised as Indians, only nine were legitimately married. In fact, in Boronata, the couples who were most likely to be married legitimately were unions between Indian women and non-Indian men.

The census of Boronata suggest two broad trends which affected the marriage patterns of the Indian groups. First, the indoctrination of the Indians , or - more precisely - the attempt of the friars of instilling Christian customs and values among the Guajiros; and, secondly, the process of cross-ethnic or cross-racial marriages. These two trends were not necessarily the outcome of the same process, and did not always pull in the same direction. It seems that during the periods when the Guajiros rejected the friars and abandoned the missions, they still continued to exchange wives with the non-Indian population. In other words, in the Guajira peninsula, cross-ethnic marriages did not represent a sign of native communities in decline. On the contrary, it seems to have been a strategy used by the Guajiro communities to forge links with some sectors of Hispanic society.

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<sup>324</sup> There was only one person classified as white in Boronata in 1754: Lorenzo Cienfuegos, an 'español' who was living with Thomasa de Medina, a free zamba. They were not legitimately married.

The Spanish need to subdue the Guajiros became especially acute in times of war. Frightened by the prospect of a possible alliance between the British and the Guajiros, a major pacification campaign was launched under the command of Bernardo Ruiz de Noriega in the midst of the Seven Years War (1756 - 1763). Ruiz de Noriega had no military experience. He was a peninsular merchant resident in Cartagena de Indias and related to José Ruiz de Noriega, the South Sea's Company agent in Havana. The Ruiz de Noriegas had been engaged primarily in the transatlantic slave trade, and it seems that Bernardo Ruiz de Noriega's main motivation for leading the pacification campaign in 1760 was the prospect of getting a hold on a royal monopoly to export brazil wood from Riohacha, a most profitable trade if the Guajira contraband trade could be stopped.<sup>325</sup> The various descriptions of this first military campaign to subdue the Guajiros illustrate the paradoxes and complexities of this type of encounter. The first day after Ruiz de Noriega had parted from the city of Riohacha with a hundred men for a reconnaissance of the Guajira territory, he went to the town of Boronata where he was the godfather of a daughter of the cacique Cecilio López de Sierra y Amoscotequí.<sup>326</sup> He explained that 'a great number of Indians from different clans had come from all over the province and frightened to see La Conquista, thinking that this was a very old person, since even their ancestors had been told by the Spanish more than a century ago that she would come'.<sup>327</sup> He therefore published an edict which stated that he was not coming to destroy them,

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<sup>325</sup> Bernardo Ruiz de Noriega was a witness when José Simeón de Munive y Mozo presented his genealogical information in Cartagena de Indias to enter El Rosario in 1759. Ruiz de Noriega then declared that he was 33 years old, see Rosario 460. For José Ruiz de Noriega, see Hugh Thomas, *The Slave Trade: The History of the Atlantic Slave Trade 1440 - 1870* (London, Papermac, 1998), p. 267. See also Restrepo Tirado, *Historia de la Provincia de Santa Marta*, vol 2, pp. 190 - 192

<sup>326</sup> Letter from Bernardo Ruiz to viceroy Pedro de la Zerda, Riohacha 20 Jan 1761 in AGI, Santa Fe 1188

but that he only wanted them to return to their settlements and live 'bajo de campana'. This edict was then published in the other missions and even farther away it had the most satisfying effect, according to Ruiz de Noriega, '...without there being necessity of firing one shot...'. He also claimed that it was '..more work to conquer the Spaniards who live in these territories...in barbarity, without God, without King and without Law...'

The rather optimistic outlook presented by Ruiz de Noriega in January 1761 soon gave way to a more pessimistic view. In March he blamed the vicario juez eclesiástico of Riohacha and other residents of Riohacha for setting some of the Guajiro communities against him.<sup>328</sup> Driven by personal interests in the pearls of the Guajira coast and not wanting the contraband trade to end, they had told the Indians that Ruiz de Noriega would force them to pay tribute, that he would steal their cattle and send their caciques to work as slaves for the King in Spain. But this accusation evidently missed the target. The ultimate failure of Ruiz de Noriega's campaign was probably mostly due to his own personality and the wildly grandiose projects he envisioned for Riohacha and the Guajira peninsula. He suggested, for instance, the foundation of a new city called San Fernando in Bahía Honda with two fortifications, and he petitioned the crown to give him a license to recruit no less than 100,000 sailors to construct the city. The fiscal of the Council of Indies who reviewed the letters written by Ruiz de Noriega commented that he 'had some sort of cerebral lesion or defect.'<sup>329</sup> Despite the madness of some of Ruiz de Noriega's proposals, his descriptions of the situation on the Guajira peninsula provide some useful insights. He claimed, for instance,

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<sup>327</sup> Ibid.

<sup>328</sup> Letter from Bernardo Ruiz to viceroy Pedro de la Zerda, Riohacha 23 Mar 1761 in AGI, Santa Fe 1188

that the officials in Riohacha and most of the Hispanic population did not really want an end to the contraband trade and they were therefore lukewarm in their support of the pacification campaigns. By his own actions and especially through his spiritual kinship with the cacique of Boronata, he showed that in practice Guajiro-Hispanic relations were not normally hostile.

The Capuchin friars never succeeded in converting the majority of the Guajiros. They did, however, manage to make some limited progress. In 1768, the bishop of Santa Marta expressed his satisfaction with the progress of the Capuchin missions among the Guajiros. Upon visiting the missions, the Bishop wrote to the King that 'he gave repeated thanks to the Divine Majesty for having seen, with heartfelt joy, the abundance with which your Missionaries had harvested through their Evangelical Preaching...'<sup>329</sup> In 1768 there were seven missions in the Guajira with a total of 3,851 Indian inhabitants. In addition to the four mission towns which existed in 1754, the capuchins had founded San Agustín del Arenal, San Joseph Laguna de Fuentes and San Nicolás del Sercadillo.<sup>331</sup> This was the largest number of Guajiro Indians in Capuchin missions recorded in the eighteenth century, and after 1768 the missions entered a new period of marked decline.

Decline began with the armed rebellion of some of the Guajiro clans in 1769 and the subsequent pacification campaign which lasted until 1779.<sup>332</sup> The

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<sup>329</sup> Restrepo Tirado, *Historia de la provincia de Santa Marta*, pp. 191 - 192

<sup>330</sup> Letter from the bishop of Santa Marta to King, 7 Dec. 1768 in AGI, Santa Fe 1189

<sup>331</sup> 'Descripción de los Pueblos de Yndios recién convertidos en la Provincia de Santa Martha, Valle Dupar, y Rio del Hacha que estan al Cargo de la Sagrada Mision de Religiosos Capuchinos', 1768 in AGI, Santa Fe 1189

<sup>332</sup> See P. Josefina Moreno and Alberto Tarazona (eds.), *Materiales para el estudio de las relaciones inter-étnicas en la Guajira, siglo XVIII* (Caracas, Academia Nacional de la Historia,

causes of the rebellion are not entirely clear, but Grahm compares it to the 1680 Pueblo Revolt in New Mexico and claims it was 'decidedly anti-Catholic' and that it 'targeted missions and missionaries'. During the rebellion some Guajiro rebels 'profaned the sacred vessels, drinking from the holy chalices their evil *chichas* and liquor, which is the drink that they use for their intoxications, and [sharpened] their tools on the altar stones'.<sup>333</sup> One friar was killed in the newly founded town of Apiessi in the upper Guajira, and the other friar were threatened which forced some of them to leave the missions and take refuge in Riohacha. However, even during these years of rebellion and pacification campaign violence was limited and the number of actual casualties low. The Guajiros succeeded in demonstrating that they could not be subdued by military means, and after 1779 relations between local Hispanic community and the Guajiro clans were more or less restored to their previous footing.

The Capuchins frequently accused the non-Indian population for being the worst enemies of the Crown's attempt to subdue the Guajiros and put an end to the contraband trade. In 1788, fray Pedro de Altea, prefect of the Capuchin missions in the Guajira claimed that the men who were used as interpreters between Spaniards and Indians were more a hindrance than a help, since '...they live in public concubinage with two or three women, and even though they have been married by the Church, in order to prove their love for the errors of the Guajiros, they deprecate our Holy Faith and Religion...'<sup>334</sup> The prefect explained how interpreters such as Gabriel Gómez and Patricio Rodríguez, although they were employed by the Crown had such close connections with the Guajiro clans

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1984), pp. 133 - 223; Kuethe, 'The Pacification Campaign on the Riohacha Frontier'; Grahm, 'Guajiro Culture and Capuchin Evangelization', pp. 147 - 150

<sup>333</sup> Cited in Grahm, 'Guajiro Culture and Capuchin Evangelization', p. 147

that they could not be trusted. Gómez was a militia captain born in Soledad in the province of Riohacha to a slave mother. During the rebellion of 1769 he was sent to stop the Guajiros from taking Riohacha but switched sides and lived with a Guajira Indian somewhere in the upper Guajira. Later he was pardoned by the governor, and returned to Boronata with his Indian concubine whom he married when she was about to die; he then bought another Indian woman from the town of Arroyo Cardón with whom he lived until his death in 1786. Rodríguez was also a militia captain, and son of a Guajira woman captured by the Spanish. He was married by the Church, but in 1788 he maintained two concubines in addition to his wife. The prefect complained that he was still paid by the Crown '...although he does not provide any services, aside from treating and contracting with his friends the Guajiros, [while] observing completely their sect and errors...' <sup>335</sup>

Given these close connections between the Guajiro clans and parts of the local Hispanic population, royal officials came to adopt a more pragmatic approach to the Guajira issue. Governor Astigarraga, for instance, when the province of Riohacha was separated from Santa Marta in 1790, gave a series of instructions to his successor on how the Indians should be treated in order to avoid trouble. <sup>336</sup> He warned that 'above all, you should do the utmost to get on well with the Guajiro Indians, treat them in a proper and respectful manner, offering them gifts on occasions and punishing them when necessary'. He also informed his successor that 'the communication with the captains of the *parcialidades* is very important, because the Indians depend on the captains for their subsistence, although their subjugation is not perfect.' Astigarraga gave the names

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<sup>334</sup> Fray Pedro de Altea to King, San Carlos de Pedraza 9 May 1788 in AGI, Santa Fe 1196

<sup>335</sup> Ibid.



of some Guajiros who could be trusted and were good informers and of others who should be treated with more caution. The Indians sometimes come to the city, Astigarraga explained, to have the Spanish authorities judge in disputes among the Indians according to their laws, and this should be done because they did not 'accept ours'. He also warned that the interpreters should be treated well but with due regard for their origins, because, even if they were Spanish they could have been raised among the Indians and could not always be trusted.

As these instructions indicate, relations between the Guajiro clans and Hispanic society were complex and paradoxical. Although hostilities sometimes occurred between the Spanish population and the Indians, this did not necessarily characterise quotidian relations between the two groups. Members of the Spanish communities could have strong family links with Guajiro communities and vice versa, while the contraband trade also undoubtedly united Indians and local Spaniards by setting them both against laws and politics emanating from governments in Santa Fe and Spain. If we compare the unconquered Guajiros with the tributary Indians, there are some evident differences. Unlike the tributary Indians, the Guajiros openly defied Catholic indoctrination, they maintained their own language and they had political and social customs ('errors' as the friars called them) which were unacceptable to the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, relations between Guajiros and local Hispanic society were in many ways closer than that of the tributary towns with the Spanish cities. This difference not only marked the way in which the various Indian communities responded to the political crisis which hit the Spanish monarchy after 1808; it also influenced how the

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<sup>336</sup> 'Instrucciones que el gobernador de Santa Marta entrega al de Riohacha' in AGS, Guerra 7072, exp. 10

communities were incorporated into the Republic of Colombia after 1819. These are issues which will be discussed in the chapters that follow.

## **Part II. Republican mutations**

## Chapter 6. Responses to the monarchical crisis, 1808 - 1811

Part One of this dissertation analysed the social configuration of Santa Marta and Riohacha provinces in the colonial period. It emphasised the highly complex nature of social and racial identities and it focused on their relation with the spatial order of the provinces. Although interaction did occur on many levels between groups such as the local nobility, the royal officials, other elites, free commoners, slaves, tributary Indians and unconquered communities, we have seen that in the late colonial period, society was nonetheless hierarchically divided by social, racial and ethnic markers. The next question which this thesis addresses is the ways in which this particular social configuration affected the responses of different social groups and individuals to the political crisis unleashed by Napoleon's invasion of the Iberian peninsula in 1807, and how the subsequent War of Independence and the formation of the republic modified the social make-up of these societies. This is the topic that is explored in this second part.

The provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha are of particular interest during the Wars of Independence, because they were important theatres of war from 1811 to 1823. Some of the major battles which determined the outcome of the war took place there. Santa Marta and Riohacha gained a reputation as the most ardent defenders of the King against the patriots of the interior and the province of Cartagena. The traditional explanation for *samarian* royalism and resistance against republicanism has focused on the actions of a few peninsular Spaniards. Following the classic work by José Manuel Restrepo, traditional historiography tended to view the royalist resistance as a trick played by peninsular governors and merchants on a backward and politically ignorant

population.<sup>337</sup> This view is misleading for several reasons. It exaggerates the influence and power exercised by a few peninsular royal officials, neglects how entrenched these peninsulars were in the local elite networks, and ignores the political outlook and interest of the larger part of the population who played an important role during the wars of independence in Santa Marta and Riohacha. Perhaps most importantly, it overlooks processes by which republican and royalist factions were created, and the part played by local political issues which did not correspond directly to either peninsular interests and policies or those of the rebel cities of Santa Fe or Cartagena.

In this chapter, we will explore the development of the political crisis and the ensuing war, and how these were experienced by different groups of people in Santa Marta and Riohacha. The picture which starts to emerge is more complex than the traditional view and less adaptable to a simple dichotomy between royalism and republicanism. It stresses the difficult position of nobles and commoners alike in choosing sides in the war, their reluctance in supporting wholeheartedly either peninsular royalists or rebels from Santa Fe and Cartagena, and their search for alternative, intermediary and negotiated positions. It also sees the political crisis as a catalyst for a series of conflicts which were rooted in particular tensions within the local society. This does not mean that the Independence period is treated as if it were a local rebellion. Although strictly local concerns emerged, the different groups of people in Santa Marta and Riohacha were well aware of political developments in other parts of the viceroyalty and the Spanish empire, and responded to them according their

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<sup>337</sup> For a recent critique of this view, see Jorge Conde Calderón, 'Poder local y sentimiento realista en la independencia de Santa Marta' in *Historia Caribe* 2:4 (1999), pp. 77 - 86

perceptions of their own position within both the existing system of government and its possible alternatives.

### Crisis of the Spanish monarchy

When Napoleon invaded the Iberian peninsula in 1807, and forced in turn both Charles IV and his son Ferdinand VII to leave the throne, it was not immediately apparent that this political crisis would tear the enormous Spanish empire apart. When the news of the invasion reached Spanish America in 1808, most cities and provinces proclaimed their loyalty to the Spanish monarchy, and war on the French usurper. So also in Santa Marta. In a letter addressed to the King dated 25 August 1808, the governor of Santa Marta, Victor de Salcedo, stated that they had received the news of the French invasion from Cartagena.<sup>338</sup> Within seven days of receiving the news, the governor explained, Santa Marta had declared war on France, and the peace treaty with Great Britain was made public. 'Santa Marta de Indias and her province has filled the desires of Your Highness giving their most public expressions of their love and loyalty to the Sovereign...War has been declared against the perverse emperor of the French, Napoleon I, and against that whole nation, while [we find ourselves] under their tyrannical yoke...With reason one can say that Santa Marta is one of the King's most loving and loyal provinces...' <sup>339</sup> The public celebration of the Ferdinand's ascendancy to the throne confirmed the loyalty of the *samaritanos* :

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<sup>338</sup> AHN, Estado 58-A, nr. 26

<sup>339</sup> Ibid, 'Se ha publicado la guerra, contra el perfido emperador de los Franceses Napoleon I o y contra toda la nacion, mientras este baxo de su tirano yugo. Se han hecho saber los Armisticios celebrados con la Inglaterra, y en leal corazon de estos moradores ha llegado a equilibrarse el amor, para con Nro Rey Fernando 7o y el encono acia al ambicioso Enemigo, que andava disfrazado con la capa de nra fiel y perpetua alianza. Puede decirse con razon , que Santa Marta, es una de las Provincias mas amantes y leales a su Rey.'

"The procession took place on the evening of the twenty-first of the present month, having been announced previously...The demonstrations of jubilee and happiness could be seen in all corners...All the principal men of the city participated in accompanying the *Real Pendón* with horses magnificently adorned and those who did not have horses went on foot, with the same decorum. Coins were showered in the three major squares of the city...The streets were cleaned with delicacy, the windows and the balconies were adorned magnificently. The people ('la pleve') did not undermine the feelings of the nobility, and everywhere resonated acclamations for our honourable sovereign and catholic King, the Lord Don Ferdinand VII. There could not have been a day of more complete satisfaction for a provincial government, than that which Santa Marta presented in the said evening.'<sup>340</sup>

The governor's letter and his description of the celebrations are interesting for various reasons. First of all, it shows that the people of Santa Marta was well informed about political developments in the Iberian peninsula. The abdication of Ferdinand VII in favour of José Bonaparte had occurred in late May of 1808 and in less than two months, the city of Santa Marta knew what had happened. Nor

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<sup>340</sup> Ibid. '... se hizo el acto procesional de dho Real Pendon en la tarde del 21 del presente, haviendose anunciado antes, por Bando para la reunion de todo el Pueblo. Las demostraciones de júbilo y alegría se veian nacer de todos los puntos de Vista sin ser posible detener la atencion, en ninguno de ellos , por que casi en el momento de fixarla , la robaron los otros, pareciendo acaso objetos mas interecantes. Todo lo principal de la ciudad concurrio al acompañamiento del Real Pendon, con caballos magnificamente adornados, y los que no lo tenian a pie, con no menos desencia. Se regaron monedas en las tres Plazas prinipales de la ciudad , unas del cuño comun, y otras , del que descifrava la lealtad de Santa Marta, como lo manifiestan las que acompaño. Las calles se acearon con delicadeza, las Bantanasy Balcones se adornaron con magnifisencia. La pleve no desgnerava de los sentimientos de la nobleza, y en todas partes resonavan, victores y aclamaciones, por Nuestro Augusto soberano y Rey

was the news limited to a literate elite. The letter states that *bandos* were read publicly to inform the subjects. Secondly, the immediate and general expressions of loyalty towards the imprisoned King are noteworthy. If the governor's description is accurate, nobles and commoners alike united in the outrage against the French invader and in support of Ferdinand VII. This of course occurred not only in Santa Marta, but in most cities and provinces of Spanish America. In Santa Marta the political crisis of the empire had few direct consequences before 1810. Until then the royal officials who had mostly been appointed during the reign of Charles IV were still respected and no groups or individuals made public claims in favour of independence from Spain. The provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha were not waiting for the first possible excuse to break away from Spain any more than were other regions of Spanish America. It would take several years before the political crisis escalated into a conflict between royalist defenders of the Spanish empire and patriot rebels struggling for independence. During 1808, 1809 and the first half of 1810 the political situation in the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha was calm.

The social and political unrest and the beginnings of violent conflict which began in Santa Marta in mid-1810 were largely the result of developments outside the province, in the Peninsula and in the two most important cities of New Granada, Santa Fe and Cartagena. During the two first years after Napoleon's invasion of the Iberian peninsula, the Junta Central based in Seville had by and large maintained itself as the head of the Spanish empire which resisted the French invaders. But in 1810, the Junta Central disintegrated and a Regency Council based in Cádiz now ruled in the name of the captive Ferdinand VII. The

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Catolico el Señor D Fernando 7o. No puede haber un dia de mas caval satisfaccion, para el



position of the Regency had been weakened by Napoleon's bold offer of independence to Spain's American dominions in December 1809. The Regency was thus from the outset forced to grant political concessions to the Americans, to ensure their continued loyalty. In February 1810 the Regency proclaimed that American Spaniards were free men, who had the right to elect their own representatives for the National Congress, and whose '...destinies no longer depend on Ministers, Viceroys or Governors; they are in your hands...' <sup>1341</sup> This did not always have the desired effect, however. For when the Iberian provinces and Kingdoms established Juntas to rule the parts of the peninsula which were not occupied by the French, and when no swift resolution of the war seemed likely, the Spanish American provinces and kingdoms followed suit. Although the political crisis, the uprisings, and the wars which swept across Spanish America between 1810 and 1824 affected nearly all towns and cities there and changed the lives of millions of people, it must be remembered that the crisis was not primarily a revolution from below. On the contrary, it was the apex of the political hierarchy which had temporarily disappeared, or - to use one of the common metaphors of the time - the Spanish nation had been left without a legitimate father. After a few years, officials in the American provinces found this situation increasingly difficult to handle. Although many of the provinces had enjoyed a certain de facto autonomy of the day-to-day government and administration of the regions, important issues such as the appointment of royal officials, the legislation of political, commercial and ecclesiastical matters, and the administration of justice in important cases had always been the responsibility of the King and his ministers. Contemporaries thus perceived a real threat to the social and political order if some superior authority was not established. In other

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gobierno de una Provincia, que el que presento Santa Marta, en la tarde ya referida.'

words, the French occupation of the Iberian peninsula caused a fundamental debate on the constitution and nature of the monarchy, a debate which was not only of utmost importance but also complicated and complex. The most renowned experts, lawyers and royal officials of high rank did not necessarily agree on the correct path for subjects to follow.

One of the most important issues debated on the American side between 1810 and 1815 was whether the Regency Council should be recognised. During this first phase of the crisis, the overwhelming majority of the American Juntas claimed to be loyal to Ferdinand VII. In other words, at first there was no ideological struggle between republicanism and royalism, but rather a more limited discussion about the position of the American provinces within the Spanish empire. In May 1810 the representative of the Regency to New Granada, Antonio Villavicencio, arrived in Cartagena. His task was to convince the people and authorities of New Granada to support and respect the Regency as the legitimate head of the Spanish dominions during the absence of Ferdinand VII. In Cartagena, Villavicencio found willing followers. A native of Quito and a descendant of Cartagena residents, Villavicencio had studied law at the Colegio del Rosario in Santa Fe, and was probably already acquainted with many of the leading creoles of the city of Cartagena who had also studied there.<sup>342</sup> The cabildo of Cartagena was also composed of a group of peninsular merchants, members of the Consulado de Cartagena (established in 1794) whose economic interests made the Cádiz-based Regency a preferable alternative. The governor of Cartagena quickly found himself in a very difficult position. Francisco Montes had been

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<sup>341</sup> Cited in McFarlane, *Colombia before Independence*, p. 338

appointed governor of Cartagena in 1809, and arrived in the city in the middle of conflict between the cabildo of Cartagena and the viceroy over the right of the Cartagena merchants to trade with neutral British and North American merchants. Although the interim governor of Cartagena, Blas de Soria, had allowed this trade, this conflicted with a law issued in March 1809 by the Junta Central which had forbidden all commerce with neutrals.<sup>343</sup> The interim governor informed the viceroy of the decision he had made to permit North American ships to enter Cartagena in order to sell flour, and explained the necessity of this. However, by a decree issued on 4 July 1809, the viceroy made it clear that such trade could not be permitted, and he threatened severe punishments against both the interim governor and the customs director if another neutral vessel was allowed to trade in Cartagena.<sup>344</sup> This prohibition was openly rejected by the cabildo of Cartagena in a session held 12 August 1809. Soria asked two of the most prominent members of the Cartagena elite to write reports on the issue. Antonio de Narváez y la Torre, the former governor of Santa Marta and now *comandante general del ejército*, and José Ignacio de Pombo, prior of the Cartagena Consulado, both confirmed that Cartagena had a right to trade with foreign neutrals, and that Santa Fe was not in a position to forbid such a trade, just as Madrid could not prohibit Valencia, Barcelona or Murcia to trade with neutrals in the Mediterranean.<sup>345</sup> Considering these reports, Soria decreed on 28 September 1809 that the trade with North American merchants would continue despite the

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<sup>342</sup> Adelaida Sourdis, 'Ruptura del estado colonial y tránsito hacia la república 1800 - 1850' in Adolfo Meisel Roca (ed.), *Historia económica y social del Caribe colombiano* (Santafé de Bogotá, Ediciones Uninorte/ ECOE, 1994), pp. 160 - 163

<sup>343</sup> Alfonso Múnera, *El fracaso de la nación: Región, clase y raza en el Caribe colombiano (1717 - 1810)* (Bogotá, Banco de la República/ El Áncora editores, 1998), pp. 140 - 144

<sup>344</sup> Múnera, *El fracaso*, p. 142

<sup>345</sup> Múnera, *El fracaso*, pp. 146 - 148. Pombo's report is published as 'Informe del Real Consulado de Cartagena de Indias a la Suprema Junta Provincial de la misma' in Sergio Elías Ortiz (ed.), *Escritos de dos economistas coloniales* (Bogotá, Banco de la República, 1965), pp. 135 - 271

prohibitions issued by the Junta Central and the viceroy. The new governor could not stop the trade. Francisco Montes wrote an extensive report to the viceroy in February 1810, where he explained that it was impossible to put an end to this trade as long as all the most prominent members of Cartagena society supported it.

Although Montes chose to comply with the wishes of the Cartagena elite against the orders of the viceroy, the governor's position in Cartagena was precarious. He had been appointed after the French invasion of the Iberian peninsula and his loyalties could easily be questioned.<sup>346</sup> The Junta Central disintegrated immediately after he arrived in Cartagena, and to the dismay of the peninsular merchants he was reluctant to acknowledge the Regency. When Villavicencio, the Regency's representative arrived in May 1810, Montes' position was already considerably weakened. On 22 May 1810, rumours spread that Montes was indeed an *afrancesado*, and the cabildo (which may have planted the rumours to start with) named two co-governors who would rule together with Montes. These two were Antonio de Narváez and Tomás de la Torre, the peninsular ex-prior of the Cartagena Consulado. On 14 June, Montes was deposed by the same cabildo allegedly because he did not comply with the conditions agreed on 22 May.<sup>347</sup> Formally, the lieutenant governor, Blas de Soria, who had acted as governor before Montes was appointed, was named the new governor by the cabildo. This coup was far from a radical patriot attack on royal government. It was executed by the patriciate of Cartagena to 'defend King, Religion and the Fatherland', and the cabildo pledged loyalty to the Regency in Cádiz.

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<sup>346</sup> McFarlane, *Colombia before Independence*, p. 340

In Santa Fe, the conflict between the American-born and the peninsulars was just as tense. One of the main issues was the composition of the cabildo, which had sparked conflict at least since the 1790s. When the viceroy managed to put six new regidores into the cabildo of 1810, who were all peninsulars, the conflict escalated to the point where leading *santaferenos* attacked both the viceroy and his regidores.<sup>348</sup> In January 1810, Ignacio de Herrera, a creole lawyer, accused the viceroy and the oidores of the Audiencia of being corrupt creatures of Godoy, and possibly pro-French traitors. The political polarisation widened the gap between peninsulars and creoles, and the viceroy and oidores started to arrest men suspected of disloyalty. While the viceroy was waiting for the Regency's representative, Villavicencio, to arrive in Santa Fe, he received the news that not only had the cabildo of Cartagena overthrown Governor Montes, but similar steps had been taken in Cali, Pamplona and Socorro during the first days of July 1810. On 20 July a group of prominent creoles staged some violence in Santa Fe which forced the viceroy to accept the establishment of a Junta, with the viceroy himself as president. On its first session, the Junta swore to rule in the name of Ferdinand VII and to respect the Regency in Cádiz. Just a few days later, the Junta of Santa Fe removed the viceroy from his position and proclaimed that it did not recognise the Regency Council based in Cádiz. It did, however, claim to rule in the name of Ferdinand VII.

The establishment of Juntas in many cities throughout New Granada in July 1810 was, then, not motivated primarily by a desire to break away from the Spanish monarchy. The Juntas swore fidelity to the King and pledged loyalty to

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<sup>347</sup> Múnera, *El Fracaso*, pp. 158 - 159

religion and the fatherland. It was more often an attempt to wrestle power away from royal officials who generally lacked legitimacy after the political developments between 1808 and 1810. The Juntas thus originated in the specific political developments of the years immediately preceding 1810, while also reflecting long-felt creole resentment against Bourbon absolutism and royal reforms which in many instances had weakened local autonomy and strengthened the influence of Crown officials appointed in Spain.

### The 'inconveniences of both extremes'

The creation of Juntas, the declaration of political independence and the crisis in which the Spanish monarchy was increasingly immersed, brought to the fore a series of questions regarding the constitution of Spanish American societies. What was the position of the Spanish dominions in America within the Spanish monarchy? Were they simply colonies, similar to the British and French islands in the Caribbean, or were they 'kingdoms' of equal standing to the provinces and kingdoms of the Iberian peninsula? When the King was held captive by a foreign invader, where did the sovereignty reside? Did it revert to the people, or did bureaucratic institutions established in the peninsula possess the authority of the Crown during the absence of the monarch? Or had the sovereignty been transferred to the prince installed by the invader?

These questions suddenly became of paramount importance even in rather remote provinces such as Santa Marta. When the zenith of the political hierarchy disappeared, the local authorities, whether they were officials appointed by the Crown or members of the cabildo, had to legitimise their own position. It would

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<sup>348</sup> McFarlane, *Colombia before Independence*, pp. 335 - 338

be an exaggeration to claim that the King's absence created a political vacuum or that it left Spanish America in anarchy. But it certainly weakened the traditional political structures, made political authority more fragile, and opened debates on the political constitution of the various components of the monarchy. In short, it represented a fundamental political crisis which left few areas of jurisdiction untouched.

One of the main consequences of the crisis was that local and 'small' conflicts became entwined with the general and 'big' questions such as independence or loyalty, republicanism or royalism, absolutism or constitutionalism. Conflicts over land, appointments, honours, family disputes, criminal cases of various sorts, and issues of trade had formerly been handled (however inefficiently and corruptly) by royal institutions. After 1810, when the legitimacy of these institutions was severely weakened, the relatively minor conflicts became linked to the major issues of the day. For instance, on the Caribbean coast of New Granada one of the main conflicts during the first years of the so-called wars of independence was the sales tax which the Junta of Cartagena established in December 1810 on all goods imported from other provinces. The Junta of Santa Marta reacted strongly against this measure. The hostilities which ensued between the two provinces in 1811 and 1812 were undoubtedly partly caused by the differences over tax and import duties. But in the written records, this issue became entangled with Cartagena's supposedly rebellious attitude towards Spain and Santa Marta's refusal to accept the authority of the new institutions established in Cartagena and Santa Fe. Was the conflict *really* about trade, profits and taxes? Or was the ideological and political conflict between the two provinces just as fundamental to the actors? Did the Junta of

Santa Marta oppose the actions of its counterpart in Cartagena, because of its trade policies or because it regarded the actions of the *cartageneros* as treasonous against the Spanish cause? These questions are nearly impossible to disentangle and it may well be that economic interests and political loyalties fed upon each other in mutually reinforcing ways. There are, however, good reasons for believing that local issues played a key part in shaping the behaviour of both elite and plebeian actors as they responded to the larger conflict. Although both material interests and political ideology evidently are important, other factors such as family feuds, controversies over land, personal vendettas, the strife between different towns and cities within the province for autonomy, and the constant negotiations between different provinces and cities in the viceroyalty over their place within the imperial territorial hierarchy all played a part in promoting the political wars which took place in this part of Spanish America.

These factors frequently pulled people in opposite directions. While most people in the city of Santa Marta undoubtedly welcomed the idea of greater local political autonomy, they *also* thought that it was dangerous and risky to break relations with Cartagena and Santa Fe. They probably did feel some sort of common identity with the rest of the Spanish monarchy, including the Peninsula. The notables of Santa Marta were related to the nobles of Cartagena, and probably had some sympathy with their political aspirations, but at the same time Cartagena was a commercial competitor. Some in Santa Marta may have been critical of the peninsular royal officials, especially those who did not form part of the local elite networks. In short, the political crisis of the Spanish monarchy did not produce one single reaction or sentiment among the inhabitants of Santa Marta. Few individuals seem to have supported wholeheartedly and



unconditionally either the royalists or the republicans. Most (and this should not be surprising) showed a marked ambivalence, indifference, and opportunism in face of the crisis. This is not to say that wars of independence were of little importance. On the contrary, the crisis affected the lives of all groups in an immediate way. But the solutions proposed by the *samarios* and the actions they took, suggest that they wanted to avoid violent and disruptive conflicts which could threaten the social and political order of the provinces.

The news of the formation of the Junta of Santa Fe reached Santa Marta in the first days of August 1810. The political crisis had begun to trickle down from the zenith of the monarchy to the most remote provinces of the empire. The first responses to the 'revolution' came, quite naturally, from the cabildos of the province. During the months of August to November 1810, all the cabildos were forced to take a stand with respect to the new Junta of Santa Fe. The fundamental question which the cabildos had to address was whether they should follow Santa Fe or continue to obey the Regency Council in Spain. This was a difficult issue, and the cabildos generally attempted to find some sort of middle way which would jeopardise neither relations with the metropolis nor the viceregal capital. Yet, the responses of the cabildos of the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha were not identical: they reflected the geographical and administrative proximity to Santa Fe, the family networks within and beyond the province and local political conflicts.

In the city of Santa Marta a group of prominent vecinos received the news from Santa Fe with great enthusiasm. One of the most enthusiastic was Agustín Gutiérrez y Moreno, a native of Santa Fe who had come to Santa Marta only two

years earlier to work as a lawyer, but who quickly became immersed in the commerce of the city. On 5 August 1810, he wrote to his brother in Santa Fe about a proposal to enlarge Santa Marta's cabildo so that it would consist of twelve regidores instead of five. The object, he said, was to form a party against the governor, who was disliked by almost everyone because of his zeal in enforcing the laws against contraband. The governor was, according to Gutiérrez y Moreno, '...such a despot and so arrogant that it is necessary that what happened to Montes happens to him ...'. Gutiérrez y Moreno also described the current enthusiastic atmosphere of the city. He himself had been called to the house of Colonel José Francisco Munive y Mozo, commander of the militias in Santa Marta to read a series of texts in front of thirteen persons (unnamed unfortunately) who praised every phrase.<sup>349</sup> The session lasted until midnight, and according to Gutiérrez y Moreno the political developments was the only subject of conversation in those days, and everything was 'criollismo y ardor'.<sup>350</sup> Except for three of the *regidores* of the cabildo who supported the governor, Gutiérrez y Moreno held that practically everyone in the city abhorred the governor and supported the establishment of a Junta following the examples of Santa Fe and Cartagena.

Action against the governor finally took place on August 10, 1810. According to the *actas* of the cabildo meeting held on 10 August, news had been received about the rebellion in Santa Fe, various prominent *vecinos* of Santa Marta had demanded the establishment of a Junta Provincial de Gobierno like those

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<sup>349</sup> The texts read included one from Nariño to the cabildo of Cartagena, one from Sotomayor, the priest of Mompóx, another from Salazar y Piñeres, and the call from Herrera to establish a Junta in Santa Fe.

which had been created in other parts of the *reino*, and the governor and cabildo were duly pressured into accepting the creation of a Junta Provincial in Santa Marta.<sup>351</sup> The cabildo met at six in the afternoon, after the “most principal part” of the *vecindario* had gathered in the governor's house and demanded the creation of ‘... a Junta Provincial de Gobierno which should guard the security of the people , and in which it could deposit its confidence...’. The governor had therefore called for a cabildo meeting, and the *vecinos* who had made the demand gathered together with many more *vecinos* and a numerous *pueblo* outside the building where the cabildo was held. The cabildo agreed that a Junta should be formed and that it should proceed with the elections.<sup>352</sup>

While Gutiérrez y Moreno painted a picture of general creole enthusiasm and resistance against the governor, other witnesses claimed that only a handful of prominent *vecinos* wanted to alter the system of government in Santa Marta in August 1810.<sup>353</sup> José María Martínez de Aparicio, the administrator of the liquor monopoly and the postal service, claimed in a report written a few months later to the Regency Council in Seville, that it was really only lieutenant governor Antonio Viana and a few friends of his who wanted to create a Junta. The population in

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<sup>350</sup> Letter from Agustín Gutiérrez y Moreno to his brother José Gregorio, Santa Marta 5 Aug 1810 quoted in Ignacio Gutiérrez Ponce, *Vida de don Ignacio Gutiérrez Vergara y episodios históricos de su tiempo (1806 - 1877)* (London, Bradbury, Agnew & Co. 1900), pp. 73 - 74

<sup>351</sup> A copy of the *acta* of 10 August 1810 can be found in AGI, Santa Fe 1183. A copy of the *acta* of 9 August 1810 can be found as an appendix to the letter written by José María Martínez de Aparicio 25 November 1810 in AGI, Santa Fe 746. In this last *acta*, the name of Agustín Gutiérrez y Moreno is not mentioned, and Enrique Arroyuelo is listed as *rexidor anal* and absent. Arroyuelo was most likely a relative (son or brother) of Buenaventura Arroyuelo y Bezaral, a native of the Señorío de Vizcaya, born ca 1733 and married María Josefa Ramón y Godoy in 1790. Buenaventura was a witness in ‘Petición de María Candelaria López de Vergara, viuda de José Ignacio Alamo y Gaviedes, de información sobre la limpieza de sangre de su extinto consorte’ in AGN, Genealogías, legajo 6, folios 51 - 76. The marriage between Buenaventura and María Josefa was recorded in LBE, 4 Nov. 1790.

<sup>352</sup> ‘Acta de instalación de la Junta Provincial de Gobierno, 10 Aug 1810’, appendix to letter by José María Martínez de Aparicio to the King, 25 Nov 1810 in AGI, Santa Fe 746

<sup>353</sup> Letter from Agustín Gutiérrez y Moreno to his brother José Gregorio, Santa Marta 15 Aug 1810 quoted in Ignacio Gutiérrez Ponce, *Vida de don Ignacio Gutiérrez*, pp. 74 - 75

general supposedly detested such novelties.<sup>354</sup> He explained that in the afflicted state which New Granada found itself after the occurrences in Santa Fe, '...a few seditious subjects, addicts of the thinking of the capital, succeeded in claiming the creation of a Junta...' These few men managed to gather a crowd which participated in the election of vocales for the new Junta. In Martínez de Aparicio's view, however, the large majority of the population did not favour any such novelties. But '...dressed with their accustomed moderation, with the beautiful features and Christian thoughts which adorn all the inhabitants (incapable of having thought of such a demand)...' the people elected the vocales. He explained that both he and his son were among the seventeen men elected to the Junta, and although they found the election based on 'hateful principles', they reasoned that their presence in the Junta could serve as a defence against the 'horrible fire of independence and despotism of the capital'. Martínez de Aparicio warned that the most dangerous subjects were José Francisco de Munive y Mozo and Antonio Viana, the lieutenant governor. The *plebe*, on the other hand, was '...amiable, and constantly clamors for the preservation of obedience to the Regency Council, and it abhors the actions of those provinces which have separated themselves from the Regency...' <sup>355</sup>

Both these descriptions were undoubtedly influenced by the strong political beliefs of their authors. If Santa Marta's population had been half as enthusiastic as Gutiérrez y Moreno claimed in his letter, the moves chosen by the cabildo and the Junta which was created on 10 August would have been much more radical. Yet, it is difficult to believe Martínez de Aparicio's assertion that a handful of friends could force the governor and the population to create a Junta if

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<sup>354</sup> See letter from José María Martínez de Aparicio, 25 Nov. 1810 in AGI, Santa Fe 746

the hostility towards innovations was as general as he claimed. It is more likely that the prevailing attitude of most of the people in Santa Marta was one of uncertainty. While many might have favoured a new political regime that was more attuned to local interests, later developments show that the people of Santa Marta tried as long as possible to find a middle way between the openly rebellious attitude of the Junta in Santa Fe and the absolutist conservatism of the peninsular royal officials.

Perhaps the public proclamation made on 14 August by Ramón de Zuñiga, a young member of the *samaritan* elite who had been educated at the prestigious Colegio de Nuestra Señora del Rosario in Santa Fé, was more indicative of the sentiments held by samaritans at the time. Addressing the 'Citizens of Santa Marta', Zuñiga expressed the ambiguities inherent in recent political developments. He declared that the happy moment had arrived when tyranny would expire and despotism disappear. In his view, the Junta had been elected by the free votes of the people, without the use of arms or violence. The only object of the Junta, he claimed, was to represent the people and seek its happiness. The Junta represented an entirely new form of government, and all those regulations which had been in the disfavour of the people would be reformed. What the Junta wanted, according to Zuñiga, was to '... form a new Constitution which will give us stable laws, which are compatible with our local interests and situation...' This was, of course, a large project, which could not be completed in a few days, but he promised that soon the Junta Central of the *reino* (New Granada) would be established, and it would put everything in order. Enthusiastic and revolutionary though it was, Zuñiga's proclamation was

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<sup>355</sup> Letter by José María Martínez de Aparicio to the King, 25 Nov 1810 in AGI, Santa Fe 746

nevertheless decidedly royalist. 'We do not ignore...', he said, '...that there are men in every society who sow disagreement among the *vecinos*...we beg you therefore ...to answer those depreciable and arsonist speakers that you have engraved in your hearts the love for the Patria, that you swear with us loyalty to Ferdinand VII, to that unfortunate prince, victim of his good faith, that we are all prepared and ready to shed even the last drop of blood for our holy religion, for our Patria and for our King...' <sup>356</sup> The vision presented in Zuñiga's proclamation to the citizens of Santa Marta is one of a constitutional monarchy, where each province and patria would have more liberty than before and laws adapted to local circumstances, but where the Spanish monarchy would remain the great protector of religion and law. Nothing was said, understandably, about the Regency Council and the question as to whether Santa Marta should follow Santa Fe or Seville. Still, most members seemed to hope that Santa Marta would not have to choose, but that some new political constellation could be worked out to guarantee both the existence of the monarchy and the strengthening of local liberties.

In addition to José María Martínez de Aparicio and his son Manuel María, fifteen members were elected on 10 August to sit on the Junta Provincial de Santa Marta. The result of this popular election is of particular interest. Because contemporaries such as Martínez de Aparicio and Gutiérrez y Moreno accepted that it had been a free and fair election which reflected the general will of the city's inhabitants it offers a rare indication of public opinion at the time. One of the notable features of the election result was that all the members elected were either royal officials, high-ranking ecclesiastics or prominent members of the *samarian* nobility. If we believe that the election was as fair and popular as the witnesses

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<sup>356</sup> Ramón de Zuñiga's proclamation was published in Manuel Ezequiel Corrales, *Documentos*

claimed, this indicates, first, that the commoners of the city felt it was natural that the inhabitants of highest social standing should represent the city and province. In this sense, the Junta was far from a democratic body. Although elected by the people, it did not contain any commoners. Secondly, the people elected representatives who were both against the formation of a Junta and several who were enthusiastic about it, which confirms the view that the population of Santa Marta were neither particularly radical nor overwhelmingly reactionary at this stage.

Of the seventeen members, six were high ranking royal officials and two were ecclesiastics. The remaining nine were all prominent members of the local nobility, some of whom were high-ranking militia officers (Figure 7). The Junta contained members born in Santa Marta and outsiders. There were three peninsulars, one born in Riohacha, one from Cartagena, one from the interior of New Granada, one from the port of Campeche in Mexico and two whose place of birth is unknown. Most of the members had lived and worked for many years in Santa Marta. The most recently arrived outsiders were the nineteen-year old provisor vicario provincial who came to Santa Marta in 1808 or 1809 from Spain, the governor who took up his position in 1805, and his lieutenant Viana who came between 1805 and 1808. The others had all been in Santa Marta since the 1790s or before. Members of the Díaz Granados family constituted a considerable part of the Junta. Apart from the 68 year old archdeacon Pedro Gabriel Díaz Granados, four of his nephews were elected. José Francisco Munive y Mozo, the colonel and commander of the militias of the city was related to this family by being the father-in-law of Francisco Xavier Díaz Granados. Manuel María Dávila

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*para la historia de la provincia de Cartagena* (Bogotá, Rivas, 1883) vol. 1, pp. 140 - 142

was married to a niece of José Francisco Munive, and Basilio García, the retired treasurer, was Munive's brother-in-law. The two Zuñigas on the Junta were also part of the samarian elite, and were related to the Díaz Granados family too, although more distantly.<sup>357</sup>

The local 'nobility' which constituted a majority in the Junta of Santa Marta was connected by blood and friendship with the 'nobles' who had formed the Junta Suprema of Cartagena and who ran the city after the overthrow of Governor Montes in June 1810. As will be recalled from a previous chapter, Antonio Narváez y de la Torre, the now ageing military officer from Cartagena (he was born in 1733) who was one of the two 'cabildantes' used to control Montes before he was thrown out, had been governor of Santa Marta between 1778 and 1785. He was also related to the entire Díaz Granados family both through descent and by marriage. Of the younger generation of nobles who participated in the formation of the Junta in Cartagena, José de Fernández de la Madrid y Castro was the son of Antonio de Narvaez' sister-in-law. He was one of the editors of the first newspaper of Cartagena, the *Argos Americano*, member of the Junta and was later president of the United Provinces of New Granada (1812 - 1816). His mother, Gabriela Fernández de Castro, was the daughter of the peninsular José Manuel Fernández de Castro who had been *vecino* and member of the cabildos of both Santa Marta and Valledupar and Catalina Pérez Ruiz Calderón, daughter of Maria Francisca Díaz Granados and the aforementioned interim governor of Santa Marta. José Fernández de la Madrid y Castro had studied at the Colegio Mayor del Rosario in Santa Fe from 1805 and onwards, together with his distant relatives Esteban, Pascual Venancio and Francisco

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<sup>357</sup> For the sources of the biographic and genealogical information see chapter 2 and figures 2, 3,



Xavier Díaz Granados all members of the Junta of Santa Marta. One of their slightly older relatives, Miguel Díaz Granados, a native of Santa Marta, who provided much of the intellectual reasoning behind the working of the Junta of Cartagena, had been vice-rector of the Colegio Mayor del Rosario between 1794 - 1799. The lawyer José Manuel García de Toledo, one of the most central figures of Cartagena in 1810 was also indirectly related to the Díaz Granados and the Munive y Mozos by being the son of María Isabel de Madariaga and grandson of Andrés de Madariaga, count of Pestagua. He was thus the niece of José Francisco Munive y Mozo's wife.<sup>358</sup>

The strong connections between the moderate and aristocratic leaders of Cartagena and the members of the Junta of Santa Marta was no coincidence. It was apparent to contemporaries that the Junta of Cartagena was a model for the nobles of Santa Marta. In the *acta* of 10 August when the Junta of Santa Marta was formed, it was stated that the Junta should operate in the same manner as the one in Cartagena, '[...] being the most appropriate for the security of the people...'.<sup>359</sup> And in Gutiérrez y Moreno's letter 5 August 1810, he wrote that a Junta was going to be formed and that two 'zarcillos' [literally tendrils] would be put there with extensive powers to control the governor 'like they did in Cartagena...'.<sup>360</sup> In August 1810 and the following months, the Juntas of Santa Marta and Cartagena followed parallel paths. The aristocratic families of Cartagena and Santa Marta sought to establish Juntas and limit the power of the

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<sup>358</sup> Múnera, *El fracaso*, p. 160. Munera claims that García de Toledo had studied at the Colegio Mayor del Rosario. So does Adelaida Sourdis, 'Ruptura del estado colonial', p. 168. But he does not appear in the list of students published in María Clara Guillen de Iriarte, *Nobleza e hidalguía*.

<sup>359</sup> 'Acta de instalación de la Junta Provincial de Gobierno, 10 Aug 1810', appendix to letter by José María Martínez de Aparicio to the King, 25 Nov 1810 in AGI, Santa Fe 746

governors and thereby control their respective cities and provinces. Both supported the Regency Council in Spain and they did not follow the steps taken by the Junta of Santa Fe.

But both the Juntas of Santa Marta and Cartagena would eventually face severe problems with other groups in their respective cities and provinces. In both cities, the commoners appeared to seek their own political goals which did not necessarily correspond with those of the local elites. Moreover, it became increasingly evident that commoners were not willing in the long run to accept unconditionally the aristocratic leadership of the local urban elites. And given that the political crisis had at least partially removed the political authority and weakened the traditional hierarchical structures, the 'will of the people' became one of the central themes of the conflict. One can easily understand the fundamental disagreement between Gutiérrez y Moreno and Martínez de Aparicio with respect to the loyalties of the population in general. While Gutiérrez y Moreno, the only santafereño who was elected to the Junta (although only as a substitute for Dr Esteban Díaz Granados who had to travel to Valledupar), was certain that the people would follow Santa Fe, and Martínez de Aparicio, a native of Seville, was equally convinced that most of the population would support the Regency Council, later developments indicate that most of the inhabitants, elites and commoners alike, found the issue much more complex.

One of the first serious questions which the new Junta had to discuss was whether Santa Marta should continue to obey the Regency Council (like Cartagena), or whether the city should follow Santa Fe and break with Spain. The

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<sup>360</sup> Letter from Agustín Gutiérrez y Moreno to his brother José Gregorio, Santa Marta 5 Aug

old cabildo had in June 1810 sworn loyalty to the Regency, but that was before the Junta of Santa Fe had been created. The developments in Santa Fe put Santa Marta in a dilemma. If they chose to recognise the Regency, they could easily be creating problems with the interior of the viceroyalty where several other Juntas had followed the example of the capital. If they chose to discontinue their support for the Regency, on the other hand, Santa Marta could disrupt the important relations with most of their neighbours and trading partners in the Caribbean area. Other ports of great military and commercial significance, such as Havana, Panama and Puerto Rico were also supporters of the Regency.

Initially, the Junta attempted to avoid the question altogether. Thus, the oath which the *vocales* of the Junta had to swear did not mention the Regency at all.<sup>361</sup> But the Junta soon found itself forced to take a stand. On the evening of 14 August, the Junta received an invitation from the Junta Suprema of Santa Fe to elect a representative for the Junta Suprema Central, which the Junta of Santa Fe wanted to create as a governing body for the entire viceroyalty. This was such a serious issue, that the Junta decided to postpone the discussion for another day, and in the meantime they simply replied to Santa Fe that they had received the invitation and that it would be discussed on a later occasion.<sup>362</sup> The matter was discussed only two days later. The *acta* states that various opinions were expressed, and subsequently the *vocales* agreed that a deputy should be elected to represent the entire province of Santa Marta in the Junta Central in Santa Fe (or whichever

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1810 cited in Ignacio Gutiérrez Ponce, *Vida de don Ignacio*, pp. 73 - 74

<sup>361</sup> 'Acta de la instalación de la Junta Provincial de Gobierno de Santa Marta', 10 August 1810 in AGI, Santa Fe 746: 'With the hand on the Holy Bible, and making the sign of the cross, the president of the Junta asked: Do you swear to God by the Holy Bible to fulfil the responsibility of *Vice-Presidente* and *vocales* of the Junta Provincial de Gobierno, to protect the security of the people, to sacrifice your blood and your lives in defence of our C[atholic], A[postolic], R[omanic] Religion of our much beloved sovereign, the lord Don Fernando VII, and to defend the freedom and the security of the Fatherland'

other city was agreed to house the Junta Central), and that the legitimacy of the Regency should be a matter for discussion in the 'Junta Suprema del Reyno'.<sup>363</sup> In order to elect a provincial deputy, the Junta of Santa Marta thought it was necessary to consult the other cabildos of the province. In this manner, the issue was delayed by the Junta of Santa Marta. That was the attitude it expressed in its letter to the Junta of Santa Fe as well. Dated 25 August 1810 and signed by the president, the vice-president, the *vocal nato* and the secretary, the letter stated that the Junta had devoted an entire session to discuss '...independence or subjugation to the Regency Council...' and the members of the Junta had agreed on the '...inconveniences of both extremes...'. Various points which were thought to be important were listed in order to convey to the Junta of Santa Fe the difficult position of the Junta of Santa Marta: the oath already sworn to the Regency by the old cabildo, the threat of a foreign invasion and the threat of civil war if the other provinces of the viceroyalty reached different conclusions from that of Santa Marta. The Junta concluded therefore that '...such an interesting and transcendental matter for the whole viceroyalty (reino) ought not to be decided by each province individually...' <sup>364</sup> In other words, Santa Marta would obey the decision made by a Junta Central if this represented the provinces of the viceroyalty, but it would not accept Santa Fe's unilateral declaration of independence from the Regency Council.

When the Junta of Santa Marta was forced to decide on its relations with the Regency Council, it was not due to outside pressure. The 'people', mainly the commoners, played an increasingly important political role in Santa Marta. It was

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<sup>362</sup> 'Acta de 14 de Agosto 1810' in AGI, Santa Fe 746

<sup>363</sup> '5a Acta de la Junta Provincial' 16 Agosto 1810 in AGI, Santa Fe 746

a crowd consisting in part of a numerous *pueblo* who had demanded the formation of a Junta in August 1810, and it was the people who had elected the *vocales*. The Junta thus owed its existence to the people and were supposed to represent their interests. But the Junta displayed a very ambiguous view towards the commoners of the city and the province. On one hand, the Junta appeared eager to know the opinion of the masses and execute their will. On the other hand, a certain fear of the masses is prevalent in the *actas* of 1810. The discussion on the formation of next year's Junta reflected this ambivalent attitude. The *vocales* knew that the commoners were following the political developments closely, and they sought both to inform them about the proceedings of the Junta and to hear their opinion on important issues. Public *bandos* (or edicts) were posted around the city and sent to other parts of the province to inform the inhabitants about the latest developments. On 20 October the Junta also decided to appoint one or more subjects in every street of the city to which the inhabitants could go to get informed about the proceedings of the Junta, to demand their rights or to simply petition what '...they feel is just and necessary...'. These representatives should then inform the vice-president about any queries or petitions which should be discussed by the Junta. This was done in order to evade '... the congregation of the People, frequently mislead by false news and the damages which this causes for the public tranquility...'.<sup>365</sup>

But the commoners did not refrain from congregating. Only two days later, Governor Salcedo informed the Junta that on the nights of 21 and 22 October, '...varios vecinos de los pardos...' had united in front of his house.

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<sup>364</sup> Copy of letter from the Junta Provincial de Santa Marta 25 August 1810 in AGI, Santa Fe 746

Although Pedro Gabriel Díaz Granados had managed to disperse them the first night, the governor found it useful to form patrols to circulate in the city. The governor himself had participated and they had come upon a group which had told the governor in the presence of José María Martínez Aparicio that the people wanted the Junta to make public its recognition of and obedience to the Regency Council.<sup>365</sup> According to the story told by the governor, there was no violence or threat involved. The people had simply made their opinion known by congregating in the city at night. This of course may well have been an incident staged by the governor in co-operation with Martínez de Aparicio to force the Junta to recognise the Regency Council. But in any case, the fact that the governor and the *vocal* used the people as an instrument to convince or force the Junta to accepting the Regency indicates the elite's ambivalent attitude towards the commoners. The Junta had to represent their will but also feared their potential for violence and unrest. After hearing the governor's story, the Junta agreed that it was necessary to make public its support of the Regency. The troops should be gathered and a ceremony organised in which the oaths of loyalty would be sworn by all the members of the Junta. And *bandos* should be posted in the city to the same end.

The confirmation of the Junta's recognition of the Regency Council was a major setback for those who had been the firmest (and only?) supporters of the actions taken by Santa Fe: lieutenant governor Antonio Viana and the lawyer and merchant Gutiérrez y Moreno, who had accepted the post of secretary of the Junta, replacing Esteban Díaz Granados who had to travel to Valledupar. Antonio

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<sup>365</sup> Ibid.: 'para evitar de este modo, la reunion del Pueblo, muchas veces engañadas con falzas noticias, y los perjuicios que resultan a la publica tranquilidad'

<sup>366</sup> '22,, acta de la Junta de Santa Marta', 22 October 1810 in AGI, Santa Fe 746

Viana was not present when the members of the Junta swore loyalty to the Regency Council. There were rumours that Viana did not support the Regency, and he was brought in and interrogated by the governor:

'Do you swear to God our Lord on the Holy Bible on which you have put your hands, to recognise the Supreme Regency Council, to follow the dispositions of this Junta, not to make expression which may cause the People to suspect you, nor to show indispositions towards Santa Fe, Cartagena, Antioquia or any other province? He answered. Yes, I swear. And the president told him: If this is true, God will assist you. If not, he will denounce you. To this Viana answered: Amen. And he added: My intentions were never to change the system of government in this city, which is confirmed by all my actions so far.<sup>367</sup>

Despite his oath, Antonio Viana did not participate in the Junta after 22 October 1810. On 27 October, he requested and received from the Junta permission to go to Gayra to regain his health.<sup>368</sup> He never returned. Agustín Gutiérrez y Moreno continued to live in Santa Marta until March or April 1811, but his letters to his brother in Santa Fe were far less enthusiastic than they had been in August.

The Junta of Santa Marta had thus been forced to align itself with the Regency Council, although it is impossible to know whether this was actually a

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<sup>367</sup> Ibid.

matter of very much concern among the commoners of the city. This, of course, made relations with Santa Fe more difficult. When the Junta of Santa Marta received a report from Santa Fe dated 29 September 1810 on the revolution which had occurred there, the Junta decided to simply answer that it maintained its obedience to the Regency.<sup>369</sup> Santa Marta attempted to maintain cordial relations with Santa Fe, but it did not recognise the Junta of Santa Fe as a superior. This was made clear when a postal ship arrived in Santa Marta from Cádiz and Puerto Rico with various letters to the viceroy and Audiencia of Santa Fe. The *vocales* of Santa Marta reasoned that, when the letters were written, the Regency could not have been aware that both the viceroy and the Audiencia had been deposed. Suspecting that the letters could contain important information regarding both the province of Santa Marta and the viceroyalty, the Junta decided to open the sealed envelopes. The reasoning was quite clear. Since the Audiencia and the viceroy had been deposed, the authority which these institutions formerly had asserted over the province of Santa Marta was now in the hands of the Junta. Since '...this Junta [was] just as independent in its province as the one in Santa Fe is in hers...', both Juntas had equal right to open the letters.<sup>370</sup> In other words, the internal territorial hierarchy of the viceroyalty had ceased to exist as a consequence of the revolution in Santa Fe. The provinces were now equally independent, but united in their loyalty towards the King. The Junta of Santa Marta would henceforth act as Audiencia and viceroy in its own province. If we are to believe the primary sources of the era, the rupture of relations between Santa Fe and Santa Marta were not something which the authorities and people in Santa Marta wanted. It does not seem to have been the case that Santa Marta used

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<sup>368</sup> '25 acta de la Junta de Santa Marta', 27 October 1810 in AGI, Santa Fe 746

<sup>369</sup> '24 acta de la Junta de Santa Marta', 24 Oct. 1810 in AGI, Santa Fe 746

<sup>370</sup> '26 acta de la Junta de Santa Marta', 27 Oct. 1810 in AGI, Santa Fe 746



Santa Fe's actions as an excuse for breaking away from them. Rather, the *vocales* of the Junta felt that given Santa Marta's geographical situation, it would be more risky to go against the Regency since all the major military garrisons of the Spanish Caribbean supported it. Moreover, a majority of the members of the Santa Marta Junta in 1810 seem to genuinely have thought that the Regency was legitimate and that it did represent the will of Ferdinand VII. And the few dissenters in the Junta, were 'foreigners', men from the interior of the viceroyalty who had not lived in Santa Marta for long before 1810.

### Reactions of the Riohacha, Valledupar and Ocaña cabildos

When the other cabildos of the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha discussed the new political situation, they had already been informed about developments in Santa Marta, which may well have influenced their behaviour. In the city of Riohacha the decision to support the Regency Council was reached without much disagreement or delay. In the cabildo meeting held in the city of Riohacha on 16 August 1810, various letters from Santa Fe and Cartagena were opened which informed about the events which had taken place there. The three members of the cabildo then agreed that it was '...a prime necessity to attend to the means by which the calm and good order of the People can be preserved...', and that in order to secure this '...the subjects of most character in this city, without distinction of classes nor estates...' should be invited to discuss the situation in the cabildo. On 17 August 1810, twenty-seven of the most prominent *vecinos* of Riohacha gathered to discuss the political situation and to elect three additional *regidores* for the cabildo. The first man to speak was Fernando de Orive, lieutenant-

colonel, commander of arms and military governor of Riohacha.<sup>371</sup> In his opinion, the essential point was that the new Junta in Santa Fe had refused to recognise the Regency Council on 26 July. This implied that the Junta could no longer be considered a legitimate royal institution, and still less a superior of the other provinces of New Granada.<sup>372</sup> He added that it would be convenient to unite 'intimately' with the provinces of Santa Marta and Cartagena and proceed in accordance with them, because they recognised the Regency Council and they were the only ones which could offer swift military and economic help if necessary. Furthermore there were 'personas doctas' in those cities which could give counsel on this intricate and ardent matter. The ecclesiastics present at the meeting simply stated that the most holy and urgent task was to preserve the rights of the monarch and his sovereignty which now resided with the Regency Council. Alfonso Gutiérrez, a peninsular and retired *contador oficial* of the Royal Treasury in Riohacha suggested that a ceremony should be held where all the inhabitants of the city swore loyalty to the Regency. This was seconded by Juan Bautista Sanz, Enrique Gloria and José Rafael Pimienta. José Casimiro Lopez Sierra and José María Lopez went even further: 'We will blindly obey our Catholic Monarch Ferdinand VII as we have sworn, and with the equal submission the Regency Council which governs Spain and the Indies in his name. Considering the poverty of this country, we should maintain peace as we have done until now without introducing any novelties.'

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<sup>371</sup> The governorship was divided between Orive and Pérez Prieto, as was the custom when the appointed governor was absent

<sup>372</sup> Acta del cabildo de Riohacha, 17 Aug. 1810 in AGI, Cuba 1713: 'el día veinte y seis en que discutiendo los vocales de aquella Junta sobre si debía o no continuar reconociendo al Supremo Consejo de Rexencia, se decide desligada del juramento que tenia hecho de reconocerlo; es visto haberse apartado de sus principios, en el punto mas esencial, para que fuese admitida por las Provincias Leales, que entiendo así, haya; que esta y sus habitantes, no pueden ni deben hunirle mientras permanezca sin reconocer la autoridad Real en el Supremo Consejo de Rexencia que Gobierna la Monarquía Española, pues ningun motivo puede dispensarnos el

But not all the *vecinos* present were equally eager to break relations with Santa Fe and swear loyalty to the Regency. José Rafael Iguarán said that he thought there was no other alternative than to keep the promise they had made and the loyalty they had sworn towards the Regency Council, and that they should follow the paths taken by Cartagena and Santa Marta. However, Riohacha should not be subordinate to either of these two provinces. Antonio Francisco de Barros, who was the administrator of the tobacco monopoly, suggested that they wait to see how the other provinces of the viceroyalty proceeded before taking a decision. Nicolas de Barros agreed with his brother.<sup>373</sup> Francisco Gutierrez, José Freyle and José María de Castro all stated that they agreed completely with Barros. But when all the *vecinos* present who wanted to present their views had done so, the interim governor concluded that Riohacha reiterated its oath of loyalty the Regency council, and that as few changes as possible were to be introduced in the government of the city.

The cabildo of Ocaña, predicably, was more sympathetic to the Junta of Santa Fe than any of the other cabildos of the province. As we have seen, Ocaña was closely connected though trade and family networks with towns and cities such as Pamplona, Cúcuta, San Gil and Socorro. And these were precisely some of the towns which had been among the first to refuse to recognise the Regency Council. Despite the wide support for the 'revolution' in these areas, the cabildo of Ocaña also tried to find some middle way between the 'inconvenient extremes'

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sagrado juramento que tenemos hecho voluntaria y espontaneamente, de obedecerlo mientras subsiste'

<sup>373</sup> Nicolas and Antonio Francisco were sons of Nicolas de Barros, a widower in 1777. See census of Riohacha in AGN, Censos redimibles, leg. 6, folio 507v. Antonio Francisco was born

so as not to destroy relations with Santa Marta. This is clearly seen in the instructions which the cabildo of Ocaña gave Francisco Aquilino Jácome who was sent to Santa Marta to represent Ocaña in the Junta of Santa Marta: 'This city, so loyal to her King and addicted to sustaining her liberty and the common cause...', the instructions began.<sup>374</sup> The cabildo furthermore declared that the inhabitants of the city were willing to shed their blood to defend these 'sacred objectives', and that they would do everything possible to assure the 'union of the provinces'. The exalted tone of the instructions indicate that the cabildo clearly saw that important developments were taking place, and it expressed its support for these change: 'We congratulate the happy revolution of our public opinions and we see the necessity of being represented for the motive proposed by the capital of New Granada and Santa Marta in order to establish a new government which will make America prosper.' In other words, the cabildo was positive about the changes taking place and it attempted to support both Santa Marta and Santa Fe. However, the support for Santa Marta had certain limits: 'We recognise the Junta of Santa Marta for now, but it cannot in the future think that it has any right to our subordination, as long as our opinion has not been consulted and the excessive number of *vocales* in the Junta is a threat to our liberty.' The cabildo of Ocaña made it clear that if the number of *vocales* were not reduced in the Junta of Santa Marta, and if the other cabildos of the province were not represented, the Junta would no longer be recognised and on the contrary be considered 'involuntary, illegitimate and improper by universal judgement'. But Ocaña did not act on this threat, and until early 1813 the city of Ocaña remained within the pro-Regency camp along with the rest of the province.

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ca 1753. He was a witness for Bernardo Josef Maduro, see letter from Maduro to the *alcalde ordinario* of Riohacha, 20 May 1784 in AGI, Santa Fe 1194.

<sup>374</sup> Parts of the instructions were published in Amaya, *Los genitores*, pp. 169 - 171

The elites of Valledupar had always been closer to those of Santa Marta than their fellows in Ocaña, and it should come as no surprise that the cabildo of Valledupar initially supported the policies followed by the Junta of Santa Marta. But the situation in Valledupar was made unstable by local political conflicts. As we have seen, the Marquis of Valdehoyos had experienced several conflicts with the cabildo during the years immediately preceding 1810.<sup>375</sup> There was nothing extraordinary in an influential and wealthy outsider having conflicts with a cabildo, but in this particular case, the conflicts soon took on a larger significance. It was well known that the Marquis of Valdehoyos was a good friend and advisor to the viceroy and to the fiscal of the Audiencia of Santa Fe, Diego de Frías, the man who was responsible for the brutal repression of the cabildo of Quito in 1809, and one of the first to be arrested in Santa Fe on the 20 July.<sup>376</sup> Antonio Villavicencio, the representative of the Regency Council who arrived in Cartagena in early 1810, warned his colleagues in Spain about the characters and ways of working of some these peninsulars, and the possible consequences it could have for relations between Spain and New Granada. Villavicencio wrote: '...nor should I omit the scandalous doings of all kinds, which the Marquis of Valdehoyos, who is truly mad, has committed in the city of Valledupar under the protection of the Viceroy...The fiscal [Diego Frías] has for years detained the complaints of the inhabitants of Valledupar against the Marquis of Valdehoyos, friend and *protegido*

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<sup>375</sup> See AGN, Empleados públicos de Magdalena 7, fols 988 - 997; 'Andrés Pinto, teniente de gobernador de Valledupar, de quien se querella el marqués de Valdehoyos por oponerse al adelanto local' (1807) and AGN, Empleados publicos de Magdalena 8, fols 331 - 368; 'Antonio Díaz, regidor alguacil mayor de Valledupar, contra quien se abrara mandamiento judicial por petición del marqués de Valdehoyos' (1808)

<sup>376</sup> McFarlane, *Colombia before Independence*, p. 344

of the Viceroy...<sup>377</sup> Before 1810, the Marquis had a bad reputation for causing trouble. When Juan de Sámano, who was appointed governor of Riohacha in October 1808, passed through Valledupar, he found that 'all the inhabitants here have expressed their disagreement with the actions taken by the Marquis of Valdehoyos, for his misdeeds and arbitrary rulings...The complaints are well founded, but the truth is that one cannot unauthorise an excellent and loyal servant of S M.'<sup>378</sup>

The unpopularity of Valdehoyos in Valledupar reflected on the position of Viceroy and even the King. Already in May 1810, there was an uprising where more than 400 people deposed the royal authorities, shouting 'down with the Marquis of Valdehoyos and the Viceroy and death to Ferdinand VII'.<sup>379</sup> According to one witness, the 'bajo pueblo' controlled the city for several weeks. If it is true that the population of Valledupar in May 1810 screamed death to Ferdinand VII, it was surely one of the earliest examples of popular anti-royalism in New Granada, and suggests how attitudes towards Spain could be shaped by purely local issues. This version of events is, however, not corroborated by other contemporary sources and should be treated with some caution. This uprising was not commented by the authorities in Santa Marta, which indicates that if there was a popular revolt in Valledupar in May and Junta 1810, it must have been quickly repressed; later that year, it was reported from Santa Marta that the entire

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<sup>377</sup> Letter by Antonio Villavicencio to Miguel de Lardizábal, Cartagena 22 May 1810 published in Pedro Castro Trespalcios, *Culturas aborígenes cesarenses e independencia de Valledupar* (Bogotá: Casa de la Cultura de Valledupar/ Sociedad Bolivariana del Cesar, 1979), pp. 57 - 58

<sup>378</sup> Letter from Sámano to the viceroy, 1 March 1808 published in Castro Trespalcios, *Culturas aborígenes*, p. 59

<sup>379</sup> Letter from Vincencio Ruiz de Gómez, alcalde of Valledupar, to the viceroy, 22 May and 2 June 1810, published in Castro Trespalcios, *Culturas aborígenes*, pp. 59 - 60

province stood firm on the side of the Regency Council and supported King Ferdinand VII.

In the provinces of Riohacha and Santa Marta as a whole, then, very few individuals argued that Santa Marta should follow the 'system' of Santa Fe. Traditionally, the loyalty of these provinces towards the King and the Regency has been taken as evidence of the backwardness of these regions. In the nationalistic history produced in nineteenth century Colombia, royal officials and 'traditionalist' and 'ignorant' Indians were blamed for the unpatriotic position of the towns and cities of Santa Marta and Riohacha. This is an anachronistic view. At the time, in 1810, none of Juntas had proclaimed independence from Spain, all were still loyal to the King and the issue was whether to acknowledge the Regency or not. In the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha, most inhabitants thought that the wisest thing to do was to stick together with the other cities of the Caribbean littoral and defend the authority of the Regency.

There are two factors which may help to explain the break with Santa Fe. First of all, one should keep in mind that the relations between the coast and Santa Fe were limited even in the late colonial period. Although the Audiencia and the viceroy of Santa Fe were formally the superiors of the local authorities in Santa Marta and Riohacha, the coastal provinces enjoyed more autonomy from Santa Fe than did the interior provinces that were nearer the capital. To break with Santa Fe was therefore not necessarily a radical move which would change the political situation considerably. Secondly, the main objective of authorities and prominent vecinos alike seems to have been to maintain peace and order. Any 'novelties' were possible threats to the tranquillity and harmony of the region.

During the second half of 1810, then, there seemed to be a coastal unity in defence of the Regency. As late as 1811, the governor of Santa Marta was convinced that Santa Marta would follow Cartagena. The common genealogies of the coastal provinces, their close relations with Spain and the Spanish Caribbean, their particular social make-up which differed markedly from that of the interior, seemed to guarantee their adherence to the Iberian peninsula. This was, however, not to be the case. By late 1810, the two cities had started to move in different directions, leading to a violent conflict which we will examine in the next chapter.



## Chapter 7. Regional disintegration and social conflict, 1811 - 1813

### The failure of the 'nobles' in Cartagena and Santa Marta

Regional harmony and unity on the Caribbean coast suffered a fundamental shock primarily as a consequence of developments in the city of Cartagena. Until 11 November 1811, when total independence from Spain was declared in Cartagena, the political situation there was just as complex as in Santa Marta. But it became increasingly clear that Cartagena would break away from the institutions in Spain which claimed to govern in the name of Ferdinand VII, and this soured relations with the cities and towns of the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha which continued to recognise the peninsular institutions. In Cartagena, one indication of the more strained relations with the Regency Council occurred in November 1810 when the Junta Suprema of Cartagena refused to accept the new governor which the Regency had appointed to replace Montes. The Junta of Cartagena nevertheless reacted strongly against the Cabildo of Mompóx which had followed Santa Fe in August 1810 and broken relations with the Regency.<sup>380</sup> On 4 February 1811, a group of peninsular merchants tried to overthrow the Junta of Cartagena and re-establish the old institutions by instigating junior officers and soldiers of the *Regimiento fijo* to seize the most prominent leaders of the Junta. The coup was put down, partly because of the intervention of Antonio de Narváez (the former governor of Santa Marta) and partly because of a popular reaction by some of the popular *barrios* of the city. As a consequence of this, many of the peninsulars behind the coup and others who did not support the new form of government

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<sup>380</sup> For the events in Mompóx in 1810, and the reactions of the Junta of Cartagena, see Adelaida Sourdis, *Cartagena de Indias durante la primera república 1810 - 1815* (Bogotá: Banco de la República, 1988), pp. 36 - 41 and Múnera, *El fracaso de la nación*, pp. 188 - 191

were forced to flee to Santa Marta. The Cartagena elites who were so closely connected to the Santa Marta nobles increasingly found themselves in a weaker position. The Gutiérrez de Piñeres brothers who were originally from Mompóx but who lived in Cartagena, and who favoured Cartagena's break with the Regency Council managed to form an important alliance with popular leaders from the barrio of Getsemaní.<sup>381</sup> Although García de Toledo and the local noble families still constituted and controlled the Junta Suprema de Cartagena, the exodus of many of the peninsulars shifted the balance of power in Cartagena in the favour of those who wanted total independence from Spain.

While politics was becoming more polarised in Cartagena, in Santa Marta Governor Salcedo and the other royal officials manoeuvred to limit the power and influence of the local nobility. Additional militia companies were set up, in order to minimise the military power of Colonel José Francisco Munive y Mozo and his men. Four new companies were established in late October 1810 under the command of José María Martínez de Aparicio, and the officers chosen to command these companies were either peninsular Spaniards such as Manuel Faustino de Mier and Vicente Pujals, or creoles who were deemed more trustworthy than Munive y Mozo, such as José Alvaro Ujueta, Pascual Venancio Díaz Granados and Manuel Zuñiga.<sup>382</sup> Support for the Regency in Santa Marta was further strengthened from November 1810 by the arrival of peninsulars and officials from Cartagena who had either been expelled or who chose to leave the city when its Junta refused to receive Francisco Dávila, the governor appointed by

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<sup>381</sup> For the failed coup on 4 Febr. 1811, see Múnera, *El fracaso*, pp. 183 - 187; José Manuel Goenaga, *Apuntamientos para la biografía de José Fernández de Madrid* (Bogotá, Imprenta del centenario, 1910) [Originally published in Cartagena in *El Porvenir*, 1889], pp. 13 - 16; Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, vol 1, pp. 238 - 240

<sup>382</sup> '22. acta de la Junta de Santa Marta' (22. october 1810) in AGI, Santa Fe 746

the Regency Council.<sup>383</sup> Then, in December 1810, elections for the 1811 Santa Marta Junta gave the governor and Martínez de Aparicio an opportunity to shift the balance of the institution yet again by using popular support. On 22 December, when the new Junta was to be elected, a crowd gathered outside the building where the old Junta sat. The governor went out on the balcony to respond to the crowd, and decided to invite two or three of them to address to Junta directly. Six spokesmen from the crowd duly demanded that a new Junta be created immediately and they named the people they wanted to be on it. The Junta responded by choosing three of the spokesmen to persuade the crowd that their demands were unacceptable, in part because more people were needed in order to make any elections valid. The crowd insisted, however, that the new Junta be installed at once, upon which the vocales decided to call the *corporaciones* and to publicise the decision that elections would be held immediately. Only heads of family could vote, but from both nobles and plebeians alike. It was also decided that the new Junta would consist of only six vocales, in addition to the governor who would act as president, and the deputies from the other provincial cabildos. The new vocales would sit for a year, and the following year the members of the Junta would simply elect their own replacements instead of having fresh elections.<sup>384</sup>

It has been argued that the creation of the new Junta was a coup organised by tyrannical peninsular royal officials who wished to reverse the radical stance adopted by the first Junta formed in August.<sup>385</sup> In reality, what happened was less

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<sup>383</sup> Múnera, *El fracaso*, p. 181

<sup>384</sup> The acta of the Junta of 22 Dec 1810 is found in AGI, Cuba 1713 and it is published in Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, vol 1, pp. 184 - 186

<sup>385</sup> See for instance Rafael Amaris Maya, 'Santa Marta en la emancipación neogranadina. La leyenda del Realismo Samario' in BHA, 65:721 (April/June 1978), 245 - 278

dramatic. The election clearly resulted in a Junta which was less dominated by the Díaz Granados family and the rest of the local nobility. But there was nevertheless considerable overlap between the Juntas of 1810 and 1811. José María Martínez de Aparicio, Rafael de Zuñiga, Pedro Rodríguez and José Ignacio Díaz Granados were all re-elected, and the new vocales were lieutenant colonel Francisco Pérez Dávila, sargento mayor and second in command of the militias of Santa Marta, and José Gregorio de la Bastida, *chantre* (precentor) of the cathedral of Santa Marta. Of these six, Martínez de Aparicio and Pérez Dávila were the only peninsulars. And both of these had worked and lived in Santa Marta for several decades and were established there with families. The reduction of the number of vocales was perhaps a recognition of the claim made by the cabildo of Ocaña, and not necessarily a way of reducing the influence of the creole elites. It should also be noted that, although the governor may have been disliked (as Agustín Gutiérrez y Moreno had claimed in his personal letters), the peninsular José María Martínez de Aparicio played a central role in both the formation of the new Junta and the establishment of the alternative militias. He was, it seems, a genuinely respected member of the community, who had lived in Santa Marta and Riohacha for almost twenty-five years, and whose administration of the liquor monopoly had increased the income of the royal treasury considerably. Moreover, Martínez de Aparicio seems to have developed a special relationship both with some of the commoners of the city and with the tributary Indian communities around Santa Marta.

Martínez de Aparicio had won support among the Indians by intervening in the conflict between the tributary Indians of Mamatoco and Colonel José Francisco Munive y Mozo, owner of Santa Cruz de Curinca, a hacienda which

bordered with the village of Mamatoco, the city of Santa Marta and the huge sugar plantation San Pedro Alejandrino (owned by Joaquin de Mier y Benitez).<sup>386</sup> According to Martínez de Aparicio, the mamatocos caused a commotion on 23 November 1810, because the governor had not proceeded with the measurement of the land in order to resolve the conflict between Munive and the Indians. The governor himself did not dare to go to Mamatoco without being escorted by the militias. Martínez de Aparicio, however, went to Mamatoco along with the treasurer of the cathedral José Eulolio Ziosi. They convinced the leaders of the village to come to the city the following day and explain their problem to the Junta. On 24 November their case was heard and it was decided that Vicente Pujals, accompanied by Jose Nicolas Ximeno, Munive y Mozo and the representatives named by the Indians would go to Mamatoco to investigate and resolve the dispute. Cases such as this indicate that commoners and tribute-paying Indians in the Santa Marta area perceived royal officials as a check on the pretensions of the local nobility, and suggest that commoners and Indians were uncertain about how a society without royal officials would actually work for them.

The situation for the noble families of Santa Marta was increasingly uncertain and confusing. Their cautious support of the Regency council proved impossible to sustain. Their noble relatives in Cartagena were losing control of the political situation there, as popular sectors in Cartagena were won over to demands for independence and political freedom. In Santa Marta, on the other hand, the commoners had shown considerable scepticism towards the political

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<sup>386</sup> For property owned by José Francisco Munive y Mozo, see his will given in Santa Marta 8 Jan. 1834 i NPSM, protocolos 1834-35. The conflict is described in a letter by José María

pretensions of the local nobility, and royal officials had succeeded in constructing a base of popular support. The euphoria expressed by members of the Santa Marta elite in August 1810 was thus soon replaced with a certain indifference and political ambiguity on the part of the noble classes.

During 1811 relations between the various cabildos of the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha and the rest of the viceroyalty of New Granada grew more tense. When Santa Fe invited Santa Marta to send a delegate to the Congress which was to be held in Santa Fe in March 1811, the Junta of Santa Marta refused. But the more immediate concern for Santa Marta was its relations with neighbouring Cartagena. For both Cartagena and Santa Marta, the trade with the interior of the viceroyalty was of vital importance, and on 28 February 1811, the new President of the Cartagena Junta, José María del Real, informed the Junta of Santa Marta that Cartagena had established a sales tax of 12 per cent on all goods imported from the province of Santa Marta.<sup>387</sup> The Junta of Santa Marta naturally reacted quite strongly against this, and petitioned the *cartageneros* to revoke the new regulations.<sup>388</sup> Instead, the Junta of Cartagena demanded that Santa Marta send a delegate to the Congress to be held in Santa Fe, and threatened to break all commercial relations with Santa Marta in case they abstained.<sup>389</sup> The Junta of Santa Marta remained opposed to the Congress, arguing that participation in the congress was contrary to their adherence to the Regency Council.

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Martínez de Aparicio to the King, 25 Nov 1810 in AGI, Santa Fe 746 and in the 36 acta of the Junta de Santa Marta, 24 Nov 1810 in AGI, Santa Fe 746

<sup>387</sup> Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, p. 240

<sup>388</sup> Ibid. pp. 240 - 241

<sup>389</sup> Ibid. pp. 242 - 243

## The struggle over the Magdalena river

For both Cartagena and Santa Marta, access and control over the Magdalena river was of vital importance. The towns of the province of Santa Marta which lay along the Magdalena river were distant from all the major cities of the province, and had always been closely connected to the towns on the western shore which lay in the province of Cartagena. Cartagena was a much larger city than Santa Marta, and most of the products which were shipped up the Magdalena river were controlled either by the merchants of Cartagena or those of Mompóx. However, during the second half of the eighteenth century the noble families of Mompóx had dominated public life in the towns along the river. In addition to the influence of Mompóx and Cartagena merchants, there had often been conflict among the different towns along the river for privileges and rights. The quest for city-status, the right to form cabildos and have royal officials appointed in their own towns, made local conflict between these towns frequent. The political crisis of the empire intensified the conflicts, as royal authority dissolved and towns seized the chance to press their competing claims.

An example of such competition was the conflict between Tamalameque and Chiriguaná, which surfaced in 1810. On 14 November 1810 the Santa Marta Junta received a report from the cabildo of Tamalameque, one of the largest towns along the lower Magdalena, complaining about events which had taken place in Chiriguaná, one of its subordinate villages. There the alcalde, Juan Josef Royeno, had been deposed by the inhabitants, allegedly with the aid of the parish priest, Luis Josef Peynado.<sup>390</sup> The alcaldes of subordinate villages were appointed by the cabildo of nearest city, and the cabildo of Tamalameque complained that

the alcalde had been deposed illegally. The inhabitants of Chiriguana, on the other hand, complained that the cabildo had long proceeded in a unlawful fashion when selecting the alcalde of Chiriguana. Recent alcaldes, the inhabitants claimed, had all been chosen in accord with the 'complacencia y satisfacci3n' of a 'vecino pudiente' of Momp3x, Domingo L3pez Bordel. Whenever the inhabitants complained about the alcalde or about L3pez Bordel to the cabildo of Tamalameque, the cabildo invariably favoured the latter. Chiriguana therefore petitioned the Junta to be transferred to the jurisdiction of the cabildo of Santa Marta. The *vocales* of Santa Marta felt that such a transfer would be precipitate. Instead they decided to send Jos3 Mar3a Mart3nez de Aparicio as its delegate to Chiriguana, with wide-ranging powers to inquire about the nature of the disorder and judge in the matter. At the same time, Mart3nez de Aparicio was to visit other towns and villages along the Magdalena river, such as Guaimaro and Tenerife, where there were rumours that some inhabitants had tried to remove Tenerife from the jurisdiction of the province of Santa Marta.

In the event, Mart3nez de Aparicio's mission failed to achieve the aims which the Junta desired. The unstable political situation along the Magdalena river soon made the already latent conflict between Cartagena and Santa Marta more transparent. When Thomas de Acosta replaced Victor de Salcedo as governor of Santa Marta in May 1811, he reported that Cartagena would declare its independence from Spain, and he believed that Santa Marta would follow the same path. 'The adhesion to Cartagena', Acosta thought, 'is nurtured and fomented by the inhabitants of both provinces, the inevitable communication between them by land, sea and rivers, the connections of blood between the

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<sup>390</sup> '32 acta de la Junta de Santa Marta', 14 Nov. 1810 in AGI, Santa Fe 746



principal families of both cities, and the relations of interest which these matters and those of commerce produce...'<sup>391</sup> In Acosta's opinion, Cartagena would always be the model followed in Santa Marta. In fact, the opposite occurred. After May 1811, relations between Cartagena and Santa Marta deteriorated and moved towards open hostility.

Agustín Gutiérrez de Moreno, the former secretary of the Santa Marta Junta, played a central part in the escalation of the conflict with Cartagena. Originally from Santa Fe, and an enthusiastic supporter of independence, he had become disheartened by the royalist stance of the Junta in Santa Marta. Sometime between April and June 1811, he left Santa Marta for Barranquilla or Cartagena. On the way there he stopped in some of the smaller towns on the eastern side of the Magdalena river and became involved in drafting a letter of complaint against the Junta of Santa Marta on behalf of the inhabitants of Sitio-nuevo, Remolino and Guaimaro.<sup>392</sup> Although the letter was signed by several inhabitants of the three towns, it was primarily a manifesto of the legal and political ideas of Gutiérrez y Moreno. The letter attacked the system of government adopted by Santa Marta, the despotic character of the governor, and the lack of means and education of some of the peninsular members of the cabildo (particularly Vicente Moré, Simón Guerrero and Esteban de Morrón), while saying next to nothing about the conditions in the three towns themselves. With this letter, Agustín Gutiérrez y Moreno continued his journey to Cartagena and presented the

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<sup>391</sup> Cited in Rafael Amaris Maya, 'La Junta Patriota de 1810' in *Revista de la Academia de Historia del Magdalena* 2:3 (Jul. -Sept. 1974), p. 48

<sup>392</sup> The letter itself is published in Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, vol 1., pp. 258 - 273. In a letter to his brother Agustín Gutiérrez y Moreno explained some of the circumstances which led him to get involved in this matter. Part of the letter is quoted in Gutiérrez Ponce, *Vida de Don Ignacio*, pp. 77 - 78.

complaint to the Junta there.<sup>393</sup> The letter had been signed on 30 June 1811, and on 11 July the Junta of Cartagena, in the name of Ferdinand VII, demanded that Santa Marta should form a government similar to their own and send a delegate to the Congress of Santa Fe. In the meantime, the Junta decided, the three towns of Remolino, Sitio-nuevo and Guaimaro were to be brought under the protection of the province of Cartagena.<sup>394</sup> In July 1811 the Junta of Cartagena moved the troops which had subjugated Mompóx to Guaimaro, and they created the so-called Confederación de Magdalena with a tribunal in Guaimaro to bring the towns along the Magdalena river under its authority.

The cabildo of Santa Marta, which had been re-created and replaced the Junta on 26 June 1811, reacted angrily to this 'invasion' of its jurisdiction and decided to send Pablo Oligós, a wealthy peninsular merchant and militia captain of Santa Marta, to Guaimaro with a scribe and forty troops.<sup>395</sup> Oligós reported that an armed vessel and two lesser ships under the command of Matías de Aldao had invaded Guaimaro, with the assistance of some armed men under the command of Bernardo Bravo, a militia lieutenant. According to Oligós, these troops from Cartagena were not supported by the majority of the inhabitants, who rather than supporting the Cartagena Junta, many *vecinos* had fled, including the parish priest. When Oligós and his men were forced to retire to an island in the river, the cabildo of Santa Marta decided to strengthen its military presence in the area, and sargento mayor Pedro Dominguez was sent to support Oligós with

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<sup>393</sup> Gutiérrez Ponce, *Vida de Don Ignacio*, pp. 77 - 78

<sup>394</sup> Letter from José María García de Toledo, president of the Junta of Cartagena, to president and vocales of the Junta of Santa Marta, Cartagena 8 Jul 1811 in Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, vol 1, p. 258

<sup>395</sup> For the dissolution of the Santa Marta Junta, see Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, vol 1., pp. 341 - 342 Letter from cabildo of Santa Marta, 7 Sept. 1811 in AGI, Santa Fe 1183. Letter from Pablo Oligós to the governor of Santa Marta, Buenavista 25 July 1811 in Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, vol 1, pp. 277 - 279

another 250 men.<sup>396</sup> When the *saMarían* troops finally entered Guaimaro on 30 July 1811, the troops from Cartagena had fled, and, according to Dominguez, the inhabitants returned from their hideouts shouting 'Long live Ferdinand VII, the government of Santa Marta, the loyal vassals and death to the traitors!'<sup>397</sup>

This incident, which started the war between the provinces of Santa Marta and Cartagena was typical of much of the conflict which would continue until 1816. Although substantial numbers of troops were frequently involved, very little actual fighting took place. This was first and foremost a war of words and opinions rather than violence and death. While the officials from Santa Marta were convinced that the population in general were royalist, the insurgents from Cartagena sought to convince people that their government was more benevolent and just than the one in Santa Marta. The *saMaríans* undoubtedly drew some comfort from the fact that Francisco Pertrus (who titled himself *apoderado general notorio del vecindario de Guaimaro*), declared that the inhabitants of Guaimaro had '...never intended anything except to defend the Crown of our Catholic Monarch and his legitimately established government in the capital of Santa Marta...' and that it was only Agustín Gutiérrez and a handful of *seductores* who had manipulated the situation and, with troops and guns, forced the population to accept the government of Cartagena.<sup>398</sup> The Junta of Cartagena, however, did not give up the riverine towns easily. On the 18 August 1811, there were two hours of battle between the two parties, but without wounded or dead on any side.<sup>399</sup> On 25 August a cease-fire was agreed, and negotiations initiated between Pedro

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<sup>396</sup> Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, vol 1, pp. 280 - 282

<sup>397</sup> Letter from Pedro Dominguez to the governor of Santa Marta, Guaimaro, 2 Aug. 1811 in Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, vol 1, pp. 285 - 288

<sup>398</sup> Letter from Francisco Petrus, 31 July 1811 in Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, vol 1, pp. 288 - 289

Rodríguez, the treasurer, and Miguel Díaz Granados as representatives of the governments of Santa Marta and Cartagena respectively. These negotiations were inconclusive. Cartagena demanded again that the system of government in Santa Marta be reformed and that the province send a delegate to the congress of Santa Fe. So the confrontation continued, still without much actual fighting taking place.

The struggle was in many ways a fight for public support. Although both the government of Cartagena and of Santa Marta presented themselves as the guardians of the popular will, uncertainty and doubt still prevailed among the inhabitants of the province of Santa Marta. When Acosta reported to the viceroy (now resident in Panama) on the situation of the province of Santa Marta in late July 1811, he repeated that his initial feeling when he had arrived in Santa Marta in May was that the inhabitants remained loyal to the Crown. The governor reported that no one in Santa Marta had openly declared their adherence to the government of Cartagena, although he recognised that there were '...some restless spirits both in the city and in the province [who were] addicted to the system of government of Cartagena...'. He emphasised that they were few, but that they were '...sons of the country, decorated and wealthy, who with their offers, seductions and gifts attempt to attract the majority of the commoners...' These individuals, he claimed, were primarily José Francisco Munive y Mozo (the militia coronel), Pascual Díaz Granados, Francisco Javier Díaz Granados and Venancio Díaz Granados.<sup>400</sup> Although the governor feared the influence of these men and their connections with the leading families of other cities on the coast, he thought

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<sup>399</sup> Letter from cabildo of Santa Marta, 7 Sept. 1811 in AGI, Santa Fe 1183

<sup>400</sup> Letter from Thomas de Acosta to the viceroy, 23 July 1811 in Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, vol 1, pp. 338 - 339

that it would be possible to defend the province and to influence the ideas of the people.

### Conflict in Riohacha, Ocaña and Valledupar

Uncertainty, suspicion and political unrest was also found in the other cities of the province. In the city of Riohacha, the governor José Medina y Galindo, who had been suspended from his post by former viceroy Antonio Amar y Borbón, returned on 6 August 1811 with an armed group of a hundred and thirty or forty men and demanded that the inhabitants recognise him as the rightful governor of the city and province of Riohacha.<sup>401</sup> His men were both *vecinos* of Riohacha and inhabitants of the Valledupar area whom he recruited on his way to Riohacha. According to Juan Bautista Sanz, an *alcalde* of Riohacha, the men had largely been recruited by Antonio de Torres, the Medina's son in law and the son of Apolinar de Torres and María Luisa Díaz Granados. At ten o'clock in the morning, the band entered mounted on horses and armed with guns, swords and knives, and shouting: 'Come out, *cabildo* of traitors!'.<sup>402</sup> When the members of the *cabildo* arrived, they were met by Medina y Galindo, his two sons and Antonio de Torres along with other men of the group. A crowd had also gathered outside the town hall, and Antonio de Torres asked them: 'Generous people, do you want me to represent your rights?' The crowd replied affirmatively, and the *alcalde* Pedro Perez Prieto, who had acted as governor in the absence of Medina y Galindo, asked the representatives of the *cabildo* whether his return should be accepted. Only the second *alcalde*, Juan Bautista Sanz, disagreed declaring that the members of the *cabildo* had sworn to uphold the laws of the Spanish monarchy, and that it

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<sup>401</sup> Letter from Juan Bautista Sanz, *alcalde ordinario* of Riohacha, 11 Aug. 1811 in AGI, Santa Fe 745

was not in their power to re-instate Medina y Galindo as long as the viceroy or another superior authority had not annulled his suspension. But Sanz added that he would accept the verdict of the other members of the cabildo and resign for the sake of public tranquillity. Medina y Galindo then stated that his suspension had been illegal, since it had been the work of the viceroy and the hated minister Godoy. Thus Medina y Galindo regained his governorship, and Sanz was ousted. Antonio de Torres was made regidor decano of the cabildo and representative of Riohacha to the Cortes in Spain.<sup>403</sup> In September, the governor had all the members of the cabildo declare their loyalty to him, and stated that henceforth anyone who criticised the government would be punished.<sup>404</sup>

This conflict in Riohacha was not a conflict between royalists and republicans. Both Medina y Galindo and the *alcaldes* who had ruled in his absence claimed to be the most loyal defenders of the Spanish monarch and the peninsular institutions which ruled in his name. But with the re-entry of Medina y Galindo, the noble families of the province of Santa Marta had an important potential ally. Although he was originally a peninsular, he was thoroughly immersed in local elite networks after almost fifty years in the area, and was directly connected, by the marriage of his daughter, to a member of the Díaz Granados family.

In Valledupar the situation was more complex. Because the Marquis of Valdehoyos, a friend of the viceroy, had become so unpopular, many inhabitants were not well disposed towards supporters of the royal government. At the same time, many of the most prominent inhabitants of the city had relatives in Santa

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<sup>402</sup> Ibid.

<sup>403</sup> Letter from the cabildo of Riohacha to the governor of Cuba, 12 Sept. 1811 in AGI, Cuba 1713

Marta and Cartagena, and quickly became involved in the politics of the day. One of these, who was to play a central role during the entire independence period, was María Concepción Loperena de Fernández de Castro. She was the widow of José Manuel Alonso Fernández de Castro y Pérez Ruiz Calderón, and through her own marriage and those of her children was related to practically all the noble families of the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha, including some of the most prominent families of Cartagena. Among her son-in-laws were Esteban Díaz Granados (the nominal secretary of the Junta of Santa Marta, and previous rector of the Colegio del Rosario) and Rafael Díaz Granados, who in turn was the brother-in-law of Apolinar de Torres, father of Antonio de Torres who had helped governor José Medina y Galindo regain his post in Riohacha. María Concepción Loperena also had many prominent relatives in Cartagena. Her sister-in-law was Gabriela Josefa Fernández Castro who had first married José Antonio Díaz Granados (they were the parents of Rafael and María Luisa Díaz Granados), and when he died she married Pedro Fernández de Madrid, a royal official born in Guatemala and son of an *oidor* of the Mexican Audiencia.<sup>405</sup> Pedro Fernández de Madrid was superintendent of the Casa de Moneda in Santa Fe, and Gabriela Josefa Fernández de Castro raised most of her eight children in the viceregal capital.<sup>406</sup> José Alvaro, one of her sons, studied medicine and law at the Colegio del Rosario and published various poems and essays in the first newspapers and periodicals of Santa Fe. After 20 July 1810, Gabriela and most of her children moved to Cartagena, where José Alvaro was elected procurador of the province and thus occupied a seat in the Junta of Cartagena. He was also one of the editors

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<sup>404</sup> Acta del cabildo de Riohacha, 9 Sept. 1811 in AGI, Cuba 1713

<sup>405</sup> Partida de bautismo de Josef Luis Alvaro Fernández de Madrid, Cartagena de Indias 21 Febr. 1789, published in José Manuel Goenaga, *Apuntamientos para la biografía de José Fernández de Madrid* (Bogotá, Imprenta del centenario, 1910), pp. 5 - 6

<sup>406</sup> AGN, Solicitudes 14, folio 57

of the *Argos Americano*. José Alvaro's uncle was Antonio de Narváez, the former governor of Santa Marta and one of the two *co-adjutores* of the Cartagena Junta (who was married to María Isidora Fernández de Castro, Gabriela's sister, as will be recalled from the previous chapter).

In the traditional 'historias patrias', María Concepción Loperena has been lauded as a national heroine who more or less single-handedly secured the support of Valledupar for the government of Cartagena.<sup>407</sup> Admittedly, she must have been an unusually educated and well-respected member of the local nobility, but perhaps her central role during the wars was just as much a result of her family connections with the Cartagena and Santa Marta elites. It is true she helped Simón Bolívar with men and horses and that she made the declaration of independence in Valledupar, but that was not until 1813 when the city of Santa Marta had already been taken by the republicans. Several other aspects of the independence period in Valledupar remain obscure. Unfortunately, little is known about the individuals and groups who disagreed with Loperena, and her gradual transformation from royalist to republican is only hinted at in her own declaration in February 1813. Perhaps the noble families of Santa Marta sought to use Valledupar as a base from which they could take control of the entire province during the years in which the royal officials seemed to have secured the control of the provincial capital. For, in late 1810, the cabildo of Valledupar had asked the Regency Council to allow Valledupar to send its own delegate to the Cortes in addition to the one from Santa Marta. When this was denied, Valledupar approached the Junta of Santa Fe and asked to be allowed a seat there on behalf

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<sup>407</sup> See for instance Demetrio Daniel Henríquez, *Pergaminos heroicos* (Ciénaga, n. p., 1945); Antonio Araujo Calderón, *Cuaderno de historia provincial* (Bogotá, Contr. General de la República, 1978) and Castro Trespalacios, *Culturas aborígenes*.



of the city of Valledupar and its jurisdiction. Jorge Tadeo Lozano, the first president of the independent Junta of Santa Fe, responded positively to the pretensions of the cabildo of Valledupar and suggested that Valledupar should communicate with the cabildo of Ocaña, which was also dissatisfied with the government of Santa Marta, and elect a delegate together on behalf of the province of Santa Marta.<sup>408</sup> This, however, does not seem to have happened and Valledupar remained, at least formally, under the government of the city of Santa Marta. When Governor Acosta reported to the viceroy on the situation of the province in late November 1811 (after the declaration of independence in Cartagena), he did not mention Valledupar as one of the places where the insurgents were strong.<sup>409</sup> The cabildo of Valledupar and some of the most prominent inhabitants of the city favoured the government of Cartagena, but it was not until the beginning of 1813 that the city openly declared independence.

In Ocaña royal authorities faced an even more difficult situation. The proximity of the rebel cities of Santa Fe and the northern cordillera, left Ocaña in a vulnerable situation. As we have seen, there were few connections between the elite families of Ocaña and those of the coast, and the number of peninsular Spaniards was small. Still, the city remained loyal to Santa Marta and the royal government until October 1811, when an expedition of 124 men under the command of Antonio Morales, arrived from Santa Fe to take Ocaña for the patriots.<sup>410</sup> The santafereños were confronted by a contingent of royalist troops under the command of José Victor de Salcedo (son of the previous governor of

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<sup>408</sup> Letter from Tadeo Lozano to Cabildo of Valledupar, Santa Fe 9 Apr. 1811 in Castro Trespacios, *Culturas aborígenes*, pp. 63 - 64

<sup>409</sup> Letter from Acosta to the viceroy, 26 Nov. 1811 in Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, vol 1, p. 357

<sup>410</sup> Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, pp. 358 - 361

Santa Marta, Victor de Salcedo y Somodevilla), which had set out from Chiriguaná on the Magdalena river and headed in the direction of Ocaña in order to defend the city against the rebels. The attempt failed. It was claimed that the cabildo of Ocaña was corrupt and had ordered the exit of Salcedo and the royalist troops before the entry of the insurgents.<sup>411</sup> Just a few months later, however, the governor of Santa Marta, Acosta, suspected Salcedo himself of supporting the rebels.<sup>412</sup> Again, no actual fighting had taken place, and although the now independent government of Cartagena had managed to take a few towns in the province of Santa Marta during the last months of 1811, there was still not an outright war. The struggle for popular support was inconclusive. In most of the skirmishes and smaller battles that took place in 1810 and 1811, the local inhabitants normally fled into the countryside and opposing bands of soldiers waited while their leaders exchanged verbal abuse.

### The escalation of the conflict

The conflict between the two provinces continued during the year of 1812. At the beginning of the year, the forces from Santa Marta were able to reconquer some of the towns along the Magdalena river, including Tenerife and some towns on the western side of the river. This was achieved partly through the intervention of parish priests.<sup>413</sup> By April 1812, the insurgent troops had left Ocaña, and the governor reported that the entire province was again on the royalist side.<sup>414</sup> The saMariáns received further military strength in May 1812, when the *fragata*

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<sup>411</sup> Ibid. pp. 360 - 361

<sup>412</sup> Lista de la Principal Canalla de Santa Marta, 5 Dec. 1812 in AGN, Archivo Restrepo, rollo 5, fondo 1, vol. 14, folio 246

<sup>413</sup> Letter from viceroy Benito Pérez to governor Acosta, 22 June 1812 in Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, vol 1, pp. 430 - 431

'Andalucía' arrived directly from Cádiz with three hundred soldiers. Upon his return to Spain, the captain of the ship declared that the entire province of Santa Marta remained loyal, although he had heard rumours that there were a few insurgents there. He also said that there was still fighting between the two bands along the Magdalena river, but that the saMariáns were winning most of the battles.<sup>415</sup> The military superiority of the royalists did not last long. With the fall of the first Venezuelan republic in Caracas in July 1812, many of the Spanish, French and Venezuelan officers who had fought there took refuge in the independent Cartagena. Among those who arrived were Pierre Labatut (a colonel from the Napoleonic wars which had come to America with Miranda), Maríano Montilla, Manuel Cortés Campomanes, Miguel and Fernando Carabeño, and Simón Bolívar.<sup>416</sup>

With the arrival of these experienced soldiers, the nature of the war changed dramatically. The rather gentlemanly struggle was replaced by a more brutal and violent conflict. Bolívar himself, after the defeat of the first republic in Caracas, was convinced that the leaders of Caracas had shown too much tolerance towards the enemy and been too reluctant in recruiting soldiers.<sup>417</sup> The émigrés from Venezuela were soon put in charge of the republican army of Cartagena, and a new offensive started against the province of Santa Marta. It was decided that Labatut should attack the city of Santa Marta itself, while Bolívar should retake Guaimaro and secure communications with the interior by holding the towns

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<sup>414</sup> AGN, Archivo Restrepo, rollo 5, fondo 1, vol. 14, folios 46 - 53. Letter from Acosta to the viceroy, 1 Apr 1812 in AGN, Archivo Restrepo, rollo 5, fondo 1, vol. 14, folios 59 - 60

<sup>415</sup> 'Declaracion de D. Domingo de Irun, capitan de la Fragata (mercante) "Andalucia" sobre lo acahecido en su viaje a Santa Marta', Cádiz 10 Sept 1812 in AMB, 49 - 87

<sup>416</sup> Sourdis, 'Ruptura del estado colonial', p. 172; John Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions 1808 - 1826* 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York, W.W: Norton & Company, 1986), pp. 200 - 202

<sup>417</sup> Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions*, pp. 203 - 204

along the Magdalena river. Bolívar impressed the *aristocráticos* of Cartagena. On 1 November 1812, Gabriela Fernández de Castro wrote to her sister-in-law in Valledupar, María Concepción Loperena: 'I talked to General Bolívar who is going to cleanse the Magdalena river of royalists. I would like you to get in touch with him and inform those in Valledupar who favour independence...'<sup>418</sup> Two days later, the French woman Anita Lenoit, who lived in the small town of Salamina on the western side of the Magdalena river, wrote Loperena to call for her support of Bolívar: 'In order to serve him [Bolívar], to whom I render my veneration as a man of providence, in his mad project of liberating the American colonies from the Spanish yoke.... General Bolívar has insisted that I write this letter which you will make known to all the women of that part of the Kingdom (reino)....Please excuse me for the trouble I am causing you, but do believe sincerely ... that it is because Bolívar has informed me that you are the flame of the political revindication in that part of the Province...'<sup>419</sup> These letters not only reflect the powerful impression Bolívar made on the noble families of the coast; they also give a glimpse of the informal communication and political co-ordination which took place during the wars of independence. The aristocratic families of the coast were preparing what they thought would be the final blow to the royalists. María Concepción Loperena acted on the advice of her sister-in-law and went to Chiriguaná to meet Bolívar, taking with her other members of the prominent families of Valledupar: her son Pedro Norberto Fernández de Castro, José Antonio de Quiróz, Rafael de Araujo and others.<sup>420</sup> Her son-in-law, José Fernández de Madrid, had been elected delegate of the independent state of

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<sup>418</sup> Letter from Gabriela Fernández de Castro to María Concepción Loperena, Cartagena 1 Nov. 1812 in Castro Trespalacios, *Culturas aborígenes*, pp. 74 - 75

<sup>419</sup> Letter from Anita Lenoit to María Concepción Loperena, Salamina 3 Nov. 1812 in Castro Trespalacios, *Culturas aborígenes*, pp. 66 - 67

Cartagena to the national congress to be held in Villa de Leyva, where he arrived late in 1812.<sup>421</sup>

The royalists in the province of Santa Marta lost their grip on the province rapidly in the last months of 1812. Governor Acosta had fallen ill in May 1812, and was replaced by José de Castillo, a militia officer who had emigrated from Cartagena after 4 February 1811. In November 1812, Labatut defeated the royalist forces in Sitionuevo and Guaimaro. On 24 December 1812, Bolívar entered Tenerife, proceeded to Mompóx where his forces were strengthened and then entered El Banco, Puerto Real and Tamalameque before going to Chiriguana where he met with María Concepción Loperena.<sup>422</sup> Meanwhile, Labatut was advancing towards the city of Santa Marta. On 1 and 2 January 1813, between 250 and 300 royalist troops, primarily consisting of tributary Indians from the town of San Juan de Ciénaga, armed with bows and arrows, a few guns and a couple of cannons, stood ready to defend the town against the ships and troops from the province of Cartagena.<sup>423</sup> However, when the rebel ships manoeuvred out of reach of the cannons and headed directly for the city of Santa Marta, the royalist officers tried to reach the city by land. When seeing this, most of the Indians refused to continue and went back to their own town, while they confiscated a chest with a thousand pesos, two cannons and killed a priest, a few soldiers and some officers who had been delayed in the reunion with the rest of the troops. Labatut changed direction once again, and returned to Ciénaga to fight the

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<sup>420</sup> Letter from Juan Salador Anselmo Daza to the governor Medina y Galindo, Valledupar 20 Jan. 1813 in Castro Trespacios, *Culturas aborígenes*, pp. 78 - 82

<sup>421</sup> Goenaga, *Apuntamientos*, p. 23

<sup>422</sup> Sourdis, 'Ruptura del estado colonial', p. 172

<sup>423</sup> For a description of the 'battle', see letter from Juan Jimenez to viceroy Benito Pérez, Portobelo 13 Jan 1813 in Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, vol 1, pp. 575 - 577

Indians. Due to the mutiny, the royalists decided not to attempt to defend the town and returned to Santa Marta.

On 6 January 1813, Labatut entered the city of Santa Marta without meeting any armed resistance at all. Most peninsulars had already fled the city in eighteen vessels which were anchored in Santa Marta at the time.<sup>424</sup> More than four hundred individuals went to the port of Portobelo in Panamá. These included some of the families who had emigrated from Cartagena to Santa Marta after 4 February 1811, such as the two *inquisidores* of the tribunal in Cartagena, several ecclesiastics from the provinces of Santa Marta, including the provisor and former member of the Santa Marta Junta Placido Hernández and canónigo Miguel María de Yarza, many officers and officials from Santa Marta, such as Thomas de Acosta, the governor, José de Castillo, José Navarro, Antonio Rebustillo, Pedro Rodríguez, José Victor de Salcedo and some of the peninsular merchants who had resided in Santa Marta, such as Vicente Moré.<sup>425</sup> This royalist flight included entire households, sometimes as many as twenty to thirty individuals, as most of the emigrés took not only their wives and children but also their slaves and *agregados*. The scale of the exodus is difficult to measure exactly: the authorities in Portobelo reported to the viceroy that they had been able to count 451 emigrants from Santa Marta not including several families who had emigrated to other ports such as Cuba, Jamaica and Riohacha.<sup>426</sup>

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<sup>424</sup> Letter from the cabildo of Riohacha to the cabildo of Valledupar, 6 Jan. 1813 in AGI, Santa Fe 746

<sup>425</sup> Relación de los emigrados que han venido de la plaza de Santa Marta por la desgraciada pérdida de aquella provincia, Portobelo 23 Jan. 1813 in Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, vol 1, pp. 570 - 572

<sup>426</sup> Letter from Carlos Meyner to the viceroy of Santa Fe, Portobelo 16 Jan 1813 in Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, vol 1, p. 565

Emigrating was costly and dangerous. Ana Muñoz, a native of Jerez de la Frontera in Spain who had been married to Tomas Garcés y Muños, stated in her will that the emigration from Cartagena to Santa Marta had cost them 2000 pesos.<sup>427</sup> Juana Josefa Ziosi, a native of Santa Marta who was married to Thomas de Aguirre, declared that not only had her husband drowned during the emigration, but they had spent 6000 pesos in 'negociaciones y armamentos'.<sup>428</sup> Vicente Moré, one of the peninsular merchants from Santa Marta who had fled to Portobelo, explained that not only had the flight cost him 1700 pesos, but he had also lost one of his daughters when the ship *Elena* capsized on the way to Portobelo.<sup>429</sup> Emigration was clearly not a soft option, and the fact that such people left Santa Marta indicates that they thought the city had become a decidedly dangerous place.

Those who decided to stay in Santa Marta may have presumed that Labatut would not alienate the inhabitants by harsh punishments. They were wrong. Several of the leading members of the community were imprisoned and sent to Cartagena in chains. Among those deported was Bishop Manuel Redondo.<sup>430</sup> Peninsular merchants and landowners such as Joaquín de Mier and Pablo Oligós were also imprisoned and deported to Cartagena.<sup>431</sup> And many of the wealthiest inhabitants lost property as a consequence of Labatut's seizure of the city. José Nicolás Jimeno, a peninsular who had lived in Santa Marta for several decades and who owned the sugar plantations of Garabulla and Papare

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<sup>427</sup> Testamento de Ana Muñoz, Santa Marta 1 April 1815 in NPSM, Protocolos 1813-1815

<sup>428</sup> Testamento de Juana Josefa Ziosi, Santa Marta 4 March 1814m in NPSM, Protocolos 1813 - 1815

<sup>429</sup> Letter from Vicente Moré, Portobelo 22 Jan 1813 in AGN, Solicitudes 3, folios 30 - 35

<sup>430</sup> Letter from treasurer of the cathedral, José Eulalio Ziosi, Santa Marta 31 Mar. 1813 in AGI, Santa Fe 746

<sup>431</sup> See Testamento de Pablo Oligós, Santa Marta 17 April 1817 in NPSM, Protocolos 1817 and José María de Mier, 'Don Joaquín de Mier y Benitez' in BHA, 62:710 (1975), pp. 507 - 540

near Ciénaga, declared that much of his property was lost with the entry of the insurgents in 1813.<sup>432</sup> Ignacio Egulbide, a less wealthy peninsular Spaniard, had two of his three slaves confiscated.<sup>433</sup> The confiscations and deportations primarily affected the few remaining wealthy peninsulars. However, this attack on the elite did not endear Labatut to the common people: it seems that he managed to alienate most of the population by his disrespect for them and for their cathedral.<sup>434</sup>

The only group which seems to have colluded with the insurgent government was made up of the aristocratic families of the city. Although little is known about the doings of the noble families before and during Labatut's occupation of the city, there are several indications that the noble families co-operated with the rebel leader. Few, if any, of them emigrated. They did not report loss of property as a consequence of the invasion, and they were all treated as potential or suspected rebels when the royalist government was re-established. Furthermore, the actions of their relatives in Valledupar and Cartagena indicate that they had indeed participated in a plot. Less than a month after the fall of Santa Marta, María Concepción Loperena read the declaration of independence in Valledupar in front of the cabildo and the majority of the inhabitants.<sup>435</sup> The declaration of independence was signed by the members of the cabildo of Valledupar, most of whom were relatives of Loperena and the nobles of Santa

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<sup>432</sup> Testamento de Juan Nicolas de Jimeno, Santa Marta 13 Jan 1820 in NPSM, Protocolos 1819 - 1820

<sup>433</sup> Testamento de Ignacio Egulbide, Santa Marta 16 March 1815 in NPSM, Protocolos 1813 - 1815

<sup>434</sup> See Ernesto Restrepo Tirado, *Historia de la Provincia de Santa Marta*, vol 2, pp. 357 - 359

<sup>435</sup> Castro Trespalacios, *Culturas aborígenes*, pp. 83 - 86



Marta.<sup>436</sup> The city of Ocaña had also fallen to the insurgents about the same time as Santa Marta and Valledupar. In December 1812, when Bolívar and his men arrived at Puerto Real on the way between Ocaña and the Magdalena river, the royal officials and most members of the cabildo fled to their haciendas or to the neighbouring Indian tributary towns. When the royal authorities had left, the patriots decided to form a Junta patriótica, which was led by José Quintana and Juan Barriga Sánchez. Bolívar entered Ocaña in early February without any armed resistance.<sup>437</sup> By coincidence, another member of the Fernández de Castro family was present in Ocaña at the time, from where he wrote a letter to the militia colonel José Francisco Munive y Mozo in Santa Marta, thanking him for all his help, congratulating him on the happy turn of events and giving his regards to several members of the *saMaría* nobility.<sup>438</sup>

Although the patriot insurgents had succeeded in taking all the three major cities of the province of Santa Marta during the two first months of 1813, significant points of resistance remained. While the local nobility of the province of Santa Marta either quietly accepted the new republican government or actively participated in it, many of the smaller towns and especially the tributary towns remained hostile to the new governors. In the Cesar valley, several of the smaller towns such as San Juan del Cesar, Barrancas and Fonseca denounced the actions taken by the cabildo of Valledupar and pledged loyalty to the authorities of

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<sup>436</sup> The Valledupar cabildo was composed of Antonio Fernández de Castro (son of Loperena), José Vicene Ustáriz (probably an uncle or cousin of Loperena whose second surname was Ustáriz), José Vicente Maestre and Rafael Díaz Granados (Loperena's son-in-law).

<sup>437</sup> Justiniano J. Páez: *Noticias históricas de la ciudad y provincia de Ocaña desde 1810 hasta la guerra de tres años* (Cucuta, Imprenta del departamento, 1924), pp. 9 - 10

<sup>438</sup> Letter from Cecilio de Castro to José Munive, Ocaña 28 Jan. 1813 in 'Prolegomenos de la campaña admirable' in *Revista de la Sociedad Bolivariana de Venezuela* 22:74 (1963), pp. 157 - 159

neighbouring Riohacha which was still royalist.<sup>439</sup> And the tributary towns outside Santa Marta, Ocaña and Valledupar became a refuge for some of the royal officials and peninsulars who had not managed to emigrate elsewhere. This popular resistance can be seen from different perspectives. In terms of the territorial hierarchy, it can be seen as an attempt by the subordinate towns and villages to resist the domination of the head cities of the province. It can also be seen as a popular reaction against the aristocratic pretensions of the prominent local families. Finally, it may also be seen as a defence of the integrity and historical identity of the tributary towns, of their 'Indianness', in the face of a political movement which claimed that the new society should have no room for privileges and special jurisdictions for corporate groups such as the tributary Indians. Probably the popular royalist resistance drew on all these elements, as well as the widespread anger caused by Labatut's behaviour.

The reaction against Labatut was not long in coming, and he was able to hold the city of Santa Marta for only two months. On 5 March 1813, the Indians of the town of Mamatoco under the leadership of their cacique Antonio Nuñez and with the assistance of some Indians from the town of Bonda entered the city and forced Labatut and his men to leave.<sup>440</sup> Labatut apparently thought that it was Colonel Munive who had organised the reconquest of the city. When Labatut retreated, he took Munive with him and had him imprisoned in Cartagena.<sup>441</sup> Munive, who was later to be imprisoned by the royal authorities of Santa Marta

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<sup>439</sup> Letter from the inhabitants of San Juan del César to the governor of Riohacha, 13 Mar 1813 in AGI, Santa Fe 746. See also Castro Trespacios, *Culturas aborígenes*, pp. 88 - 93

<sup>440</sup> See description of the decoration of Nuñez in the introduction of this dissertation. See also, copy of letter from Francisco Antonio Linero to cabildo of Riohacha, Santa Marta 5 Mar 1813 in AM, leg. 50, exp. 550 and letter from the cacique of Mamatoco to the governor of Riohacha, Mamatoco 5 Mar 1813 in AGI, Santa Fe 746

for *infidencia*, claimed that he had been the '....principal axis ... of the reconquest of Santa Marta ...for which [he was] taken in a pair of chains to Cartagena where the people threatened [his] life...'.<sup>442</sup> In light of the previous conflict between the Indians of Mamatoco and Munive over the measurement of land between his hacienda and the Indian town, an alliance between them does not seem to have been likely. Perhaps Munive and the other notables of Santa Marta had found Labatut's rule harmful to their cause, or perhaps Munive arranged his own evacuation when he saw that the royalists would retake Santa Marta. Whatever the motivations behind Munive's actions in early 1813, it is evident that it did not take long for the saMarían notables to recover control the politics of the city. Already on 6 March 1813, the day after the reconquest, Rafael de Zuñiga (the lawyer who had been so enthusiastic about the creation of the Junta in 1810), informed governor Galindo in Riohacha that Santa Marta had witnessed the glory with which the French tyrant Labatut had been expelled from the city. Zuñiga had been elected *comandante de armas* and in that capacity he urged any emigrants of Santa Marta to return as soon as possible to defend their city in case Labatut should return.<sup>443</sup>

The tide was beginning to turn against the insurgents in the province of Santa Marta. While Labatut had to flee from Santa Marta, the royalists were getting the upper hand in the Cesar valley. After the declaration of independence in Valledupar on 4 February 1813, most of the towns in the Cesar valley chose to

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<sup>441</sup> Francisco Antonio Linero in his letter to the cabildo of Riohacha of 5 March 1813 stated that Labatut 'left with the few men he had and with colonel Munive, whom he attributed the assault by the Indians of Mamatoco..'. in AM, leg. 50, exp. 550

<sup>442</sup> Letter from José Munive, Santa Marta 12 Aug 1815 in 'Recurso de apelación del Señor coronel de milicias D. José de Munive' in AGN, Solicitudes 4, folios 471v - 472

<sup>443</sup> Letter from Rafael de Zuñiga to the governor of Riohacha, Santa Marta 6 Marh 1813 in AGI, Santa Fe 746

separate themselves from the jurisdiction of Valledupar and adhere to the royalists of Riohacha. The ensuing war in the Cesar valley was on one level a conflict between royalists and republicans, but on another level it was merely an escalation of long struggle between leading families in the area, and it also exemplified the differences between the cities and the subordinate towns. These local disputes continued to fuel conflict in the region and, although the patriot rebels had lost the first round of the war in the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha, local differences would eventually help them gain the upper hand.

## Chapter 8. Pleas of heroism and innocence, 1813 - 1818

After the reconquest of Santa Marta in March 1813 and the restoration of royalist control of the entire province, the province's inhabitants returned more or less to normal. The insurgency had failed, and the crisis seemed to be over. This feeling was undoubtedly strengthened when news reached Santa Marta in 1815 that King Ferdinand VII had returned to Spain. Many of the motives for the revolution now appeared to have withered away. The insurgents could no longer claim that the monarchy was governed by usurpers and pro-French corrupt ministers. With the return of the old order, the inhabitants of Santa Marta sought to come to terms with the new situation. Those who had actively participated in the war against Cartagena applied for honours and distinctions. Those who were suspected of supporting the rebels professed their innocence. During the years 1813 to 1818 a series of letters were written by *samarios* to the Crown, which outlined the patriotic deeds and noble stance adopted by individuals and communities in the face of the insurgent threat in the preceding years.

### Heroic commoners

Perhaps the most telling aspect of these letters and accounts is the social division between those who sought distinctions and honours and those who merely claimed innocence. The tendency is quite clear. Indians and commoners were able to obtain certificates from local authorities attesting to their loyalty, courage and active participation in the war against the Cartagena rebels. Members of the local nobility, on the other hand, sought simply to prove that they had not supported the insurgents.

The tendency of local elites in Santa Marta, Valledupar and Ocaña to more or less secretly support the rebels of Cartagena has been discussed in the previous chapter. Less attention has so far been paid to the more intriguing question of why the commoners and tributary Indians of Santa Marta province generally came to support the royalists. If we compare the case of Santa Marta with that of Cartagena, the question becomes clearer. In Cartagena the commoners of the city chose the 'patriot' side, and according to Múnera the coloured population of Cartagena came to identify independence with equality.<sup>444</sup> In Múnera's view the gradual separation between Cartagena and Spain in 1811 and 1812 was to a large extent the result of the pressure exercised by the commoners against the moderate creole elites. Inflamed by the debates in Cádiz which concluded that coloured Spanish Americans would not be citizens except in unique circumstances, the coloured artisans and workers of Cartagena pressured the local elites into total independence from Spain, when the elites would have preferred a more diplomatic and negotiated solution to the political crisis. If Múnera's description is accurate, one has to ask why the commoners of Santa Marta and Cartagena reacted so differently to the crisis of the Spanish monarchy.

There are several lines of approach towards explaining the difference in public opinion between the two cities. There are two traditional explanations. The first regards popular politics during the wars as little more than the bribery of the rich. This is to say that particular elite leaders managed to attract popular support through gifts, drinks and favours. Some contemporary documents may be taken as evidence for this practice. In Santa Marta, Governor Acosta reported that some of the suspected insurgents, among them Colonel Munive and members of the

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<sup>444</sup> Múnera, *El fracaso*, pp. 173 - 215

Díaz Granados family, corrupted commoners through '...offers, seductions and gifts...'.<sup>445</sup> In Cartagena, some of those who opposed independence accused Gabriel Piñeres of having corrupted the masses with money and rum.<sup>446</sup> One could widen this argument, and claim that although political opponents labelled this practice as bribery, it should be seen as the manifestation of patron-client relationships. One could argue that the influence and significance of the elite families lay in their ability to mobilise popular segments of society in support of their own political projects. There are of course several examples of commoners who were drawn into the conflict through the participation of their patrons. Some of the slaves of María Concepción Loperena de Fernández de Castro were freed by their master after the declaration of independence in Valledupar in 1813, and some of them joined the ranks of Bolívar's army, while others continued to work for Loperena, now in the capacity of bodyguards and soldiers.<sup>447</sup> But even though there are examples of commoners following the political paths taken by their patrons, this was not necessarily the general tendency : as we shall see later, the elites did not manage to control and manipulate popular opinion in Santa Marta any more than they did in Cartagena.

Another traditional explanation is implicit in much of what has been written on independence on the Colombian coast, and has strong racist connotations. While the commoners of Cartagena are generally referred to as 'negros y mulatos', those of Santa Marta are depicted as 'indios y zambos'. While the texts present this difference in the socio-racial make-up of the two cities as a

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<sup>445</sup> Letter from Thomas de Acosta to the viceroy, 23 July 1811 in Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, vol 1, pp. 338 - 339

<sup>446</sup> Múnera, *El fracaso*, p. 196

<sup>447</sup> See will of María Concepción Loperena de Fernández de Castro in Castro Trespalacios, *Culturas aborígenes*, pp. 223 - 227

biological or ethnic fact, this view is based on traditional prejudices on the political and social positions of Blacks and Indians: Blacks supposedly favour equality while Indians are backward traditionalists who fight for the maintenance of historical privileges and 'natural rights'. This explanation is seldom spelled out and made explicit. Nevertheless, it is a tendency which continues to obstruct a thorough understanding of the popular politics of the Colombian coast.<sup>448</sup> There are several problems with this concept, some obvious, others more subtle. First of all, little or no historical evidence can be found to support the view that the socio-racial make up of the two cities was substantially different. More importantly, in terms of the political developments during the independence period, socio-racial composition may have borne little relation to political attitude and practice. It was not the phenotype of the commoners but rather their political outlook and their relationships with the local elites that mattered, whether in Santa Marta or Cartagena. Nevertheless, it is clear from the preceding chapter that the tributary communities in the province of Santa Marta generally opposed republicanism and tended to support the royalists against the local nobles. Unfortunately, Múnera does not try to explain *why* the commoners of Cartagena wanted independence. He argues that they identified independence with social equality, and he assumes that equality was something commoners (and particularly those of part-African descent) wanted. However, although examples undoubtedly exist where free coloureds supported the political aspirations of liberal radicals during the wars of independence and afterwards, developments in Santa Marta suggest that this was not always the case.

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<sup>448</sup> In addition to Múnera's version, see for instance Aline Helg, 'The limits of equality: free people of colour and slaves during the first independence of Cartagena, Colombia, 1810-15' in *Slavery and Abolition*, 20:2 (Aug. 1999), p. 1-30. Adelaida Sourdis, 'Ruptura del estado colonial', p. 159 is more careful, and notes how the Indians of Malombo in the province of Cartagena reacted differently from those of the tributary towns of the Santa Marta province.



Consider for instance the case of Narciso Vicente Crespo, one of the most renowned royalist supporters in Santa Marta. He himself acknowledged that some of his ancestors were 'originarios de Africa', and he was clearly not a member of the samarian elites. Crespo was born in Santa Marta in 1779 to Thomas Crespo (a native of Campeche de Yucatán) and María Carmen Robles (of Santa Marta). Although his baptism was recorded in the book for 'españoles', his parents' marriage had been recorded in the book for commoners.<sup>449</sup> Narciso Vicente Crespo could not pretend to be of the higher social levels of Santa Marta, but nor did he belong to the poorest segments of samarian society. Before the wars he had worked as a scribe for the treasury in Santa Marta and he owned a house in the city. When the additional militia companies were created in Santa Marta in 1810 to neutralise the ones under the command of Colonel Munive, Crespo was named captain of the sixth company. He served as commander of this company first in the defence of the city of Santa Marta and subsequently in the defence of the towns along the Magdalena river in 1811 and 1812.<sup>450</sup> When Labatut took Santa Marta, Crespo fled to Maracaibo and Riohacha where he gathered soldiers to reconquer his home city.<sup>451</sup> When the Indians of Mamatoco and Bonda forced Labatut to flee, Crespo and his men went to San Juan de Ciénaga where they defeated the rebel forces during several battles which took place in May 1813.

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<sup>449</sup> Copy of the baptism of Narcisco Vicente Crespo, 30 Oct 1775 in AGI, Santa Fe 746; the marriage of his parents is found in LPMN, 7 Dec 1774. Montalvo in his letter to the Secretario de estado, Santa Marta 20 Sept. 1813 repeated that some of Crespo's ancestors had been 'originarios de Africa' in AGI, Santa Fe 746

<sup>450</sup> See copy of letter from governor Thomas de Acosta, Santa Marta 12 Jan 1812 and copy of letter from the alcalde pedáneo of San Antonio de Buenavista, Félix Meléndez, San Antonio 5 Jan 1812 in AGI, Santa Fe 746

<sup>451</sup> See passport given to Crespo by the governor of Maracaibo, Fernando Millanes, Maracaibo, 23 Feb 1813 in AGI, Santa Fe 746

Under the liberal constitution of 1812, the concept of citizenship had been introduced, but only those who were Spanish and not 'tainted by African blood' were automatically granted citizenship. Those of part African descent could only be given citizenship after having documented their merit and services to the monarchy. In his application for citizenship, Crespo wrote a detailed account of the battles in Ciénaga, clearly aimed at showing the courage and intelligence with which he had defended the Crown against the powerful forces of the rebels. Crespo had in his own words, '... deprived Cartagena of its most fanatical and glowing heroes addicted to its detestable system, and had shown in the most humiliating manner what the arms of Santa Marta are capable of when they are directed by the wise dispositions of an enlightened Chief...' <sup>452</sup> Crespo's application for citizenship reveal that he hoped to be included in the group of respectable men on whom the Crown could count. Although he clearly saw his partly African origins as an obstacle to achieving his aim, it did not discourage him from writing the application. He evidently thought that it was possible for Spanish Americans of different racial or ethnic origins to enhance their position within the social hierarchy, and he did not favour independence.

It may be objected that Crespo was an untypical case because, as a commoner who belonged to the upper levels of common samarian society, he had more than most to gain from supporting the royalists. Nevertheless, his case demonstrates that the coloured inhabitants of Spanish America did not necessarily find independence more attractive than adherence to the Spanish monarchy. What needs to be explained, then, is why in certain places the commoners chose to support the insurgents, while in others they chose to support the royalists. In

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<sup>452</sup> See copy of letter from Crespo to the governor of Santa Marta, Ciénaga 13 May 1813 in

order to understand why the popular classes of certain places supported the royalist cause while others chose the opposite side, one has to look closely at grievances, alliances and networks in particular places.<sup>453</sup>

This approach seems to work well for the Colombian Caribbean. In the city of Santa Marta, we have seen that there were particular tensions between the local nobility and the surrounding tributary towns. These conflicts went a long way back, and assumed with a new intensity during the wars of independence. Likewise, we saw that in Valledupar the royalist cause was threatened by the unpopularity of the Marquis of Valdehoyos, a close friend of the viceroy and the fiscal of the Audiencia in Santa Fe. When the royalists succeeded in retaking the city of Valledupar in late February 1813 and restoring their control over the Cesar valley, a central figure was Buenaventura de la Sierra, the son of the Agustín de la Sierra who had 'pacified' the Chimilas in late eighteenth century and who had established close networks and alliances with the smaller towns and villages in the valley. In Ocaña, the proximity with the revolutionary centres of the northern parts of the Eastern Cordillera, and the close connections between the elites of Ocaña and towns such as Socorro, Cúcuta and Pamplona made the prominent *vecinos* there more likely to support the rebels. In a more general vein, one might say the political crisis of the Spanish monarchy affected all parts of Spanish America, but that the precise configuration of conflict in each place depended on local circumstances. Whether the population happened to be Blacks, Indians, whites or mestizos is less important when explaining political affiliation than the

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AGI; Santa Fe 746

<sup>453</sup> Peter F. Guardino, *Peasants, Politics and the Formation of Mexico's National State: Guerrero 1800 - 1857* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1996) Guardino shows that one of the most salient features of popular decisions in Guerrero depended on the *relationship* between the population, local elite and royal officials in each place.

nature of the political conflicts and tensions in each locality prior to the outbreak of the political crisis in 1809.

Unfortunately, the pleas of heroism and indifference presented by samarios after 1813 usually refer only indirectly to local political conflicts. The writers were generally much more concerned to present themselves as actors in a great moral drama between the righteous and the traitors, between royalists and insurgents. The emphasis is on the moral and honorific qualities of the actors, and the degraded nature of those who opposed the 'just cause' of the King. This is not to say that pre-1810 local conflicts did not shape post-1810 political allegiances, but that the petitioners simply chose to play down the part played by minor local conflicts when explaining their loyalty to the Crown. Local conflicts were, rather, transformed to a higher political and moral level, and represented in a language of fidelity and treason, so that petitioners could achieve their particular goals under the cover of loyalty to the royalist cause.

Applications for citizenship under the Constitution of Cádiz are good examples of the way in which individuals sought to advance themselves by presenting the war as a moral struggle. Apart from Crespo, another applicant of citizenship was his military colleague Tomás José Pacheco, also among the most renowned supporters of 'la Justa Causa'. Pacheco was born in Santa Marta in 1778, the legitimate son of Manuel Benito José Pacheco (native of Lisboa who had come to Santa Marta in 1766 or 1767) and Josefa María Bernea.<sup>454</sup> In his

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<sup>454</sup> Partida de bautismo de Tomas Jose Pacheco, 3 Jan 1779 in AGI, Santa Fe 746. See also discussion of the situation of his father in a previous chapter. AGI, Santa Fe 1195 'Testimonio de las diligencias practicadas sobre justificar la cristiandad hombría de bien y residencia de Manuel Benito Josef Pacheco y abaluo de los Bienes que este posee'

application, Pacheco sought to present himself as a respected and distinguished *vecino* of Santa Marta. No mention was made of the fact that his baptism was recorded in the book for 'pardos, indios, negros'. On the contrary, he emphasised the high social standing of his wife, María Ana Castañeda, and he had several witnesses testify that he possessed a house and five slaves in the city of Santa Marta. Most importantly, however, he declared that '...my small sacrifices in defence of the sacred rights of the national cause have been nothing else than the indelible obligation of loyalty to which I have been born as an individual of a generous Spain, so that in my conduct I see only the fulfilment of my duties ...'<sup>455</sup> This modesty on his own behalf was complemented by the declarations of several witnesses who testified that Pacheco's services were 'outstanding and notorious' and that he had fought courageously against the rebels of Cartagena for nearly two years in various points along the Magdalena river.<sup>456</sup> Neither Pacheco nor the witnesses made any mention about internal conflicts in the province. The rebels were identified as foreigners (from Cartagena) who had failed their obligation to protect King and fatherland. The language of filial obedience and the territorialisation of loyalty permeated the text. The insurgency was identified with the neighbouring province of Cartagena: its inhabitants had failed to uphold the rights of the monarchy, while only the province of Santa Marta remained committed to its obligation to protect the just cause against the insurgents.

Those who had fought for the royalist cause obviously felt they had gained the right to distinctions and favours. The royalist commoners had earned 'moral

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and AGI, Indiferente General 1536. 'Carta de naturaleza a Benito Josef Pacheco, natural de Portugal y vecino de Santa Marta' 29 June 1786

<sup>455</sup> Copy of letter from Tomas José Pacheco to the cabildo of Santa Marta, San Juan de la Ciénaga 5 May 1813 in AGI, Santa Fe 746

credit' during the war, and after 1813 they employed this to improve their own positions and to settle old scores. The Indians of the town of San Juan de Ciénaga described in a lengthy letter to the Crown the courage they had shown when fighting the hated rebels of Cartagena.<sup>457</sup> The letter was directed to 'Father of pueblos' and 'our sovereign and father', and it specified the sacrifices and services of the town during the war with the rebels of Cartagena. The rebel leaders were described as tyrants, and Bolívar was referred to as 'el cruel sanguinario'. Against these rebels the Indians of Ciénaga had managed to maintain their 'liberty' by fighting courageously under the orders of Crespo and Pacheco. As a compensation for their sacrifices and services, the Indians applied for exclusive fishing rights in the Ciénaga Grande, the right to certain lands south of the Ciénaga and the privilege to create an 'erario' for the communal expenses of the town. The conflict over the fishing rights and the lands bordering on the *ejidos* of San Juan Ciénaga was old, and the Indians knew that what they asked for would injure the interests of others. But this time the Indians did not bother to claim lands formally owned by families resident in Santa Marta. Instead they claimed lands to the south of the Ciénaga, the former property of the Count of Pestagua and now owned by a wealthy merchant of Cartagena. The exclusive fishing rights they demanded would be harmful to the inhabitants of the towns of the western shores of the Magdalena river who also fished in the Ciénaga. But as these local people and the owner of Pestagua were residents of the rebellious province of Cartagena, the Indians evidently calculated that, in current political circumstances, the government would take their side. They proposed that fishermen from other

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<sup>456</sup> See declarations by José de León Godoy, José Antonio del Castillo and José Antonio Bermudez in AGI, Santa Fe 746

<sup>457</sup> 'El Cabildo del Pueblo de San Juan de Ciénaga, Provincica de Santa Marta, solicita la merced de tierras y pesquerías que expresan como lo disfrutaban sus antecesores' in AGN, Solicitudes 6, folios 619 - 656

towns could only fish in the Ciénaga if they paid a contribution to the new 'erario' of the town. The letter caused controversy, especially in Cartagena, where several vecinos rallied against the claims of the Indians. Although the Indians did not succeed in their claim, their actions illustrate some points about the nature of the conflicts during the war of independence. Again there was clearly a conflict on two levels between the Indians of Ciénaga and the landowners of Cartagena. The conflict over land which had been going on for decades (if not longer) was a basis for the more general struggle between royalists and republicans. Although it is doubtful whether the Indians of Ciénaga chose to support the royalists solely *because* of their previous conflicts with elite landowners, they clearly used their support for the Crown in order to win their long-standing struggle over local resources.

Ciénaga was not the only town in the province of Santa Marta which applied for special consideration after 1813 in the light of the inhabitants' loyalty and services to the Crown. The cabildo of Santa Marta wrote a report of the war where it described the material losses inflicted on the city of Santa Marta, the courage and loyalty of the inhabitants, the cruelty of Labatut and his men, and as compensation for the sacrifices and services made on behalf of the crown, the cabildo asked that the fortifications of the city be strengthened, the sales tax on trade with the foreign colonies in the Caribbean be reduced, and that a number of families from the Canary Islands be sent to populate the countryside.<sup>458</sup> The city of Riohacha had already in 1813 been granted the privilege of being titled 'Muy Noble e Ilustre Ciudad' in gratitude for its loyal stance during the war. In a letter to the Crown in 1813, the cabildo of Riohacha described the heroism and loyalty

which the inhabitants of the city and surrounding Indian towns had shown in the face of the insurrection.<sup>459</sup> Riohacha had not only been the sole city of the Colombian Caribbean which had held the rebels at bay, but it had also protected several of the towns of the Cesar valley when Valledupar declared independence, and had subsequently participated in the reconquest of both Valledupar and Santa Marta. The cabildo accordingly asked for arms and munitions order to defend themselves should the rebels try to take Riohacha again.

In most of the pleas of heroism written by individuals and communities in Santa Marta province after the reconquest in 1813, there is a marked tendency to cover-up internal differences of opinion. The enemies of the 'King's just cause' are depicted as foreigners and intruders from Cartagena and elsewhere who had proceeded against the general popular will. The inhabitants of Santa Marta province, on the other hand, are presented as loyal subjects willing to sacrifice their lives and property to defend the sacred cause.

That Santa Marta was essentially royalist and Cartagena republican was, in fact, a simplification. Various individuals in Santa Marta had supported the rebels publicly and many more were suspected of doing so privately. Suspicion fell primarily on the local notables. Upon the reconquest of Santa Marta in March 1813, hundreds of individuals had been imprisoned without trial or legal hearings. According to the captain-general of New Granada Francisco de Montalvo, a 'multitude' of individuals were in prison when he arrived in Santa Marta in June 1813, either because of their suspicious conduct before and after Labatut's entry,

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<sup>458</sup> Letter from the cabildo of Santa Marta to the Crown, Santa Marta 5 Dec. 1816 in AGI, Santa Fe 1183

<sup>459</sup> Letter from cabildo of Riohacha to the Crown, Riohacha 6 May 1813 in AGI, Santa Fe 1183



or because of their behaviour during the two months the rebels held the city. Those who took charge of the city immediately after the reconquest in March 1813 were so alarmed by popular hatred of those suspected of betraying the royalist cause, that they had not dared to release the prisoners from jail. When the new governor Pedro Ruiz de Porras arrived in May 1813, he found that there was only one lawyer in the city. The lawyer happened to be Esteban Díaz Granados who was related to many of socially prominent prisoners. Considering the popular hatred against these individuals, Ruiz de Porras concluded that it was safest to leave them in jail until another lawyer could conduct the investigations. Montalvo agreed with the governor on this matter. Although he thought that Esteban Díaz Granados was of good judgement and a respected member of the community, his family relations and friendships with many of those in prison precluded him from conducting the legal processes against them. Furthermore, Montalvo said that the 'pueblo' believes ...rightly or wrongly that [the prisoners] are addicted to independence, and it is irritated by the mere suggestion that some of them should be freed...<sup>460</sup>

Montalvo's letter illustrates several points. The first – which corresponds with the pleas of heroism discussed above – is that the commoners of Santa Marta generally opposed independence. Secondly, Montalvo described a basic division between the commoners and the nobles with respect to the war. He suggested that while the notables had been careful not to proclaim their political pretensions and royal officials who came from other parts of the Spanish empire were not sure of their position, the commoners were convinced that the notables supported independence. A third, and perhaps most significant point in Montalvo's

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<sup>460</sup> Letter from Francisco de Montalvo to Secretario de Estado, Santa Marta 22 Aug. 1813 in

correspondence, is that the political position of the commoners had become a central issue for the officials. During the years of restored Spanish rule between 1813 and 1818, the commoners of the city of Santa Marta and the tribute-paying Indians of the surrounding towns had achieved a much more direct say in the government of the province than they had had previously. This was a quite understandable development, given that it was the commoners who had managed to keep Santa Marta royalist when both the local elites and the royal officials had opted for easier solutions. Commoners had proved that the future of the monarchical order in Santa Marta depended on their support, and their political influence manifested itself in various ways. We have already seen how the commoners of the city arrested several of the most prominent *vecinos* of the city of Santa Marta following the recapture of the city in March 1813. Both the governor and the captain-general felt that it was risky to free any of these suspects due to the general hatred against the prisoners. Montalvo, on another occasion, reported that the Indians of the surrounding towns of Santa Marta had been given arms by Ruiz de Porras and had used them to confiscate goods and property from the *haciendas* of presumed supporters of the insurgency, whom the Indians called 'Jacobins'.<sup>461</sup> An even more astonishing example of popular interference in the royal government occurred when the commoners of Santa Marta and the Indians of the surrounding towns refused to accept the newly appointed governor of Santa Marta in 1814. The native authorities of Masinga, Bonda, Mamatoco, Gaira and San Juan de Ciénaga expressed their concern about the arrival of a new governor, in a letter to the captain-general. They preferred the interim governor Pedro Ruiz de Porras because they trusted his judgement. Neither Porras nor

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AGI, Santa Fe 746

<sup>461</sup> Rebecca A. Earle, *Spain and the Independence of Colombia 1810 - 1825* (Exeter, University of Exeter Press, 2000)

Montalvo were keen on this form of popular intervention, but explained in several letters to the Regency council in Spain that they did not see any alternative than to accede to the commoners' request.<sup>462</sup>

### Elite innocence

When, after 1813, the commoners had gained a political role which they had not previously enjoyed, the position of the local noble families was correspondingly weakened. Deemed suspicious by commoners and officials, their domination over the cabildo of Santa Marta was ended. In the decades before 1810, members of the Díaz Granados family and their relatives and 'clients' had controlled the cabildo; but after 1813, this situation changed. Although local notables such as Rafael de Zuñiga and José Díaz Granados were allowed to sit on the cabildos between 1813 and 1817, most of the *alcaldes* and *regidores* were peninsular merchants and officials such as Joaquín de Mier y Benítez, Manuel Conde, Simón Guerrero, José Alvaro de Ujueta and Miguel de Bustillo y Colinas.<sup>463</sup>

The elite families of Santa Marta were treated with caution by the royal authorities after the restoration of the monarchical order, and the punishments for those found guilty were rather lenient. Of the notables, Colonel Munive was among those who had been suspected of supporting the rebels ever since the creation of the Junta in 1810. Munive, who in his letters and statements to the royal authorities always claimed that he supported the royalists, was taken to Cartagena by Labatut when he retreated in March 1813. Labatut thought Munive had helped the royalist recovery of Santa Marta, and Munive was thus arrested

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<sup>462</sup> 'Pedro Ruiz de Porras solicita la estabilidad en el gobierno de Santa Marta' in AGN, Solicitudes 3, folios 89 - 96

and kept in prison in Cartagena from 1813 to 1816. However, when Cartagena finally succumbed to the royalists in 1816, Munive was then arrested by the royalists, suspected of having supported the rebels. Munive argued that he was not guilty of 'infidencia' and that, on the contrary, he had never wanted to change the political system and had always supported the King's cause.<sup>464</sup> Most importantly, he argued that the accusation against him was a falsification made by his personal enemies and the 'indios y zambos', people devoid of any honour. It was, he insisted, a disgrace that royal justice had trusted the testimonies of such lowly individuals against him and against the honourable and respectable witnesses he had called to support his case. As his plea indicates, the influence now exercised by the commoners on the government of the city must have been a most unwelcome development for local notables.

Perhaps the most immediate concern of the prominent vecinos was to avoid severe punishments, and in this they seem to have been successful. Francisco Pérez Dávila, the member of the 1811 Junta, and second-in-command of the Santa Marta militias after Colonel Munive, had been responsible for the decision to evacuate Santa Marta instead of defending the city before Labatut's entry. For this he served a prison sentence for six months and loss of his salary for three years.<sup>465</sup> Pascual Díaz Granados of Valledupar (son of Colonel Pascual Díaz Granados mentioned in chapter 2), was singled out as one of the main insurgents in the Cesar valley by those who defended the royalist cause there.<sup>466</sup> Nevertheless, his widow, Juana Francisca Pumarejo, managed to get a pension in

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<sup>463</sup> For biographic information on these individuals, see figure 7.

<sup>464</sup> 'Recurso de apelación del Señor Coronel de Milicias D. José de Munive del auto de gobierno de esta plaza' in AGN, Solicitudes 4, folios 464 - 479

<sup>465</sup> AGN, Solicitudes 6, folios 724 - 737 and Solicitudes 8, folios 664 - 670

1818 after his death as he had been a lieutenant in one of the militia companies in Santa Marta.<sup>467</sup> Nicolas Díaz Granados, originally from Valledupar and married to María Francisca Paniza from the same city, happened to be in Cartagena when independence was declared. After his death and after the first republic had fallen in 1816, Paniza sought to restore the honour of her deceased husband, who had been an officer in the militias of Cartagena. When independence was declared, Nicolas remained in Cartagena and continued to serve in the militia. In the eyes of the royalist officials, Nicolas Díaz Granados was therefore a traitor and, even though he had served in the insurgent government for only four months before he died, they stated that his widow had no right to a pension. Paniza, however, had several witnesses declare that Nicolas had wanted to return to Santa Marta, that he had secretly and privately expressed his opinions against the insurgents, but that he had been unable to leave Cartagena because of failing eye-sight and the situation of his wife and four small children. In the end, the authorities accepted the widow's plea.<sup>468</sup> In Paniza's letter, her husband is depicted as an individual caught in unfortunate circumstances. Essentially a loyal subject of the king, he had been unable to withdraw from a disloyal city because of bad health and consideration for wife and children. No mention is made of all his relatives, the other members of the Díaz Granados family in Cartagena, Santa Marta and Valledupar, who found themselves in similarly suspicious circumstances.

Among the few in Santa Marta who were actually subject to serious judicial investigation for having supported the rebels was the priest of Ocaña,

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<sup>466</sup> See for instance the letter by the ayuntamiento of San Juan del César to the Crown, San Juan del César 23 June 1813 in AGI, Santa Fe 746

<sup>467</sup> AGN, Solicitudes 11, folios 22 - 32

<sup>468</sup> AGN, Solicitudes 8, folios 466 - 496 and folios 643 - 648

Alejo María Buceta.<sup>469</sup> His support for the rebel cause may not have been stronger than those of the local elites, but his insecure position and previous conflicts with several prominent vecinos in Ocaña made him a less dangerous prey for the royal officials. In the beginning of 1816, the bishop of Santa Marta ordered the *vicario juez* of Ocaña to investigate the conduct of Father Buceta, and the investigation shed interesting light on how clergy and laymen reacted during the war. The priest Jorge Quintero Príncipe declared that Buceta was present when Bolívar entered Ocaña in February 1813 and demanded that all the inhabitants of the city declared their loyalty to Cartagena. According to Quintero Príncipe, Buceta had withdrawn to the door of the Church so that he would not have to participate in the oath. Since then, Quintero Príncipe asserted, Father Buceta had viewed the political crisis with a 'certain indifference, always favouring the side which happened to be in power'. The priest Antonio Clavo, however, thought that it was 'de publica voz y fama' that Father Buceta was an insurgent, and declared that he had heard that Buceta had once gone out at night with several other insurgents singing songs in honour of Bolívar and in dishonour of the King. The priest Ramines went even further. Not only had he heard that Buceta was an insurgent and very much addicted to the intrusive government; he also believed that Buceta had written verses in favour of Bolívar and to the disgrace of the monarch. These songs had been sung with solemnity in the streets of Ocaña, and the ceremony had been concluded with refreshments in the house of the intrusive *vicario*, Father Cecilio de Castro. Furthermore, Ramines thought Buceta was entirely negligent of his pastoral duties.

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<sup>469</sup> The following is primarily based on 'Sumaria información sobre la conducta del presbítero Alejo María Buceta' in AHESM, tomo 19, folios 257 - 277. See also Sánchez Rizo, Luis A.: 'Bolívar, Ocaña y el padre Buceta' in *Hacaritama* 29:222 (1964), 41-42.

Perhaps because of the conflict between the three testimonies, a second investigation was carried out, this time by Captain Francisco García, and in its course royalist officials obtained more information which could be used against Buceta. Manuel Antonio Lemus y Trigos, one of the members of the cabildo who had emigrated from Ocaña before the entry of Bolívar 1813, declared that Buceta had refused to pledge loyalty to the Junta of Santa Marta. When the expedition from Santa Fe under the command of Antonio Morales was about to enter Ocaña in late 1812, Buceta published an edict in favour of the American cause. And during mass, Buceta sung 'pro Republica nostra' instead of 'pro regum nostro Ferdinando'. Lemus y Trigos also confirmed that Buceta had sung blasphemous verses against the King accompanied by Cecilio de Castro and Bartolomé Rincón: one of the songs was 'El General Bolívar tiene un caballo para atar a su cola al Rey Fernando'. Josef Trinidad Jacome also declared that Buceta had always been more in favour of independence than the just cause of the King, and that he had also heard him sing 'pro Republica nostra' in mass. The last witness, Antonio Quintero Peynado, explained that Buceta had been a parish priest in Carcajal until expelled for bad conduct; he had then served in various smaller towns around Ocaña, and had been disliked in all of them before he finally arrived in Ocaña. There he had a quarrel with Gabriel Peynado, whom he hit with 'palos', for which he was summoned to Santa Marta and then suspended 'a divinis'.

In this case, we are also beginning to glimpse a history of tensions and conflicts which preceded the war of independence itself. Buceta, apparently a man disliked by many of the notable families of Ocaña, was perhaps - as he himself

claimed - not very enthusiastic about the American cause.<sup>470</sup> But he was a prime target for the local elites, who singled him out as a central and dangerous player in the revolutionary drama. When Buceta went to Santa Marta to confess to the Bishop, he declared that he had always favoured the rights of the King, and that the accusations against him were the work of his personal enemies. He admitted that he had been forced to omit 'pro Regum nostro Ferdinand' during mass, but he assured the bishop that he had always prayed for the King in his heart. He did, however, admit to a lesser charge: that he had not fulfilled his obligation of keeping the parish records in the proper condition. This apparently allowed the bishop to compromise: he absolved Buceta of the charge of infidencia (since most of the testimonies were hearsay), but, he suspended him for three years for his neglect of the parish books.

Was Buceta really an insurgent? The ecclesiastical and military authorities were unsure. Although several witnesses had given incriminating testimonies against the priest, and public opinion held that he had betrayed the cause of the King, the authorities found it difficult to get at the truth. The declarations were certainly unfavourable to Buceta but, as he claimed, they were made by his enemies. Perhaps the witnesses had other and more immediate reasons for disliking Buceta than his supposed support of the American cause? The leading families of Ocaña had themselves not been convincing in their support for the monarchy, and their disapproval of Buceta may have had little to do with his alleged republicanism.

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<sup>470</sup> Consult also 'Manuel Saa y Corral, capitan a guerra, hace varios cargos a Alejo María Buceta, cura de Aguachica'. 1795 in AGN, Curas y obispos 38, folios 698 - 730. Manuel Saa y Corral may have been the son of Vicente Saa y Corral, a peninsular Spaniard married to Rafaela Llaín Sarabia, member of the most prominent of the notable families in Ocaña. (See Amaya, *Los genitores*, p. 157)



These letters, reports and investigations from the reconquest years tell different parts of the same story. It is a story fraught with ambiguities. Although some individuals appear as firm royalists or strong supporters of the 'American cause', in most instances the ideological struggle between royalism and republicanism seem to have been only one element in the various divisions and conflicts in Santa Marta in the independence period. As the case of Father Buceta shows quite clearly, it was not always easy to distinguish insurgents from loyal subjects even for well-informed officials at the time. Buceta's case and particularly the testimony of Jorge Quintero Príncipe, also hints at another phenomenon which unfortunately is difficult to study: indifference. Quintero Príncipe stated that Buceta had merely '...favoured whichever side which happened to be in power...' Perhaps this was, after all, the most rational and common approach to the political crisis. However, historical records seldom reflect the opinions of the indifferent.

## Chapter 9. The Royalist Failure, 1819 - 1823

The second round of the Wars of Independence took place between 1819 and 1823 in the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha, and ended with the defeat of the royalist forces and the inclusion of the provinces into the new Republic of Colombia. In Santa Marta and Riohacha many of the patterns of political and military reaction and participation of the first round of the wars (1810 - 1813) were repeated in the second round. The population in general were either indifferent or favoured the King's cause. The tribute-paying Indian communities were again those which most clearly supported the royalists, and the local elites were again suspected of siding with the rebels.

But the final years of the Independence wars were in some ways very different from the first. From the perspective of the royal officials, the situation was undoubtedly more problematic. The rebels had not only gained some experience in warfare, they had also succeeded in recruiting scores of veterans from the Napoleonic wars in Europe.<sup>471</sup> And in London, José María del Real had obtained loans and gifts to finance weapon and ammunition for the nationalist armies in Venezuela and Colombia. Bolívar, who in 1815 and 1816 lived in exile in Jamaica and Haiti, returned to the Llanos on the border between Colombia and Venezuela where he established a base for the liberation of northern South America at Angostura. In David Bushnell's words, this time Bolívar was able to 'project a more popular image of the patriot cause', by giving bonuses to soldiers,

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<sup>471</sup> For the role of foreign legionaries in the liberation of Colombia, see for instance Luis Cuervo Márquez, *Independencia de las colonias hispano-americanas. Participación de la Gran Bretaña y de los Estados Unidos. Legión británica* (Bogotá, Editorial Selecta, 1938) 2 vols.; Alfred Hasbrouck, *Foreign Legionaries in the Liberation of Spanish South America* (New York, Octagon Books, 1969); Sergio Olano Ortiz, *Franceses en la independencia de la Gran Colombia* (Bogotá, Editorial ABC, 1949)

offering freedom to slaves who joined the army and co-operation with rebel leaders of humble origins.<sup>472</sup> In early 1819 the second attempt of liberating New Granada started with the Bolívar crossing the Llanos, climbing the Eastern Cordillera and defeating a major part of the royalist army stationed in the interior at the battle of Boyacá in August 1819. On 10 August Bolívar entered Santa Fe without resistance. And in December 1819 at Angostura, congress passed a law which stated that the old Captaincy-General of Venezuela and the Viceroyalty of New Granada (including the jurisdictions of the audiencias of Quito and Panamá) constituted one country, and called for a constituent assembly to meet in January 1821 in Cúcuta.<sup>473</sup> Thus, the Republic of Colombia was created while large parts of its territory were still under royalist control.

After the battle of Boyacá and Bolívar's entry into Santa Fe, the rebels controlled the interior of New Granada. But the royalist forces were mostly concentrated on the coast, and between 1819 and 1823, the bulk of the fighting took place in Venezuela and provinces of Santa Marta and Cartagena. In the fall of 1819, four rebel fronts stood ready to invade the coast. General Mariano Montilla, a native of Caracas, commanded a relatively large contingent of soldiers based on the island of Margarita off the coast of Venezuela. Many of his soldiers were foreign legionaries recruited in Europe and on the Caribbean Islands. Among his officers were Luis Brion, a merchant from Curazao, and the Irish veteran d'Evereux. In Haiti, General Gregor MacGregor, another veteran from the Napoleonic wars had a few hundred men, mostly Irish and British, who had been recruited in London. In the interior, José María Córdoba and Hermogenes

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<sup>472</sup> David Bushnell, *The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993), p. 47

Maza were planning to take Mompóx and the lower Magdalena river valley, while Jacinto Lara and José María Carreño were in charge of the troops which were to be used to take Ocaña and proceed to Valledupar (Map 10). These four forces were then supposed to unite somewhere on the coast and organise the liberation of any areas not already controlled by rebel forces.<sup>474</sup>

In the fall of 1819, the royal officials on the coast were thus in a difficult situation. They faced an enemy that was now better equipped, better organised, more experienced and had larger resources than they had during the first phase of the war before 1815. Most of the interior had fallen rather easily into the hands of the rebels, and although the coastal population in general still favoured the King's cause, for every rebel victory the patriot side gained popularity. Perhaps the greatest problem for the royalists was that they did not agree on how the rebellion should be handled. Some, like General Morillo, favoured a military solution to the conflict and harsh punishments against supporters of the rebel cause. Others, including Governor Pedro Ruiz de Porras of Santa Marta, thought that popular royalist support could only be maintained by leniency and diplomacy. These differences over policy were fundamental and divided royalists in many of the towns in the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha, as we shall see in this chapter. Indeed, it may be argued that it was the failure of the royalists to adopt a coherent and unified policy for the restoration of the monarchical order which enabled the patriots to take control of the northern provinces between 1819 and 1823.<sup>475</sup> The object here, however, is not to discuss the reasons for the ultimate failure of the royalists, but more specifically to examine the positions of different

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<sup>473</sup> William Marion Gibson, *The Constitutions of Colombia* (Durham, Duke University Press, 1948), pp. 36 - 37

<sup>474</sup> This paragraph is based on Adelaida Sourdis, 'La ruptura del estado colonial', pp. 182ff

groups in Santa Marta and Riohacha provinces during the final years of the wars of independence. As in the previous rounds of conflict, the war between republicans and royalists became intertwined with purely local issues.

### Riohacha: the people and the governor

The first rebel attack on the coast was MacGregor's occupation of Riohacha in October 1819. Fortunately, this action is very well documented, and the sources reveal interesting aspects of the reactions and positions of many of those involved. It is thus worth taking a closer look at the attack and the reactions it provoked.

In July 1819, 1080 men had arrived in Haiti from London.<sup>476</sup> According to one of them, Robert August O'Daly, they were not really soldiers but colonists who had been misled by MacGregor in Britain. MacGregor had told them

'...that the main object they were to be employed upon, was the Establishment of a Colony in the Bay of Caledonia, on the Isthmus of Darien, which Territory General MacGregor claimed...It was asserted by him that there was formerly a Company established in the Vicinity of the Bay of Caledonia, under the Title of the Scotch Darien Company, whose object was to open Communication between the Atlantic, and the Pacific Oceans. It was further asserted by General MacGregor, that one of his ancestors was the Chief of

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<sup>475</sup> This is convincingly argued by Earle, *Spain and the Independence of Colombia*

<sup>476</sup> The following is based on the declaration made by Robert August O'Daly in Riohacha on 19 Oct. 1819 and a letter in English written by the same man to the governor of Riohacha dated 24 Oct. 1819 both in AGI, Cuba 745

the said Company ; that the said ancestor married the daughter of the then Inca of the said Isthmus; at whose Marriage, the aforesaid Territory was ceded to the Ancestor of MacGregor, by the said Inca; and that upon this Ground he founds his claim to the Title and the Territory of the Inca of the Isthmus of Darien. That the great object at which he aims is the Completion of the Intentions of his Ancestors, by collecting a sufficient Force to possess and maintain himself on the said Isthmus; and in Order to collect this Force, an Edict has been issued by him, as Inca of the Isthmus, authorising his agents in London, North America and Hamburg to propose Terms for the re-establishment of the said Company , which is now under negotiation...<sup>477</sup>

When the colonists arrived in Los Cayos in July 1819, they were soon told by several merchants there that MacGregor had lied and that his true object was to fight the Spanish. Many of the colonists ran away in Haiti, several died, and there were probably only about two hundred men left when they finally re-embarked. They sailed from Los Cayos on 27 September in three vessels, and only

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<sup>477</sup> This rather adventurous tale have some elements of truth. There had certainly been a colony in the Darien operated by the so-called Scottish Darien Company in the late seventeenth century. See 'Testimonio de autos formados por don Diego de los Rios y Quesada, gobernador de Cartagena, sobre el poblamiento que los escoses estaban haciendo en las costas del Darién' in AGI, Santa Fe 215; Frank Cundall, *The Darien Venture* (New York, Printed by the order of the trustees, 1926); George Pratt Insh, *The Darien Scheme* (London, Staples Press, 1947) and John Prebble, *The Darien Disaster* (Edinburgh, Secker & Warburg, 1968). There were also rumours in 1718 of another foreign settlement in the Darien, see Synnøve Ones, 'The Politics of Government in the Audiencia of New Granada, 1681 - 1719' (Ph.D. diss., University of Warwick, 2000), p. 58. It is not entirely impossible that one of MacGregor's forefathers had participated in the Scottish Darien Company, but it seems more unlikely that he was descendant of an Inca of Panama. He was in any case obsessed with establishing his own colony (and state) in Central America. In 1820 he created the Republic of Poyais on the Mosquito coast, and again fooled hundreds of colonists from the British Isles to go there. Most of them died. See Alfred Hasbrouck, 'Gregor McGregor and the Colonization of Poyais, between 1820 and 1824' in HAHR 2:4 (November, 1927), pp. 438 – 459; Frank Griffith

MacGregor knew where they were going. O'Daly thought they were going to the island of San Andrés, off the coast of Nicaragua. When MacGregor informed him that they were going to Riohacha, he also showed him a letter from a merchant based in Jamaica, Ignacio Cabero, which stated that the population of Riohacha were waiting to be liberated and that the foreigners would be welcome there. When they arrived in Riohacha on 5 October, they were surprised to find that the inhabitants did not greet their arrival. According to O'Daly, MacGregor hesitated over whether they should proceed or return, but decided on taking the city by force if necessary.

The manner in which MacGregor's soldiers had been recruited probably did little to boost motivation, and they succeeded in taking the city of Riohacha, thanks largely to the reaction of the inhabitants, most of whom, including Governor José de Solís, fled to neighbouring towns or ranches. Despite this flight, MacGregor and his men were able to hold the city for only a week. On 11 October 1819, a force consisting mainly of Guajiro Indians led by militia captains Clemente Iguarán and Miguel Gómez, helped by a handful of Riohacha residents, drove away some of the invaders (including MacGregor), killed a few of them and took the remainder as prisoners.<sup>478</sup> In a letter written after the royalist reconquest of the city, Governor Solís claimed that it was the systematic sacking of abandoned houses which made the inhabitants oust the invaders.<sup>479</sup>

Following the reconquest of Riohacha, Governor Solís embarked on a ruthless and highly unpopular campaign of punishing both the foreign prisoners

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Dawson, *The First Latin American Debt Crisis. The City of London and the 1822 – 25 Loan Bubble* (Yale, Yale University Press, 1990)

<sup>478</sup> Letter from José de Solís to the viceroy, 13 Oct. 1819 in AGI, Cuba 745

and any inhabitants he suspected of supporting the rebels. The governor had little trust in the inhabitants of Riohacha. Even those who had actually fought MacGregor and retaken the city (while Solís himself was still in the town of Moreno waiting for reinforcements from Valledupar), were described by the governor as '...barbarian and immoral people without religion who support whoever gives them the most...'.<sup>480</sup> He was convinced that MacGregor had been invited by someone in the city, and questioned the foreign officers who had been taken prisoner specifically about their relations with the locals.<sup>481</sup> When they were unable (or unwilling) to provide the kind of information the governor sought, he stated that their presence was dangerous because they could corrupt the minds of the inhabitants. Solís was especially weary of Alexandro Antonio Sánchez Lima, a native of Portugal recruited by MacGregor in London. According to Solís, '...in every popular concurrence or revolt, there is always a tumultuous head, who through courage or spirits dominates everyone...'.<sup>482</sup> In this expedition, the role was played by Sánchez Lima, who by speaking Spanish, and with intrigues and lies, managed to befriend some of the inhabitants of Riohacha while he was imprisoned. Solís therefore decided to execute him, and he called upon Francisco Paula de Uribe, the highest ranking militia officer in Riohacha, to carry out the order the following day at eleven in morning. Uribe was shocked and told the governor that he found the punishment repugnant. He somewhat mysteriously added that perhaps the people would find some way to have the execution suspended. Solís found this attitude very suspicious '...in a military man whose

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<sup>479</sup> Letter from José de Solís, Riohacha 14 Oct. 1819 in AGI, Cuba 745

<sup>480</sup> 'gente barbara, immoral , y sin religión que se inclinan a quien mas les da' in letter from José de Solís to the viceroy, 30 Oct. 1819 in AGI, Cuba 745

<sup>481</sup> See letter from Solís 14 Oct 1819 and declarations by Alexandro Antonio Sánchez Lima, Tornfield Bevilge and Robert August O'Daly, all in AGI, Cuba 745.

<sup>482</sup> 'En todas las concurrencias populares, sublevaciones y expediciones, se manifiesta siempre una cabeza tumultuaria que o bien por su intrepidez o arrojo , o por su espíritu de partido



only compass should be blind obedience...'. He therefore instructed Mateo Llorens, Jacinto Amaya and a few other trustworthy Spaniards to execute Sánchez Lima and the other prisoners between one and three o'clock in the morning while the city was asleep. All the 64 prisoners who were still in the city were executed that night. Another 48 were transported to Valledupar and shot there on 8 November.<sup>483</sup>

Militia officer Francisco Paula de Uribe was not the only one who was shocked by the governor's treatment of the foreign prisoners and the local population. Several other vecinos disagreed with the way the governor handled the situation. In a letter to the governor of Santa Marta, three vecinos of Riohacha, Silvestre Cotes, Antonio Amaya and Luis de Zuñiga, complained that Governor Solís had become uncertain about his own position after MacGregor's assault on the city.<sup>484</sup> They asserted that some inhabitants had wanted to depose the governor because of the cowardice he had shown during MacGregor's invasion, but that the entire city now agreed to accept Solís as he had returned from Moreno to Riohacha. According to the three vecinos, the brutal ways of Solís were unfortunate, because they alienated the inhabitants from the royalist cause. The governor had '...proceeded most iniquitously, making lawsuits, confiscating property, imprisoning and afflicting the inhabitants, and doing all kinds of arbitrariness including expatriating some of the very defenders of the Crown...'<sup>485</sup> Cotes, Amaya and Zuñiga found the situation in Riohacha under

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domina a todos y es el eje y movimiento de todos los sucesos y ocurrencias' in letter from José de Solís to viceroy Sámano, 6 Nov. 1819 in AGI, Cuba 745

<sup>483</sup> Letter from José Solís to viceroy Sámano, 20 Nov. 1819 in AGI, Cuba 745

<sup>484</sup> See copy of letter from Amaya, Cotes and Zuñiga, 13 March 1820 in AGI, Cuba 745

<sup>485</sup> 'ha procedido con la mayor iniquidad, sumariando, embargando, aprisionando, afligiendo con todo genero de arbitrariedad hasta expatriar con horrorosas prisiones a los mismos defensores del soberano' in letter from Amaya, Cotes and Zuñiga to the governor of Santa Marta, in AGI, Cuba 745

Solís so difficult that they moved to Santa Marta where they sought the protection of Governor Ruiz de Porras in case Solís should move against them. They also claimed that many other vecinos of Riohacha had been forced to emigrate to 'more quiet and pacific places' in order to evade the governor of Riohacha.

Solís accused several of the inhabitants of Riohacha of co-operation with the enemy, and transported them to Cartagena for trial (in the military tribunal in case of the militia soldiers and before the Audiencia for the civilians). The suspects represented all social layers of the city, which suggests that Solís felt he could trust neither nobles nor commoners. They included for instance 76 year-old carpenter Andrés Padilla (father of the famous José Padilla, admiral of the liberation navy), merchant and notable José Aniceto Rodríguez, Italian sailor Rosario Armenta, worker and small-scale trader José Antonio Peñalverde, sailor Ramón Ruiz, slave Francisco Cantillo, and militia soldiers José María López, José María Pimienta, Crisostomo Velásquez and Casimiro López.<sup>486</sup> What the suspects had in common, apart from being accused of *infidencia*, was that they all vehemently denied the charges. The suspects either professed their innocence or claimed that they had accepted civil and military posts in MacGregor's government in order to expel the invaders at the first convenient opportunity. That the suspects denied the charges is of course rather unsurprising, given the severe punishments they would receive if found guilty. What is more interesting is that, by their allegations and counter-allegations, the governor and the suspects presented very different views on how local government should be conducted.

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<sup>486</sup> The cases against the six first ones were heard by the civil authorities, and the summaries of their cases can be found in AGI, Cuba 745. The cases of the four last ones and probably several others were heard in military court and were not found among the others. It is possible that these cases are found in the Archivo Militar General in Segovia which could not be consulted

The governor's main charge against the population in general was that they lacked discipline and did not obey their governor in the manner he thought was necessary. In his view '...all branches of administration of the state should be in an equilibrium, whose axis is the exact compliance to the obligations of each and every one, especially those who are directly involved in public employment.'<sup>487</sup> Solís was especially dissatisfied with the conduct of the militia officers. When the militias of Valledupar at first refused to execute the foreign prisoners, Solís complained to the viceroy '...on this occasion one can clearly see that the militias of Valledupar can only perform in the posts or professions which they hold, and not give military support when it is needed, because they all excused themselves when asked to execute the prisoners and because of this defect or pusillanimity I had to ask sergeant Felipe López to do it...I would prefer fifty men from the Royal Battalion to a hundred from the militias of these territories...' <sup>488</sup> The governor equated royalism with loyalty to royal officials, and when the inhabitants of Riohacha failed to obey his orders, the governor interpreted this as a sign of infidelity to the Crown.

The population in general took a very different view of their obligations to the Crown. Although they continuously professed their allegiance to the just cause

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for this study. Their names are nonetheless mentioned in a complaint written by their respective wives dated 12 Dec. 1819 in AGI, Cuba 745

<sup>487</sup> 'Estando sugeto la administración de todos los Ramos del Estado a un equilibrio, cuyo Eje es el cumplimiento exacto de las Obligaciones y deberes de cada uno debiendo ser con más Puntualidad por partes de los que tienen tendencias directas con los Empleos Publicos' in letter from Solís to viceroy Sámano, 10 March 1820 in AGI, Cuba 745

<sup>488</sup> 'En esta ocasion se ha hecho de ver comprovadamente que los Milicianos del Valle Dupar solo sirven para los Exercicios u Oficios que profesan, y no para dar auxilio de Armas en los casos que se requieren por que escusandose todos ellos hacer Fuego sobre los prisioneros fue preciso supliesen este defecto o Pusilanimidad uno de estos el sargento segundo Felipe Lopez.prefiero mejor a cinquenta hombres de los del Batallon del Rey que a ciento de las

of the King, many disagreed fundamentally with the governor and his way of ruling the province. Even the governor of Santa Marta thought that Solís had overplayed his role, and indirectly fomented the rebel cause with his actions. The Santa Marta governor wrote to the viceroy in a confidential letter that '...Your excellency knows that the soldiers' confidence in their chief has great influence on military operations, and that of the People in the one who governs on politics. The inhabitants of Riohacha are all behind their city...and they have given...the most positive proofs of courage and loyalty, but they are possessed with the greatest mistrust in their governor...' <sup>489</sup> The previously cited letter from Cotes, Zuñiga and Amaya provide a similar perspective on the political situation in Riohacha. Perhaps the disagreements between the governor and the local notables are a typical example of conflicts between, on one hand, peninsular officials committed to the absolutist notion of government with its emphasis on loyalty, obedience and order, and on the other, the pactist and more lenient style of government favoured by Spanish American elites. Whatever the case, it is clear that by his authoritarian manner of running the province, the governor threatened the royalist stance of the inhabitants.

The conflict between the governor and the *riobacheros* made the city a vulnerable to rebel attacks. On 12 March 1820, the city was occupied again, now by a much larger force commanded by Mariano Montilla and Luis Brion. <sup>490</sup> Governor Solís immediately fled and hid in the Indian town of Moreno. By this

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Milicias de estos Territorios' in letter from Solís to viceroy Sámano, 20 Nov. 1819 in AGI, Cuba 745

<sup>489</sup> 'VE sabe el grande influjo que tiene sobre las operaciones militares la confianza del soldado en su Xefe, y en la política, la del pueblo en el que lo gobierna. Los habitantes de la Hacha son el todo de su ciudadestán poseidos de la mayor desconfianza de su Gobernador' in letter from Ruiz de Porras to viceroy Sámano, 5 April 1820 in AGI, Cuba 745

<sup>490</sup> Luis Cuervo Márquez, *Independencia de las colonias hispano-americanas*, vol. 1, pp. 393 - 397; Sourdis, 'Ruptura del estado colonial', pp. 185 - 187

time, most of the inhabitants of the city had also fled, either from the governor or from the invaders. The only forces which attempted to retake Riohacha were the guerrillas headed by militia officer Miguel Gómez and his troops of Guajiro Indians. Riohacha itself was not the principal target for Montilla and Brion. It merely served as place where the troops could be landed, and they soon ventured into the Cesar valley in order to take Valledupar and the surrounding towns. There they were supposed to meet the troops of Jacinto Lara and José María Carreño who were going north from Ocaña. During the rest of 1820, royalists and republicans both controlled Riohacha for brief periods, but the rule of Governor Solís had definitely passed.

The story of Governor Solís and his conflicts with the inhabitants of Riohacha illustrates several points which have been commented on in previous chapters. The most important of these is that the wars of independence and the way the wars were enacted locally in Spanish America cannot be fully appreciated without considering the previous patterns of political conflict in each locality. In Riohacha it was not only the governor's intransigence which made his position precarious; there had been repeated conflicts between the governor and cabildo repeatedly since Medina Galindo first took possession of the post in September 1792.<sup>491</sup> When Solís complained about the lack of obedience of the city, he was especially concerned about the actions of militia officer Francisco Paula de Uribe and former *alcalde ordinario* Pedro Pérez Prieto. When Medina and Galindo had been absent from Riohacha after his suspension in 1808, it was Pérez Prieto who had acted as governor over civil matters and Uribe's father (Fernando) who had been in military command. It would therefore be reasonable to assume that one of

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<sup>491</sup> AGS, Guerra, Serie 110, Legajo 7072, Expediente 10

the reasons for the constant flow of charges and counter-charges between Solís and Pérez Prieto was rooted in a personal conflict over political influence and control in the city and province of Riohacha. Thus, in addition to the political struggle between Governor Solís and the inhabitants of Riohacha, there was also a more personal conflict over power which was fed by older and purely local issues.

Another characteristic of political conflict in Riohacha is that the strongest support for both the royalist cause and the governor came from the Indian towns surrounding the city. Militia officer Miguel Gómez of Riohacha played a role which can be compared to that of Vicente Narciso Crespo and Thomas Pacheco in Santa Marta. Like Crespo and Pacheco, Gómez did not belong to the upper layers of local society. Born in Riohacha ca 1770 and son of militia captain Gabriel Gómez, Miguel was categorised as a pardo in the militia records, and he was lieutenant in the militia company for coloureds.<sup>492</sup> Just as Crespo and Pacheco succeeded in taking command over the tributary Indians of the towns around Santa Marta, Gómez managed to direct troops from the Indian towns surrounding Riohacha. All three may perhaps be seen as mediators between the Indian communities and peninsular royal officials. Unfortunately, little is known about the precise relationship between the mediators and the communities, but it is clear from the attitude of Governor Solís that he did not regard Gómez as an unconditional supporter of royal government. Gómez' position with respect to the Indian communities seems to have depended more on his personal relations with members of the communities than on his (relatively low-ranking) position in the militias. It should be noted that Miguel's father, Gabriel Gómez, had

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<sup>492</sup> 'Libro que comprende las hojas de servicio de los oficiales y sargentos primeros pardos del cuerpo de cazadores de Infantería voluntaria de Riohacha por fin de Diciembre 1818' in AGI, Cuba 756A.

participated in various of the pacification campaigns against the Guajiros since the 1770s, and had also been stationed in the town of Moreno for several years as a military commander.<sup>493</sup> It is therefore likely that Gabriel Gómez had developed relations with some of the Guajiro leaders, which his son Miguel was able to use during the political crisis of the independence period.

This takes us back, once more, to the question of why many of the Indian communities in Santa Marta and Riohacha provinces generally were the most loyal defenders of the Crown. One possible explanation is that the Indians saw the royal officials as allies against the economic and political pretensions of the local creoles. The Indians may have feared the consequences of a total break with Spain if this implied uncontrolled creole rule. Their defence of royal officials and the Crown becomes in this view less a result of an ideological conviction (or an example of Indian traditionalism and backwardness), than a logical consequence of local patterns of conflict; struggle over land, commerce and local political power.

### **Ocaña: wavering elites**

The patterns of conflict in Riohacha during the final years of the wars of independence are similar to those of the Ocaña area. However, the chronology of events was different. The city of Ocaña was nearer to major rebel centres, such as Pamplona, Cúcuta, Socorro and Mompóx. The local elite was a much larger group than in Riohacha and as a city in the interior of New Granada, Ocaña did not have its own militia companies. All this meant that Ocaña was an easier target for

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<sup>493</sup> See the 'hoja de servicio de Gabriel Gómez' in 'Libro que comprehende las hojas de servicio'

the insurgents than the cities along the coast. After the first entry of rebel forces from Santa Fe in late 1812, Ocaña remained republican until 1816. The supporters of the royalist cause fled to nearby rural properties or the surrounding Indian towns.<sup>494</sup> Most of the local notables, however, stayed in the city and they created a 'Junta Patriótica' which replaced the cabildo.<sup>495</sup>

Another significant difference between Ocaña and Riohacha was that Ocaña was not a provincial capital and thus did not house a governor. The only high-ranking royal official in Ocaña in the late colonial period was the treasurer of the Royal Exchequer who also served as *Juez de puertos* and collected the taxes on goods shipped from or through Ocaña. Although there had been serious conflicts between the treasurer and the local notables in the mid-eighteenth century when the post was new, the last officials had all been effectively incorporated into local elite networks before the outbreak of the wars of independence. The conflict between the royal officials such as José Mateo Sánchez Barriga and his successors was gradually dissolved by the inclusion of these outsiders into local elite society. His immediate successor, the peninsular Sebastián Llaín Sarabia, who was appointed in 1761, married Antonio del Rincón y Quintero Príncipe, member of the principal families of Ocaña and descendant of the conquistadors and first encomenderos of the area.<sup>496</sup> One of his daughters, María del Rosario Llaín Sarabia, married Simón Jácome Morineli, another member of the local nobility.<sup>497</sup>,

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in AGI, Cuba 756A.

<sup>494</sup> Páez, *Noticias históricas*, pp. 9 - 10

<sup>495</sup> Páez, *Noticias históricas*, p. 10. Quintana Navarro was probably son of José de Quintana and Manuela Navarro. (a married couple belonging the Ocaña elites who were present at the party thrown by Juana Lázaro Velásquez in 1790 according to Amaya, *Los genitores*, p. 152) There is also a case in AGN, Policía 6 where Magdalena Barcena from Honda accuses a Manuel Quintana Navarro (her own brother-in-law) who is resident in Ocaña for having failed his promise of marriage and left her in an interesting state.

<sup>496</sup> AHESM, tomo 20, folios 95 - 97

<sup>497</sup> Rosario 905



The next royal official of Ocaña was Miguel de Ibáñez, a native of Cartagena de Indias, who was appointed sometime before 1786.<sup>498</sup> He also married into the local elite through his wife Manuela Jacoba Arias Pereira Rodríguez Therán.<sup>499</sup> Conflict between a high-ranking official and local notables, such as the one in Riohacha, was thus much less likely in Ocaña during the wars of independence. On the contrary, Miguel de Ibáñez and his family were suspected of supporting the rebels and during the early republican period they were prominent actors on the political scene in both Ocaña and Santa Fe.<sup>500</sup>

Like the elites of the other cities of Santa Marta and Riohacha provinces, the notables of Ocaña had generally adopted a careful attitude during the wars of independence. Few of them had publicly announced their support of the rebel cause, and the ones who formally ruled the city in the years between 1812 and 1816 were recent arrivals in Ocaña such as José de Quintana Navarro or young students such as Antonio Quintero Copete.<sup>501</sup> When Ocaña was retaken by the royalists in 1816, some of the local notables were the ones who accused the priest Buceta for having supported the rebel cause, although, as noted in the previous chapter, Buceta's support of republicanism was probably no stronger than that of the local notables.<sup>502</sup> However, during the second round of the wars of independence, many of the notables seem to have adopted a more decidedly republican stance. In 1819, when the rebels were planning their great liberation campaign of the Caribbean coast, Ocaña was still under royalist rule. In

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<sup>498</sup> Melendez Sánchez, *Vivir la región*, p. 174

<sup>499</sup> She was born in Ocaña in 1772 and was the daughter of alcalde ordinario Manuel José Arias de Pereira and Juana de la Cruz Rodríguez Therán y Fernández Carvajalino. Rosario, 1010

<sup>500</sup> Biographical information on the members of the Ibáñez family is provided by Castro Trespacios, *Culturas aborígenes*, p. 27 ff

<sup>501</sup> Páez, *Noticias históricas*, pp. 9 - 26

November 1819, rebel soldiers allied with some of the most prominent vecinos of Ocaña prepared an ambush where many royalist soldiers and officers were killed. When the royalists managed to regain control of the city, several members of leading Ocaña families were accused of having participated in the conspiracy. The accused included María Martina Jácome, Monica Castrellón, Salvadora del Rincón, Don José Ibáñez, Don Juan José Pacheco, priest José María Pacheco, Don Manuel María Trigos and Sebastian Quintero, all members of the leading families of Ocaña.<sup>503</sup> Francisco Aquilino Jácome Morineli y Llaín Sarabia is also a good example of this change in political attitude. Member of the Ocaña's elites and educated at the Rosario from where he held doctorates in both civil and canon law, Jácome Morineli fled Ocaña when the rebels invaded in late 1812. Arrested by Bolívar himself, he was reprimanded, forced to pay a fine of two thousand pesos and convinced to return to Ocaña. He became a rather lukewarm supporter of the rebel cause until the final stages of the war. He was, however, named governor of the jurisdiction of Ocaña during the Congress of Cúcuta in 1821, a post which he held until 1832.<sup>504</sup>

On the other hand, the tributary Indian towns near Ocaña continued to support the royalist cause despite the republican advance. When Ocaña was still under royalist control, a voluntary militia company popularly known as *los colorados* had been created. The soldiers were mainly recruited from the towns surrounding the city of Ocaña.<sup>505</sup> Unfortunately, little information remains about the character

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<sup>502</sup> The witnesses who testified against Buceta included priests Jorge Quintero Príncipe, Fermín Ramines and Antonio Clavo in addition to alcalde ordinario Manuel Antonio Lemus y Trigos, Joséf Trinidad Jácome and Antonio Quintero Peynado

<sup>503</sup> 'Relacion que continua manifestando que por complice en los acontecimientos del 10 de noviembre ppo se hallan presas con expresion de los delitos o causas que han motivado su prision' in AGI, Cuba 745

<sup>504</sup> See Páez, *Noticias históricas*, pp. 70 - 79 and Rosario, 905

<sup>505</sup> Páez, *Noticias históricas*, pp. 50 - 69

of this guerrilla unit, which was said to contain 1500 men in 1820.<sup>506</sup> The colorados continued fighting well into the 1820s and caused havoc locally, although they ultimately failed to prevent the consolidation of republican government. Ocaña was taken by the republicans under the command of Carmona on 11 March 1820, the day before Brion and Montilla entered Riohacha.

### Royalist Indian guerrillas

The last remaining royalist area in the provinces of Riohacha and Santa Marta was the provincial capital itself. The fate of the city of Santa Marta was decided in a major battle which took place in and around the Indian town of San Juan de Ciénaga on 10 November 1820. There, the forces under Carmona, Brion, Padilla and Carreño had united in order to take Santa Marta, and from there the republicans hoped to take Cartagena and the western parts of Venezuela still under royalist control.<sup>507</sup> The naval forces of Brion and Padilla controlled the waters between Ciénaga and the city of Santa Marta, while the troops under the command of Carreño and Carmona attacked Ciénaga by land. Approximately two thousand republican soldiers took part, while 1800 royalists sought to defend Ciénaga. The royalist forces were commanded by General Sánchez Lima. Vicente Narciso Crespo and Thomas Pacheco along with Indian captain Jacinto Bustamente were the most prominent of the local officers. The battle of Ciénaga was among the most bloody of the wars of independence, with some 800 royalist and 140 republican casualties.<sup>508</sup> Among the royalist dead, Thomas Pacheco,

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<sup>506</sup> Páez, *Noticias históricas*

<sup>507</sup> Jacobo Henríquez Jr., *Centenario de la batalla de Ciénaga 1820 - 1920* (Barranquilla, Tip. de República, 1920), pp. 12 - 13

<sup>508</sup> Henríquez, *Centenario de la batalla de Ciénaga*, p. 20. The number of fallen soldiers is slightly lower in the account given by Carreño the day after the battle. He claimed 631 royalists

whose dying words were: 'I die happy because we have all remained in the field of honour without abandoning our principles. Long live Spain!'<sup>509</sup> But most of those killed were Indians from the town of San Juan de Ciénaga, who also had provided the bulk of the royalist fighting force. According to Carreño, 'the enemy, mostly Indians, as brave as the best troops, entered the houses of the town, defending themselves with great obstinacy, and we had to engage for more than an hour and half of fire in order to get them out...'<sup>510</sup>

The bloody fall of Ciénaga stands in sharp contrast to the peaceful surrender of Santa Marta. When the republicans had taken Ciénaga, the cabildo of Santa Marta immediately proposed an armistice in order to reach a capitulation.<sup>511</sup> Carreño agreed to the truce on the condition that all arms and ammunition of the city were handed over to Colonel Juan Salvador Narváez, and all supporters of the Spanish government were given a passport to leave the province; he also promised that he would respect the property of all citizens of Santa Marta.<sup>512</sup> The governor of Santa Marta, Ruiz de Porras then fled before the republican troops entered the city.<sup>513</sup> With the peaceful capitulation of Santa Marta, the entire province of Santa Marta was at least formally controlled by the republican forces.

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had died, 257 were wounded and 632 were taken prisoners, while only 40 republican soldiers had died and 120 were wounded. See Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, 2. vol., p. 428

<sup>509</sup> Henríquez, *Centenario de la batalla de Ciénaga*, p. 17

<sup>510</sup> 'El enemigo, en mayor parte indios, tan valientes como la mejor tropa, se metió en las casas del lugar, sosteniéndose con grande obstinación, y hube de emplear más de hora y media de fuego para desalojarlos de todas partes' in letter from Carreño to Bolívar, Ciénaga 11 Nov. 1820 in Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, 2. vol., p. 427

<sup>511</sup> Letter from cabildo of Santa Marta to Carreño, Santa Marta 10 November 1820 in Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, 2. vol., p. 428

<sup>512</sup> Letter from Carreño to cabildo of Santa Marta, undated in Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, 2. vol., pp. 428 - 429

<sup>513</sup> See report from Mariano Montilla to Bolívar, Santa Marta 19 Nov. 1820 in Corrales, *Documentos para la historia*, 2. vol., pp. 429 - 431

Small royalist guerrilla groups still remained in the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha. It was assumed at the time that these bands operated under the command of General Morales, commander of the royalists in Maracaibo, although this was perhaps an exaggeration. The colorados, after their failed attempt to hold Ocaña in November 1821, moved north towards the Cesar valley and united with the remnants of the troops under Juan Salvador Anselmo Daza, who had simply ignored the sentence of exile to which he had been condemned in 1820. Together with Buenavenura de la Sierra, Daza's friend and comrade-in-arms, the royalists laid siege to Valledupar in October 1822. Simultaneously, the Indians of San Juan de Ciénaga, Gaira, Bonda and Mamatoco, led by the *cacique* Jacinto Bustamente, and a handful of royalist Spaniards invaded the city of Santa Marta and held it for three weeks.<sup>514</sup> Some of the patriot/ republican leaders fled to Taganga on the night that Santa Marta was taken by the royalists. But the tributary Indians of Taganga arrested governor Rieux and *comandante* Carmona and handed them over to the royalists.<sup>515</sup> While they were in control of the city, the royalist rebels removed furniture and doors which were used as firewood for the bonfire they set up in the streets. Mr Fairbanks, a British merchant who was living in Santa Marta at the time, complained that they had drunk all the liquor he had in store, and used the Bordeaux wine and the champagne for cooking.<sup>516</sup>

When Morales in Maracaibo received the news of the royalist uprisings in the neighbouring provinces to the west, he decided to take advantage of the

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<sup>514</sup> José Manuel Restrepo, *Historia de la revolución de Colombia* (Medellín, 1969) [First published in 1827] vol V, pp. 10 - 17 and José Manuel Groot, *Historia eclesiastica y civil de Nueva Granada* 2. ed. (Bogotá, 1893) vol. 4, pp. 293 - 296

<sup>515</sup> José C. Alarcón, *Compendio de historia del Departamento del Magdalena* (Bogotá, 1963), p. 107 - 110

<sup>516</sup> Captain Charles Stuart Cochrane, *Journals of a Residence and Travels in Colombia during 1823 and 1824* (London, 1825), p. 59. See also Restrepo, *Historia de la revolución*, pp. 10 - 17 and Páez, *Noticias históricas*, pp. 50 - 67

situation and he equipped two expeditions, one under the command of Colonel Narciso López with six hundred men to cross the Sierra de Perijá and enter the towns of the upper Cesar valley, and another under the command of Antonio López de Mendoza which crossed into the Guajira peninsula.<sup>517</sup> In March 1823, these royalist forces succeeded in taking most of the towns between Riohacha and Valledupar, where they were aided by Miguel Gómez, the pardo militia captain who had so frequently led Guajiro soldiers to the defence of the Spanish crown. But by the end of March 1823, republican troops under Mariano Montilla and José Sardá obliged the royalists to retreat to Maracaibo. Most royalists deserted, and after 1823 they posed no real threat to the republican government.

For the leading families of Santa Marta and Riohacha, the transition to republican rule in late 1820 occurred without much drama. The republicans knew that most of the notables had more or less secretly favoured the republican cause. The republican victory did therefore not cause violent reactions against the most prominent citizens. On the contrary, the notables of the cities of Santa Marta and Riohacha provinces continued to hold important positions in local government. In the city of Santa Marta, José Francisco Munive y Mozo retained his title as colonel after 1820. He had provided general Montilla with 273 head of cattle and 20 horses for his campaign along the Magdalena river in September 1820, which was recognised as a national debt by the republican government in 1824.<sup>518</sup> In addition to sustaining the republican forces with his own property, Munive also acted as an agent for the government in collecting forced subsidies from other

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<sup>517</sup> Castro Trespalacios, *Culturas aborígenes*, pp. 135 - 137

<sup>518</sup> See letter from José Munive to the governor of Santa Marta, 13 Aug. 1824 in Casa de la Moneda, Db 4759

cattle-owners such as the Indian communities.<sup>519</sup> Esteban Díaz Granados, who was married to María Concepción Fernández de Castro (daughter of María Concepción Loperena), and was a graduate of El Rosario who had been *asesor* of the Spanish governors during the wars of independence, was officially appointed to hold the same position in the republican government in December 1821.<sup>520</sup> In Ocaña, Francisco Aquilino Jácome (the same man who had been sent to Santa Marta as a delegate of the cabildo of Ocaña in 1810), a graduate of El Rosario, member of the principal families of the city and married to Juana de Dios Lemus Rodríguez, was appointed governor of the jurisdiction of Ocaña during the congress of Cúcuta in October 1821 by Colonel Juan Salvador Narváez, a post which he held until 1831.<sup>521</sup> Similarly, in the cities of Valledupar and Riohacha, members of the leading families generally continued to serve in the most important posts of local government.

Even peninsular Spaniards who had publicly supported the royalist cause were in some instances able to remain in Santa Marta and become respected republicans. Perhaps the best-known example is Joaquín de Mier y Benítez, a peninsular-born merchant who came to the Caribbean coasts of New Granada when he was four years old in 1791 with his parents Manuel Faustino de Mier y Terán and María Teresa Benítez.<sup>522</sup> When his father went bankrupt in 1808, Joaquín inherited the estate of San Pedro Alejandrino, one of the largest

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<sup>519</sup> See for instance note from José Munive to the cabildo of Gaira, Santa Marta 24 Nov. 1820 in Casa de la Moneda, Db 0084, folio 4

<sup>520</sup> The appointment is reproduced in José M. de Mier, *La Gran Colombia*, (Bogotá, Presidencia de la República, 1983), pp. 15 - 16. His marriage to María Concepción Fernández de Castro is recorded in Castro Trespalacios, *Culturas aborígenes*, p. 236. See also the information he presented when applying for a *beca* in Rosario 930.

<sup>521</sup> For the appointment and Jácome's marriage, see Páez, *Noticias históricas*, pp. 70 - 79. Genealogical information can be found in Rosario 905.

<sup>522</sup> A very informative biography of Joaquín de Mier is provided by his descendant José María de Mier, 'Don Joaquín de Mier y Benítez' in BHA, 62:710 (1975), pp. 507 - 540.

plantations of the area right outside the city of Santa Marta. The family experienced a further shock when Manuel Faustino died while imprisoned by the republicans in Cartagena in 1813. Joaquín was named captain of the royal militias of Santa Marta in 1817, but he worked principally as a merchant bringing goods to Santa Marta, particularly from Jamaica. When Santa Marta fell in November 1820, Joaquín at first emigrated to royalist Portobelo, but soon decided to return to Santa Marta, where he managed to convince Montilla and Carreño of his adhesion to the republican cause by bringing arms and ammunition on favourable terms for the new regime.<sup>523</sup> In 1821 he was appointed lieutenant colonel of the republican militias of Santa Marta, and Montilla noted that 'Mier is the right man as chief of the battalion: still young, presentable, adored by everyone, respected by the Indians who are accustomed to obey him, rich, enthusiastic and very committed...'<sup>524</sup> Perhaps De Mier's ultimate proof of republican zeal was given when he insisted that Simón Bolívar should be his guest when Bolívar, deposed from the presidency of Colombia, travelled to Santa Marta on his way to Europe in 1830. (Bolívar died in San Pedro Alejandrino.) Joaquín de Mier was able to secure his respected position in the new republican regime, because of his high-standing in the local community, his low military profile during the wars of independence and his willingness to serve the new republican regime in various ways.

Other royalists did not receive the same gentle treatment. Juan Salvador Anselmo Daza of Valledupar belonged to a family which had held local political positions in the Cesar valley at least since the seventeenth century. During the wars of independence, several of the Dazas had publicly declared their loyalty to

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<sup>523</sup> Mier, 'Don Joaquín', p. 516



the crown and Juan Salvador Anselmo Daza had been commander of the royalist troops in the valley during the entire period. When his forces were eventually subdued by the republicans, Daza was condemned to exile in Curazao for five years.<sup>525</sup> But his case was exceptional. In fact, the number of prominent inhabitants who were forced to leave the new republic after 1820 seems to have been low. Of course, some priests were told to go. In December 1820, general Montilla expelled *canonigos* Placido Hernández and Miguel María de Yarza as well as the priest Benítez, who all went to Cuba. Montilla ordered that the expulsion be done with decency given the frankness with which these ecclesiastics had expressed their loyalty to the royalist cause.<sup>526</sup> This suggests that other ecclesiastics had been equally supportive of the royalist cause, but less forthright about their conviction; some of these may have left voluntarily and secretly. Certainly the number of ecclesiastics in the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha was considerably lower in the early republican period than in the late colonial era.<sup>527</sup>

The most brutal treatment were undoubtedly given to Indians and commoners who had fought on the royalist side during the last years of the struggle. Ordinary soldiers were the ones most likely to die in battle, and hundreds of survivors were imprisoned. Some of them were sentenced to death, some were sent to the prisons in Chagres and Panamá, others to the penal colony created in San Sebastián de Rábago in the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta. A considerable number of ex-royalist soldiers from the towns around the city of Santa Marta

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<sup>524</sup> Cited in Mier, 'Don Joaquín', p. 516

<sup>525</sup> For the sentence on Daza, see letter from Mariano Montilla to Santander, Riohacha 22 Oct. 1820 in Castro Trespalcios, *Culturas aborígenes*, pp. 122 - 123. The actions of Daza during the wars of independence are described in Castro Trespalcios, *Culturas aborígenes*, pp. 85 - 117. Genealogies of some of the members of the Daza family can be found in AGN, Mapoteca 4, nos. 141 A - 143 A.

<sup>526</sup> Copy of letter from Montilla to the bishop of Santa Marta, 11 Dec. 1820 in AGI, Santa Fe 1245

were forcibly enlisted in the republican army which was to liberate Peru and Bolivia after 1820.<sup>528</sup> The Indian communities were also forced to give cattle to the republican armies based in Santa Marta.<sup>529</sup> These measures, however, were not sufficient to extinguish the social and political differences between the former tributary Indian communities and the Hispanic cities. Indeed, conflicts between former Indian towns and cities such as Santa Marta continue to mark the regional politics for decades, albeit in a very different manner than under colonial rule.

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<sup>527</sup> This is an issue to which we will return in the next chapters.

<sup>528</sup> See for instance Tulio Vargas, *Anotaciones históricas*, pp. 133 - 139; Castro Trespalcacios, *Culturas aborígenes*, p. 135 and Alarcón, *Compendio de historia*, p. 107 - 110

<sup>529</sup> See Casa de la Moneda Db 0084

## Chapter 10. Elites and commoners in the early republic

### The arrival of modernity?

To what extent did independence alter the social make-up of Spanish American societies? Did independence leave the basic social and economic structures largely intact as most materialist historians have argued, or did it, as some recent studies have suggested, create 'new' societies constituted in radically different ways than the colonial ones they replaced? This chapter will examine some aspects of early republican society in the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha. It will show that the changes brought on by independence were surprisingly dramatic and fundamental. Not only did independence engender new forms of political participation, extensive reform of basic legal dispositions concerning the place of individuals and groups in society, the arrival of newspapers and political pamphlet literature and an extensive program to educate the population at large; it also changed the way society itself was conceptualised by both elites and commoners. These mutations in the social *imaginaire* of samarian society manifested themselves in the marriage patterns of the early republic, which differed in significant aspects from those of the late colonial period.

With the advent of post-structuralist perspectives within Latin American historiography, historians have started to re-evaluate the importance of independence. One prominent advocate for this new vision is François-Xavier Guerra, who sees independence as a 'profound mutation' of Latin American societies. Inspired by post-structuralist research on the French Revolution, Guerra argues that Latin American independence marked the transition from an *ancien régime* type of society to modernity. Seen from this perspective, the fundamental

difference between colonial and republican society lies in the form in which society itself was constituted and conceptualised. In the colonial period, individuals were typically ascribed to ethnic, racial and social groups or corporations by birth, and society was conceptualised as a hierarchy constituted by these groups. After independence, however, the republic was formed by citizens whose status at birth was ideally irrelevant and who could associate with groups through their own free will. New forms of sociability thus replaced the old, and Guerra emphasises institutions such as newspapers, elections, *tertulias*, the so-called Patriotic Societies (*Sociedades de Patriotas*) and he stresses their modern and public character.<sup>530</sup> In Guerra's view, one may start to discern a geography of modernity as it spread through the Hispanic world in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries emanating from France, through Spain and across the Atlantic to Spanish America, although further research is still needed in order to establish the chronology of this process.<sup>531</sup> The number of newspapers, the level of literacy and the density of elementary schools all increased throughout the Hispanic world in the independence period. Independence marked the transition to modernity in Latin America, in the same manner as the French Revolution signified the same transition in Europe.

What place did provinces in the Spanish American periphery such as Santa Marta and Riohacha occupy in this geography of modernity? Guerra does not attempt to identify the precise chronology of the arrival of modernity in different parts of Spanish America, but he notes that it did not necessarily arrive first in the largest urban centres of the continent. Although the biggest colonial cities such as Mexico, Lima and Santa Fe de Bogotá had by far the largest number of

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<sup>530</sup> Guerra, *Modernidad e independencias*, pp. 86 - 98

newspapers, the highest density of elementary schools and the largest production of printed books, all these were to a surprising extent dominated by traditional Catholic and royalist ideology. Perhaps, then, less 'sophisticated' and smaller cities and ports such as Caracas, Buenos Aires and Cartagena were more receptive to the modern forms of sociability?

Even in remote corners of the republic such as Santa Marta and Riohacha, independence marked an obvious watershed in the development of a literate and popular public. The quest for a new society, more just and rational than the colonial, left its mark in all walks of life. The first *samaritan* newspapers appeared right after the republican victory, and in addition to commercial news, papers such as *La Gazeta de Santa Marta*, *El Samario*, *El Eco Samario*, *El Constitucional de Santa Marta*, *El Churriador* and *El Amigo del País* covered primarily the political and military events of the period and the local position in the new form of government.<sup>532</sup> The newspapers perhaps provide the most salient evidence that contemporaries saw themselves in an era of a radical and fundamental political change. In one of the first issues of the *Gazeta de Santa Marta*, the editors noted with satisfaction that among the subscribers there were two Indians and a woman. The *Gazeta* prided itself on having attracted these readers, and claimed that it was the first newspaper in the republic to have a female subscriber and it attached great importance to the Indian readership: 'Among our subscribers', the *Gazeta* announced, 'we find the names of three unexpected persons...an Indian native of Mamatoco, the very dignified citizen Joaquín Vicente Muñoz,...the brave Captain Benito Malombo of San Juan de Ciénaga, who has embraced the cause of Liberty

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<sup>531</sup> Guerra, *Modernidad e independencias*, pp. 102 - 113

<sup>532</sup> Issues of these newspapers can be found in AGN, Archivo Restrepo, fondos 1 and 11, in the Biblioteca Nacional and in the Hemeroteca of BLAA.

with the enthusiasm of a man who is convinced of the great difference which exists between the domination of some intruders who only came to impoverish the country and bring back the riches to Spain from that of our own countrymen elected by ourselves...[and] finally one of the fair sex. Who would have thought that! Neither in Cartagena, Bogotá, nor Angostura has there ever been a female subscriber. This honour was reserved for the lady Manuela Munive de Solís...<sup>533</sup>

As this statement indicates, the newspapers of the early republic publicised the radical nature of the political changes which independence implied. But the statement also illustrates some of the limitations of these changes; the early republic had inherited a patriarchal social structure where women, Indians and all non-noble men and women more generally had been excluded from active political participation. The newspaper clearly identified the Indians and the woman as exceptions among their subscribers. No doubt the overwhelming majority were members of the male elites of the city of Santa Marta.

It should nonetheless be noted that the newspaper celebrated the fact that it was attracting a wider public and emphasised the political meaning of this tendency. 'Let us picture', the editor proposed, 'the two illustrious Indians Joaquín Vicente and Captain Malombo in their respective towns seated at the doorstep of their houses surrounded by their relatives and friends, and perhaps even the entire town, reading the *Gazeta*. What a spectacle for a patriot! What a theme worthy of contemplation for a political philosopher! There we see, he would shout, the first effects of Freedom!' <sup>534</sup> As the editor acknowledged, if the aims of the revolution were to be accomplished, political participation could not be limited to the male

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<sup>533</sup> *Gazeta de Santa Marta*, 19 May 1821, p. 8 in AGN, Archivo Restrepo, fondo 1, vol. 9, fols. 208 - 209

<sup>534</sup> *Ibid.*

elites. The perceived passivity of the other segments of samarian and Colombian society would have to be overcome.

Great emphasis was therefore put on education. Article 15 of the 1821 constitution held that only those who could read and write were allowed to vote, but the same article clarified that this requirement would only apply after 1840.<sup>535</sup> It was felt that the masses had not had the opportunity to educate themselves during the colonial regime, and hence it would be unjust to make such a requirement before the republic had existed for some years. As David Bushnell has acknowledged, education was one of the primary concerns of early republican legislators.<sup>536</sup> At the Congress of Cúcuta in 1821 an ambitious plan was conceived to improve the education of the Colombian nation at large. The legislators decreed that there should be an elementary school in every village with more than a hundred inhabitants, a secondary school in every canton (a new territorial unit introduced after independence which will be discussed in more detail below), a 'college' in every province and a university in every *departamento*. Elementary school was made compulsory for children (both girls and boys) between six and twelve who were supposed to be taught how to read and write, religion, morality and the responsibilities of citizens in the new society.<sup>537</sup> This educational structure was formally put in place in the province of Santa Marta by two decrees issued by Santander on 17 May 1824, where funds previously assigned to the convents of Valledupar, Ocaña and Santa Marta were reassigned for the creation of

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<sup>535</sup> For English translations of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Colombian constitutions, see William Marion Gibson, *The Constitutions of Colombia* (Durham, Duke University Press, 1948).

<sup>536</sup> David Bushnell, *El Régimen de Santander en la Gran Colombia*, p. 224. See also Guerra, 'The Spanish-American Tradition of Representation and its European Roots' in *JLAS* (26:1) 1994, p. 11

<sup>537</sup> Bushnell, *El Régimen*, pp. 224 - 226

lancasterian primary schools in all three cities and a *colegio seminario* in Santa Marta.<sup>538</sup>

In practice, however, lack of both human and financial resources impeded the advance of educational projects and the functioning of schools. Letters from teachers and other authorities in the province of Santa Marta illustrate the problems faced in the 1820s. A teacher at an elementary school for girls in the city of Santa Marta complained that more than seventy girls came to class in order to learn how to read, write, cook and sew, and that it was impossible for her to teach them all by herself. She also complained that although she had been promised an annual salary of a hundred pesos, 'only a minimal part' was actually being paid.<sup>539</sup> In Sitionuevo, the political judge Manuel Sarco reported that he could not find anyone who was both able and willing to be a schoolmaster, and that only four inhabitants were able to sign their own names. He later expressed his surprise at the naming of Domingo Valle as teacher, and wrote to the governor that 'because of his compassion with the youth he felt compelled to inform [the governor] that far from imbibing education and virtues ...[the boys] will be instructed in vices and immorality as the reprovved conduct of [Valle] who lives in constant drunkenness is well-known'. In a subsequent letter Sarco informed the governor that the parish priest was serving provisionally as teacher but that only eleven boys went regularly to class.<sup>540</sup> Continuing efforts were made to educate the population throughout the republican era, but problems of this sort did not go away and the actual number of pupils remained low especially in the towns and

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<sup>538</sup> José M. de Mier, *La Gran Colombia* (Bogotá, Presidencia de la República, 1983), pp. 280 - 283

<sup>539</sup> AHGSM, Caja 16, 1825 contains various of these letters.

<sup>540</sup> Letters from Manuel Sarco to governor of Santa Marta, 17 Jul, 28 Aug and 17 Nov 1825 in AHGSM, Caja 16, 1825.



villages of the province. In Ciénaga there were ten schools in 1842, of which one was public, mixed and run on the Lancaster-model, while the other nine were private, the 'old method', and probably run by priests. These ten schools had together only 98 pupils, though, according to the census of 1843, there were 1123 children and youth under 16 in the town.<sup>541</sup>

One is thus tempted to ask: Did independence in fact produce 'new men', or did the grandiose educational and political projects of the 1820s fall short of their ambitious aims? As explained in the introduction, the post-modernist perspective on the entirely new way of conceptualising post-independence society may not necessarily be incompatible with the materialist insistence on the continuity of basic social and economic structures between the colonial and republican periods. Theoretically, it would be possible to argue that, while the way people thought of society changed quite radically, the basic social divisions inherited from the pre-independence era still prevailed after independence. For Santa Marta and Riohacha, it is certainly not difficult to find arguments to support the thesis that independence had little impact on social life. The number of elementary schools remained small, most of them were of the traditional sort and run by priests, and none of the newspapers survived for more than a couple of years. Yet, if we take up Guerra's vision of the arrival of modernity as a series of mutations, then we should not allow the initially precarious development of modern institutions to disguise their impact in the longer run.

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<sup>541</sup> For numbers of schools and pupils in Ciénaga in 1842, see 'Cuadro de las escuelas primarias de niños de ambos sexos que existen en este cantón en 31 de agosto de 1842' in AHGSM, Caja 86, 1842. For the 1843 census of Ciénaga, see AHGSM, Caja 1 Censos, Carpeta 1, fols. 8 - 35

How, then, can the changes brought on by independence be assessed? One way to approach this issue, congruent with my examination of social structure in Part I, is by analysing the marriage patterns of the early republic and comparing them with the patterns for the late colonial period that were discussed in the first part of this dissertation. If people tended to marry *isogamically* (i.e. partners were of the same social status or class), the empirical study of marriage patterns in a given locality may be used to explore the social divisions in that locality. And in our case, we may compare the marriage patterns of the early republican period with those of the late eighteenth century, in order to study continuities and changes in the social make-up of samarian society. So, let us focus on marriage patterns as an expression of social stratification and thereby explore the changes and continuities between the late colonial and early republican periods in the city of Santa Marta and some of the surrounding towns of the province.

The following analysis will show that the social make-up of early republican samarian society differed markedly from its late colonial predecessor. The marriage patterns indicate a dramatic simplification of the social structure towards a two-class system: elites and commoners. The same families remained at the apex of local society, but the differences between poor whites, free coloureds, slaves and Indians tended to wither away. The intricate social-make up of late colonial society analysed in previous chapters, which had come into existence both as a result of Spanish law and the particular dynamic of ethnic and social relations in the provinces of Santa Marta and Riohacha, was quite radically transformed as a consequence of independence. Perhaps early republican society

was no less aristocratic and racist than its colonial predecessor, but, as we shall now see, it was surely very different in certain important respects.

As will be recalled from the first part of the dissertation, there had been two separate marriage books in the city of Santa Marta before independence: one for the 'white descendants of Spaniards' and another for 'pardos, mestizos, negros'. This practice was quickly abandoned after independence. The early republican marriage records were not divided by social or racial categories: all marriages in each parish were kept in the same book. Although a second parish (San Miguel) was created in the city of Santa Marta in 1810, supposedly to serve commoners and those who could not dress the proper way for the cathedral, in practice commoners continued to marry in the cathedral while some members of the elites married in San Miguel. More significantly, the practice of recording a racial or ethnic designation for brides and grooms ended after independence. The only group which was clearly identified in the new marriage records were the slaves, but as the number of slaves decreased rapidly in the first decades after independence, the number of slaves in the marriage records is correspondingly low. Given the nature of the early republican marriage records, it is impossible to construct detailed statistical material on the marriage patterns of the different socio-racial groups comparable to those of the late colonial period. We are therefore forced to take a more rounded approach, by using the biographical and genealogical data available on families and individuals in order to address those questions which concern us here.

## Republican elites

Local elites had generally shown an ambiguous attitude towards the patriot cause during the wars of independence. Under the new regime they needed to demonstrate republican patriotism in order to defend their political and social pre-eminence. This need manifested itself in the post-independence marriage patterns of the patrician families of Santa Marta. As will be recalled from Chapter 2, in the late colonial period the noble families in the cities of the coast had principally married among themselves. After independence, however, a new trend appeared. Daughters of elites families started to marry high-ranking veterans of the liberation army, even foreigners. The higher-ranking posts in the administrative and political republican provincial government were to a large extent filled by veterans of the war, generals and colonels who had fought alongside Bolívar, Montilla and MacGregor in the liberation of the coast. Few of these were native of Santa Marta or Riohacha, and they were no doubt regarded as outsiders in the provinces just as peninsulars had been before 1810. Many of them, perhaps the majority, were natives of Venezuela or the interior of New Granada and others were of British, Irish, French, Swedish and even Spanish origin. In the marriage records from the city of Santa Marta from the early republican period, the presence of these foreigners is easily recognisable, especially if compared to the situation before independence. Of the sixty-nine grooms whose geographic origin was recorded in the marriage record of both parishes in the city of Santa Marta between 1828 and 1832, twelve grooms (or 17.39 per cent) were from Venezuela. In the late colonial period only 5.12 per cent of the grooms married in Santa Marta had been from Venezuela. (see table 12). Similarly, between 1828 and 1832

more than 7 per cent of the grooms were from non-Spanish Europe, while before 1810 less than four per cent of the grooms had been from these countries.<sup>542</sup>

Although information on the occupation of the grooms is seldom given in the marriage records, it is likely that most of the Venezuelans and Europeans were war veterans.<sup>543</sup> In 1822, María Josefa Buenaventura Ignacia Francisca Dominga Ramona (Pepa) Díaz Granados married the Swedish Count Fredrik Adlercreutz, who had joined the Colombian liberation army in 1820 after an embarrassing bankruptcy in his home country and subsequently served as governor of Mompóx in the 1820's.<sup>544</sup> Her sister Francisca Díaz Granados married a German veteran, Frederick Adolf Rausch, while another sister married first the Scot Donald Stevenson in 1831, followed by Thomas Rodney Cowen in 1841, and Cecilia Díaz Granados married Irishman and military surgeon William Porter Smyth in the mid- 1830s.<sup>545</sup> Statistically, such marriages between the daughters of local elites and foreign war veterans never reached high levels. But the significance of these matches is the dramatic change they indicate in the political outlook of samarian elites. Before independence, marriages with Protestant foreigners were unthinkable and no examples are known from the eighteenth century. The fact

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<sup>542</sup> These statistics are based on the 80 marriages recorded in LMC and the 22 listed in LSM between 1828 and 1832.

<sup>543</sup> For instance, Trinidad Portocarro from Venezuela who married in Santa Marta in 1831 was 'general de brigada'; Juan Bautista Arismendi from Venezuela married in Santa Marta in 1830 was subteniente; Vicente Niño from Venezuela married in 1830 was cabo del batallón tiradores; José Falcón from Venezuela was comandante de caballería and married in Santa Marta in 1831; Esteban Rodríguez from Venezuela was a captain and married in Santa Marta in 1831 and Marcelino Chaves from Venezuela was a soldier in the 'batallón de tiradores' and married in Santa Marta in 1830;

<sup>544</sup> Letter from Christopher Hughes (representative of the United States in Stockholm from 1819 to 1825) to the General John Devereux (of the Irish Legion) dated 10 July 1820 in C. Parra-Pérez (ed), *La Cartera del Coronel Adlercreutz* (Paris, 1928), pp. 33 - 36

<sup>545</sup> 'Censo de la población de la parroquia de la catedral de Santa Marta, 1843' in AHGSM, Censos Caja 1, folio 279r. In 1827 William Porter Smyth appeared as a witness in Santa Marta to testify that Santiago (James?) Byrne was single, and Smyth declared that he was 31 years, born in Ireland and a military surgeon. See 'Información de soltería y libertad para contraer matrimonio Santiago Byrne con Eglé Daniels', 1 Mar 1827 in AHESM, Tomo 31, folios 1 - 4

that at least a handful of such marriages were celebrated in the first decades after independence suggests that the samarian elites sought unions which could strengthen their patriotic, republican and modern image. It may also be seen as a repetition of the colonial strategy of marrying with descendants of the first conquistadors of the area, except that now marriage alliances were sought with the patriotic heroes of the independence wars. Future generations of the patrician families would thereby be able to claim descent from the *precursores* and national heroic figures.

The highest-ranking posts in provincial government were given to war veterans during the first decade after independence. Of the twelve men who served as governors in either Santa Marta or Riohacha between 1821 and 1831 (Ortega, de Rieux, Sardá, Fernández, Fernández de Madrid, García, Díaz Granados, Patria, Castaño, Cataño, Carmona and Mendoza), at least six were patriot war veterans and former officers in the liberation army (Ortega, de Rieux, Sardá, Carmona, Fernández de Madrid and Patria).<sup>546</sup> Right after independence, then, local elites were no more involved in the government of their own provinces than they had previously been, but this situation soon changed. With independence the laws forbidding marriages between officials and locals were no longer valid, which made it easier for local elites to co-opt the officials appointed by the new government. And more importantly, after 1830 local elites themselves were increasingly being appointed to the highest political positions in the provinces. In 1831 José Ignacio Díaz Granados became governor of Santa Marta at the same time that his cousin Esteban Díaz Granados was appointed prefect of the Department of Magdalena (which at that time comprised the provinces of

Riohacha, Santa Marta, Mompóx and Cartagena).<sup>547</sup> And in Riohacha, José María Cataño, who sat on the royalist cabildo of Riohacha in 1811 and who had several relatives who had served on the Riohacha cabildo before 1810, was appointed governor in 1831. From then on, local elite families controlled the political positions of provincial government.

The lower-ranking positions of republican government were from the end of the wars generally filled by locals and dominated by the elite families in each city. In provincial capitals such as Santa Marta and Riohacha there was a *teniente de gobernador* or *asesor letrado* who should assist the governor especially in legal matters. Esteban Díaz Granados who had been the *teniente* of Santa Marta during the last years of Spanish rule occupied the same position for most of the 1820s except the periods when he served in the national congress. Below the letrado, there was a government secretary, a first and second officer and scribe or amanuensis. These positions were generally all served by members of prominent local families in 1820s, such as José María Cataño in Riohacha and Antonio de Torres in Santa Marta. After independence city government was also in the hands of the cabildos, though they were now usually referred to as *municipalidades* and their former alcaldes now had the title of first *juez político* and from 1829 (?) *jefe político*. Unsurprisingly, these positions were also held by local elites in each city. In the city of Santa Marta José Ignacio Díaz Granados (the later governor), Evaristo de Ujueta (son of former *contador* of Santa Marta Juan José de Ujueta) and Gregorio de Obregón (brother-in-law of Evaristo de Ujueta and father of José Antonio and Andrés Obregón Ujueta who married Ana and Dolores Díaz Granados

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<sup>546</sup> See figure 8 for names and background of the early republican governors of Santa Marta and Riohacha.

respectively<sup>548</sup>) were *jefes políticos* in the 1820s. In Valledupar, the post was served by José Domingo Pumarejo (son of Juan Manuel Pumarejo and Rosa María Daza and married to Ciriaca de Quirós, daughter of José Antonio de Quiróz and María Josefa Daza all members of the most notable vallenato families), Valerio Cajigas (related to the same families) and José María Quiróz (the uncle of José Domingo Pumarejo's wife). In Ocaña, the *jefes políticos* were the previously mentioned Francisco Aquilino Jácome, Pedro Alcantará Ibáñez (son of former juez de puertos of Ocaña Miguel de Ibáñez and Manuela Jacoba Arias Pereira Rodríguez Terán) and Manuel Marín Trigos.<sup>549</sup> In general, then, the local elites in Santa Marta and Riohacha continued to control city government also after independence, and after a decade of republican rule they increasingly dominated provincial government.

Naturally, most elites marriages continued to be local. But they were no longer restricted to the handful of families who had been considered 'noble' before independence. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, some peninsular merchants had settled in Santa Marta such as Gerardo Oligós, Joaquín de Mier, Gregorio Obregón, Francisco Carbonell y Solá, Salvador Vives, José Fexido, Antonio Garriga, Antonio y Juan Vilá, Josef Galí, Juan Gallart, Pedro Boet, Josef Balaguer, Miguel Brugera, Pedro Catalán and Pedro Escofet.<sup>550</sup> Some of these remained neutral, or were even republican, during the independence wars, and after independence they intermarried with the former noble families of

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<sup>547</sup> For the appointments of republican officials during the first decade after independence see José María de Mier, *Gran Colombia*.

<sup>548</sup> Restrepo, *Genealogía de Santa Fe*, p. 311

<sup>549</sup> For the names of the *jefes políticos*, see Marco Tulio Vargas, *Anotaciones históricas*, pp. 140 - 141. The biographic and genealogical information is assembled from a large variety of sources mentioned in chapter two.



Santa Marta. There also seems to have been a tendency for samarian elites to marry more frequently than before with elites from other cities of the new republic, especially with Cartagena and Bogotá families which had taken prominent roles in the wars and formation of the republic. Starting in the 1820s one can thus start to perceive the formation of a nation-wide, republican and patriotic network of families which - although increasingly divided by political ideology - came to monopolise national and provincial level politics for most of the nineteenth century (and beyond?).

Conversely, those families which had supported the royalists were shunned, at least initially. One example is the peculiar criminal case brought against Juan Manuel Daza for the abduction of a young girl. On the face of it, this was a simple case of *raptó* prosecuted under the rules inherited from Spanish law. The case arose from a liaison which began, when, at seven o'clock at night on 5 August 1829 the fifteen year old María Andrea Bermúdez sneaked out of her father's house to join Juan Manuel Daza. Together they rode to his *hacienda* Santa Cruz, close to the town of Gaira.<sup>551</sup> There they spent more than two weeks together before the father of the young woman, Manuel Martínez, finally managed to have her taken from Juan Manuel by force and accused Daza of abduction. María Andrea was then taken to Santa Marta where she was questioned by the authorities. She explained that she had left her father's house by her own free will in order to live with Daza. She also explained that Daza had not promised her marriage, but that they had had a sexual relationship before she left her father,

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<sup>550</sup> Joaquín Vilorio de la Hoz, 'Empresarios de Santa Marta: el caso de Joaquín y Manuel Julián de Mier, 1800 - 1896' in *Cuadernos de historia económica y empresarial* [Published by Centro de investigaciones económicas del caribe colombiano, Cartagena] no. 7, nov. 2000, pp. 2 - 7

that she trusted him and that was why she decided to go and live with him.<sup>552</sup> When she had finished her statement, she was handed over to her father, and Díaz Granados ordered the arrest of Daza and the seizure of all his goods, not only for having taken María Andrea away from her home, but also for '...having deflowered a well protected and prudent virgin...'.<sup>553</sup> As a result of this hearing, Juan Manuel Daza was imprisoned on 25 August, and forced to prove his innocence. First of all, however, he wrote to María Andrea to find what she had said when questioned. He begged her to tell the truth, and to acknowledge that he had not deceived her, and that she had offered her love to him of her own will. He ended the short letter with a rather imprudent request: '... Sneak out, come here, and go back after I have given you a little kiss..<sup>554</sup> In another letter to her, also written from prison, he complained that he alone had to suffer imprisonment, when '...we both are accomplices for loving each other. If love is one, and guilt is one, the punishment should also be one; therefore you should be here with me, and this misfortune would thus be bearable...'.<sup>555</sup>

His misfortunes would not last for long, however. On 1 September, Daza asked that María Andrea be questioned again and demanded that she state whether she was a virgin before she left her father's house, and whether she went with Daza by her own will. The following day María Andrea repeated what she had previously told the judges: that Daza had deflowered her but that she had not

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<sup>551</sup> All of the the details of the following story has been taken from "Diligencias sumarias por el delito de rapto perpetrado por Juan Manuel Daza en la joven María Andrea Bermúdez intentada por Manuel Martínez padre de la joven" in AHGSM, 1829, Caja 1, Legajo 198.

<sup>552</sup> "...Que como antes de salir de la casa de sus padres ha sido el primer hombre Daza que la conocido carnalmente, y que con igual moral se resolvió a ir a vivir con él en el tiempo que ha estado en la Hacienda..."

<sup>553</sup> "...no solo por rapto sino por defloro de una doncella recogida y recatada..."

<sup>554</sup> "...Date una huida y ven aca que te volverás después que te dé un besito..."

been forced to go his house. Upon hearing the girl's replies, Daza then demanded to talk to the girl in the presence of the governor. With only the governor, the scribe, Marias father and Daza present, María Andrea was questioned for the third time. This time she admitted that Daza had not been the one who deflowered her and she also declared that Esteban Díaz Granados had prompted her father to pursue the case judicially.

After this, the emphasis of the case shifted. The governor may now have suspected that the conflict had little to do with the honour of the girl and her family, and had more to do with the old disputes and grievances between the Daza and Díaz Granados families. Daza was realeased from prison and, once free, he wrote to the governor complaining about the power which the Díaz Granados family had, not only in the city of Santa Marta, but in the entire province including Valledupar, Daza's native city. He furthermore explained how Díaz Granados was an old enemy of his father, because they had been on opposite sides during the war and that Díaz Granados had have him imprisoned at all costs, '..because he is interested in my ruin for revenge...'. According to Daza, María Andrea's last testimony showed that the accusation against him was false and malicious. Not satisfied with receiving justice, Daza took the opportunity to reiterate his grievances against the Díaz Granados: 'For several years ...this city and its province suffer beneath the heavy weight of the arbitrariness of the Díaz Granados. ...against them there is neither justice, law nor reason. They are licensed to all classes of crimes...No one dares to punish them or to proceed

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<sup>555</sup> "Es dura cosa que yo solo esté aquí, cuando los dos somos complices por querernos. Si uno es el querer, y una es la culpa, también debe ser una la pena; y por lo tanto tu deberías estarme acompañando, pues de esta suerte sería sobrellevable."

against them, not only now, but ever since the old government [before independence]...'

Daza may have exaggerated the influence of the Díaz Granados. After all, the case against him was dropped and he was released, which in itself shows that there were limits to the influence of the Díaz Granados. More interestingly, perhaps, the case against Daza illustrates the polarising and disrupting effect which the wars of independence might have had on intra-elite relations. Daza himself explained his predicament as a consequence of the wars, when his father had supported the royalists. The Dazas and Díaz Granados were distantly related, and no similar type of conflict between the two families is known from the colonial period. The fatal choice of Juan Manuel's father of openly supporting the royalists apparently converted the family into a black sheep among the elites of Santa Marta.

### Republican rupture

The affair between Daza and María Andrea and the reactions it provoked also illustrate another feature of early republican society :namely, a new, liberal and anti-authoritarian attitude towards marriage and sexuality. In fact, a number of sources suggest that the position of the Church in general and in the institution of marriage in particular were weakened after independence. Independence forced some priests to abandon the republic, and the number of clergy dropped to half of the late colonial level within a few years of independent rule. But the main reason for the relative scarcity of ecclesiastics in early republican Santa Marta was not ecclesiastical emigration. It was caused both by several specific measures

adopted by the first republican government to reduce the influence and wealth of the Church, together with a more general scepticism about the significance of religious institutions.<sup>556</sup> While there had been 128 ecclesiastics in the province of Santa Marta in 1778 and 131 in 1793, there were only 71 in 1825, 45 in 1835, 63 in 1843 and 90 in 1851.<sup>557</sup> In 1793 there had been on average one ecclesiastic for every 360 inhabitant. In 1825, the corresponding ratio was 625 and in 1835 it was 1035.<sup>558</sup> In practice, this meant that many parishes in the province of Santa Marta did not have a priest after independence. The bishop of Santa Marta declared in a report in 1836 that '...the scarcity of priests is clearly manifest, as there are 68 parishes in this bishopric while there are only 27 parish priests...'.<sup>559</sup> This situation subsequently improved somewhat: according to the 1843 census, only thirteen of the 48 parishes in the province of Santa Marta (which at that time did not include the canton of Ocaña) had no minister. Nonetheless, compared to the late colonial period, the presence of the Catholic church was still very weak: fifty years earlier there had only been two parishes without regular or secular clergy.

The weakness of the Church was also reflected in marriage quotients which were considerable lower in the early republican period than in the years before independence. In the late colonial period, the marriage quotients had been around thirty per cent for all groups except the slaves, a 'normal' rate compared to

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<sup>556</sup> An excellent discussion of anticlericalism in early republican Colombia is provided by Bushnell, *El Régimen de Santander*, pp. 237 - 296

<sup>557</sup> Summaries of the 1778, 1825, 1835 and 1843 census are published in Miguel Urrutia and Mario Arrubla (eds.), *Compendio de estadísticas históricas de Colombia* (Bogotá, Universidad Nacional, 1970), tables 1 - 7 following page 19. The 1793 census of the province of Santa Marta is found in AGI, Indiferente general 1527. A summary of this census is published in McFarlane, *Colombia before Independence*, pp. 359 - 360

<sup>558</sup> In comparison, the province of Bogotá in 1825 had 499 ecclesiastics and total population of 188,695, which gives an average of 378 inhabitants for every ecclesiastic.

<sup>559</sup> 'República de Colombia. Obispado de Santa Marta. Cuadros que manifiestan el estado personal del Clero secular y Regular de la diócesis...' 31 Aug. 1836 in AGN, Curas y obispos 15, folio 724

contemporary marriage quotients elsewhere in Latin America and Europe in the late eighteenth century.<sup>560</sup> According to the 1843 census, however, the average marriage quotient for Santa Marta province was only 21.47, and in the largest cities such as Santa Marta and Valledupar only between ten and fifteen per cent of the population were married (table 13).<sup>561</sup>

Why did the marriage quotients drop so suddenly during the first decades of republican rule? There may have been a variety of causes, some of which are hard to assess due to the lack of general demographic statistics. There may have been proportionately more children in 1843 than in 1793, and thus a relatively smaller 'marriageable' population. This is impossible to verify because we do not have any late colonial censuses from Santa Marta province where the population is divided into age groups. Or the average age at marriage may have increased, leaving a larger percentage of the population unmarried at any given point in time. Unfortunately, this suggestion is also difficult to verify, since the age of brides and grooms were not recorded in the samarian marriage books. Although neither of these hypotheses may be ruled out, it seems that the low marriage quotients at least partially was caused by a general and popular lack of interest in the sacrament of marriage and a more liberal attitude towards religious institutions, while the reduced number of priests made it easier to evade the institution of marriage. In 1829 the parish priest of the town of Barrancas in the province of Riohacha complained to the bishop that 142 of his parishioners had failed both to confess and to receive communion in 1828, and despite the minister's repeated '...actions, warnings, explanations and exhortations..., [he] had lost the hope of bringing

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<sup>560</sup> See discussion above in Chapter 3, pp. 106 ff and Tables 1 and 13.

<sup>561</sup> Censo de la población de la provincia de Santa Marta, 1843 in AHGSM, Censos Caja 1

these rebel sheep to true understanding...'.<sup>562</sup> He also listed the names and doings of some of the worst transgressors. Juan Bacilio Zoto was, according to the parish priest, '... one of the atheists who disperse perverted doctrines here'; while Francisco Antonio Vidal was '... a disrespectful slave with a public concubine...'; Martín Solano was 'cousin of Juan Bacilio and follower of his maxims', María del Carmen Banegas had '...lived seven years in public concubinage, she had three daughters and it was impossible to correct her'; Ana Solano was 'a widow who lived here in concubinage with a married man from Riohacha, who had left his lawful wife two years earlier...'; José María Salas was simply '...a married man of the worst customs, bad Christian and lived an uncontrollable life...' ; Francisco Ramires had '...lived in public concubinage for eight years and had four children with the woman and the priest had not succeeded in correct him...'; Lorenzo Iguarán was married '...but he had abandoned his wife years before, and now he lived publicly with an infidel Indian of the Guajira, and he [was] so [spiritually] abandoned that when the priest saw him fatally wounded he still refused to confess...'.<sup>563</sup> At about the same time the parish priest of the former Indian tributary town Gaira reported to the bishop that in his parish only 25 individuals had fulfilled the annual precept of confession and communion, of whom 20 were women. The priest explained to the bishop that this were less than one thirtieth of those obliged to confess in the parish. He claimed that not only did the inhabitants look with indifference at 'the Sacred Religion of Jesus Christ, but, far from manifesting humiliation for this obligation... they utter burlesque

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<sup>562</sup> 'He practicado quantas diligencias, avisos, explicaciones y exortaciones están a mi alcance, y he perdido la esperanza de reducir al verdadero conocimiento tan rebeldes Ovejas...' in letter from Joseph Antonio Chrispin to bishop of Santa Marta, 29 May 1829 in AHESM, tomo 35, folios 118 - 119v.

<sup>563</sup> These and other examples are found in the letter from Chrispin to the bishop of Santa Marta, 29 May 1829 cited above.

expressions...'.<sup>564</sup> In Gaira the marriage quotient dropped from 44.81 per cent in 1793 to 16.19 in 1843 (tables 4 and 13), and while there were on average five marriages in the parish in the years between 1793 and 1819, between 1820 and 1850 there were only 3.2 marriages a year despite a doubling of the population between 1793 and 1843.<sup>565</sup> It might perhaps be argued that this was nothing new, in that examples of laxity and popular acceptance of informal consensual unions had abounded in the late colonial period. But if we compare these reports with for instance the 1776 ecclesiastical *visita* discussed in Chapter 3, the disregard for the institution of marriage and ecclesiastical control appears considerably more generalised after independence.

This change is related to another 'mutation' of social customs, which was perhaps even more fundamental for the make-up of early republican society. When people *did* marry in early republican Santa Marta and Riohacha they found partners from a much wider spectrum than previously. The former tributary town of Gaira provides a neat illustration of this phenomenon. During the late colonial period, practically all brides and grooms who married in the parish were natives and residents of Gaira and classified as Indians in the census and no one from Gaira married in the city of Santa Marta between 1772 and 1788.<sup>566</sup> After 1820, however, this situation began to change.<sup>567</sup> As will be recalled from Chapter 4, in

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<sup>564</sup> Letter from Miguel de la Rosa Carrillo to the bishop of Santa Marta, 24 Jun. 1829 in AHESM, tomo 35, folios 120 - 121v.

<sup>565</sup> Gaira had 309 inhabitants in 1793 and 571 in 1843. Marriages per year calculated from LG.

<sup>566</sup> Based on LG, LPMN and LMC and the 1804 census of males in Gaira in AGN, Censos de varios departamentos 6, folios 582 - 587. For a more detailed discussion of colonial marriage patterns in the tributary towns, see Chapter 4.

<sup>567</sup> Unfortunately, the geographic origin of brides and grooms were normally not recorded in the marriage records from Gaira between 1822 and 1850. Of the 192 grooms and brides who married in Gaira between 1820 and 1850, the geographic origin is only listed for four grooms and one bride. These grooms were from Santa Cruz (Province of Cartagena), the city of Riohacha, Mamatoco and Tubará, while the only bride listed was from Villanueva (in the Cesar valley). But this should not be taken to mean that the rest of the brides and grooms were



the tributary towns a few surnames prevailed in the late colonial period. In Gaira the most common surnames at the end of the colonial period were Manjarres, Eguí, de Silva, Incapié, Boto, Aritama, Mesa, Ruiz and Zambrano. In 1804, the 257 males of all ages in Gaira had only 25 different surnames. We may then compare the surnames of the 1804 male count with the surnames of those who married in Gaira between 1793 and 1820 on one hand, and those who married between 1820 and 1850 on the other. The difference is remarkable; while only 11 brides and 11 grooms (8.15 per cent) had 'new' surnames between 1793 and 1820, between 1820 and 1850 27 brides (28.13 per cent) and 25 grooms (26.04 per cent) had surnames found neither in 1804 census, nor in the late colonial marriage records (table 14). In other words, the marriage records from Gaira indicate first that the inhabitants did not bother to marry to the same extent as before independence, and secondly that when they did marry, they married outsiders to a much larger extent than previously. In sum, independence implied a relaxation of the bonds and constraints which had tied the former tributary towns together.

The weakening of the tributary heritage and the Indian rejection of a special status within the early republican regime also manifested itself when the inhabitants of the former tributary towns around Santa Marta refused to pay the so-called voluntary contribution Bolívar sought to introduce in 1827 to revitalise government finances. José Ignacio Díaz Granados, governor of Santa Marta, explained in a letter to the Secretary of the State in 1831, that the former tribute-

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from Gaira, and that the priest did not bother to record the origins of his own parishioners. All these outsiders were listed between 1837 and 1842, when different priests were serving in Gaira. No geographic origins were listed at all between 1821 and 1828 when Joaquín Avendaño was serving, or between August 1842 and 1850 when the priests Forero, Naberán, Gómez and Manjarres were serving. The absence of notes on geographic origin on brides and grooms is therefore more likely due to the omissions of the priests, than as an indication of localised marriage patterns.

paying Indians of the towns around Santa Marta refused to pay a special contribution, that they abhorred such a system and that they preferred to pay normal taxes as ordinary citizens of Colombia.<sup>568</sup>

Further evidence of this tendency is found in the marriage records of the two parishes of the city of Santa Marta. During the late colonial period, there had been few marriages between inhabitants of the city and other towns in the province; only 3.13 per cent of brides and grooms who married in the cathedral of Santa Marta between 1772 and 1788 were from towns and villages of the province of Santa Marta outside the city. After independence, however, 12.59 per cent of the brides and grooms were originally from the province of Santa Marta excluding the city itself.<sup>569</sup> Again, the marriage records suggest a loosening of boundaries which during the colonial period had separated the tributary Indians from the commoners in general.

The same type of change may be observed in the slave population, although the process occurred in a somewhat different manner. In Chapter 3 we saw that the slaves generally found it difficult to marry, but that a surprisingly high number of male slaves were able to marry free women. Beginning in the colonial period, the slaves were able to make their way into the group of free commoners. This process accelerated during the early republican period, particularly because the number of slaves decreased dramatically through emancipation. While there had been 4,127 slaves in the province of Santa Marta in 1793 (8.76 per cent of the population), in 1825 there were only 1,619 (3.64 per cent) left and the number

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<sup>568</sup> Letter from José Ignacio Díaz Granados to Secretario de Estado del despacho del Interior, 24 May 1831 in AGN, Indios (Magdalena), folios 788 - 788v.

<sup>569</sup> See table 16

continued to decline to 1,420 (3.02 per cent) in 1835, while there were 1,084 (2.43 per cent) in 1843 and 304 (0.83 per cent) in 1851, the year slavery was finally and completely abolished.<sup>570</sup> The most significant reduction in the number of slaves took place during the wars themselves, when slaves were freed through a variety of methods. Some, no doubt, were freed as a compensation for military services on both royalist and republican sides, but the exact number of slaves who gained their freedom in this manner is unknown.<sup>571</sup> Nor is it possible to establish with certainty to what extent slave-owners in Santa Marta sold their slaves to foreigners in this period, a tactic perhaps used to recover investments in a unstable period.<sup>572</sup> We do know that 100 slaves just in the city of Santa Marta paid for their own freedom between 1811 and 1820, and that 25 were manumitted by their owners without compensation.<sup>573</sup> There were essentially four ways for slaves to gain their freedom after independence; through escape, by buying their own freedom, by being voluntarily manumitted by their masters and through republican legal measures adopted by the Colombian government from 1821 and onwards. Of these, escape was the statistically least significant. When the jefe político of Santa Marta made a list in 1843 of all the escaped slaves in the entire province, there were only 59 names on the list, some of which had escaped more than twenty years earlier.<sup>574</sup> More significant was the so-called paid manumission, whereby slaves themselves, or their relatives and friends, bought their freedom. For the city of Santa Marta, Romero Jaramillo found 77 cases of paid manumission between 1821 and 1851. During the same period and also limited to the city of Santa

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<sup>570</sup> As explained above, the province of Santa Marta did not include the canton of Ocaña in 1843.

<sup>571</sup> See for instance Bushnell, *El régimen de Santander*, p. 206

<sup>572</sup> Romero Jaramillo, *Esclavitud en la provincia de Santa Marta*, p. 91 notes how merchants from Jamaica and Curazao and ship owners of various origins were particularly well-represented among the buyers of slaves in the city of Santa Marta between 1811 and 1820.

<sup>573</sup> Romero Jaramillo, *Esclavitud en la provincia de Santa Marta*, appendix 7.

<sup>574</sup> Romero Jaramillo, *Esclavitud en la provincia de Santa Marta*, appendix 11.

Marta, there were 38 'manumisiones graciosas'.<sup>575</sup> The fall in the number of slaves in the 1830s and 1840s was undoubtedly in part caused by the 1821 free womb law, which implied that all children born of slaves would be free at the age of eighteen. In 1843, there were 676 children and adolescents who were born free under this law.<sup>576</sup>

Once freed, the former slaves were incorporated into the commoners or lower classes of the province. There is no evidence of systematic spatial segregation of liberated slaves from the population at large. The few palenques which existed in the province of Santa Marta during the colonial period were apparently all abandoned when the wars broke out, and no new ones were formed in the early republican period as far as we can tell. Since the practice of giving a racial designation to witnesses and accused in criminal cases, in the parish records and in the censuses was ended after independence, it is nearly impossible to follow the experiences of the former slaves after their emancipation. The former slaves become -to us - indistinguishable from the lower classes in general. In the early years of republican rule, then, the new political system in Santa Marta had swept away the *sistema de castas*, replacing it with a new concept of the citizenry which, if it could not break down racial prejudices, simplified social division at least. Whether this would work to the advantage of the lower classes would, of course, only be seen as the republic developed over the course of nineteenth century.

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<sup>575</sup> Romero Jaramillo, *Esclavitud en la provincia de Santa Marta*, appendix 7.

<sup>576</sup> Romero Jaramillo, *Esclavitud en la provincia de Santa Marta*, p. 159

## Conclusion

Three broad issues have been discussed in this thesis: the social configuration of late colonial society in Santa Marta and Riohacha, the responses of different social and ethnic groups to the political crisis of the Spanish monarchy and the extent to which independence and the formation of the Colombian republic brought radical social changes.

In the first part, marriage patterns were used to explore the composition of different social and ethnic groups in Santa Marta and Riohacha provinces, and although they revealed a highly complex and fluid social fabric, certain important aspects of late colonial society need to be emphasised: there existed a small and inter-related network of noble families in the major cities which dominated social and political positions despite the formal control exercised by royal officials; a larger and more open group of white elites with a stronger peninsular connection but without the aristocratic pretensions of the nobles occupied a socially elevated position which was nonetheless less prominent than that of the former group; a thoroughly Hispanised group of commoners with a variety of geographical and ethnic backgrounds constituted the majority of the population; the slaves who attained freedom were constantly included into the group of commoners, whereas the Indian communities - tributary and unconquered alike - maintained a more pronounced cultural distance to the Hispanic groups. Thus, although late colonial society differed markedly from the bipolar, two-republic scheme of the early colonial period, it still retained important aspects of the *sistema de castas*.

In chapters 6 to 9 the reactions and responses of these groups to the political crisis of the Spanish monarchy were discussed. Initially, the local noble families cautiously sought to take political control of the provinces, but in this they failed, largely because of the opposition of royal officials, commoners and different Indian communities. Again, the patterns of political alignments were highly complex, fraught with ambiguities, and depended partly on the nature of previous conflicts in each locality, but, nevertheless, generally elites tended to support independence, while commoners defended the royalist cause.

In the last chapter, the implications of independence for the social configuration were explored, and it was argued that during the early republican period, the social make-up of samarian society changed, not because of migrations or specific demographic developments, but because society was conceptualised in a new manner. The minute, legal and traditional differences which had separated tributary Indians, free commoners and slaves were weakened, so that a new 'class' of commoners emerged, composed of all those who did not belong to the white elites. Similarly, the careful maintenance of 'nobility' which had been so important to the handful of aristocratic families in late colonial Santa Marta withered, and the early republican elites constituted a wider and more heterogeneous group than before. This should not be taken to mean that early republican society was necessarily more egalitarian or attuned to racial differences than the late colonial one. It merely implies that it was a different type of society, where the social stratification had become simpler. The elites continued to be considered white, wealthy, honourable and - above all - the rightful political leaders of the province, while the commoners came to be seen as coloured, poor, uneducated manual labourers.

This simplification of social divisions is reflected in the accounts of foreign visitors to early republican Santa Marta: on the whole, they failed to distinguish between coloureds, Blacks, slaves, Indians, and commoners more generally. Already in 1826 the British Consul Fauche wrote that '...the population of Santa Marta ...is of the worst description, poor indolent and chiefly negroes', while the French diplomatic agent, who visited Santa Marta in 1828 reported in a more careful vein that in Santa Marta '...the prominent are of white or creole race; the coloured have the lowliest occupations.'<sup>577</sup> The Brazilian diplomat Miguel María Lisboa commented twenty-five years later that the population of Santa Marta was '...of mixed races where the African predominates.'<sup>578</sup> As none of these foreigners stayed long in Santa Marta, it might be argued that their comments were based on inadequate local knowledge. A more acute (and positive) observer, such as the French traveller and radical Elisée Reclús who visited Santa Marta and the surrounding areas in 1855 was able to see more profound fissures and processes. Commenting on his visit to Bonda, the most remote of the former tributary towns, Reclús explained: 'Today the descendants of the old Taironas experience a state of transition. They have not yet entered the current of civilisation..., but neither do they live in their old fierce and savage liberty. They do not even speak the language of their fathers, and after the wars of independence, which turned them into soldiers and citizens, they lost their local

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<sup>577</sup> G. A. Fauche: 'Report showing the advantages which would result to Columbian and British commerce should this government sanction the opening of the port of Savanilla' in PRO, FO 18/37, f. 266 and Augusto LeMoyne, *Viaje y estancia en la Nueva Granada* (Bogotá, Edición Incunables, 1985), p. 19

<sup>578</sup> Miguel María Lisboa, *Relación de un viaje a Venezuela, Nueva Granada y Ecuador* (Bogotá, Fondo Cultural Cafetero, 1984), pp. 169 - 170

patriotism in order to adhere to the great Colombian nation. In this new patriotism is found the seed of their future regeneration..<sup>579</sup>

As Reclús noted, independence sparked a series of changes (or mutations as Guerra prefers) which resulted in a new type of society, essentially different from the one which had existed prior to 1810. When Antonio Nuñez, the 80-year old cacique of Mamatoco, led the tributary Indians in support of the royalists during the wars, it was perhaps an attempt to resist these changes and the creation of a republic ruled by local elites. He lost the battle, and with the formation of the republic of Colombia, Nuñez' fellow townsmen embarked on a new strategy: to become citizens and soldiers of the new republic and defend their rights as members of the new society created by the revolution.

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<sup>579</sup> Reclús, Elisée: *Viaje a la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta* (Barcelona, Laertes, 1990), p. 94




## Maps, tables and figures

Map 1. The Spanish Conquest




Map 2. Classification and distribution of documented native languages ca 1500




*Source: Terence Kaufman, 'The native languages of South America' in Christopher Moseley and R. E. Asher (eds.), Atlas of the World's Languages (New York, Routledge, 1994), pp. 46 - 58 and map 20*

Map 3. Cities founded in the 16<sup>th</sup> century




Source: Jorge Orlando Melo, *Historia de Colombia. La dominación española* (Bogotá, Presidencia de la República, 1986) p. 352.

Map 4. Encomiendas in the province of Santa Marta, 1627




Source: *Trinidad Miranda Vásquez, La Gobernación de Santa Marta (1570 - 1670) (Sevilla, Escuela de estudios hispano-americanos, 1976)*


Map 5. Towns and missions founded in 18<sup>th</sup> century



Map 6. Spanish cities and Indian tributary towns, 1793




Map 7. Geographic distribution of population, Santa Marta (1793) and Riohacha (1778) provinces




Source: 'Padrón general que manifiesta el numero de habitantes en esta provincia de Santa Marta con disitncion de clases, sexos y estados incluso parvulos. Santa Marta 1793' in AGI, Indiferente General, 1527 and 'Censo de la provincia de Riohacha' in AGN, Censos de varios departamentos 6, folio 360



Map 8. The city of Santa Marta and tributary towns, 1793



Map 9. Capuchin missions in the Guajira, 1754



Map 10. Republican fronts in 1819




Table 1. Summary of census and marriage quotients in the provinces of Santa Marta (1793) and Riohacha (1778)

Overall marriage quotients:

	'Blancos'		'Indios'		'Libres'		'Esclavos'	
	population	% married	population	% married	population	% married	population	% married
Prov. of Riohacha	333	32.43	633	45.66	2513	24.67	469	6.82
Prov. of Sta Marta	5183	30.56	8636	31.80	29050	28.15	4127	12.99

The cities and larger towns (with more than 1000 inhabitants):

	'Blancos'		'Indios'		'Libres'		'Esclavos'	
	population	% married	population	% married	population	% married	population	% married
Santa Marta	499	35.47	21	19.05	2490	25.66	591	12.18
Riohacha 1788	181	27.07	11	0	1463	23.17	410	3.66
Valledupar	828	33.33	0	-	2410	19.25	796	10.05
Ocaña	1712	24.65	60	33.33	2944	27.58	923	9.10
San Juan de Cesar	303	24.09	19	21.05	725	24.83	115	6.09
Valencia de Jesus	267	33.33	8	0	1412	24.01	242	11.98
Tenerife	60	43.33	59	35.59	1442	27.74	77	18.19
Chiriguana	60	41.67	0	-	2113	26.60	93	29.03
Guaymaro	27	59.26	8	0	1551	32.82	105	13.33
San Antonio	13	53.85	9	22.22	1317	31.28	61	3.28
Piñon	75	40.00	13	46.15	995	30.95	25	20.00
Total cities	4025	31.50	208	24.52	18862	28.04	3438	12.65

Indian towns in Santa Marta and Riohacha:

	'Blancos'		'Indios'		'Libres'		'Esclavos'	
	population	% married	population	% married	population	% married	population	% married
Buenavista y San Andres	0	-	359	31.48	95	34.74	0	-
La Loma y Borotare	32	31.25	552	31.88	231	28.57	30	13.33
El Molino	33	36.36	870	29.43	277	32.13	11	0.00
Atanquez	0	-	346	35.55	18	27.78	1	0.00
Sto Tomas de Villanueva	123	17.89	838	23.15	111	30.63	4	0.00
El Rosario y Manocasa	0	-	452	40.71	0	-	4	0.00
Sta Ana de los Tupes	70	28.57	136	33.82	288	20.14	23	0.00
El Espiritu Santo	0	-	144	43.06	4	0.00	0	-
Pernambuco	306	41.69	26	38.46	0	-	0	-
Tuerto	0	-	600	28.67	0	-	0	-
Sn Seb de Rabago	0	-	151	37.09	15	13.33	0	-
Ariguani	0	-	127	0.00	35	22.86	7	0.00
Moro	1	0.00	209	35.89	5	100.00	0	0.00
San Juan de la Cienaga	36	33.33	1236	31.55	212	19.81	1	0
San Jacinto de Gayra	0	-	299	44.81	8	50.00	1	0
Mamatoco y Taganga	0	-	389	31.36	0	-	0	-
Bonda y Mazinga	0	-	317	39.75	0	-	0	-
Santa Ana	25	52.00	551	32.49	83	36.14	0	-
Arroyo Cardon	0	-	132	49.24	1	0	0	-
Boronata	0	-	183	39.89	239	23.43	14	21.43
Camaronas	0	-	126	41.26	104	30.77	1	0
Cototama	0	-	174	55.17	2	0	0	-
<b>Total indian towns</b>	<b>626</b>	<b>34.60</b>	<b>8217</b>	<b>32.91</b>	<b>1728</b>	<b>26.85</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>7.22</b>

Spanish towns (with between 500 and 1000 inhabitants):

	Blancos		Indios		Libres		Esclavos	
	population	% married	population	% married	population	% married	population	% married
Sitio-Nuevo	28	64.29	12	83.33	657	37.90	12	83.33
Remolino	51	50.98	3	0.00	583	30.87	3	0.00
Simaná	7	28.57	0	-	546	29.30	0	-
El Banco	26	30.77	0	-	861	29.85	0	-
Guamal	18	11.11	0	-	822	29.20	0	-
San Jose de Barrancas	134	24.63	5	0.00	566	23.32	5	0.00
Fonseca	266	27.44	0	-	526	24.33	0	-
Vadillo	76	36.84	0	-	715	29.93	0	-
Agua-Chica	27	62.96	0	-	766	34.46	0	-
Tamalemeque	34	11.76	2	0.00	617	28.36	100	26.00
Moreno	17	35.29	0	-	691	28.94	34	20.59
<b>Totals</b>	<b>684</b>	<b>31.72</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>45.45</b>	<b>7350</b>	<b>29.92</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>27.92</b>

Spanish villages (with less than 500 inhabitants):

	'Blancos'		'Indios'		'Libres'		'Esclavos'	
	population	% married	population	% married	population	% married	population	% married
Plato	2	50.00	1	0.00	334	35.03	3	33.33
San Bernardo	0	-	0	-	263	31.94	26	30.77
Tamalemequito	14	35.71	0	-	201	36.32	12	16.67
El Paso	5	60.00	0	-	289	26.30	153	30.72
San Fernando	9	66.67	0	-	284	45.07	0	-
Veneno	0	-	18	11.11	79	43.04	1	0.00
Becerril	43	41.86	86	17.44	154	28.57	68	19.12
San Zenon	0	-	240	25.00	103	34.95	0	-
Pinto	42	45.24	178	33.15	267	35.21	3	66.67
Saloa	6	33.33	0	-	331	31.12	45	35.56
Pedraza*	9	22.22	0	-	275	22.55	12	8.33
Bahia-honda*	0	-	0	-	61	19.67	0	-
Sinamaica*	117	36.75	0	-	182	30.22	0	-
Sabana del Valle*	7	57.14	1	100.00	15	46.67	1	0
San Carlos	84	72.62	0	-	0	-	0	-
Punta Gorda	1	100.00	10	60.00	19	26.32	0	-
San Jacinto y Fem.	5	20.00	1	100.00	352	36.08	8	25.00
Jobo	111	13.51	0	-	305	14.43	30	5.26
Total	455	39.78	535	26.92	3514	31.33	362	25.85

Sources: 'Padron general que manifiesta el numero de personas habitantes en esta provincia de Sta Marta con distincion de clases, sexos y estados incluso parvulos.' in AGI, Indiferente General 1527; and AGN, Censos de varios departamentos, legajo 6, folio 360

Table 2. Origin of 'white' brides and grooms in Santa Marta 1772 - 1795

Origin of brides	N.D.	City of Santa Marta	Province of Santa Marta	Riohacha	Province of Cartagena	Maracaibo	Total of grooms
Origin of grooms							
N.D	8	3	1	0	0	0	12
City of Santa Marta	4	15	0	0	1	0	20
Province of Santa Marta	1	2	0	0	0	0	3
Province of Cartagena	1	4	0	0	0	0	5
Spain and Canary islands	4	32	2	2	2	1	43
France	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
<b>Total of brides</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>86</b>

Source: LBE

Table 3. Origin of 'common' brides and grooms in Santa Marta, 1772 - 1788

Origin of brides	N.D.	City of Santa Marta	Province of Santa Marta	Riohacha	Province of Cartagena	Total of grooms
Origin of grooms						
N.D	68	12	0	3	4	87
City of Santa Marta	19	84	3	3	4	113
Province of Santa Marta	0	2	0	0	0	2
Province of Riohacha	2	4	0	0	0	6
Province of Cartagena	6	13	2	0	5	26
Interior of New Granada	1	4	1	0	0	6
Rest of Spanish America	6	13	1	1	0	20
Non-Spanish Caribbean	0	1	0	0	0	1
Spain and Canary islands	13	14	2	1	1	31
France, Italy and Portugal	1	6	0	0	0	7
<b>Total of brides</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>299</b>

Source: LMPN

Table 4. Sins reported during the episcopal visit of Santa Marta 1776 - 1778

Parish visited	Demographics 1793		Sins reported 1776			
	Pop.	% married	Priests' failure of celibacy	Adultery	Informal unions	Illegal separations
City of Santa Marta	3627	24.77	0	0	0	0
San Antonio	1401	30.21	1	9	2	0
Guaymaro	1694	31.88	0	0	0	0
San José de Sitio Nuevo	701	40.48	0	0	0	0
Fonseca	954	25.38	0	0	0	0
Barrancas	877	23.24	0	0	1	0
Valledupar	3777	20.32	2	0	0	0
Pueblo Nuevo (Valencia)	1933	23.69	0	0	2	0
Sitio de Fernandez	367	35.69	1	1	0	0
Aguachica	812	35.44	0	2	0	3
Simaná	576	29.29	0	0	0	2
Sabanas de San Bernardo	290	31.83	0	4	5	1
Ocaña	5673	23.73	0	0	0	4
<b>Totals</b>	<b>24475</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>10</b>

Source: "Testimonio de los Sumarios en que constan las vidas y Costumbres de las personas de todos estados, y Clases de la Provincia de Santa Marta actuados en la Pastoral primera Vissitta del Obispo Dn Francisco Navarro" in AGI, Santa Fe 1193

Table 5. Household structure Boronata 1754 and 1777

Types	Boronata 1754				Boronata 1777			
	slaves/ agregados		Numbers	Per cent	slaves/ agregados		Numbers	Per cent
	with	without			with	without		
1. Solitaries								
a) Widowed						3	3	6.52
b) Single or unknown marital status					2	2	4	8.70
2. No family (not evidently related)			1	1	2	3	5	10.87
3. Simple family households								
a) Married couples alone	2	6	8	22.22		5	5	10.87
b) Married couples with child(ren)	3	18	21	58.33	6	8	14	30.43
c) Single mothers with child(ren)					3	7	10	21.74
d) Widowers with child(ren)								
e) Widows with child(ren)		2	2	5.56		5	5	10.87
4. Extended family households								
5. Multiple family households*	4		4	11.11				
<b>Total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>100.00</b>

\*The multiple family households in Boronata consisted of a nuclear family and at least one slave family.

Sources: 1754 Quaderno in AGI, Santa Fe 1185 and 1777 Census of Riobacha in AGN, Censos de varios departamentos 6

Table 6. Married persons by race and legitimacy of marriage. Boronata 1754

Race	legitimate marriages	illegitimate marriages	totals
unknown	2	0	2
blanco	0	1	1
indio	6	8	14
mestiso	0	8	8
mulato	3	14	17
negro	0	1	1
sambo	10	15	25
slaves*	13	3	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>84</b>

\*No racial categories were ascribed to the slaves in this census

Source: AGI, Santa Fe 1185

Table 7. Race of married men and women in Riohacha, 1777

Race of women Race of men	blanca	negra	parda	samba	ND	Total men
blanco	20	0	9	2	0	31
negro	0	5	3	4	2	14
parda	2	3	61	8	0	74
sambo	0	0	11	11	1	23
ND	0	1	3	3	4	11
<b>Total women</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>153</b>

Source: Census of Riohacha province in AGN, Censos de varios departamentos 6

Table 8. Married couples by race of males and females. Boronata 1754

females	india	mestisa	mulata	samba	total of males
males					
blanco	0	0	0	1	1
indio	1	0	0	0	1
negro	1	0	0	0	1
mestizo	1	1	0	0	2
mulato	3	4	1	8	16
sambo	7	1	0	3	11
<b>total of females</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>32</b>

Source: 1754 Quaderno in AGI, Santa Fe 1185

Table 9. Married couples in the city of Riohacha by legal status, 1777

Married women Married men	free	slave	nd	Total
free	138	4	0	142
slave	4	3	2	9
nd	1	1	0	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>153</b>

Source: Census of Riohacha province in AGN, Censos de varios departamentos 6

Table 10. Marriages in the city of Santa Marta by legal status, 1772 - 1788

Brides Grooms	free	slave	nd	Total
free	318	4	0	322
slave	14	17	0	31
nd	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>332</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>353</b>

Source: LBE and LMPN

Table 11. Marriages in the Capuchin missions among the Guajiros, 1754

Mission	'Pure' Indians	Non-Indian inhabitants	Legitimate marriages	'Consensual unions'	Men with several wives
Boronata	233	192	23	52	2
El Rincón	324	0	none	62	7
La Cruz	420	0	14	54	1
Orinos	306	0	none	62	2

Source: 1754 Quaderno in AGI, Santa Fe 1185

Table 12. Origins of brides and grooms, Santa Marta, 1772 - 1788 and 1828 - 1832

	Origin of grooms				Origin of brides			
	1772-1788		1828-1832		1772 - 1788		1828-1832	
	Numbers	Percent	Numbers	Percent	Numbers	Percent	Numbers	Percent
<i>City of Santa Marta</i>	125	49.21	28	40.58	189	83.63	39	59.09
<i>Province of Santa Marta</i>	4	1.57	5	7.25	11	4.87	12	18.18
<i>Province of Riohacha</i>	6	2.36	2	2.90	10	4.42	3	4.55
<i>Province of Cartagena</i>	29	11.42	9	13.04	15	6.64	8	12.12
<i>Interior of New Granada</i>	6	2.36	2	2.90	0	0.00	0	0.00
<i>Venezuela</i>	13	5.12	12	17.39	1	0.44	4	6.06
<i>Rest of Spanish America</i>	7	2.76	1	1.45	0	0.00	0	0.00
<i>Non-Spanish Caribbean</i>	1	0.39	3	4.35	0	0.00	0	0.00
<i>Spain and Canary Islands</i>	53	20.87	1	1.45	0	0.00	0	0.00
<i>Europe other than Spain</i>	10	3.94	5	7.25	0	0.00	0	0.00
<i>Africa</i>	0	0.00	1	1.45	0	0.00	0	0.00
<i>Totals</i>	254	100	69	100	226	100	66	100

Sources: For marriages 1772 through 1788; LMB and LMP. For 1828 through 1832; LMC and LSM

Table 13. Marriage quotients in the province of Santa Marta, 1843

<i>Cantons</i>	<i>Parishes</i>	<i>Free population</i>	<i>% married</i>	<i>Slaves</i>	<i>% married</i>
1. Santa Marta	Catedral	2829	11.35	206	3.88
	San Miguel	1361	12.12	15	6.67
	Mamatoco	473	17.97	7	14.29
	Bonda	326	29.75	0	-
	Masinga	70	28.57	0	-
	Taganga	187	25.67	0	-
	Gaira	556	16.19	15	13.33
	Sitio Nuevo	1892	24.00	40	5.00
	Remolino	1743	27.19	87	3.45
	Guaimaro	1330	25.79	9	0.00
	Salamina	246	46.34	1	0.00
	Valledupar	2238	13.18	163	6.13
	Atanques	371	23.99	0	-
	Badillo	1030	13.98	58	12.07
2. Valledupar	Valencia de Jesus	560	18.39	26	3.85
	San Seb. de Rabago	357	34.73	0	-
	Paz	582	15.81	17	11.76
	Tupes	389	22.62	6	0.00
	Palmira y Jovo	273	19.05	2	0.00
	Espíritu Santo	595	11.60	4	0.00
	Tenerife	1994	27.78	14	14.29
	Meredia	1264	28.01	3	0.00
	Pedraza	374	30.75	0	-
	Cerro	3006	25.08	26	7.69
	Piñon	1494	40.16	16	0.00
	Plato	1541	23.95	22	0.00
	Pinto	401	23.94	1	100.00
	Santa Ana	782	25.06	0	-
3. Tenerife	San Fernando	392	18.88	0	-
	San Zenon	492	28.05	0	-
	San Sebastian	592	22.80	1	0.00
	Venero	189	23.28	0	-
	Guamal	1234	23.34	0	-
	Tamalemiquito	355	19.44	0	-
	Banco	686	23.76	8	0.00
	Velen	137	14.60	0	-
	Chiriguana	2044	15.95	44	13.64
	Paso	678	15.34	83	4.82
	Jagua	384	20.31	71	14.08
	Becerril	357	13.73	7	0.00
	Saloa	201	15.42	0	-
	Chimichagua	596	17.62	4	25.00
4. Plato	Tamaleque	432	16.67	5	0.00
	Cienega	4072	16.92	64	7.81
	Pueblo Viejo	1141	20.33	0	-
	Media Luna	412	29.13	6	0.00
	Pivijai	1610	28.07	36	2.78
	Fundación	326	25.15	17	5.88
	<b>Total</b>	<b>44594</b>	<b>21.47</b>	<b>1084</b>	<b>6.46</b>

Source: Censo de la población de la provincia de Santa Marta, 1843 in AHGSM, Censos Caja 1




Table 14. 'New' surnames in Gaira census and marriage records, 1793 - 1850

<i>Surnames found in 1804 census</i>	<i>'New' surnames in marriage records 1793 - 1820</i>	<i>'New' Surnames in marriage records 1820 - 1850</i>	
Acosta	Aguilar	Alvarado	Martínez
Aritama	Benavides	Amada	Medina
Boto	Corán	Aponte	Mendis
Bovea	de la Vega	Aquilino	Mercano
Camacho	Durán	Blanquille	Mulga
Camargo	Gaviria	Branco	Munive
Castro	Gómez	Bravo	Nariño
Díaz	Granados	Bustos	Padilla
Doncel	Griego	Cajuelo	Perea
Egui	Gutierrez	Cantillo	Pinto
Fuentes	Isleño	Caudano	Resina
Garcia	Lavañinos	Colina	Rivas
González	Malmón	de la Hoz	Rivera
Incapié	Mana	de la Rosa	Rua
Isaguirre	Mendez	Figuera	Salazar
Julio	Moso	Freiles	Sara
Manjarrés	Punuana	Guerrero	Sotomayor
Mesa	Salas	Hernandez	Suarez
Ozuna	Sánchez	Iguarán	Torres
Rodríguez	Valle	Lafaurie	Ujuela
Ruiz	Vidal	Lavañeros	Ulloa
Silva	Ximenes	Linero	Varines
Vasquez		Lizcano	
Zacarias		Locarno	
Zambrano		Maldonado	

*Sources:: 'Censo de población de San Jacinto de Gaira' in AGN, Censos de varios departamentos 6, fols. 582 - 587 and LG.*

Figure 1. Ecclesiastical hierarchy of the diocese of Santa Marta in 1768



Sources: 'Yndice delas Yglesias, Prebendados, Parrocos, Vicarios, y demas beneficiados del Obispado de Santa Martha en Indias' and 'Descripción de los Pueblos de Indios recién convertidos...', both dated 7 December 1768 in AGI, Santa Fe 1189

**Figure 2. List of students from the province of Santa Marta at the Colegio Mayor de San Bartolomé, 1689 - 1806**

<i>Place of origin and name of student</i>	<i>Year genealogies presented</i>	<i>Genealogical information</i>
<i>Riohacha</i>		
José Jacinto Arias y Santaya López	1773	B. in Riohacha, son of Pedro Arias de Santaya y Domínguez (b. in Socorro and vecino of Riohacha) and Gabriela López Sierra. José Jacinto was the uncle of Josefa Arias y Santaya who married José María Martínez de Aparicio. (See Rosario 1009)
<i>Santa Marta</i>		
Lucas Esteban Nuñez Dávila Bodquín García	1741	B. in Santa Marta 28 Nov. 1726, son of Juan Esteban Nuñez Dávila (b. in Santa Marta) and Juana Salvadora Bodquín García (b. in Santa Marta and d. before 1741) (Bartolomé 952)
José Francisco Mozo de la Torre	1749	B. in Santa Marta, son of José Sebastian Mozo (from Cádiz) and María Antonia Mozo de la Torre (from Cartagena) (Bartolomé 1024 and Genealogías de Santa Fe, pp. 307ff)
Luis Francisco José de Robles Castañeda	1754	B. in Santa Marta en 1740, son of Joaquín José de Robles (escribano and notario) and María Josefa de Castañeda Miranda, vecina of Santa Marta. (Bartolomé 1076)
<i>Tenerife</i>		
José Martín de las Cuevas y Estrada Jiménez	1689	B. in Tenerife, son of Fracisco de las Cuevas y Estrada (encomendero) and María Jimenez de Escobar (descendant of 'conquistadores and pacificadores de la provincia de Santa Marta'). (Bartolomé 597)
Manuel Francisco de Alemán Vega	1728	B. in Tenerife, son of Alfonso de Alemán and Alfonsa de Vega Portocarrero (Bartolomé 814)
José Francisco Gutierrez de Urbinaa	1740	B. in Tenerife, son of Andrés Gutierrez and Juana Josefa de Urbina. (Bartolomé 938)
Juan Antonio Villegas Gutierrez	1764	B. in Tenerife, son of José Villegas and María Catalina Gutierrez. (Bartolomé 1215)
<i>Tamalameque</i>		
Domingo Orbegozo Machuca	1713	Son of Domingo Orbegozo and María Polonia Machuca (Bartolomé 713)
Juan Bautista Sáenz del Pontón Díaz	1728	Son of Juan Sáenz del Pontón and Margarita Díaz Pachuca (Bartolomé 813)
José Tiburio Pieschacón Cardona	1794	B. in Tamalameque 1782, son of Vicente Pieschacón Fernández (from Castilla la Vieja and vecino of Simaná) and Ana Teresa de la Concepción Cardona Ramirez (from Mompóx and vecina de Simaná). (Bartolomé 1788)
Pedro Bernardino Pieschacón Cardona	1794	B. in Tamalameque en 1779 and brother of the former. (Bartolomé 1789)
<i>Ocaña</i>		
Manuel de Mendiola y Herrera Becerra	1690	Son of Nicolás de Mendiola y Herrera (alcalde ordinario de Ocaña) and María Becerra y Murga vecina de Ocaña (Bartolomé 613)
Antonio Bermúdez Carvajal	1695	Son of Tomás Bermudez Lozano and Inés Carvajal, vecina of Ocaña. (Bartolomé 636)
Bruno Fernández de Castilla Peña	1755	B. in Ocaña, son of Andrés Fernández y Castilla (alcalde ordinario de Ocaña) and Isidora Peña, vecina de Ocaña. (Bartolomé 1095)
Miguel Sánchez Barriga y Osorio	1764	Baptised in Ocaña 1750, son of José Barriga (b. San Lucar de Barrameda 1721, came to New Granada and served as oficial real and juez de puertos in Ocaña) and Isabel Osorio (b. in Simití 1717, daughter of Ignacio de Osorio and Paula de Escura). Miguel was named 'abogado de la Real Audiencia' in 1777 and served as 'asesor del cabildo de Santa Fe'. Married Agustina Rosa Brito y Ricaurte in 1772 (Bartolomé 1195 and Genealogías de Santa Fe, pp. 95 - 96)
Antonio Esteban del Rincón Jácome	1782	B. in Ocaña el 1 de agosto 1768, y era son of Antonio José del Rincón Quintero (vecino de Ocaña and alcalde ordinario de la misma) and Josefa Jácome Morineli Rodríguez, vecina de Ocaña. (Bartolomé 1540)
Tomás Rafael Trillo y Gómez de Castro	1802	B. in Ocaña, son of Eusebio Ramón Trillo Castilla (bapt. in Ocaña 1755 and síndico procurador general) and Juana María Josefa Gómez de Castro del Rincón, bapt. in Ocaña 1755 and married there in 1775 (Bartolomé 1907)
Juan Bautista Manzano Quintero	1806	B. in Ocaña in 1779, son of José Manzano Quintero (from Ocaña) and Manuela Quintero Príncipe del Rincón (from Ocaña and married in 1771)
<i>Valledupar</i>		
Bernardo Martín Rabadán Rodríguez	1749	B. in Valledupar e son of José Antonio Rabadán (capitán) and Cecilia Rodríguez Baquero.

**Figure 3. List of students from the province of Santa Marta at the Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Señora del Rosario**

<i>Place of origin, name of student</i>	<i>Years attended (a.) or genealogies presented (g.)</i>	<i>Genealogical information</i>
<b>Riohacha</b>		
Francisco de Fuentes y Castellanos	1686 (a)	Son of Antonio Fuentes, alcalde de Riohacha, and Ana Francisca de Castellanos y Peñalosa, both from Riohacha
Antonio José de Torres y Díaz Granados	1798 (a)	B 1782, son of Apolinar de Torres and Maria Luisa Díaz Granados
Manuel María Martínez de Aparicio y Arias	1806 (a)	B 1792 in Riohacha, son of José María Martínez de Aparicio (Osuna) and Josefa María Arias de Santaya y López (from Riohacha). Brother of Jose María Martínez de Aparicio
<b>Santa Marta</b>		
Martín de Espinosa y Galarza,	1699 (a)	Born in Santa Marta, son of Ignacio de Espinosa, gob de Santa Marta, and Juana Galarza.
Manuel José Campuzano y Yanzi	1743 (g)	B. in Pueblo Nuevo de Santa Marta, son of Bernardo Campuzano (n of Pueblo Nuevo) and Gertrudis Policarpia de Yanzi (Pueblo Nuevo)
Lucas José Munive y Mozo	1759 (g)	B 1744, brother of José Simeón and Juan José.
José Simeón de Múñive y Mozo	1759 - 70 (a)	B. 1746, son of Salvador de Múñive y Vásquez (regidor and b in Santa Marta) and Rosa María Mozo de la Torre.
Juan José de Múñive y Mozo	1768 - 73 (a)	Brother of José Simeon and Lucas José Munive y Mozo
Sebastian Ramón Díaz Granados	1772 - 77 (a)	B. 1752, son of Pedro Norberto Díaz Granados y Nuñez and María Josefa Pérez Campo.
Juan Nepomuceno Nuñez Davila y Díaz Granados	1784 - 93 (a)	B. 1773, son of Juan Esteban Nuñez Dávila y Mozo (b. 1742 in Santa Marta) and María Cecilia Díaz Granados (b 1747 Santa Marta)
José Benito Luque Moreno y Gómez	1782 (g)	B. 1767, son of Pedro José deLuque Moreno y Urdaneta (b. in Taganga 1739) and Maria Gregoria de Gómez y Ibarra (b. 1738 in Santa Marta)
Miguel Díaz Granados y Nuñez	1784 - 88 (a)	Vice-rector 1794 - 1796
Ramón Zuñiga y Nuñez	1784 - 91 (a)	B 1769, son of Manuel Jose de Zuñiga (from Santa Marta) and Francisca Nuñez Dávila (from Santa Marta)
Nicolas Díaz Granados y Nuñez	1789 - 90 (a)	B. 1774, son of Pascual Díaz Granados y Pérez and Joaquina Nuñez Dávila y Mozo.. Brother of Pascual Vicente and Francisco Xavier.
Manuel Silvestre Díaz Granados y Díaz Granados	1791 - 92 (a)	B. 1778, son of José Francisco Díaz Granados and Maria Ana Díaz Granados
Rafael Díaz Granados y Castro	1794 - 99 (a)	Son of José Antonio Díaz Granados and Gabriela de Castro
Esteban Díaz Granados y Díaz Granados	1799 - ? (a)	B. 1780. Brother of Manuel Silvestre Díaz Granados
Pascual Díaz Granados y Nuñez	1799 (a)	B. 1783, brother of Nicolas and Francisco Xavier.
Francisco Xavier Díaz Granados y Nuñez	1800 (a)	B 1784, brother of Pascual and Nicolas Díaz Granados y Nuñez
Felipe Fernandez de la Madrid de Castro, colegial 1805	1805 (a)	Son of Pedro Fernandez de la Madrid (superintendente de la Casa de Moneda) and Gabriela Fernandez de Castro Pérez y Granados from santa Marta
José Luis Fernandez de la Madrid de Castro	1805 (a)	Died 1830. Brother of Felipe Fernandez de la Madrid de Castro
José María Martínez de Aparicio y Arias	1819 (a)	
<b>Ocaña</b>		
Salvador del Real y Soto Muñoz	1743 - (a)	B. 1722, son of Pedro Juan del Real y Soto (n. de Galicia, vec de Ocaña), oficial de la Real hacienda, alcalde ordinario, fiel ejecutor; and Gertrudis Muñoz Guerrero from Ocaña.
Joaquín Nicolás del Real y Soto Muñoz	1745 - (a)	Brother of Salvador del Real y Soto Muñoz.
Francisco Antonio Pacheco y Jácome	1749 - (a)	B. 1729, son of Juan Martín Pacheco (dif. procurador de Ocaña) and María Rosa Jácome Morineli
Francisco Maximo Rodríguez de León	1767 (g)	B. 1744, son of Juan Antonio Rodríguez Terán and Francisca de León Carreño, both from Ocaña
José Antonio Cortés y Rodríguez	1788 - 94 (a)	B. 1776, son of Martín Cortés y Rodríguez and Aniceta Rodríguez Terán y Leon
Francisco Aquilino Jácome Llaín	1796 - 99 (a)	B. 1780. Son of Simón Jácome Morineli and María del Rosario llaín y Sarabia
José Jácome Llaín,	1796 - 99 (a)	B 1782. brother of Francisco Aquilino Jácome Llaín
Martín Teodoro Cortes y Rodríguez	1799 (a)	B. 1780, brother of José Antonio Cortés y Rodríguez
Miguel de Ibañez y Arias	1806 (a)	B. 1792. Son of Miguel de Ibañez from Cartagena (oficial real in Ocaña) and Manuela de Arias y Rodríguez (b. 1772 in Ocaña)

Valledupar		
José de Jesús Díaz Granados y de la Guerra	1787 - 93 (a)	B. 1774, son of Pedro Norberto Díaz Granados y Pérez and María Luisa de la Guerra y Vega.
José Francisco de Cardona y Pumarejo	1793 - 97 (a)	B. 1783, Son of Francisco Antonio José Cardona y Sierra (from Laredo in Santander Spain), alcalde ordinario de Valledupar married to Maria Josefa de Pumarejo y Mújica from Valledupar.
Manuel Esteban de la Sierra y Maestre	1801 (a)	B. 1784, son of Agustín de la Sierra, coronel de milicias, capitán de conquista, regidor de Valencia de Jesús and Marcelina Maestre del Campo (from Valledupar). She was the daughter of José Francisco Maestre, alcalde and oficial real of Valledupar, and María Francisca del Campo.
San Juan de Cesar		
Pedro José Pinto Cotrin y Gonzalez	1789 - 91 (a)	B. 1774, son of Andres Pinto Cotrin y Herrera (b. 1740 in Valledupar) and Maria Concepcion González de Acuña y Rodríguez(b. 1753 in San Juan de Cesar).

*Source: Rosario*

The chart illustrates the lineage of the Granados family, starting from the top left and branching out to the right and bottom. Key figures include Gabriel Diaz Granados (b. 1655 Spain), Pedro Juan de Mendoza, Juan de Mendoza, and Francisco Castellanos y Bartonuevo. The chart shows marriages and offspring, with names and birth dates/locations provided for many individuals. The lineage continues through several generations, ending with Petronila de Salamanca at the bottom right.

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graph TD
    G1[Gabriel Diaz Granados  
b. 1655 Spain] --- G2[1687 Santa Marta]
    G2 --- G3[Maria Josefa de Mndoza y Castellanos  
b. ca 1670 Riohacha]
    G3 --- G4[Diego Antonio Nuñez Velasquez  
b 1654 Santa Marta]
    G4 --- G5[Francisca Vasquez de Estrada  
b. 1655 Santa Marta]
    G5 --- G6[Cipriano del Campo  
b. Antioquia]
    G6 --- G7[1679 Santa Marta]
    G7 --- G8[Petronila Gutierrez de Vega  
b. 1660 Santa Marta]
    G8 --- G9[Francisca Taboada y Salamanca]
    G9 --- G10[Petronila de Salamanca]

    P1[Pedro Juan de Mendoza] --- P2[Maria Castellanos y Osma]
    P2 --- P3[Maria Castellanos y Peñalosa]
    P3 --- P4[Diego Nuñez de Velazquez]
    P4 --- P5[Isabel Gómez de Alarcón]
    P5 --- P6[Micaela Gómez de Alarcón]
    P6 --- P7[Andrés Vasquez de Estrada  
b. Spain]
    P7 --- P8[Pedro del Campo Redondo  
b. Spain]
    P8 --- P9[Barabara Durán de Rivera  
b. Antioquia]
    P9 --- P10[Lorenzo Gutierrez de Vega]
    P10 --- P11[Francisca Taboada y Salamanca]

    J1[Juan de Mendoza] --- J2[Maria Castellano y Osma]
    J2 --- J3[Francisco Castellanos]
    J3 --- J4[Marcela de Mendoza]
    J4 --- J5[Diego Nuñez Velasquez]
    J5 --- J6[Maria de Quero]
    J6 --- J7[Manuel Gómez]
    J7 --- J8[Luisa de Alarcón  
b. Canary Islands]
    J8 --- J9[Juan Gutierrez de Vega]
    J9 --- J10[Maria de Vega]
    J10 --- J11[Francisco Taboada]
    J11 --- J12[Petronila de Salamanca]

    F1[Francisco Castellanos y Bartonuevo] --- F2[Elena Peñalosa]
    F2 --- F3[Diego Antonio Nuñez Velasquez]
    F3 --- F4[Diego Nuñez de Velazquez]
    F4 --- F5[Isabel Gómez de Alarcón]
    F5 --- F6[Micaela Gómez de Alarcón]
    F6 --- F7[Andrés Vasquez de Estrada  
b. Spain]
    F7 --- F8[Pedro del Campo Redondo  
b. Spain]
    F8 --- F9[Barabara Durán de Rivera  
b. Antioquia]
    F9 --- F10[Lorenzo Gutierrez de Vega]
    F10 --- F11[Francisca Taboada y Salamanca]

    M1[Miguel de Castellanos] --- M2[Juana de Rivas]
    M2 --- M3[Elena Peñalosa]
    M3 --- M4[Diego Antonio Nuñez Velasquez]
    M4 --- M5[Diego Nuñez de Velazquez]
    M5 --- M6[Isabel Gómez de Alarcón]
    M6 --- M7[Micaela Gómez de Alarcón]
    M7 --- M8[Andrés Vasquez de Estrada  
b. Spain]
    M8 --- M9[Pedro del Campo Redondo  
b. Spain]
    M9 --- M10[Barabara Durán de Rivera  
b. Antioquia]
    M10 --- M11[Lorenzo Gutierrez de Vega]
    M11 --- M12[Francisca Taboada y Salamanca]

    J13[Jose Antonio Diaz Granados  
b. 1688 Santa Marta] --- J14[1707 Santa Marta]
    J14 --- J15[Cecilia Nuñez Velasquez  
b. 1690 Santa Marta]
    J15 --- J16[Diego Antonio Nuñez Velasquez]
    J16 --- J17[Francisca Vasquez de Estrada  
b. 1655 Santa Marta]
    J17 --- J18[Cipriano del Campo  
b. Antioquia]
    J18 --- J19[1679 Santa Marta]
    J19 --- J20[Petronila Gutierrez de Vega  
b. 1660 Santa Marta]
    J20 --- J21[Francisca Taboada y Salamanca]
    J21 --- J22[Petronila de Salamanca]

    P12[Pedro Norberto Diaz Granados  
b. 1711 Santa Marta] --- P13[1733 Santa Marta]
    P13 --- P14[Maria Josefa Pérez Ruiz Calderón  
b. 1715 Santa Marta]
    P14 --- P15[Domingo Pérez Ruiz Calderón  
b. 1656 Spain]
    P15 --- P16[1707 Santa Marta]
    P16 --- P17[Maria Josefa del Campo  
b. 1686 Montpex]
    P17 --- P18[Francisca Taboada y Salamanca]
    P18 --- P19[Petronila de Salamanca]

    P20[Pascual Diaz Granados  
b. 1749 Santa Marta] --- P21[1733 Santa Marta]
    P21 --- P22[Maria Josefa Pérez Ruiz Calderón  
b. 1715 Santa Marta]
    P22 --- P23[Domingo Pérez Ruiz Calderón  
b. 1656 Spain]
    P23 --- P24[1707 Santa Marta]
    P24 --- P25[Maria Josefa del Campo  
b. 1686 Montpex]
    P25 --- P26[Francisca Taboada y Salamanca]
    P26 --- P27[Petronila de Salamanca]
  
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Figure 5. Higher ranking royal officials and marriages, 1770 – 1810

<i>Period</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Place and year of birth</i>	<i>Wife and year of marriage</i>	<i>Wife's birth</i>
<b>Governors of Santa Marta</b>				
1768 - 76	Nicolas Díaz de Perea	Spain	Margarita Santana <sup>1</sup> , before 1763	Spain <sup>2</sup>
1776 - 85	Antonio Narváez y de la Torre	1733 Cartagena	M. Isidora Fern. de Castro, 1786 <sup>3</sup>	Santa Marta
1786 - 92	José de Astigarraga	Spain	?	
1792 - 04	Antonio Samper y Gonzales	Navarra (Spain)	Benita Bravo y Pérez, 1801 <sup>4</sup>	Santa Marta
1804 - 10	Victor Salcedo y Somodevilla	Spain	Rita de Soria, before 1804 <sup>5</sup>	Spain
<b>Governors of Riohacha ( from 1790)</b>				
1790 - 08	Josef María Medina Galindo	Extramadura	Ana M Urrutia y Prado, before 1790	Cuba
1808 - 09	Juan de Sámano	?	?	?
<b>Luitenant governors of Santa Marta</b>				
1780 - 91	José Simeón Munive y Mozo	1746 Santa Marta	M Manuela Mozo de la Torre, before 1772 <sup>6</sup>	Santa Marta
1792 -	Manuel Campusano	1730 Valencia de Jesús	Maria Josepha de la Rocha <sup>7</sup>	Santa Fe
1802 -	José María de Aviles	Granada (Spain)	M Victoria Panage de la Ruse, 1804 <sup>8</sup>	b. 1790 Saint-Domingue
1807 -	Antonio Viana	1769 Honda	?	
<b>Contadores of Santa Marta</b>				
1765-89	Santiago López de Castilla	Extremadura (Spain)	1 <sup>st</sup> wife: María Josefa Salas y Mesa 2 <sup>nd</sup> wife: Antonia del Real, 1778 <sup>9</sup>	?
1790 -	Matheo Trespalacios	b. ca 1752 <sup>10</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup> wife: ? 2 <sup>nd</sup> wife: Francisca Bustamente y Layseca, 1793 <sup>11</sup>	Ocaña Santa Fe
	Manuel de Cartas y Tejerina <sup>12</sup>	?	?	?
1798 -12	Juan José de Ujueta	b. 1756 Spain	María Mercedes Bisais y Navarro, Cartagena 1782	Cartagena de Indias
<b>Tesoreros of Santa Mara</b>				
1770 -72	Nicolás García	Castilla la Vieja (Spain)	M Teresa Mozo, Santa Marta 1772 <sup>13</sup>	Santa Marta
1772 -86	Basilio García	?	M Josefa de Jesús Munive y Mozo	Santa Marta
1787 -95	Manuel Truxillo <sup>14</sup>	Villa de Priego (Spain)	Manuela Josepha de Zuñiga, 1792 <sup>15</sup>	Santa Marta
1798 -19	Pedro Rodríguez <sup>16</sup>	?	? García	?
<b>Oficiales reales y jueces de puertos de Ocaña</b>				
1754-65	José Mateo Sánchez Barriga	b.1721 S Lc. Barr (Sp)	Isabel Osorio, before 1750 <sup>17</sup>	Simití (Cart.)
1766 -82 <sup>18</sup>	Joseph de Llaín y Saravia	b. ca 1727 Burgos <sup>19</sup>	Ana Josefa del Rincón <sup>20</sup>	Ocaña
1786 -12	Miguel de Ibañez	b. 1761 Cartagena <sup>21</sup>	Man Jacoba Arias Pereira Rodríguez	Ocaña

<sup>1</sup> 'Expediente sobre la pensión concedida ...a Da Margarita Santana, viuda de Nicolás Díaz de Perea, gobernador que fue de Santa Marta' in AGI, Santa Fe 1234

<sup>2</sup> AGI, Santa Fe 1234, Carte de Nicolas Diaz de Perea a Julian de Arriaga, 8 Sept. 1763

<sup>3</sup> LBE, 24 Mar 1786

<sup>4</sup> Copy of the marriage certificate is found in 'La parte de Benita Bravo, vecina de Santa Marta, solicita se declare por legitima heredera a su hija tenida durante el matrimonio con D. Antonio Samper' in AGN, Solicitudes 13, folios 133 - 185. Samper and Bravo were divorced in 1810.

<sup>5</sup> AHGSM, Protocolos 1813 -15, 'Testamento de José Victor de Salcedo', 13 May 1815

<sup>6</sup> The daughter of José Simeón and María Manuela Mozo de la Torre, María Antonia Munive y Mozo married Juan Manuel Martínez in Santa Marta. See LBE, 7 June 1791.

<sup>7</sup> AGN, Policía leg. 2, folios 370 - 383

<sup>8</sup> AGN, Genealogías leg. 3, folios 449 - 478

<sup>9</sup> LBE, 11 Jan 1778

<sup>10</sup> Rosario 923

<sup>11</sup> AGI, Estado 57, exp. 6

<sup>12</sup> He was imprisoned, probably for involvement in smuggling. One of his slaves asked for permission to marry while Cartas was still in prison. See 'José de la Cruz, esclavo de Manuel Cartas, contador que fue de las Reales Cajas de Santa Marta, solicita permiso para casarse' in AGN. Negros y esclavos 1, folios 997 - 1003.

<sup>13</sup> LBE, 1 May 1772

<sup>14</sup> He fled Santa Marta sometime between 1795 and 1798 due to several errors in the accounts of the Royal Exchequer. See 'Pedro Gabriel Diaz Granados contra la testamentaria de Pascual Diaz Granados', 1802 - 1806 in AGN, Testamentarias del Magdalena 2, folios 610 - 728

<sup>15</sup> LBE, 9 Oct. 1792

<sup>16</sup> When Pedro Rodríguez died in 1819, his son José Francisco Rodríguez y García, asked to inherit his father's position. See AGN, Solicitudes 14, folios 650 - 657

<sup>17</sup> Bartolomé 1620 and 1621


<sup>18</sup> The reports of Llaín Saravia on the cajas of Ocaña are found in AGI, Santa Fe 1219 - 1221

<sup>19</sup> Witness in the bigamy case against Angel Antonio Bustamente, in AHN, Inquisición, 1623 (caja 1), expediente 6

<sup>20</sup> Rosario 905

<sup>21</sup> Bartolomé 1454 and Genealogías de Santa Fe, pp. 95 - 96

Figure 6. Genealogy of the parts in the case of Barlisa vs Lafit



Source: AGN, Juicios criminales, tomo 74, folios 901 - 962



Figure 7. Elected members of the Junta Suprema Provincial de Santa Marta 1810

<i>Name</i>	<i>Place of birth</i>	<i>Year of birth</i>	<i>Arrived in Santa Marta</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Family relations with other members</i>
Victor de Salcedo y Somodevilla	Spain	unknown	1805	201	Governor, presidente	None
José Francisco Munive y Mozo	Santa Marta	ca 1761	native	106	Coronel, vice-presidente	Brother-in-law of Basilio García, uncle of Manuel Dávila's wife, father-in-law of Francisco Xavier Diaz Granados
Antonio Viana	Honda (New Granada)	1769	1805?	105	Teniente de gobernador, vocal nato of Junta arcedeano	None
Pedro Gabriel Diaz Granados	Santa Marta	1742	native	190		Uncle of Esteban, Venancio, José Ignacio and Francisco Xavier Diaz Granados
Placido Hernandez Dominguez	Placencia (Spain)	1792	1808-09	196	provisor vicario capitular,	None
Rafael de Zuñiga	Santa Marta	unknown	native	198	teniente coronel de milicias	Nephew of Ramón de Zuñiga
Pedro Rodríguez	unknown	unknown	1798	153	tesorero oficial	?
José María Martínez de Aparicio	Sevilla (Spain)	1762	1792	200	admin. principal de aguardientes	Father of Miguel María Martínez de Aparicio
José Rafael Sánchez y Galvez	Campeche (Mexico)	unknown	?	133	contador de aguardientes	?
Basilio Garcia	unknown	unknown	1771	116	oficial real jubilado	Brother-in-law of José Francisco Munive y Mozo and father-in-law of Manuel Dávila
Esteban Diaz Granados	Santa Marta	1780	native	164		Newpew of Pedro Gabriel Diaz Granados, cousin of Venancio, José Ignacio and Francisco Xavier Diaz Granados
Ramón de Zuñiga	Santa Marta	1769	native	172		Uncle of Rafael de Zuñiga
Venancio Diaz Granados	Santa Marta	1783	native	193		Nephew of Pedro Gabriel Diaz Granados and cousin of Esteban, José Ignacio and Francisco Xavier Diaz Granados
Miguel María Martínez de Aparicio	Riohacha	ca 1786	1792	140		Son of José María Martínez de Aparicio
José Ignacio Diaz Granados	Santa Marta	1782	native	181	subteniente de milicias	Nephew of Pedro Gabriel Diaz Granados and cousin of Esteban, Venancio and Francisco Xavier Diaz Granados
Francisco Xavier Diaz Granados	Santa Marta	1784	native	143	subteniente de milicias	Newpew of Pedro Gabriel Diaz Granados, brother of Venancio Diaz Granados, son-in-law of José Francisco Munive y Mozo and cousin of Esteban Diaz Granados and José Ignacio Diaz Granados.
Manuel María Dávila	Cartagena	unknown	before 1804	112		Son-in-law of Basilio García and married to a niece of José Francisco Munive y Mozo

*Source: 'Lista de los sujetos que en 10 de agosto de 1810 fueron electos por votación del pueblo ...' in AGI, Santa Fe 746, LBE, Rosario and Bartolomé.*

Figure 8. Governors and officials in early republican Santa Marta and Riohacha

<i>Date appointed</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Biographic information</i>
<b>Governors of Santa Marta</b>		
6. Dec 1821	José María Ortega	Coronel graduado
?	Luis Francisco de Rieux	He served as interim governor of Santa Marta, and resigned for having been elected to the senate
3 Jan 1823	Pedro Antonio García	
8 Jul 1823	José Sardá	B. in Navarra (Spain), a veteran of the Peninsular War in Spain, he was taken prisoner by the French Army and subsequently fought for Napoleón until 1815 when he was recruited to fight for the liberation of Mexico. On his way there, in 1816 he met Bolívar in Haiti and fought under Montilla in Venezuela until the end of the war. Coronel
13 Sep 1826	Luis José Fernández	
30 Dec 1826	José Sardá	See above
21 Jun 1827	Francisco Fernández de Madrid	B. 1792 Santa Fe, son of Pedro Fernández de Madrid and Gabriela Fernández de Castro, fought in the liberation army.. Primer comandante
17 Apr 1831	José Ignacio Díaz Granados	B. ca 1782 in Santa Marta, son of Pedro norberto Díaz Granados and María Luisa de la Guerra y Vega.
<b>Governors of Riohacha</b>		
6 Dec 1821	José Sardá	See above
8 Jul 1823	Juan José Patria	teniente coronel
26 Mar 1825	Francisco Carmona	coronel
20 Aug 1825	Francisco Fernández de Madrid	See above
21 Feb 1827	Camilo Mendoza	
27 Oct 1827	José María Castaño	
17 Apr 1831	José María Cataño	
<b>Teniente asesor del gobierno de Santa Marta</b>		
9 Dec 1821	Esteban Díaz Granados	B. 1780 in Santa Marta, son of José Francisco Díaz Granados and Mariana Díaz Granados, studied at the Rosario and married to María Concepción Fernández de Castro.
15 Jan 1822	Fortunato Gamba y Valencia	B. 1788 in Cartago (New Granada), son of Nicolás Santiago de Gamba López y Ureña and María Catalina de la Merced Valencia Beltrán de la Torre. Studied law at San Bartolomé, served as 'abogado de los tribunales de la república' in 1820.
10 Nov 1823	Juan Arosemena	B. 1784 in Panama, son of Pablo José Arosemena y Lombardo and Rosalia Lasso de la Vega y Lombardo. Studied at El Rosario from 1805. When appointed to Santa Marta he was teniente asesor in Veraguas, his home town.
11 Jun 1824	Esteban Díaz Granados	See above.
<b>Other official posts</b>		
18 May 1822	Antonio Torres	<i>Secretario del gobierno de Santa Marta.</i> Son of Apolinar de Torres and married to María Luisa Díaz Granados
11 Mar 1822	José María Cataño	<i>Secretario del gobierno de Riohacha</i>
18 May 1822	Ramón Bermúdez	<i>Oficial 1. del gobierno de Santa Marta</i>
18 May 1822	Manuel Antonio Cayón	<i>Oficial 2. del gobierno de Santa Marta</i>
1 Jun 1822	Ildefonso de Llanos	<i>Escribiente/ amanuense del gobierno de Santa Marta</i>
17 Nov 1823	Tomás Pereira	<i>Oficial 1 de Santa Marta</i>
17 Nov 1823	Fermín García	<i>Oficial 2 de Santa Marta</i>
7 Apr 1823	Manuel Rodríguez y Abello	<i>Amanuense de la secretaría del gobierno de Santa Marta</i>
11 Jun 1824	José María Cataño Bernal	<i>Oficial 1 de Riohacha</i>
17 Dec 1825	Rafael Salazar	<i>Escribiente de la secretaría del gobierno de Santa Marta</i>
7 Mar 1826	José Antonio Esquiaqui Llovet	<i>Juez letrado de hacienda de Riohacha</i> B. in Spain, vecino of Santa Fe, son of Domingo Esquiaqui (teniente coronel, vecino of Cartagena) and María Francisca Llovet (b. in Spain)
28 Jul 1828	Luis Bermúdez	<i>Oficial 1 de Santa Marta</i>
28 Jul 1828	Miguel Antonio Zuñiga	<i>Oficial 2 de Santa Marta</i>
1 Jun 1829	José de Jesús Mendoza	<i>Alguacil mayor de Santa Marta</i>
5 Jan 1830	Miguel García	<i>Juez político y jefe de policía de Santa Marta</i>

Sources: José María de Mier, *Gran Colombia 7 vols (Bogotá, Presidencia de la República, 1983)*; Bartolomé, Rosario; Soledad Acosta de Samper, *Epoca de la Independencia. El General José Sardá (Bogotá, Imprenta Moderna 1909)*;

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SR 55 Negocios judiciales: legajo 3  
SR 57 Manumisión: legajo 1  
SR 85 Secretaría de guerra y marina: tomo 412  
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SAA 32 Solicitudes: legajos 2 - 8 and 11 - 14  
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